







‘The philosophical traditions of Greece and India are divergent but also 
show striking convergences. This book is an important and valuable 
contribution to the comparative study of the two ancient cultures. The 
various chapters are learned and sophisticated and considerably enrich 
our understanding of Greek and Indian philosophy.’
Phiroze Vasunia, University College London
How can we explain the remarkable similarities between 
early Indian and early Greek philosophy?
Around the middle of the first millennium bce there occurred a 
revolution in thought, with novel ideas such as that understanding the 
inner self is both vital for human well-being and central to understanding 
the universe. This intellectual transformation is sometimes called the 
beginning of philosophy. The revolution occurred in both India and 
Greece, but not in the vast Persian Empire that divided them. How was 
this possible? This is a puzzle that has never been solved. 
This volume brings together Hellenists and Indologists representing 
a variety of perspectives on the similarities and differences between 
the two cultures, and on how to explain them. It offers a collaborative 
contribution to the burgeoning interest in the Axial Age, and is of 
interest to those intrigued by the big questions inspired by the 
ancient world.
Richard Seaford is Emeritus Professor of Ancient Greek at the 
University of Exeter.
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The astonishing similarities between early Indian and early Greek thought have 
long attracted great interest, but seldom the collaboration that is required for 
a real advance in explaining them. This volume contains most of the papers 
delivered at a conference at the University of Exeter in July 2014, as part of 
the project ‘Ātman and Psychē: Cosmology and the Self in Ancient India and 
Ancient Greece’. The conference, and the project as a whole, were funded by 
the Arts and Humanities Research Council, to which we are most grateful. The 
conference consisted of days of lively discussion between Indologists, Hellenists 
and others: interdisciplinary discovery at its best. Another outcome of the project 
will be a monograph by myself.
I would like to thank Richard Fynes for his help with Sanskrit, and Edinburgh 
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BSB Śaṅkara, Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya, in E. Deutsch and R. Dalvi (eds), 




DK H. Diels and W. Kranz (eds) Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 6th edn, 
Berlin, 1951.
DL Diogenes, Live of the Philosophers


















How are early Greek and early Indian thought similar? And how do we explain 
the similarities? These questions can contribute to the current debate about the 
so-called Axial Age, in which – it is claimed – various civilisations were in the 
first millenium bce transformed, intellectually and ethically, in ways by which 
we are still defined.
There is general agreement neither on the dating of the Axial Age nor on 
which civilisations count as manifestations of it. The focus of this volume is 
mainly (but not exclusively) on the period from about 800 bce to Alexander’s 
crossing of the Indus in 326 bce. In this period we can say that philosophy is 
to be found in both Greece and India, provided that ‘philosophy’ is defined not 
by rationality, which is in a sense ubiquitous, but rather by understanding the 
universe as a systematic whole that lacks any fundamental role for the personal 
agency of deity. Of course in neither culture was this a majority view. It is cer-
tainly not the only possible definition of philosophy, and we might even prefer 
to call it proto-scientific rather than philosophical. But it defines a phenomenon 
of considerable intellectual and historical significance, and distinguishes Greece 
and India (and China) from the other societies that are often regarded as mani-
festing the Axial transformation: Israel and Iran.
The belief just described as defining ‘philosophy’ is one of many shared by 
Greece and India in this period. Allen finds a basic pentadic structure in various 
contexts in both Greek and Indian texts. The development of abstraction, as a 
prerequisite for philosophy, is traced as early as the Ṛgveda by Jurewicz in the 
instance of ṛtá – ‘cosmos, order, truth’ – a concept that is then compared with 
Greek harmonia by Chaturvedi. Other shared ‘philosophical’ beliefs are monism 
(the belief that everything is in fact a single entity, for which see Seaford, 
Robbiano, Obryk), and the idea that understanding the (sometimes explicitly 
incorporeal) inner self or soul (psuchē, ātman) is central to understanding the 
universe and vital for human well-being.
2 Introduction
This last theme runs through most of the chapters. Linguistic aspects of the 
development of ātman are discussed by Bailey. The close relation, in both cul-
tures, between the inner self and the totality of existence (Höchsmann) is a basis 
for the practices that in both cultures seek transcendent wisdom, immortality, or 
liberation from the cycle of births and deaths (Bussanich, Visigalli). Even the 
well-known distinction of motivations for contemplating the universe (salvation 
in India, wonder in Greece) is partially dissolved by Pinchard. An even closer 
relationship of subject (knowing) with Being produces for both Parmenides and 
(much later) Śaṅkara a monism that has positive psychological and ethical impli-
cations (Robbiano). Psychological and ethical implications are at the heart of 
the elaborate image of the inner self as a chariot, which famously occurs in both 
cultures (Magnone, Schlieter, Forte and Smith, Höchsmann). The development 
of the inner self is in both cultures affected by the interiorisation of the cosmic 
rite of passage (Seaford). Another such belief (about the inner self) exclusive in 
this period to Greece and India is ethicised reincarnation, the sources of which 
are discussed by Burley.
Most of this (the main exceptions are Ṛgveda and Śaṅkara) falls within the 
period from about 800 to 326 bce. A longer perspective is adopted by Obryk, 
who applies to both cultures the threefold typology of religions that consists 
of affirmation, rejection and accommodation of the world. The Greek views 
of Indian justice discussed by Stoneman were produced both before and after 
Alexander crossed the Indus. And we conclude with a sample of reception: Syea 
explores Nietzsche’s positive evaluation of both Greece and India as embodying 
alternatives to Christianity.
How are the similarities in thought to be explained? There are three possibilities: 
(a) a shared Indo-European origin, (b) influence (in one direction or the other, 
or by diffusion from a third source), and (c) parallel autonomous development. 
These three kinds of explanation, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive, 
all appear in this volume. (a) is more likely for basic structures of narrative and 
thought (Allen) than for philosophy as defined above, which does not appear in 
the earliest texts (Ṛgveda, Homer), whereas (b) is more likely (and sometimes 
certain) after than before Alexander crossed the Indus. Espousal of (b) or (c) 
prompts the question – no more than touched on in this volume – of the condi-
tions that allow or promote their occurrence. A good case to think with is the 
famous image of the inner self as a chariot: Magnone inclines to assign it to (b), 
but Schlieter inclines to assign it to (c), which is favoured more confidently by 
Forte and Smith.
This volume takes its place in a long history from antiquity onwards – 
vividly presented by Halbfass (1988) – of thinking about the similarities and 
differences between Greek (or European) and Indian thought. Many recent con-
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tributions are listed in the consolidated bibliography at the end of the volume. As 
an example of what a single scholar can achieve one might single out the flawed 
but impressive synthesis by McEvilley (2002). Our volume is distinctive (though 
not unique) in that its chapters were discussed at a conference by a mixture of 
Hellenists with informed interest in India and Indologists with informed interest 
in Greece. The vastness of the subject requires this kind of approach. Further, the 
volume appears at a stage in the advance of globalisation at which it has become 
unprecedentedly implausible – however much the practice continues – for any 
culture to assume its own (implicit or explicit) metaphysical assumptions to be 
a standard to which other cultures should aspire. This lends interest and urgency 
to discussion of the origins of such differences, and to the burgeoning debate 
about the Axial Age. Did the Axial transformations occur in each civilisation 
independently? How and why did they occur? Do we now require, as some have 
suggested, a second Axial Age, and how could it occur? Our volume may be 
considered a small contribution to the fascination of understanding where our 
various civilisations have come from, but also – indirectly – to the question of 
where they are going.
What follows is a summary of each of the chapters.
Ancient similarities between Greeks and north Indians – in their institutions, 
poetic phraseology, myth and epic – have been attributed to their shared Indo-
European origin. A contribution to this perspective is made here by Allen, who 
focuses on two kinds of similarity. Firstly, he sets out a series of correspondences 
between two journey narratives, the journey to the next world in the Kauṣītaki 
Upaniṣad and the journey of the Homeric Odysseus from Ogygia to Phaeacia. 
Despite the obvious differences, the number of similar details (he counts twen-
ty-five), in roughly the same order, is too great to be coincidental. His second kind 
of similarity between the two cultures is based on the shared ‘trifunctional ide-
ology’ that Georges Dumézil attributed to their Indo-European origin (the three 
functions are – roughly speaking – sovereignty, physical force and production). 
However, Allen finds both the total of three and the category of social func-
tion, adequate though they may be for a well-functioning society, too restrictive 
for a worldview. Accordingly he favours the replacement of Dumézil’s triadic 
structure with a pentadic one, in which the triad acquires at the bottom what is 
undesirable and at the top something transcendent. This pentadic structure is 
found in various kinds of context. From India Allen focuses on the ontological 
classification of five pentads of tattvas elaborated by the  philosophy known 
as Sāṃkhya, and from Greece on the set of five elements. Finally, the two 
kinds of similarity intersect: the journey narratives manifest pentadic patterns, 
and the Sāṃkhya schema contains an evolutionism that gives it a narrative 
quality.
4 Introduction
Jurewicz emphasises abstraction as a key component in the development 
of philosophy in India. Whereas Havelock (1983) related the origin of Greek 
philosophy to the advent of literacy, Jurewicz argues that the development of the 
capacity for abstraction is attested already in the earliest Indian text, the Ṛgveda, 
many centuries before the advent of writing in India. This issue is important, 
she claims, not only for Indology but also from the more general point of view 
of philosophy seen as a human endeavour, not limited to the European tradi-
tion. In contrast to the earliest European philosophy, which is preserved only 
in fragments, the Vedic tradition is a rich source for the beginnings of human 
philosophical inquiry. The understanding of metaphor provided by cognitive 
linguistics reveals mechanisms by which the concrete is used to express the 
abstract. In particular, she shows how in the Ṛgveda the Sanskrit word ṛtá, which 
may be used of an abstract and metaphysical concept (‘cosmos, order, truth’), 
derives in stages from the fundamental concrete experience of herding cows, as 
well as from the experience of other fundamental concrete realities such as the 
dawn, rivers and ritual. Experience is transformed in order to create abstraction 
that is conducive to philosophy.
Chaturvedi begins from the observation of Emile Benveniste that, for the 
Indo-Europeans, the idea of ‘order’ is ‘the foundation, both religious and moral, 
of every society’, and that the importance of this notion is shown in the consid-
erable number of lexical forms derived from the root *H2er (to fit, to arrange). 
She discusses two of these forms – the Greek harmonia and the Sanskrit ṛtá. She 
analyses hymns from the Ŗgveda and the fragments of Philolaus, Empedocles 
and Heraclitus, with the aim of uncovering the extent to which they play similar 
roles in their respective cosmologies. She first discusses harmonia and ṛtá as 
cosmological principles, showing how both involve a harmonic regulation of 
opposites, and then focuses on the moral applications of these principles. She 
concludes that, at the most abstract level, harmonia and ṛtá are principles of 
order that stand for the dynamic fitting together of disjointed entities. The fitting 
together takes place in nature, the macrocosm, and in human life, the microcosm; 
furthermore, it involves adaptations between microcosm and macrocosm.
Bailey notes that the central concept of the ātman, so crucial for refining 
the nature of personhood in the Upaniṣads and beyond, is still not understood 
in its full epistemological and ontological contexts. In part this is because it is 
‘ungraspable and unthinkable’, leading many teachers in the Upaniṣads to give 
their own take on it. He proposes no magic solution to its comprehensibility in 
the older Upaniṣads (sixth to fourth centuries bce), but rather begins from the 
proposal that the people who composed these texts – like those who composed 
the early Jain and Buddhist texts – were brilliantly skilful at defining existence as 
a fundamentally negative condition. Given that worldly existence, with its social, 
cultural, political and economic spheres, remains the problem to be confronted, 
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how is the connection between the ontologically complete ātman (Brahmā) and 
the ontologically incomplete manas/śarīra, the physical world of the senses and 
the mind, argued for and maintained? In order to illuminate the certainty with 
which the link – even if ontologically true or false – had to be made, he focuses 
on some passages of cosmological/cosmogonic import from the Bṛhadāraṇyaka 
Upaniṣad, where a contrast is made between the two verbs as and bhū, both 
conveying a different ontological sense of ‘being’ and ‘becoming’ as they apply 
to the ātman and the Brahmā. It is by use of these verbs that the entrance of the 
ātman into the world of imperfect existence is described. In addition, attention 
is focused on the Sanskrit prefix vi, which indicates difference and diffuseness, 
in defining the ontological development of the ātman. Finally he contextualises 
this within the kinds of socio-economic structures that background a shift in 
the stress on particular ontological categories, and questions whether the sixth–
fourth centuries bce were really periods of radical change, as scholars have often 
suggested.
Höchsmann describes how the conceptions of universe and soul in Timaeus, 
Ṛgveda and the Upaniṣads converge and overlap but do not coincide. While 
the Ṛgveda (10.129) invites conjectures regarding a plurality of universes, the 
Upaniṣads affirm that there is one universe, as ātman is identified with brahman, 
the eternal totality of all that exists. The cosmology of the Timaeus integrates the 
open-ended view of the origin of the universe in the Ṛgveda with the certainty 
of the Upaniṣads. In the Ṛgveda and the Upaniṣads there is (as in subsequent 
Indian cosmologies) an ethical conception of the cosmic order, but cosmogony 
seems morally and aesthetically neutral: in contrast to the Timaeus, there is no 
motivation to create a cosmos endowed with beauty and goodness, no eternal 
paradigm of supreme goodness. Their anthropomorphic cosmogony is distinct 
from the mathematical structures and the ordered harmony of the cosmogony 
in the Timaeus. But all three regard the universe as a hierarchically organised 
and interrelated system in which order (ṛtá in the Ṛgveda) prevails. In both 
Timaeus and the Upaniṣads cosmology is the prerequisite for self-knowledge (of 
psyche and ātman) and ethics. Such knowledge is in Timaeus both metaphysical 
(of dēmiourgos, eternal model for the universe, and forms) and empirical (the 
psyche experiences the order and harmony of the planetary movements corre-
sponding to the laws of musical harmony). As for the ātman, it encompass all 
that is encountered in existence. The Timaeus and the Upaniṣads both lay the 
foundations for moral realism, the view that moral values, principles and actions 
have objective validity beyond individual preferences, cultural norms and social 
institutions. The knowledge of ātman and psyche has theoretical and practical 
significance. Interpretive analyses of ātman and psyche as the constant and 
enduring self throughout persistent change can increase our understanding of 
personal identity and continuity of consciousness.
6 Introduction
Bussanich presents fresh approaches to Plato’s conception of wisdom and 
the means to attain it by comparison with South Asian yoga traditions. Despite 
important differences, Plato, classical Vedānta, Yoga and early Buddhism all 
seek transcendent wisdom and liberation from the cycle of births and deaths. On 
the basis of homologies between cosmos and psyche in which the hierarchy of 
consciousness mirrors the structure of reality, these traditions promote cognitive 
and affective practices whose aim is to remove external accretions to the self 
and the delusion and suffering they bring in their wake through the attenuation 
of desire and thought. Vedānta and classical Yoga espouse withdrawal of the 
senses (pratyāhāra), meditation (dhyāna), concentration (dhāraṇā) and med-
itative absorption (samādhi). Early Buddhism promotes calmness meditation 
(samatha/śamatha), whose goal is samādhi, and insight meditation (vipassanā/
vipaśyanā), whose goal is wisdom (prajñā). There is evidence in the Platonic 
dialogues for analogies to South Asian meditative praxis which enables the soul 
to ascend the hierarchy of states of consciousness. Comparison of these practices 
raises questions about the similarities and differences between South Asian and 
Platonic conceptions of wisdom and the means to attain them. Are the highest 
states of knowledge in Plato non-conceptual? Is the interdependence of the 
intellectual/analytical insight and non-cognitive ‘cessative’ meditations in South 
Asian yoga found also in Plato?
Visigalli explores the idea, present in both ancient Greece and early India, 
that immortality can be achieved through some structured methods. Borrowing 
and adapting Michel Foucault’s (1988) notion of the technologies of the self, 
he calls such methods ‘technologies of self-immortalisation’. While Foucault is 
concerned mainly with the exploration of how these technologies of self- caring 
and self-knowledge produce a certain self-understanding, Visigalli explores 
how composite psychophysical practices are aimed at producing a post-mortem 
immortal self. First, building on Sedley’s (2009) discussion of different kinds of 
immortality in Plato, he examines the theme of self-immortalisation through the 
practice of philosophy in Plato’s Timaeus. Then he explores the ritual construc-
tion of an immortal self (ātman) in the ritual of the construction of the fire altar 
(agnicayana). In doing so, he focuses on the interplay of ritual actions and the 
attendant ritual speculations. Finally, he poses some questions about immortal-
ity, and considers how the Indian and Greek evidence invites different answers.
Pinchard challenges the common view that, unlike Greek speculation, pri-
meval Indian thought about the whole universe (in the Upaniṣads) was not 
strictly theoretical but mainly aimed at salvation. Husserl, for example, held this 
view. But this contradistinction is not valid because certain Greek philosophers 
linked the intimate experience of eternity, which really breaks the power of 
death, with the true theōria in order to define a complete way of life (it is more 
explicit in Plato and Aristotle, especially at Nicomachean Ethics X, 7, but it may 
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be present in some Pre-Socratic thinkers too), while in India wonder may also 
be viewed as the first motive leading to the disinterested search for truth about 
metaphysical principles (cf. Aristotle Metaphysics A1). Such personal names as 
Satyakāma (Chāndogya Upaniṣad) have to be interpreted literally. Indeed the 
absolute reality, the brahman itself, is desire, but desire for itself. It is not just 
a thing. Hence to unite personally with the brahman implies keeping the desire 
for truth alive. The cult of selfhood typical of Indian philosophy is very different 
from a restricted selfishness, and the disinterestedness of the theoretical attitude 
cannot be restricted to Greek thought alone.
Robbiano presents the argument, shared by Parmenides and Śaṅkara, that 
boundaries between human individuals and between things are ‘epistemologi-
cally weak’, because they are not real but superimposed by humans. Parmenides, 
Śaṅkara and Descartes would agree on being certain of ‘being’ in some sense, 
but would differ when asked to specify of what being they are certain. Descartes, 
embracing Aristotle’s assumption that predicates must belong to a substance, 
would say that the being of which he is certain belongs to a thinking substance 
or a soul. But Parmenides and Śaṅkara would argue that being does not belong 
to any substance: any entity we might regard as the subject or owner of being is 
produced by custom, by which we superimpose boundaries on being, which is 
fundamentally undivided. What leads Parmenides and Śaṅkara from the certainty 
of being to the certainty of undivided being is their shared foundational concep-
tion of knowing, according to which it is impossible to know anything other than 
being. It follows that we cannot know any boundary, since we cannot know any 
second being, and therefore no knowledge is possible of any boundary allegedly 
separating the two. With no knowledge of a first boundary, no other boundary 
can be regarded as trustworthy; consequently no knowledge can be claimed of 
the many things, separated by unreliable boundaries. The step from the impossi-
bility of knowing anything other than being to the lack of reality of any second 
being might look like a fallacy, taking an unwarranted step from epistemology 
to ontology. However, for the conception of knowing and being that entails 
their identity, there is no fallacy. Finally, the metaphysics of undivided being 
might facilitate experiencing the lack of boundaries, yielding ‘unshakenness’ 
and invulnerability (Parmenides), compassion and liberation (Śaṅkara).
Magnone discusses the intriguing similarity between the allegories of the 
soul chariot in Plato’s Phaedrus and in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad. The similarity 
has been pointed out – if not thoroughly investigated – by several scholars, 
with varying assessments that are largely dependent on each individual schol-
ar’s assumptions concerning various issues: the bare possibility or degree of 
likelihood of contacts and influences between early Greek and Indian thought, 
the significance (or otherwise) of the intercultural comparative endeavour, or 
indeed the methodological soundness of even positing the question in the almost 
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complete absence of pertinent historical documentation. Because assessments 
are thus heavily influenced by theoretical assumptions, the chapter begins with 
some methodological considerations in order to define the grounds, scope and 
limits of the attempted comparison, also drawing on the methodological dis-
courses of other related fields, like mythology and folklore. Then a review of 
the relevant texts of the Phaedrus and the Kaṭha Upaniṣad sets out both the 
congruencies and the discrepancies in the treatment of the chariot allegory. A 
summary reference to the results of a detailed survey of kindred passages in 
both literary traditions (presented by Magnone elsewhere) helps to demonstrate 
that the allegory of the soul chariot is integral to Upaniṣadic thought in a way 
that is unparalleled in Greek thought, thus supporting the conjecture of diffusion 
in a westward direction. Finally, the chapter will briefly discuss the paramount 
difference – i.e. the conspicuous absence of the idle passenger in the Phaedrus 
allegory vs. his centrality to the allegory of the Kaṭha – and its significance as 
a theoretical watershed between Upaniṣad-based Indian and Plato-influenced 
Greek philosophy.
Schlieter uses theoretical work on metaphor to argue that in both Greece 
and India the danger, intense experience and various uses of chariots were a 
source domain for a dynamic ‘anthropo-therio-technological metaphor’ for the 
interpretation of various abstract domains. Chariots were not only depicted as 
vehicles of gods such as the sun (helios, sūrya, kāla), i.e. symbols of cosmic 
stability, but also used as symbols of royal power and social prestige (in the 
Iliad, Vedic hymns, and poetic literature). As for chariots as metaphors for the 
mind or soul and its liberation, Indian influence on pre-Alexandrian Greece is, 
although highly unlikely, theoretically possible, since the absolute chronology of 
the Upaniṣads is still disputed. But the striking similarities follow a certain logic, 
given that a somewhat similar use of chariots (both actual and metaphorical) 
in the respective traditions had already been established. There are subtle but 
important differences in the Greek and Indian chariot metaphors for the inner self 
– e.g. the passenger able to leave the chariot at a final destination, a difference 
discussed also by Magnone. Cognitive analysis of chariot metaphors may bring 
out those (sometimes hidden) philosophical preconceptions prevalent in abstract 
domains such as the ‘mind’, the connection of ‘body and mind’, the relationship 
between the ‘rational’ and the ‘emotional’ part, or the relation between a ‘steer-
ing mind’ and the ‘Self’. Finally, in late antiquity, which saw the end not only of 
the light and fast chariot but also of a certain ideal of embodied self-mastery, it 
seems that chariot imagery was no longer fully ‘functional’. The Buddhist use of 
chariot imagery in the Indian, and the Christian use in the late antique tradition 
may each be a final allegorical phase producing a rigorous deconstruction of the 
chariot (ride) and its symbolic force for visualising the mind, Soul and liberation.
For Forte and Smith the genealogy of the chariot imagery in both Greece 
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and India is best explained not by influence but through local intertexts: the Iliad 
and the Vedas respectively. For the Greek material their main concern is not with 
Plato but with the chariot journey described by Parmenides. The concentration of 
similarities between Iliad 23 and the text of Parmenides suggests that he is engag-
ing specifically with the chariot race during Patroclus’ funeral games, which also 
serves as a source of philosophical material for Empedocles and includes the 
locus classicus for Socratic ἐπαγωγή. The chariot in Kaṭha Upaniṣad is a met-
aphor for the sacrifice, specifically the fire altar; its imagery is a redeployment 
of the chariot imagery and narrative setting used in the earlier Kaṭha Brāhmaṇa. 
They argue that understanding the metaphysics of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad is only 
possible when contextualised as a component of a hieratic canon. Once these 
commitments are recognised, it becomes apparent that Parmenides’ poem and 
the Kaṭha Upaniṣad have distinct antecedents and discursive agendas.
Seaford proposes as a similarity between the two cultures, around the middle 
of the first millennium bce, the interiorisation of ritual, specifically the cosmic 
rite of passage (sacrifice in India, mystic initiation in Greece). The internal or 
mental performance of the ritual, or the adoption of its terminology and struc-
ture to describe intellectual transition, tends to replace its actual performance. 
In India this development issues from the discernible individualisation of the 
sacrifice. Conflict, reciprocity (voluntary requital) and group are marginalised; 
the power of the ritual tends to become invisible and automatic; merit is accumu-
lated by the individual; the object of the sacrifice becomes the self; and finally 
everything is absorbed into the individual self. In the same period in Greece the 
language and structure of the ritual of mystic initiation are used by Heraclitus, 
Parmenides and Plato to describe the intellectual progress of the individual. In 
both cultures this interiorisation is connected to the advent of monism and of the 
all-importance of the inner self. As for the causes of the development, it is pro-
posed that an important factor in both cases was the advent of a general means of 
exchange. Monetisation can be correlated with various features of interiorisation 
(and of monism): money unites all goods, individualises, bestows a sense of 
(unified) interior power, and replaces conflict and reciprocity with power that is 
invisible, automatic and individually accumulated.
Burley begins by presenting the ‘ethicisation’ thesis developed by the anthro-
pologist Gananath Obeyesekere. According to this thesis rebirth beliefs with only 
minimal ethical features evolved into karmic beliefs that regard one’s future life 
as being conditioned by the ethical quality of one’s current life. Though applying 
primarily to South Asian traditions, this thesis also bears upon ideas of transmi-
gration in ancient Greece. Underlying both Obeyesekere’s analysis and other 
speculative views is the assumption that a metaphysical conception of rebirth 
is logically and chronologically prior to any ethical outlook that accompanies 
it. But this assumption is challenged by Catherine Osborne, who argues that 
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the ethical outlook of certain Greek philosophers generated their transmigration 
theories. Elucidating and critically engaging with Obeyesekere’s and Osborne’s 
work, this chapter not only disrupts the aforementioned assumption but also 
questions whether there must be an order of priority between metaphysics and 
ethics at all. A viable alternative is that worldviews involving rebirth comprise 
both metaphysical and ethical dimensions, neither of which is prior to the other. 
An implication of this latter view is that talk of a transition from non-ethicised 
to ethicised conceptions of rebirth should be replaced by considerations of the 
transition from one kind of ethically imbued conception to another.
Obryk applies to both cultures the typology of religious movements  created 
by Roy Wallis (world-affirming, world-rejecting and world-accommodating 
religions). In Indian philosophy we may compare the scheme karma, jñāna 
and bhakti. In Greece the world-affirming type could be seen in both the polis 
religion, with its immanent gods and rituals, and the practice of magic. This 
corresponds in the Indian typology to karma (action), which involves the mech-
anistic process of controlling the world and environment by means of sacrifice 
(yajña) and ritual (karma-kāṇḍa). When frustration arises from apparent lack of 
success in controlling the world, then jñāna (science) appears, striving to find 
a transcendent monistic supreme power behind the world of occurrences. This 
parallels Wallis’s world-rejecting type, which can be found in Greek thought and 
practice as the philosophical search for the primordial principle. Thirdly, there 
seems to be a reconciliation of the ritualistic and philosophical approaches to 
religion and worldview in the theurgy of Iamblichus and (partially) much earlier 
in the individual development of Socrates’ religiosity. This corresponds to the 
bhakti/upāsana strand (loving service or devotion): transcendence is understood 
to be fully independent of worldly presumptions and the world, and what is in 
the world is used for the service of this transcendent but personal divinity. This 
corresponds to Wallis’ world-accommodating type.
Stoneman investigates the report that Ctesias (early fourth century bce) 
‘claims that the Indians are very just people; he also describes their customs and 
manners’. What were the sources of Ctesias’ information? What did he mean 
by ‘justice’? Was he correct in ascribing these qualities to the Indians? Did 
Greek δικαιοσύνη/δίκη correspond to an identifiable Indian term? Did Greek 
reports of India provide information about Indian reality or are they merely 
an interpretatio Graeca? These questions are set in the context of Greek com-
ments on Indian society from Homer and Scylax of Caryanda to Onesicritus, 
Megasthenes and the Alexander Romance. The main components of the Greeks’ 
idea of Indian justice may be summarised as ‘honesty’, non-violence, piety, and 
the avoidance of usury, theft, adultery and drunkenness, as well as respect for 
authority. These overlap with Greek definitions of justice, not least in the form 
elaborated by Plato (in the main social justice). In some respects – e.g. absence 
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of slavery and non-violence – Indian ‘justice’ seems to resemble Greek utopian 
ideas, as developed by Plato but also in Hellenistic writers, Cynic philosophers 
and parts of the Alexander Romance. Greek assertions can be compared with 
Indian texts that include not only the Ṛgveda and the Upaniṣads but also texts 
that were written down later than Ctesias (and even Megasthenes), such as 
the Arthaśāstra, Dharmasūtras and Laws of Manu. Most of what the Greeks 
believed about Indian society and its justice can be shown to be true, though 
they sometimes misunderstood what they observed or were told. The Greek texts 
are more reliable than has sometimes been supposed, and the information in the 
Alexander Romance and Onesicritus is more up-to-date than that in Ctesias or 
even Megasthenes; much depended on who the authors’ informants were.
Syea brings us into modernity. The arresting and intriguing parallels which 
exist between Greek and Indian philosophy did not go unnoticed by Friedrich 
Nietzsche, who spoke of ‘the wonderful family resemblance of all Indian, Greek, 
and German philosophising’ (Beyond Good and Evil 20). Nietzsche’s works pro-
vide us with a useful prism for exploring these similarities. In On the Genealogy 
of Morality, Nietzsche demonstrates how values which emerge in cultures are 
driven and supported by physiological, psychological and sociological trends. 
This genealogical method complements the notion of parallel autonomous intel-
lectual development in ancient India and ancient Greece, as it suggests that 
similarities would emerge, should certain conditions obtain in both cultures. 
In particular Nietzsche was interested in how the agonal spirit surfaced in the 
warring poleis of ancient Greece, and how this came to imbue Greek literature 
and philosophy – we need only think of Homer’s Iliad, Hesiod’s two Erises and 
Heraclitean strife. It is suggested that this agonal culture could also be extended 
to the city-states of ancient India, where it also filtered through to philosophical 
writings – epics like the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyaṇa explicitly place discus-
sion of self, state and normativity against a background of conflict. The chapter 
examines how Nietzsche found in these cultures viable models of self and state, 
suggests that these models were born out of an agonal context, and proposes that 
Nietzsche came to see ‘Greek’ and ‘Indian’ as modes of being, which informed 
his own ideas on normativity, providing him with an alternative to the Christian 
slave morality he so despised.
1
The common origin approach to comparing 
Indian and Greek philosophy
Nick Allen
Can a comparison between Indian and Greek philosophies abstract from hist-
ory? Most scholars would agree that to isolate philosophical positions from the 
socio-cultural history in which they were formulated is artificial and problem-
atic, but the question then becomes what sort of history is needed. Of course 
the Vedas were preceded by the Indus Valley civilisation and Homer by the 
Mycenaeans, but such precursors cast little light on philosophy and can be left to 
other specialists. So histories of Sanskrit thinking usually start with the Ṛgveda, 
much as their Greek equivalents start with Homer. No doubt many scholars take 
for granted that no other style of history is or ever will be feasible.
The assumption is paradoxical, however, since, as languages, Sanskrit and 
Greek have histories that go back well before the Vedas and Homer. For two cen-
turies philologists have been writing their own sort of history, embodying many 
of their findings in the starred forms they attribute to the Indo-European pro-
tolanguage (usually dated to the fourth millennium bce). This history involves 
semantics as well as phonology, and the well-known work of Benveniste (1969) 
studied the vocabulary of Indo-European institutions. Equally well-recognised 
are Calvert Watkins (1995), who applied a similar approach to the history of 
Indo-European poetical phraseology, and Martin West (2007), who in addition 
tackled some particular constructs found in Indo-European myth and epic.
More immediately relevant is the vast corpus of comparativism produced 
by Georges Dumézil (1898–1986), much of it addressing the Indo-European 
‘trifunctional ideology’. Leaving the functions till later, I emphasise the word 
‘ideology’, which Dumézil defines in various ways. Depending on viewpoint, it 
can be defined ‘either as a means of exploring material and moral reality or as a 
means of ordering the capital of ideas accepted by the society’. It was ‘at once an 
ideal and a way of analysing and interpreting the forces that ensure the smooth 
running of the world (le cours du monde) and the life of men’. Trifunctionality 
was ‘the framework (cadre) of a system of thought, an explanation of the world, 
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in brief a theology and a philosophy, or, if you like, an ideology’.1 Elsewhere 
he puts in parallel the words mythology, theology and ideology as meaning 
respectively the collection or catalogue of myths, of gods and of governing ideas 
(idées directrices).2 Thus, although he does not use the term, in talking of an 
Indo-European ideology Dumézil is postulating a proto-philosophy lying behind 
the thinking of these early literate societies. If one wants to situate Sanskrit and 
Greek philosophy within history, here is an historical approach that possesses a 
considerable literature and at least merits serious consideration.
Many factors have contributed to the relative neglect of Dumézil’s approach. 
Obstacles internal to the oeuvre include its sheer bulk (some seventeen volumes 
published or reissued after 1966 – the year he saw as opening his phase du bilan, 
his ‘summing up period’). The books are not particularly repetitive, and their 
range of reference makes considerable demands on the serious reader. I would 
add that the correlational type of ideology is postulated without explicit refer-
ence to anthropological literature on classification, and thereby risks appearing 
odder than it is;3 also that (as we shall see later), the trifunctional schema by 
itself is too narrow to constitute a plausible ideology. External obstacles include 
the conservatism of academic disciplines, criticisms by opponents of cultural 
comparison and controversies among its practitioners, and the play of fashion.4 
But the difficulties and objections can be overcome and Dumézil-style work 
continues.
Much of this comparativism explores the survival of the ideology in dif-
ferent contexts – socio-structural, legal, mythic, ritual and so on, but Dumézil 
never claimed that the Indo-European cultural heritage could be reduced to 
manifestations of trifunctionality – indeed he protested against such reduction.5 
Much scope exists for comparison of narratives to which the functions are not 
immediately relevant, and this is how I shall start: the conceptual simplicity of 
the argument makes it an appropriate opening to the empirical part of the paper. 
If the units of a Sanskrit story, one after another, resemble the units of a Greek 
story, and the resemblances are unforced and persuasive, then the more numer-
ous the resemblances the stronger the case for common origin. Logically, to 
 1 Respectively Dumézil 1958: 18–19, 1968: 15, 1979: 79–80.
 2 Dumézil 1986: 19; a meaning of ideology that he describes as ‘very humble’.
 3 Allen 2000: 39–60.
 4 Here is an outspoken but not unrepresentative opinion: ‘Wide-ranging comparison has con-
sistently disappointed. Books of Lévi-Strauss, Dumézil and Eliade now sit beside those of 
Max Müller and Frazer as cautionary examples. They consistently misrecognised products 
of their own imagination and desire (human mind, tripartite ideology, homo religiosus) 
for objects having historical, prehistorical and/or transhistorical actuality’ (Lincoln 2012: 
100).
 5 Dumézil 1981: 34.
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compare Sanskrit and Greek manifestations of a hypothetical ideology is a more 
complex undertaking.
Otherworld journeys
The relation between this world and other worlds has been a traditional philo-
sophical issue pertaining to cosmology and eschatology, but it is a relation that 
is often spatialised and presented as a journey: an obvious instance is Er’s return 
journey to the other world, narrated at the very end of Plato’s Republic. However, 
of the two journeys we shall compare, only the Sanskrit one is straightforwardly 
cosmic and eschatological. The Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad is among the five early 
Upaniṣads that were written in prose and are probably pre-Buddhist. Like some 
others of the five, it is an anthology of ‘material that must have existed as inde-
pendent texts’, before being put together by one or more editors.6 The material 
that concerns us (KauU 1.2–7) is one such unit of text or pericope. It tells us what 
happens to the souls of the dead, and is preceded (1.1) by a scene-setting account 
of why Citra Gāṅgyāyani (doubtless a king) came to be teaching a Brahmin.
To summarise Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad 1.2, all who die go to the moon, which 
is the door to the heavenly world. The moon asks the soul ‘Who are you?’, and 
those unable to answer correctly turn into rain and fall to earth for rebirth, in 
higher or lower forms depending on their behaviour and knowledge. Breaking 
into verse, the text gives the correct answer, and those who know it are allowed 
to proceed on the path of the gods. Our concern is primarily with this devayāna 
(as distinct from the pitṛyāna, the path of the fathers or ancestors).
In 1.3, the knowledgeable soul traverses the worlds of Agni, Vāyu, Varuṇa, 
Indra and Prajāpati, before reaching that of brahman or Brahmā (the neuter 
abstraction and the masculine deity often merge in Sanskrit, which lacks capital 
letters, and Olivelle writes only the former). Nothing further is said about the first 
five, but the passage through the final world (Brahmāloka) is presented initially 
as a summary. The phrase sa āgacchati, ‘he arrives at’, introduces each one of 
the ten locations, which are then given a shorter or longer comment. Brahmā is 
the end-point of the journey.
The Greek comparandum picks up the voyage of Odysseus after he leaves 
Ogygia and follows him until his first night in Alcinous’ palace (Od. 5.282–
7.347). Vast and obvious differences separate the two travellers. Odysseus is 
an epic hero from ancient times, but within the story he is very much alive. The 
 6 Olivelle 1996: xxxiv, = 1998: 11. The 1996 paperback lacks the Sanskrit text, with its 
variant readings and scholarly conjectures, but otherwise hardly differs from the 1998 mon-
ograph. I rely heavily on Olivelle, but when glossing Sanskrit terms have made selective 
use of Monier Williams’ Sanskrit-English Dictionary.
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Vedic figure is nameless since he represents any Upaniṣadic contemporary who 
knows the answer to the moon’s question; and he has certainly died. However, 
our focus will be less on the travellers than the journey.
 1. The lake Āra. ‘He crosses it with his mind, but those who go into it with-
out a complete knowledge drown in it.’ Compare the wily and tenacious Odysseus 
who, despite nearly drowning in the storm sent by Poseidon, succeeds, with the 
help of other deities, in completing his sea-crossing from Ogygia to Scheria. The 
Sanskrit word for the lake is hrada, ‘a large or deep piece of water, lake, pool 
(only rarely applied to the sea)’, but commentators compare the name Āra with 
Ara, one of two seas (arṇava) situated in the world of Brahmā (ChU 8.5.3–4).
 2. The watchmen Muhūrta, who flee from him. The name refers to a dura-
tion of about forty-eight minutes, but neither the reading nor the meaning is clear 
and I defer discussion.
 3. The river Vijarā (‘Ageless’), which he crosses with just his mind. The 
comments here are substantial (fifteen lines in the translation), but only need 
selective treatment. Having crossed the river, the traveller shakes off his good 
and bad deeds (respectively onto the relatives he likes and dislikes), then pro-
ceeds freed from them. Compare the unnamed river or River God, who helps 
Odysseus exit from the sea, and into which the hero then throws or drops his 
buoyancy-aid-cum-headdress. He had received it from the goddess Ino, who had 
requested its return, which the river duly performs (5.346–51, 459–62).
The scene shifts for a moment to Brahmā (presumably in his palace). The 
god knows that the soul has reached the river, and instructs five hundred nymphs 
(apsaras) to go there quickly and welcome him. Each group of a hundred carries 
something different: garlands, lotions or ointment (āñjana), cosmetic powders, 
clothes and fruit. The beloved Mānasī (from manas ‘mind’) and her twin or 
counterpart Cākṣuṣī (cakṣus ‘eye, seeing, sight’) bring the flowers they have 
picked, and three additional females are named. The welcome party adorns the 
traveller with Brahmā’s ornaments, and he proceeds.
After Odysseus lands and falls asleep on a hillock, the scene shifts (6.1–84). 
Wanting to help the hero return to Ithaca, the goddess Athena visits Alcinous’ 
palace. Taking the form of Nausicaa’s friend and age-mate (homēlikiē), the 
daughter of Dymas, Athena gives the sleeping princess the idea of making a 
laundry trip to the mouth of the Scherian river; her father should arrange trans-
port. In the morning Alcinous cheerfully agrees, and a mule wagon is loaded not 
only with laundry but also with supplies of food, drink and olive oil for bathing. 
Nausicaa sets off on it, accompanied by her age-mate and maid-servants. The 
females do not know that they will meet and help Odysseus, and Athena inter-
venes again to bring this about. The princess ensures that the hero receives oil for 
his bath in the river, then clothes, food and drink, and advises him on the journey 
to the city.
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The shared features are as follows: exit from river and the discarding into 
it of something no longer needed; scene-shift; deity’s initiative to encourage 
or help the traveller; involvement of the palace owner (so Brahmā parallels 
Athena plus Alcinous); journey by a group of young females; their supplies, 
which include oil, clothes and edibles; their paired leadership (two twins or age-
mates); meeting of females and traveller beside river; beautification of traveller 
by females (he acquires adornments or clothes). Moreover, of the three other 
named celestial females, two, Ambā and Ambālī, are paired as Jagatī (possibly 
a reference to heaven and earth): compare the two beautiful handmaidens who 
sleep on either side of the entry to Nausicaa’s bedroom (6.18–19).7
The next five Vedic locations have in common their almost cursory treat-
ment. A measure of unity is also provided by a feature discussed later, but for 
now we need only the Greek comparanda.
 4. The tree Ilya. Compare the poplar grove, sacred to Athena, situated 
within shouting distance of the city (6.291–4, 321–2), where Odysseus is to leave 
the maidens and wait for a while. The grove, with its environs (spring, meadow, 
park, vineyard), is the only topographical feature mentioned by Homer between 
the water-meadow and the lofty city walls.
 5. The plaza (saṃsthāna, ‘urban public place’) Sālajya. Compare the agoras 
that Odysseus admires in the Phaeacian capital (7.44, cf. 6.266).
 6. The palace Aparājita (‘Invincible’). Compare the dwelling or palace of 
Alcinous (his dōma, dōmata or domos).
 7. The doorkeepers Indra and Prajāpati, who flee from him. Compare the 
immortal and ageless dogs made of gold and silver by the god Hephaestus, and 
stationed as guards on either side of the entrance to the palace (7.91–4).
 8. The hall Vibhu (‘Extensive’). Compare the hall (megaron, 6.304) in 
which the royal couple sit, together with other Phaeacian nobles.
The two remaining locations are again treated in parallel.
 9. The throne Vicakṣaṇa (‘Radiant, Far-shining’). Nothing is said about 
anyone sitting on it. Instead, the paired components of the throne – front legs, 
back legs, lengthwise supports and side-supports – are correlated with pairs of 
named sāman chants, and the whole throne is identified with wisdom. Ignoring 
all this, simply compare the object with the throne of Alcinous (6.308), and with 
the silver-studded thronos next to it, which the king’s favourite son vacates for 
Odysseus (7.162, 167–71). At just this point Odysseus is described as ‘wise and 
crafty-minded’ (daïphrōn, poikilomētēs, 7.168).
10. The couch or bed Amitaujas (‘Of unlimited power’), which is life-breath 
 7 The third, Ambikā, is mentioned simply as another nymph. Discussing the journey, Ruben 
(1947: 226–31) remarks on what a beautiful story it could be if only Citra were not so 
wooden (hölzern). Did Ruben have the Odyssey in mind?
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(prāṇa). The component parts again receive correlates (only two of the pairs are 
linked with particular sāman chants), but instead of eight parts there are thirteen, 
and the extra ones include the longitudinal and transverse strings, two layers of 
bedding and a pillow. Compare the bed on the portico where Odysseus sleeps 
after talking to the royals (7.335–8, 345): it is covered with three layers of bed-
ding and the bedstead is described as ‘pierced’ (trētos) – ‘in order to take the 
cords that served as mattress’.8
The traveller mounts the couch on which Brahmā is sitting, is questioned by 
the god, gives satisfactory philosophico-religious answers, and is accepted into 
the god’s world (1.6–7). Here ends the first section (adhyāya) of this Upaniṣad, 
and the next one, unrelated to the scene set in Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad 1.1, is not 
about dead souls. The pairing of the new arrival and his host, who must be sitting 
side by side on the couch, finds a parallel of sorts in the pairing of Odysseus and 
the royal couple: the text moves directly from the former, sleeping on the portico, 
to the latter, sleeping in an inner chamber (346–7). These two lines conclude 
book 7.
However, to find a comparison for Brahmā’s questioning of the new arrival, 
we must turn back to the Greek throne room (location 9). After the Phaeacian 
nobles have dispersed, Queen Arete puts the first question asked of Odysseus: 
who is he and from where (7.238). Brahmā opens his interview with the same 
question, ‘Who are you?’; Sanskrit ko ‘si and Greek τίϛ εἰς are etymologically 
cognate. Neither respondent offers anything so banal as a name, parent or place 
of birth, but even so they both quickly gain the questioner’s approval. Brahmā 
says his world is now the traveller’s. If Odysseus decides to stay, Alcinous 
offers him marriage to Nausicaa and a respectable place in Phaeacian society 
(7.311–15).
So far the focus has been on comparing the journeys location by location, 
but the locations can also be compared in groups. Roughly speaking, the first 
three are watery and peripheral; the next five are transitional and move towards 
a centre; the final two form a climax.
The three watery locations: The Vedic lake and river parallel the Greek sea 
and river, but we offered no Greek comparison for the second location, that of 
the watchmen Muhūrta, who flee. If one accepts Olivelle’s translation of the 
uncertain text, one seeks a parallel in the watery section of the Greek; but the 
only other location identified by agents rather than objects is the seventh, that 
with the two doorkeeper gods, who also flee (same verb: apa, ‘away’ + √dru, 
‘run, hasten, flee’). One therefore looks for agents who might have blocked the 
traveller’s progress, but do not do so. Poseidon sees Odysseus from a distant 
mountain (5.282–3), gives him a hard time during the storm, watches him 
 8 Hainsworth 1998: 340.
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suffer until he starts swimming, and then departs for his own palace, lashing 
his horses.
The transitional locations: In the Sanskrit these are held together by ref-
erences to the senses. At the tree the soul is permeated by Brahmā’s fragrance 
(implying smell), at the plaza by the god’s flavour (taste), at the palace by his 
radiance (vision). This sequence forms the start of a standard rising hierarchy of 
senses which ends with hearing, and the last quality to permeate the soul (at the 
hall) is Brahmā’s yaśas, his glory or fame; so perhaps here, in this oral culture, 
fame is linked with hearing; and perhaps too, though the text does not say so, the 
remaining sense, namely touch, correlates with Indra.9 In any case, with the radi-
ance (tejas) from Brahmā’s palace compare the radiance (aiglē, 7.84) from the 
palace of Alcinous. Moreover, the first transitional location in the Sanskrit sees 
the start of the sequence of senses, and in the Greek marks the hero’s separation 
from Nausicaa’s party and a new phase of his journey. Henceforth, as Odysseus 
moves from nature to culture, the locations he comes to are associated only with 
human artefacts and deities.
The climactic locations: These are both items of palace furniture on which 
humans can place themselves, whether to sit or lie. One or other is the site of the 
final host-traveller conversation, and the second forms the end of a significant 
textual unit.10
In concentrating on Brahmā’s world, we have ignored the soul’s earlier 
post-mortem travel. Like everyone who dies, he begins by going to the moon, 
where his knowledge enables him to escape from the round of births and deaths 
on earth and to take the more desirable path of devayāna. Compare Odysseus, 
whose qualities of character enable him to avoid drowning along with his crew 
after the visit to Thrinacia (12.416–19), so that he can do as he wishes and 
return eventually to wife and family. But between leaving the moon and reach-
ing Brahmāloka the soul comes to (āgacchati again) five other worlds. In the 
sequence Agni-Vāyu-Varuṇa the first two theonyms mean Fire and Wind, and 
the third is a god of waters. With the traverse of the world of Wind, compare 
Odysseus’ double visit to the isle of Aeolus, Controller of the Winds (10.1–76).
These two pre-Brahmāloka rapprochements are somewhat weakened by the 
fact that in Odysseus’ life story the separation from his crew comes after his visit 
to Aeolus, rather than preceding it. Within Brahmāloka this sort of objection 
applies only to the conversations at the climax locations. Otherwise, locations 
and events follow the same order in the two stories: the tree Ilya resembles the 
poplar grove not only qua arboreal but also in that the tree/grove appears after 
 9 The sequence smell-sight-hearing-taste-manual action appears in KauU 1.7.
10 The timing of the devayāna is indeterminate, but the palace bed on which Odysseus ends 
his first day in Scheria contrasts with the outdoor bed of leaves on which he began it.
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the river scene and before the plaza/agora. The positional similarity reinforces 
the intrinsic similarity.
The similarities relevant here are those that can reasonably be understood 
as deriving from an Indo-European (or at least Greco-Aryan) protonarrative, 
but it is difficult, and probably unnecessary, to formulate rules for recognising 
such a similarity and for deciding whether or not it is outweighed by the dif-
ferences, which of course can always be found. Even so, and without claiming 
any precision, one can ask roughly how many rapprochements we have found 
for the Brahmāloka journey. Including the groups of locations, but ignoring 
positionality and a few relatively weak comparisons (e.g. Poseidon as watch-
man, Nausicaa’s paired beautiful handmaidens, Odysseus’ wisdom at location 
9), I estimate more than twenty-five. This degree of similarity, bearing both on 
structure and details, cannot plausibly be explained except by some common 
origin.
I hope then to have persuaded readers both that Citra’s dry eschatological 
doctrine is cognate with the epic adventures in Homer, and that comparativ-
ism based on linguistic common origin need not be speculative, superficial or 
neglectful of philological detail. Some may still worry that our Upaniṣad was 
written down too late in the history of Sanskrit literature to have retained nar-
rative content that bypassed the earlier Vedas – copious as they are; but such 
worries overlook the dimension of secrecy in the transmission of the Vedas, and 
also rest on a historiographic prejudice. In fact, previous work along similar lines 
provides reassurance: the Mahābhārata, written down perhaps half a millennium 
after our Upaniṣad, also contains much narrative that is cognate with Homer and 
that bypassed earlier Sanskrit literature.
In particular, the Great Epic narrates several otherworld journeys, and nota-
bly one by its central hero: Arjuna goes to heaven to visit his divine father Indra 
in his palace in the city of Amarāvatī (from amara, ‘immortal’). His journey too 
is cognate with that of Odysseus to the palace of Alcinous, and a fuller study 
of the Brahmāloka journey would benefit from this additional comparison.11 
Moreover, the comparison can also be extended to the internal journey of the 
yogin, directed towards the mental state of kaivalya, and to the progress of the 
Buddha to Enlightenment.12 The Upaniṣadic eschatology belongs to a family of 
narratives that includes not only epic adventures but also spiritual undertakings; 
11 At the river Vijarā the text compares the soul shaking off his deeds to a man driving a 
chariot who looks down at its two wheels and sees nights and days, good deeds and bad 
ones, and all the pairs of opposites. Compare Arjuna’s views from the celestial chariot that 
takes him from the Himalayas to heaven (3.43.26ff., 3.164.40ff. in the Critical Edition). 
The theme of the traveller being tested by a deity is clearer in the Sanskrit epic than in the 
Greek.
12 Allen 1998, 2005a.
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and as we shall see, codifications of Hindu philosophy include yoga among their 
six categories.
Philosophy and the functions
Dumézil saw Indo-European ideology as made up of three components: the first 
function (F1) related to sovereignty, the sacred and wisdom; the second (F2) to 
physical force; the third (F3) to fecundity and wealth. Full formal definitions can 
be found in Dumézil,13 but these succinct indications will suffice here. Though 
an important manifestation of the ideology is in the ideal division of labour in 
society – into the descending hierarchy of priests, warriors and producers – 
social structure is, as we noted above, only one of the many contexts in which the 
same pattern occurs. But even at this point in the argument, worries may arise. 
Supernatural assistance, reliable defence, a flourishing economy – all these are 
desirable, even necessary, for a well-functioning society, but are they sufficient 
basis for a worldview? Do not ideologies typically have a place for what is unde-
sirable and devalued – phenomena like demons, death, pollution and enemies?
To make a long story short, already in 1961, the Rees brothers, analysing the 
fivefold sacred geography of Ireland, proposed in effect that Dumézil’s model 
– useful, indeed essential, as far as it went – needed to be expanded from three 
categories to five,14 and I have long argued that they were right. We need not 
only an extra category at the bottom of the hierarchy, but also a readjustment at 
the top. We can leave priests and their specialised wisdom in F1, but sovereignty 
needs a separate category relating to transcendence, totality and creation. The 
new categories, bracketing the old, sometimes hang together, and for this reason 
among others, I label them respectively F4- and F4+ (the minus and plus refer-
ring to negative and positive valuation). The model as a whole I label ‘pentadic’.
The pentadic ideology has shaped so much of Indian life and thought that the 
choice of starting point is difficult. One option would focus on social structure, 
citing the brief myth of origin of the varṇas in the Puruṣasūkta (RV 10.90.11–
12) and relating it to caste, while another might start from Vedic sacrifice, the 
theme that dominates the Brāhmaṇa texts.15 Yet a third could follow the Reeses 
and open with the spatial schema of centre and cardinal points. However, for 
specifically philosophical thought the obvious choice is Sāṃkhya.
The medieval classification of orthodox Hindu philosophies mentioned 
above organises its six ‘views’ (darśanas, from dṛś, ‘see’) into pairs, and couples 
Sāṃkhya with Yoga. Sāṃkhya is widely regarded as the first of the six to have 
13 Dumézil 1958: 18–19.
14 Rees and Rees 1961: 118–39.
15 See respectively Allen 2007 and Allen 2015.
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been systematised, and was immensely influential on the others – it provided 
yoga with its metaphysical assumptions. The name, from saṃkhyā, ‘reckon up, 
enumerate, calculate’, already suggests the developed theory, which lists twenty- 
five principles or realities (tattvas), and can be read as supplying an ontology 
both for the cosmos and for individual psycho-physiology.16 Thus Puruṣa, the 
first tattva in typical lists, can be read both as an update of the creative Puruṣa 
of Ṛgveda 10.90 and as puruṣa, ‘man, human being, person’. The theory is 
emphatically soteriological and dualist. The aim is to recognise the fundamental 
difference between puruṣa and prakṛti (‘nature or Nature’, which covers all the 
remaining tattvas), and by doing so to bring ‘the adherent to the condition of 
isolation (kaivalya) or release (mokṣa)’.17
Whereas yoga starts from the pluralistic here-and-now and works towards 
kaivalya, Sāṃkhya, starting from the holistic and abstract, moves towards the 
plural and concrete, by laying down processes of evolution or emergence. But the 
emergence of tattvas is not presented simply as a sequence; the list is structured 
into five sets of five. The first pentad, too complex for a truly satisfactory discus-
sion here, contains three successive evolutes from prakṛti, including ahaṃkāra, 
roughly ‘the ego’ (from aham, ‘I’, cognate with Latin and English ego, and kāra, 
‘maker’). From this ego-principle evolve three of the remaining four pentads: the 
senses, the organs or capacities for action, and the subtle elements. It is as if they 
were three successive sets of quintuplets, born to one father, for the last member 
of one pentad precedes the first of the next, but does not emanate it. The final 
pentad, the gross elements, emerges from the subtle ones.
The twenty-five-tattva doctrine as presented in the Sāṃkhyakārika is rela-
tively late (fourth century ce or later), and specialists have studied earlier texts 
in the hope of working out its development. An interesting phrase occurs in the 
oldest Upaniṣad, in a discussion of the nature of brahman. In Bṛhadāraṇyaka 
Upaniṣad 4.4.17 Yājñavalkya says that within brahman are established pañca 
pañcajanā ākāśaśca, which Olivelle translates as ‘the various groups of five, 
together with space’. He thinks that ‘the repetition of pañca is meant to indicate 
an indeterminate number of such groups’, and cites some possible instances; 
but he recognises ‘five groups of five’ as an alternative rendering.18 Anyway, 
whatever the verdict in this case, developed Sāṃkhya offers a pentad of pentads, 
and we need to consider the higher-level set as well as the five lower-level ones.
At the lower level the first five tattvas seem to have conflated several 
16 Wanting to maximise the philosophical coherence of Sāṃkhya, Burley 2007 attacks the 
cosmological reading, but I mainly follow Larson 1979. Both books include a text and 
translation of the Sāṃkhyakārika.
17 Larson 1979: 13.
18 Olivelle 1998: 520.
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 different ideas, but pentadic theory focuses on the relation between puruṣa 
and prakṛti, and the composition of prakṛti. Puruṣa is contentless conscious-
ness, inactive and detached, yet at the same time fundamental. It is close to 
and observes, even enjoys, prakṛti, which covers not only materiality but also 
much that Westerners would label ‘mental’. While puruṣa is a masculine word 
and prakṛti feminine, the two are not presented as relating sexually. Nevertheless, 
the implicit maleness of Puruṣa, combined with his otherness relative to Nature 
in general, makes him a potential representative of the transcendent category 
F4+. Prakṛti is complex: she or it has two conditions – unmanifest and manifest, 
and is composed of three ‘qualities’ (guṇas, literally ‘strands’). Extraordinarily 
widespread in ordinary life, as well as in philosophy, the guṇas, which are not 
tattvas, form a descending hierarchy: sattva, rajas and tamas were character-
ised by Dasgupta as intelligence stuff, energy stuff and mass stuff.19 Despite 
Dumézil’s doubts and a weakish argument regarding tamas, the triad can be 
taken to represent F1–2–3; and the fourth tattva, the ego-principle, associated 
with devalued ‘self-conceit’, can represent F4-. This interpretation is presented 
by Allen,20 and if it is on the right lines, the third tattva (buddhi, ‘intelligence’) 
and the fifth (manas, ‘mind’) must be extrinsic ideas included for one reason or 
another.21
The other pentads are more straightforward. The second and third derive 
from the ego-principle in its sattva mode, the fourth from the same principle 
in its tamas mode. The second coheres neatly with the fourth: hearing, feeling, 
seeing, tasting, smelling correspond to sound, touch, form, taste, smell. The 
third, the organs of action, also corresponds more or less – speaking, grasping, 
walking around, making love, excreting.22 The fifth lists the elements as we nor-
mally understand the word.
The set of five pentads form a descending hierarchy with a one-three-one 
structure. The first pentad, with its internal complexity, contains the really fun-
damental tattvas and can be construed as transcendental and creative (F4+). The 
middle three all derive from the ego-principle, but are themselves ranked by 
their order and links to the guṇas. Their shared origin sets the core triad apart 
from both the first and the fifth pentad, and the latter, derived from the fourth, 
is removed from the first by one additional step. But the collective labels for the 
second and third pentads, buddhīndriyas and karmendriyas, derive from buddhi 
19 Dasgupta 1922: 242, 244.
20 Allen 1998: esp. 181–7.
21 Thus manas not only fills out the first pentad but also, taken with the second and third 
pentad, constitutes ‘the group of eleven’ (tattvas 5–15). Note too that the derivatives of the 
ego-principle are structured as 1+4, i.e. manas plus four pentads.
22 Manu (2.89–92), claiming to present the eleven in their proper traditional order, roughly 
reverses the order in his karmendriya list, which moves from anus to ear.
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(same root as in the ‘Buddha’), and karma, ‘action’ (from kṛ, ‘make, do’). So 
these pentads fall under F1 (wisdom) and F2 (dynamism). Just as the immaterial 
puruṣa outranks the partly material prakṛti, so the subtle elements outrank the 
more material gross elements, even if the devaluation is positional and implicit 
rather than overt.
Admittedly, the subtle elements (tanmātras, ‘only that much, rudimentary’) 
are not clearly linked to the definition of F3. Their position in the hierarchy is the 
one so often associated with fecundity and wealth, but here any such association 
is indirect (via the guṇas) or absent. Nevertheless it is reasonable to construe the 
upper-level pentad as reflecting the pentadic ideology. The ideology provided 
the framework within which those who devised Sāṃkhya operated creatively. 
The argument must be looked at as a whole; one cannot expect every manifesta-
tion of the ideology to conform perfectly to the model.
At the lower level we shall now concentrate on the fifth pentad: space, wind, 
fire, water, earth. The list corresponds reasonably well to the second and fourth: 
space to hearing and sound, wind to feeling and touch, fire (providing light) to 
seeing and form, water to tasting and taste, earth to smell. The ordering of the 
elements is the standard Indian one, already found in the Upaniṣads. ‘From 
ātman (arose) space, from space air, from air . . .’ (TaitU 2.1); but after earth the 
list continues with plants, food and man. Elsewhere (ŚvU 2.12, 6.2), the standard 
order is reversed, but the pentad appears as an isolated whole.
Let us follow the standard order. Ākāśa means ‘space, ether, sky’, and in 
philosophy ‘the subtle and ethereal fluid supposed to pervade the universe and 
to be the peculiar vehicle of life and sound’. Wind – air in motion – is akin to 
breath. Fire covers the sun as well as fires maintained by humans; within the list 
it is anomalous in normally requiring fuel. Water of course includes rain. Earth 
(pṛthvī), feminine as a noun and female as a goddess, can be related within its 
pentad to ākāśa taken as sky, but within the whole schema it relates to puruṣa, 
the first tattva; very roughly, the list views the cosmos from above downwards, 
but other hints of hierarchy appear in the trend from whole to part, abstract and 
rarefied to concrete, and male to female. More precisely, the two extremes stand 
apart from the core, again illustrating the one-three-one pattern. In a geocentric 
universe earth is static, and space has nowhere to go, while the intervening triad 
are all mobile: they blow, spread or rise, and flow.
It has long been known23 that the Greeks recognised the same list of ele-
ments but reversed the standard order of the second and third: ether, fire, air, 
water, earth. The one-three-one pattern seems to be present in the cosmogony of 
the sixth-century Pherecydes:24 Zeus, Khronos and Khthoniē (Earth) are primal, 
23 E.g. Deussen 1999: 189.
24 West 1971: 1–27.
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and from his seed Khronos made fire, wind and water. There follows a distribu-
tion among five cosmic nooks (mukhos, ‘recess’).
In any case, the Greek sequence accords precisely with pentadic theory. 
Ether, like ākāśa, pertains to totality (F4+). Fire is central to sacrifice in Greece 
– consider its place in Hesiod’s origin myth (Theogony 535ff.) – no less than in 
India, where Agni is sometimes the priest of the gods; and in a cosmic context its 
place in religion (F1) outranks its role in domestic human nourishment (which 
would imply F3). Wind exerts force (F2), especially in storms. Water is essential 
for the flourishing and fecundity of humans, but no less for that of agricultural 
plants and animals – the source of wealth (F3). Earth here falls under F4- by 
virtue of its position, but no doubt for other reasons too, such as its acceptance of 
polluting corpses; in other contexts its fertility may place it under F3.
In his comparison of Greek and Indian philosophy McEvilley explores the 
elements but neglects the possibility of common origin.25 In criticising this 
neglect, I presented a fuller account of the relation between elements and func-
tions, including some evidence from Zoroastrianism.26 However, I hope enough 
has been said here to render it plausible that, despite the minor difference in 
standard order, both Indian and Greek lists manifest the pentadic ideology.
It would be interesting to explore the correlations between elements and 
senses, but all I can offer here is a note on the rank of the ‘transcendent’ sense 
and its relation to the orality that for so long dominated these early cultures. 
Most Hindu traditions allot ultimate philosophical authority to the Vedas, and 
the Vedas are śruti (‘hearing, ear, sound’ – the texts were originally ‘heard’ 
by sages). Among the many meanings of brahman are ‘pious effusion or utter-
ance, prayer, the Veda’, but ‘the most sacred sound in the whole Veda’ is the 
often-used monosyllable oṃ, which can even stand for brahman.27 Compare the 
Pythagorean notion of the harmony or music of the spheres; but also the akous-
mata (from akouō, ‘hear’), the curt oral maxims so significant to the movement 
that they served to label one of its subgroups (the akousmatikoi).
The elements provide one clear bridge between Sāṃkhya and early Greek 
philosophy, but it is not the only one. Among the lesser-known texts of the 
anthropologist Marcel Mauss (whose first academic post was as a Sanskritist) 
is his 1911 article ‘Anna-Virāj’.28 Virāj, often linked with food (anna), is a 
25 McEvilley 2002: esp. 300–10.
26 Allen 2005b. I take the opportunity to amplify a remark on p. 66 of the article. Many Pre-
Socratics proposed an arkhē, a ‘basic source or principle of all things’ (Graham 2010: 18). 
Thales favoured water, Anaximenes air, Heracleitus fire; and Anaximander’s apeiron (‘the 
boundless or infinite’) corresponds to F4+. According to Aristotle, no philosophers regarded 
earth as an arkhē, but Xenophanes may perhaps have done so (Graham 2010: 117, 131). 
27 Killingley 1986: 14.
28 Mauss 1969, vol. 2: 593–600.
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cosmogonic figure, sometimes male, sometimes female. Presented in Ṛgveda 
10.90.5 as both the child and the parent of Puruṣa, Virāj was seen by Renou29 
as the female principle, ‘a sort of primitive Śakti’, and her sex is also noted by 
Jamison and Brereton.30 But Virāj is also the name of a metre characterised by 
verses of ten syllables (5+5); and as an adjective virāj (from rāj, ‘reign’) means 
‘ruling far and wide, sovereign’. In seeking to link these various attributes Mauss 
cites Chāndogya Upaniṣad (4.3.8), which identifies the metre with the highest 
throw in dice, namely ten (presented as 5+5). As he notes, and as is well known, 
the names for the throws of the four-sided dice are the same as the names of the 
yugas, the four eras of cosmic time; the throws 4, 3, 2, 1 form a series of decreas-
ing value, as do the homonymous eras. At first sight we are dealing with quartets. 
But Mauss suggests that some forms of dicing allowed a winner-takes-all score 
of 1+2+3+4 = 10. In other words, via the dice, he is connecting a cosmogonic 
female with arithmetic or numerology, and at the same time recognising a fifth 
entity that is totalising and transcendent. As we noted, the very name ‘Sāṃkhya’ 
points to numerology, and clearly ‘Anna-Virāj’ deals with Sāṃkhya-like ideas.
In Greece the combination of numerology, ontology and soteriology points 
us to Pythagoras and his tradition (the attribution of mathematical thinking to 
the sixth-century founder can be doubted). The Pythagorean tradition greatly 
valued the tetractys, a name for the sum of the first four numbers. Regarding 
it as the kernel or epitome of reason, the adherents referred to it in their most 
solemn oath,31 and presented it visually as a triangular array of ten pebbles (the 
‘perfect triangle’); one pebble at the top, then two, then three, with four in the 
bottom row. They also used the pentagram or five-pointed star;32 and pentagons, 
which can be made by joining the points of the star, form the surfaces of only one 
among the five regular solids, namely the dodecahedron, which was said to sym-
bolise ‘the sphere of the all’ (Plato Tim. 55c). Whether or not the Pythagoreans 
connected these various manifestations of fiveness, I suppose that in all cases the 
number somehow related to the old ideology.
On the other hand, pentadic theory is only superficially about five (or ten) 
being a sacred number among Indo-European speakers. Basically it is about 
the manifestation of an ideology having five compartments, and provided each 
compartment has only one representative (which is not always the case), five will 
appear as specially favoured. No doubt various natural factors have contributed 
to the picture – the five (or ten) digits, the number of readily distinguishable 
senses, the five true planets then known, the fact that an individual has a back, 
29 Renou 1956: 98, 247–8.
30 Jamison and Brereton 2014: 1538.
31 Burkert 1972: 72, 186–7.
32 Burkert 1972: 176.
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front and two sides. But such factors can hardly have given rise to the ideology, 
which is more likely to have originated in a society having five clans.33
In practice, ‘fours’ are often more salient than ‘fives’. India has four varṇas, 
Vedas, yugas, puruṣārthas (values); Greece often lists only four elements, and 
the term ‘tetractys’ alludes to four, not five. Influenced by such facts, certain 
comparativists have seen quintessences and the like, not as representing an F4+, 
but (often) as in a sense secondary, as a superadded summary.34 An Africanist 
anthropologist, van Binsbergen (2012), perceives rightly that study of the ele-
ments must one day go beyond Indo-Europeans (and the relatively well-known 
Chinese five-element theory), and particularly attacks Eurocentric emphasis 
on Empedocles’ recognition of four elements.35 Certainly fours are prominent. 
However, those who look for representatives of F4+ will often find them. When 
Empedocles referred to his quartet as rhizōmata (‘roots’), he, and his predeces-
sors, were surely aware that roots spread out from a central trunk or stem.
Concluding observations
The otherworld journeys and the pentadic sets exemplify different aspects of the 
ideological tradition shared by Indian and Greek philosophers, but they do not 
represent any deep-lying divide within the Indo-European heritage. The journey 
stories often manifest pentadic patterns, in whole or part: as we saw, the transi-
tional locations correlate with at least three of the five senses, and among the five 
worlds that the soul traverses before reaching Brahmā’s, three are linked with 
the mobile elements. The tenth and final location is characterised with a com-
pound of a-mita, literally ‘not measured’; compare the arkhē of Anaximander, 
whose a-peiron is literally ‘what lacks an end’. The evolutionism implicit in the 
Sāṃkhya schema gives it a narrative quality comparable to that of the genealo-
gies in Hesiod’s Theogony (and in certain passages of the Sanskrit epic).
The chapter has argued that comparisons of Indian and Greek philosophy 
need to recognise the importance of the Indo-European cultural heritage that 
they share, but this does not imply rejection of other historical approaches. Greek 
contacts with West Asia (especially Iran), as favoured by Martin West, must be 
relevant to certain topics such as astrology. As for Richard Seaford’s interest in 
urbanisation and monetisation, it is a priori implausible that such massive social 
changes had zero impact on philosophising. In the language of biological anthro-
pology, whereas Seaford pursues homoplasty (similarities arising from similar 
33 Allen 2012.
34 Pierre and André Sauzeau 2012: esp. 55–62.
35 But he ranges so boldly across continents and ages that, as he recognises, few are likely to 
follow his theories.
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selection pressures), pentadic theory pursues homology (similarities resulting 
from common origin); and like the biologists, we need both. I only claim that 
those thinkers who innovated did so within, or at least in the light of, the pentadic 
ideology, in whatever forms it had reached them.
2
The concept of ṛtá in the Ṛgveda
Joanna Jurewicz
In this chapter I will discuss the problem of the beginning of abstract thinking 
as it is attested in the Ṛgveda. It is an ancient Indian text from the fifteenth to 
the thirteenth centuries bce, composed in Sanskrit. Its final redaction was done 
probably in the seventh century bce. The Ṛgveda (similarly to other early Indian 
texts) was composed and transmitted orally for centuries. Its earliest known man-
uscript is dated to the eleventh century ce.
In his paper ‘The Linguistic Task of the Presocratics’ Havelock (1983) 
reconstructs the beginnings of abstract concepts in Pre-Socratic philosophy. He 
shows how the concepts of dimension and space, body and matter, void, change, 
motion, etc., were created. He claims that the beginning of abstract thought is 
connected with the beginning of literacy. He shows how the Pre-Socratics used 
their earlier oral tradition, how they extended the meanings of words and broke 
the rules of traditional syntax in order to produce more abstract meanings.
My analysis will show that the way chosen by the Pre-Socratic philosophers 
is not the only possible way of creating abstract concepts. Moreover, my claim is 
that abstract thought is not necessarily connected with literacy because, as I have 
just mentioned, the early Indian texts were composed and transmitted orally.
The most general definition of the abstract concept is that it is a concept that 
does not refer to any concrete experience. We do not find many such concepts 
in the Ṛgveda. The main instances are sát (being/truth), ásat (non-being/untruth) 
and ṛtá, which is translated as ‘truth, order, cosmos’.1 (For ṛtá see also Chaturvedi 
in this volume.) While sát and ásat appear rarely and mostly in abstract contexts, 
ṛtá often appears in contexts which evoke concrete concepts connected with 
everyday life experience. For example, we can read about its horn, milk, udder, 
womb, etc. The expressions ‘horn of truth’ or ‘udder of cosmos’ sound strange, 
 1 Mayrhoffer (1992) translates it as ‘Wahrheit, Übereinstimmung, (Welt-)Ordnung’. For 
difficulties in translation of this word see Witzel 2014.
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but the concept denoted by the word ṛtá must be such as to justify them. What is 
also intriguing is that the word ṛtá is the past participle of the verb ṛ-, ‘to go’, and 
literally means ‘something that has gone’.
In order to understand the Ṛgvedic concept of ṛtá, I will use the method-
ology of cognitive linguistics, which investigates the problem of how people 
create meaning and make the world meaningful for them. The main assumption 
of cognitive linguistics is that thinking is motivated by experience coming from 
our bodies and environment, both physical and cultural. Thinking is manifest in 
signs, and so analysis of signs can lead us to the understanding of thought and of 
its experiential motivation.
Cognitive linguistics proposes models of mental operations which are 
reflected in signs. One of these models is conceptual metaphor.2 It is a model 
of thinking which operates between two concepts. It enables thinking about one 
concept in terms of another. The concept that provides its categories is called 
the source domain, and the concept which is conceived in its terms is called 
the target domain. For example, in the Indo-European languages, cognition is 
conceived in terms of seeing: seeing is the source domain, cognition is the target 
domain.3 Since conceptual metaphor reflects itself in language, we can mean-
ingfully say: I see what you mean, when we understand someone else’s thought 
(cognitive metaphor analysis is also used by Schlieter in this volume).
This metaphor is used in everyday thinking elaborated in, for instance, art 
and advertisements. It is also elaborated in philosophy. For example, in his 
definition of intuition, Descartes writes: ‘Intuition is the undoubting conception 
of an unclouded mind, and springs from the light of reason alone.’4 Within the 
frames of this metaphorical thinking, reason is conceived in terms of a lamp and 
possibilities of cognition are conceived in terms of possibilities of seeing. One 
of these possibilities is light, another is lack of a cloud covering the object. In 
the source domain, if there is light but the object is covered, we cannot see it. In 
the target domain, if reason works properly, but the mind does not, there is no 
intuition.
Usually, the complex concepts are conceived with the aid of various source 
domains. Cognition is such a concept: another way of conceptualising it is to 
conceive it in terms of grasping, as in the sentence ‘Now I have grasped your 
point.’5
 2 For conceptual metaphor cf. e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 2003, Lakoff 1993, Lakoff and 
Turner 1989. 
 3 Sweetser 1990.
 4 Quoted after Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 394.
 5 For other examples of English conceptualisation of thinking and mind see Lakoff and 
Johnson 1999: 235ff. 
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Using this methodological tool, I will show how the abstract concept of ṛtá 
was created and understood in the Ṛgveda. I will also show that reconstruction of 
the experience which motivates the way towards abstraction allows us to under-
stand much more about the target concept. Finally, I will argue that translations 
of ṛtá as ‘truth’, ‘order’ or ‘cosmos’ obscure the semantic core of this concept. 
Since the full analysis of the usages of ṛtá would go beyond the scope of the 
present paper, I will only analyse some examples of the genitive use of the word 
ṛtá. Similarly to cognition, ṛtá is a complex concept and is conceived in various 
terms. I will focus on its conceptualisation in terms of a cow.
Before proceeding I must say a few words about the Ṛgvedic concepts of 
world and man.6 The world is a manifestation of reality conceived in terms of 
fire (agní), which in creation manifests its opposite aspects. One of them is con-
ceived as fiery, the other is conceived in terms of Soma. The Sanskrit word sóma 
refers to a plant7 from which juice was prepared and offered in fire during ritual. 
The juice and its divinised form are also called by this name. During ritual the 
juice was poured into the fire and drunk by the priests. It produced supernatural 
effects such as (the Ṛgvedic poets claim) omniscience, the ability to fly, and 
immortality.8 The poets believed that during ritual gods come to the earth and 
men fly up to the sun where the supernatural effects of Soma could be realised. 
Thus sacrifice was a sphere where earth and sky unite beyond time and space. 
Moreover, it was the ritual which set the cosmos in motion. The kindling of fire 
made the dawn appear. The Somic juice, poured into fire, became the rising sun.
For the Ṛgvedic poets, the prototypical cow is a moving cow. This was 
motivated by their semi-nomadic life, which was divided between periods of 
migration (yóga) and settling (kséma).9 The Sanskrit word yóga, used to denote 
the first period, literally means ‘a yoke’, which betrays one of the main occupa-
tions of Ṛgvedic society, namely breeding cattle. During the periods of migration, 
cattle travelled with people in search of new pastures. The moving cow in terms 
of which ṛtá is conceived is not mentioned explicitly but is evoked metonymi-
cally via the concepts of path (pánthā/páth) and track (padá). It is important to 
note that in northwestern India, during the times of the Ṛgveda, the paths and 
roads were made by the tracks of living beings or chariots and carts. At least, 
we do not have any archaeological evidence for paths made in a different way.
The use of the word ṛtá in the genitive case with the concept of path and 
track is the most frequent of all its usages in this case. The poets create the image 
 6 I have presented them in full length in Jurewicz 2010.
 7 It not known what kind of plant it was. For possible identifications see Wasson 1968, Falk 
1989, Oberlies 1999, Stuhrmann 2006. 
 8 Jurewicz 2010: 171ff.
 9 Oberlies 1998: 333ff.
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of the agents who follow the tracks of a cow that went away and disappeared. 
The agents following the cow are dawns, rivers, fire, Soma and thoughts. It 
is important that all of them are conceived in terms of cows and bulls in the 
Ṛgveda, and this conceptualisation is conventionalised. So in the source domain, 
the poets create images of cows and bulls following the path of a leading cow 
which, marching in front of the herd, is invisible for those who follow it. The 
analysis of this source domain will allow me to reconstruct the meaning of ṛtá in 
these contexts and its modes of conceptualisation. I will then briefly show how 
other parts of the cow’s body are used in the conceptualisation of ṛtá.
1. Dawn
eṣā́ divó duhitā́ práty adarśi jyótir vásānā samanā́ purástāt |
ṛtásya pánthām ánu eti sādhú prajānatī́va ná díśo mināti || (1.124.3)10
The Daughter of Heaven has appeared opposite, dressed in light, in the same way [as 
the others], from the east. She follows along the path of truth (ṛtá), straight to the 
goal. Like one who knows the way, she does not confound the directions.
If the recipient activates the conceptualisation of dawn in terms of a cow, he will 
create the image of a cow which follows the path made by a leading cow. The 
recipient can easily evoke the image of the herd of cows, taking into account that 
dawns are usually presented as plural in the Ṛgveda. These are the terms in which 
the appearance of the morning light is conceived: it appears in the nocturnal sky 
in the same way as cows appear in the pasture.
In this stanza, the concept of dawn is activated via the epithet ‘the daughter 
of heaven’ (divó duhitā́). It triggers the recipient to evoke another conceptu-
alisation of the dawn in terms of a young woman who in this context can be 
interpreted as a cowherdess. People universally conceive natural processes in 
terms of actions performed by agents.11 In the source domain, the cowherdess 
makes the cows go to the pasture. In the target domain, the personified dawn 
creates morning light in the dark sky. As the personified agent of the appearance 
of morning light, dawn is divinised as the goddess. The cowherdess also follows 
the path of a leading cow which went out to the pasture for the first time by itself.
Within the frame of this metaphoric conceptualisation, ṛtá, conceived in 
terms of the leading cow, is the first dawn which appeared during creation.
10 All translations of the Ṛgveda are from Jamison and Brereton 2014.
11 For example, we say The wind has closed the window.
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2. Rivers
yéna síndhum mahī́r apó ráthām̐ iva pracodáyaḥ |
pánthām ṛtásya yā́tave tám īmahe || (8.12.3)
[That] by which you impel the great waters forth to the Sindhu like chariots to travel 
the path of truth (ṛtá) – for that we beg.
The Sanskrit word for water, áp, is always used in plural in the Ṛgveda, and 
waters are conceived in terms of cows. So in the source domain the poet creates 
the image of a cowherd who makes the cows follow the path left by the leading 
cow. In these terms there is conceived the flow of rivers from their sources along 
their river-beds to reach the river Sindhu. Ṛtá, conceived in terms of the leading 
cow is the first river which made the river-beds for all other rivers. In this stanza, 
the personified agent who makes the rivers flow is the god Indra, to whom the 
whole hymn is devoted.
3. Ritual
Fire created in the morning ritual
idám u tyán máhi mahā́m ánīkaṃ yád usríyā sácata pūrviyáṃ gaúḥ |
ṛtásya padé ádhi dī́diyānaṃ gúhā raghuṣyád raghuyád viveda || (4.5.9)
Here is the great face of the great ones [= Sun], which the ruddy cow [= Dawn] 
 followed (as it went) in front.
She [?] found it shining hidden in the track of truth (ṛtá), going quickly, 
quick-streaming.
The stanza comes from the hymn to fire (Agni). In the first hemistich, the dawn 
is conceived in terms of a reddish (usríyā) cow.12 In the source domain, the cow 
is presented as finding something which quickly moves. In the Ṛgveda, fire, 
when it is kindled, is conceived in terms of a little calf which agrees with the 
experience evoked in the source domain: a cow finds a calf.13 Conceptualisation 
of fire in terms of being found agrees with the Ṛgvedic thinking about fire and 
the experience of its kindling. Fire was kindled in fire-sticks where, as it was 
believed, it was hidden. In the stanza, it is the dawn which kindles fire but the 
recipient understands that the intention of the poet is to present a simultaneity of 
earthly and cosmic processes: fire is kindled when the dawn appears. As I have 
12 Since such a qualification of cows is very common in the RV, we can presume that real 
cows possessed by the Ṛgvedic poets had this kind of colour.
13 This conceptualisation is very much elaborated in RV 1.164 to conceive of cognition 
(Jurewicz forthcoming).
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already mentioned, the Ṛgvedic poets were even more bold in their ontological 
assumptions: kindling of fire during sacrifices made the dawn appear.
Since speech is conceived in terms of fire and words are conceived in terms 
of cows in the Ṛgveda, the recipient can also understand that the stanza presents 
the appearance of speech in the morning. This also agrees with the experience: 
the ritual kindling of fire and preparation of Somic juice was accompanied 
by recitation of Ṛgvedic stanzas. Within the frames of the conceptualisation 
activated in the stanza, ṛtá, conceived in terms of the leading cow, is the first 
kindling of fire and first recitation.
Fire created by people in the morning
táṃ yajñasā́dham ápi vātayāmasi ṛtásya pathā́ námasā havíṣmatā (1.128.2ab)
The one who sends the sacrifice to its goal along the path of truth (ṛtá): we make 
him our familiar with reverence accompanied by oblations.
This verse also comes from the hymn to fire, which is described as one that makes 
the sacrifices successful. I would agree with other translators of the Ṛgveda who 
interpret it as presenting the poets who kindle the fire along the path of ṛtá.14 This 
interpretation is more justified both on the ground of the syntax of the sentence 
and on the ground of the logic of the image created by the poet. Fire is conceived 
in terms of a calf/bull which is expected to follow the path left by the leading 
cow. The recipient may create the image of herds of bulls if he activates concep-
tualisation of flames of fire in terms of bulls. The agents of this activity are men. 
Ṛtá is the first flame of fire which appeared in the world.
Path between the earth and the sun
ábhūd u pārám étave pánthā ṛtásya sādhuyā́ |
ádarśi ví srutír diváḥ || (1.46.11)
And the path of truth has come into being to lead the right to the far shore. The 
course of heaven has appeared.
The Ṛgvedic poets believed that there is a uniting element between the earth and 
the sun which is activated during sacrifices and which enables the ritual union 
of the sacred and profane spheres. This element is conceived in terms of a path15 
which appears in the morning and is marked by the rising sun. As already men-
tioned, the sun is conceived in terms of a bull in the Ṛgveda and if the recipient 
activates this conceptualisation, he will see the logic of the image built in the 
hemistich. The path made by the leading cow is every day followed by the rising 
14 Witzel and Gotō 2007, Elizarenkova 1989, Renou 1964.
15 There are other concepts for Soma such as tree and plant. In more general terms, it is the 
axis mundi. 
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sun, and by men and gods in ritual. Here, the cosmic change is conceived as 
having no personified agent. Ṛtá is the first sunrise.
Streams of Soma
rā́jā síndhūnām pavate pátir divá ṛtásya yāti pathíbhiḥ kánikradat | (9.86.33ab)
The king of rivers, the lord of heaven, purifies himself. He proceeds along the paths 
of truth, ever roaring.
In the source domain, the image of a neighing stallion/a roaring bull is created 
which follows the paths left by the leading cow.16 The target domain consists 
of two concepts. The first one is the appearance of the proper form of the juice 
during its preparation. The second one is the god Soma who appears during the 
ritual. Ṛtá is the first act of preparation of Soma and the first appearance of the 
gods during ritual.
Thoughts at the beginning of supernatural cognition
índrāgnī ápasas pári úpa prá yanti dhītáyaḥ |
ṛtásya pathíyā ánu || (3.12.7)
Indra and Agni! From our [ritual] work our insights go forth toward [you] along the 
paths of truth (ṛtá).
Within the frames of the metaphor activated in this stanza, thoughts are con-
ceived in terms of cows which follow the track of the leading cow. The gods 
Indra and Agni are the agents who cause the thinking of men. Ṛtá is the first true 
cognition.
The climax of supernatural cognition
kánikradad ánu pánthām ṛtásya śukró ví bhāsi amŕ̥tasya dhā́ma |
sá índrāya pavase matsarávān hinvānó vā́cam matíbhiḥ kavīnā́m || (9.97.32)
Ever roaring along the path of truth, gleaming you radiate across the domain of the 
immortal one [the sun?]. Providing the means for exhilaration, you purify yourself 
for Indra, spurring on your own speech with the thoughts of the poets.
In the source domain, a horse or a bull follows the path left by the leading cow. 
In these terms, Somic juice is conceived. However, it is presented as illuminat-
ing ‘the domain of what is immortal’ (amŕ̥tasya dhā́ma). Since cognition is also 
conceived in terms of illuminating in the Ṛgveda (as by Descartes), the recipient 
understands that the juice, when it is drunk, causes supernatural cognition. The 
16 That the concepts of the bull and the stallion overlapped can be seen in that both can be 
called by the same name (vŕ̥ṣan) and their sound is denoted by the same verbs (krand-, ‘to 
neigh’, rud-, ‘to roar’). 
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object of this cognition is conceived in terms of the abode where immortality 
may be realised.
However, the recipient is also prompted to activate one more target domain 
of the bull/horse which is the sun. As we have seen, the sunrise is conceived in 
terms of a bull following a path made by the leading cow (1.46.11). Moreover, as 
has also been already stated, the Ṛgvedic poets believed that Somic juice poured 
during morning ritual into fire became the rising sun. Within the frames of this 
belief, in ritual men follow the same path after the bull, in terms of which the 
Somic juice transformed into the rising sun is conceived. Thus conceived, it is 
the causative agent of the supernatural cognition and is divinised. Men were also 
conceived in terms of bulls, so the image is very coherent. Here, ṛtá is the first 
sunrise and the first cognitive realisation of ritual.
We can see how the experience is used to express very abstract concepts. 
All the concepts, conceived in terms of the leading cow which went away, are 
the processes: the first appearance of dawn, the first sunrise, the first outflow 
of the first river, the first ritual with its frames and actions: the first kindling 
of fire, the first preparation of juice and its first cognitive results. Taking into 
account that ritual performed by men sets the cosmos in motion, we can gener-
ally understand ṛtá as the creative act during which everything happened for the 
first time. Reality manifested itself in all these processes – as burning fire and the 
dawn, as Somic juice and the rising sun, and as the cognitive agents, gods and 
men who will be able to repeat these processes for ever. It is difficult to find any 
European philosophical concept which could render this meaning in one word, 
as the Sanskrit word ṛtá does. The Ṛgvedic poets, to make this abstract concept 
more understandable, conceptualised it in terms of the leading cow which is far 
away, at the front of the huge herd, but people know that it is somewhere and 
follow its tracks. Conceptualisation of various elements of the world in terms of 
cows and bulls allows the Ṛgvedic poets to express many processes in terms of 
this one image.
It is important to note that not every concept could be conceptualised in 
terms of bulls and cows. As we have seen, they are the agents of the processes 
crucial for the Ṛgvedic poets, the processes which could be seen as life-giving.17 
They are connected with the appearance of light and water in the cosmos and 
with ritual in its social and psychic dimensions.
4. The general meaning of the concept of cow
So the concept of cow is a very general concept in the Ṛgveda. Its generality 
allowed the poets to construe general statements:
17 I call them defining events in Jurewicz 2010. 
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útsa āsãm paramé sadhástha ṛtásya pathā́ sarámā vidad gā́ḥ || (5.45.8cd)
At the fountainhead of them [= cows], in the highest seat, Sarama found the cows 
along the path of truth (ṛtá).
Sarama is a mythical bitch that is presented in the Ṛgveda as leading the poets. 
This concept also probably comes from the experience of cowherds who use 
dogs. The bitch is presented as following a path left by cows and as finding 
them. The cows are found in their highest seat (paramé sadhásthe) and at their 
fountainhead (útse).
As I have already mentioned, the Ṛgvedic poets believed that Soma poured 
into fire became the rising sun. The sun was conceived then in terms of a fiery 
receptacle filled with Soma. When the sun reaches its zenith, Soma which filled 
it becomes most perfect. Men who reach the sun in ritual can drink it, which 
strengthens their supernatural state. At the same time, it was also believed that 
Soma flows down from the sun in the form of rain.
So the target domains are as follows. The first one is streams of Soma in the 
sun. The second is thoughts which appear in the mind of man exalted by Soma. 
The third is streams of rain. Since Soma in the sun could not appear without 
ritual which preceded it, the recipient is prompted to unfold the whole cosmic 
cycle which begins with human activity. Ṛtá is conceived in terms of the first 
cow which is now traced by Sarama. The meaning of ṛtá in this context is very 
abstract. It is the first creative action which resulted in sunrise and rain.
5. How ṛtá was understood
I will now discuss some other implications of the conceptualisation of ṛtá in 
terms of a leading cow that went away. The poets present themselves as those 
who guard the tracks of ṛtá (10.5.2). In RV 9.73.6d it is stated that ‘evildoers 
do not traverse the path of truth (ṛtá)’ (ṛtásya pánthāṃ ná taranti duṣkŕ̥taḥ).18 
As the tracks of cattle are hidden from outsiders, in the same way the poets hide 
knowledge about reality. It belongs only to them. If an outsider finds it, it will be 
seen in terms of theft of cattle and evaluated as morally bad.
As we have seen, in most of the stanzas a divinised agent of the process or 
activity is mentioned. The gods in the Ṛgveda are called cowherds (gopā́).19 This 
conceptualisation implies that they guard everything that is conceived in terms 
of cattle, beginning with ṛtá and ending with men. Moreover, the concept of 
gods links the abstract concept of reality acting on itself with everyday human 
18 The enemies of the poets are qualified as morally bad in the RV (Jurewicz 2010: 65ff.) 
19 E.g. 1.1.8, 5.63.1, 6.49.15, 9.48.4, 10.8.5.
The concept of ṛtá in the Ṛgveda 37
life. Conceived in terms of cowherds, gods lead men in their ritual activity in the 
same way as the cowherds safely lead their herd:
ṛtásya mitrāvaruṇā pathā́ vām apó ná nāvā́ duritā́ tarema || (7.65.3cd)
By your path of truth (ṛtá), Mitra and Varuna, we would cross over difficulties, as 
[we would] waters by a boat.
In the source domain, the poets are presented as following the path of the leading 
cow. In the target domain, they repeat the first creative activity. The recipient 
understands that the gods have already repeated this activity. Putting this in 
terms of the source domain, they went along the same path as the leading cow. 
Conceptualisation of gods in terms of bulls strengthens the coherence of this 
interpretation. Men are the next herd of bulls which follows the path. Since, as I 
have mentioned above, in the time of the Ṛgveda paths were made by the tracks 
of those who left them, the more people and animals went along them, the better 
the path was. Walking on such a path is the source domain for a good life.20 Thus 
seen, ṛtá is not only the first creative activity but also the condition of the good 
life for men.
Conceptualisation of ṛtá in terms of the leading cow that went away also 
implies that it is not present in the world. However, other usages of the genitive 
case of this word show that it can be partially perceived. Manifestations of ṛtá 
in the world are conceived in terms of manifestations of parts of the cow’s body.
The link which unites sky with earth is conceived in terms of a cow’s horn 
(ṛtásya śŕ̥ṅgam, 8.86.5), which is extended when the sun rises. The sun is con-
ceived in terms of a cow’s udder from which milk can be milked by men in ritual 
(ṛtásya dhā́rāḥ sudúghā dúhānāḥ, 7.43.421). The fuel of fire which is clarified 
butter is conceived also in terms of cow’s milk (ṛtásya páyas, 1.79.3, 3.55.13). 
The milky streams of ṛtá are mentioned in many stanzas (ṛtásya dhā́rā, e.g. 
1.844, 5.12.2, 7.43.4, 9.33.2). The ritual place where fire is kindled and Somic 
juice prepared is conceived in terms of a cow’s womb from which calves are 
born (ṛtásya yóni, e.g. 1.65.3, 3.1.11, 3.62.13, 9.64.20). In the following stanza, 
the back (sā́nu) of ṛtá is mentioned:
ṛtásya sā́nāv ádhi cakramāṇā́ rihánti mádhvo amŕ̥tasya vā́ṇīḥ || (10.123.3cd)
Having stridden onto the back of truth (ṛtá), the voices lick at the immortal honey.
20 This conceptualisation of happiness in terms of a good journey on the chariot can be seen 
in the later Sanskrit term for happiness which is sukhá. In the RV this word is used only in 
reference to a chariot which has a good axle. Such chariots made the journey good. 
21 See Jurewicz 2014.
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This stanza is a good example how concrete experience is used and transformed 
in order to express the metaphysical and ritual content. The concept of voices 
metonymically22 activates the concept of people who sing during ritual. The con-
text implies that they are conceived as being in the sun. As I have just mentioned, 
the sun is conceived in terms of the cow’s udder in the Ṛgveda. This conceptu-
alisation is evoked via the concept of licking honey. Honey corresponds to milk 
which flows from the udder and is identified with Soma in the Ṛgveda. Thus the 
people are conceived in terms of calves which drink milk from a cow’s udder.23
However, the experience is transformed in the stanza. The recipient is also 
prompted to create the impossible image of people who sit on the back of a cow 
and, at the same time, are calves which drink milk from the udder. In these terms, 
the climax of their supernatural cognition under the influence of Soma is con-
ceived. The impossibility of the image expresses the impossibility of this state 
which goes beyond the everyday limits of human life.
The concrete source domain gives a clear structure to the target domain. In 
terms of the back of the cow, the borderline sphere between the manifest and 
unmanifest aspects of reality is conceived; this sphere is reached with supernatu-
ral cognition. The manifest aspect of reality is conceived in terms of the body of 
the cow. The unmanifest aspect is conceived in the negative terms of something 
which is not the cow and cannot be cognised.
Within the frames of this conceptualisation, the word ṛtá refers to the whole 
manifest aspect and is often used in the Ṛgveda with this meaning. At first 
glance, it may seem contradictory to the conceptualisation of ṛtá in terms of 
the leading cow which went away, as analysed above. A closer look, however, 
reveals the coherence of the thinking of the poets who masterly transform their 
everyday experience in order to express their metaphysical assumptions.
In more general terms, ṛtá can be understood as energy initiated in illo tem-
pore and constantly active in cosmic processes and human ritual actions. I would 
argue that the most important feature of ṛtá understood as energy is its order, 
which is realised in time on the cosmic level and in ritual on the human level.24 
Manifestations of this energy in the world are conceived in terms of the parts of a 
cow’s body. Its existence is known on the basis of inference, which is conceived 
in terms of following tracks left by the cow. This energy can be cognised and 
experienced directly in supernatural cognition, which is conceived in terms of 
22 Conceptual metonymy is another model of mental operations analysed in cognitive linguis-
tics, see Lakoff and Johnson 2003. 
23 The climax of supernatural cognition is also conceived in terms of drinking from a spring 
which is on the sun, e.g. 1.154.5. 
24 Ṛtá is also conceived in terms of a chariot (e.g 3.2.8, 4.10.2, 6.55.1, 7.66.12). The concepts 
of a chariot and its parts are elaborated in RV 1.164 to present manifestation of reality in 
time and speech (the most important part of ritual) (see Jurewicz forthcoming). 
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reaching the cow’s back. From this place, not only the whole cow can be seen but 
also the whole herd it leads. The unmanifest source of energy is uncognisable.
It seems that the concept of ṛtá has no counterpart in Greek philosophy. The 
concept of energy, which can be used as one of its counterparts, narrows the 
meaning of ṛtá, and the same is true of its other translations mentioned at 
the beginning of this chapter. In the mind of the recipients of the Ṛgveda, this 
word activates the whole complex of metaphysics together with the condition of 
man. Its conceptualisation in terms of the experience connected with cowherding 
allows the poets to precisely express subtle aspects of a single but multileveled 
reality.
We can see that abstract concepts can be conceived in concrete terms without 
loosing their abstractness. Just the opposite, the clear and simple structure and 
scenario of the source domain is mapped onto the target domain in a way which 
highlights the aspects of the abstract concept without pulling it into concrete-
ness. The Ṛgvedic evidence proves this. Moreover, it shows that the ability for 
abstraction was part of human thinking even in the most ancient times known to 
us. Taking into account that the Ṛgveda continues a rich Indo-European poetical 
tradition,25 we can infer that this ability appeared much earlier. It is also worth 
adding that the attempts of the Pre-Socratic philosophers, analysed by Havelock, 
aimed at creating abstract concepts that reified experience. I have shown that the 
Ṛgvedic poets looked for such conceptualisations which could preserve their 





As has been noted by Émile Benveniste (1969: 99–101), ‘order’ is an extremely 
important concept for Indo-Europeans and is represented by, inter alia, Greek 
‘harmonia’, Sanskrit ṛtá, Avestan aša, and Old Persian arta, all of which descend 
from the same PIE root – *H2er- (to become adjusted, to fit).1 However, as 
Franklin has pointed out, the importance of order to Indo-Europeans is often dis-
cussed in light of the connection between arta and ṛtá.2 It is surprising that there 
have been scarcely any accounts of the striking similarities between harmonia 
and ṛtá, and my aim in this paper is to shed some light on that affinity.3 Harmonia 
was an important cosmological and ethical concept for Heraclitus, Empedocles 
and the so-called Pythagoreans; ṛtá, on the other hand, is considered by many 
 1 I have followed Benveniste’s (1969: 99–101) lead in assuming that ṛtá derives from the 
same root as harmonia – ar2 (to fit or adapt), which is a phonological descendant of the 
PIE *H2er. It has also been claimed that it derives from ar1 (to move); this is the view 
of Oldenberg (1888) and Apte (1942), for instance. ar1 and ar2 are homophonous, but 
syntactically different. Both these roots are falsifiable and it is beyond my scope here to 
offer justification, apart from the fact that a considerable majority of scholars – including 
Bergaigne (1883), Grassman (1875), Renou (1949), Dumézil (1954), Dandekar (1967), 
Benveniste (1969) and Malamoud (1989) – assume that ṛtá derives from ar2. In any case, 
I am in keeping with Gonda’s (1977: 142) view that ‘any etymology is by definition a 
hypothesis and as such never unchallengeable, always liable to constant revision’, and 
that ‘prehistoric roots . . . are not real words but abstractions of our making considered to 
symbolize in a brief formula what some related words have, formally and semantically, in 
common’. Accordingly, I use etymology merely as a starting point and not in order to make 
substantive arguments. 
 2 Franklin 2002: 1.
 3 John Curtis Franklin’s (2002) paper is one of the very few to discuss this connection in 
any detail. Even Benveniste who, in his discussion of ‘themis’, points out that the Greek 
arariskō comes from the same root as ṛtá (1969: 100), does not mention harmonia in this 
context. 
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to be the quintessence of Vedic philosophy. I argue that both these terms can be 
understood as abstract concepts of order, and I rely on evidence from the Ṛgveda 
and from the fragments of Heraclitus, Empedocles and Philolaus in order to do 
so. (For ṛtá see also Jurewicz in this volume.)
The first pressing problem concerning both terms is that they are not easily 
translatable. A cursory glance at any lexicon will demonstrate the vast range 
of meanings that ṛtá has; and harmonia isn’t nearly as straightforward as most 
present-day translators have taken it to be – indeed much is lost in unhesitatingly 
translating it as ‘harmony’. Accordingly, I will begin with an overview of the 
various meanings of each of these terms before turning to the Ṛgvedic hymns 
and Pre-Socratic fragments in order to offer a conceptual comparison between 
the two.
Harmonia
I would like to begin with a brief note on the etymology of ‘harmonia’ (‘har-
moniē’ in the Ionic Greek dialect). The abstract suffix ‘ia’, (-iə̯) is added to a 
conjectural theme *ar-mn, which itself presumably comes from the PIE root 
*H2er- (fit).4 Harmonia does not, of course, mean what contemporary music 
theorists define as ‘harmony’; indeed, as the other words that derive from this 
root suggest,5 the earliest uses of harmonia are not even specifically musical. 
For Homer, in whose works we find the first extant occurrence of the word, 
the primary meaning is ‘physical joining’ together of planks of wood.6 In the 
same corpus, though, we already encounter a more abstract meaning in the Iliad 
(22.255–6), where harmonia stands for ‘covenant’ or ‘agreement’.
Hesiod (Theogony 933) describes the goddess Harmonia as the daughter 
of Aphrodite and Ares. Lasus of Hermione’s fragment 702 contains the first 
extant use of harmonia in reference to the realm of music.7 In Pindar’s odes, 
we find mention of the goddess Harmonia8 in addition to harmonia as a musical 
mode.9 From these early uses, we can see that the notion of harmonia entails the 
 4 Ilievski (1993) traces the roots back to Linear B. He claims that the dialectical basis of the 
noun (h)armo and the verb harmozō can be explained only by phonetic rules according to 
which the inherited IE vocalic nasal -mn- developed a reflex -mo-.; the verb is a technical 
term and, he claims, there is no doubt that the noun harmonia is derived from this verb.
 5 These include verbs like harmozō (fit together) and arariskō ( join together) and nouns like 
harma (chariot), arithmos (number), artus (bond) and arthron ( joint).
 6 Cf. Odyssey 5.247–8; 5.361–2. 
 7 Δάματρα μέλπω Κόραν τε Κλυμένοι᾿ ἄλοχον μελιβόαν ὕμνον ἀναγνέων Αἰολίδ᾿ ἂμ 
βαρύβρομον ἁρμονίαν.
 8 Pythian Ode 3.87–92; 11.7–12.
 9 Nemean Ode 4.44–9; Pythian Ode 8.67–75. 
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 preexistence of two or more disjointed entities, usually in a state of tension – as 
is exemplified by the mythical figure who is the product of the goddess of love 
and the god of war. To borrow from Finney, we can understand harmonia as a 
‘reconciliation of opposites, a fitting together of disparate elements, whether in 
music, universe, the body politic, or the body of man’.10 For the later Greeks, 
harmonia comes to stand for order – and, as we will see, a particular kind of 
order – in the universe as well as many other domains, including mathematics, 
psychology, ethics, poetics and music.
For Heraclitus, harmonia was a central cosmological principle whereby 
opposites were in the proper relation to one another. Empedocles described it as 
a principle of balance working alongside love (philotēs) and strife (neikos). It 
was of supreme importance to the Pythagoreans as well – they regarded harmo-
nia as the orderly fitting together of sound and considered that the good of the 
human soul consisted in ‘grasping and assimilating to that order’.11 I will offer 
a more detailed discussion of Pre-Socratic conceptions of harmonia in what 
 follows. For now, let us turn to ṛtá.
Ṛtá
The substantive Ṛtá has been commonly translated in English as ‘truth’, ‘order’ 
and ‘law’, in French as ‘verité’, ‘ordre’ and ‘loi’, and in German as ‘Wahrheit’, 
‘Weltordnung’ and ‘Gesetz’. Yet none of these – individually or taken together – 
suffice to properly capture the sense of the word. The Ṛgveda alone contains over 
four hundred instances of the noun ṛtá as well as its adjectival form, occurring in 
a variety of contexts, in hymns dedicated to different deities.
In the Böhtlingk Wörterbuch (1928), ṛtá as an adjective was defined as 
‘ordered, right, righteous, brave, efficient, true’; as an adverb, it meant ‘rightly, 
correctly, properly, strongly’; finally, as a substantive, it could mean: ‘a) fixed 
order, determination, decision, b) order in sacred matters, sacred custom, statute, 
pious work, divine law, faith as the epitome of religious truth, c) the right, truth 
(especially religious truth), and the right path’. Apart from this array of possible 
meanings, one of the remarkable things about ṛtá is the richness of imagery asso-
ciated with it – a path (pantham ṛtásya),12 a seat (ṛtásya yonī,13 ṛtásya sadan14), 
a wheel (cakram ṛtásya15) and a stream (dhārām ṛtásya16), to name but a few.
10 Finney 1973: 388.
11 Barker 1989: 6.
12 RV 1.46, 65, 79, 124, 128, 136; 3.12, 31; 5.45, 80; 6.4; 7.44, 65; 10.66, 70
13 RV 3.62; 4.1.
14 RV 1.84, 164; 3.55; 4.21, 42; 5.1; 7.53.
15 RV 1.164.
16 RV 1.67; 5.12; 7.43. 
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As we can see, it is by no means so straightforward a term that a single trans-
lation could do it justice.17 My goal is merely to highlight its various senses before 
attempting to ascertain whether these can be subsumed under some more general 
principle. Perhaps one way of arriving at a somewhat coherent understanding 
of a term with so many different senses is by regarding ṛtá as a single principle 
with manifestations in various domains – indeed, much the same could be said 
for harmonia. Gonda puts it well when he describes ṛtá as ‘that untranslatable 
term which may be approximately described as the supreme and fundamental 
order-and- reality conditioning the normal and right, natural and true structure 
of cosmos, ritual and human conduct’.18 In this passage, Gonda describes the 
domains of ṛtá as the cosmos, ritual and human conduct; we could say, on the 
other hand, that the domains of harmonia include the cosmos, human conduct and 
the human soul. Both harmonia and ṛtá could be understood as principles of order 
and balance that have different manifestations in these different domains. In the 
remainder of this chapter, I will explore the extent to which this hypothesis is tena-
ble. I hope, in the process, to shed more light on the precise nature of this ‘order’.19
One of the most striking similarities between harmonia and ṛtá is the manner 
in which they serve as regulating principles in the cosmos. The universe, for 
both the ṛṣi-s of the Ṛgveda and for the Pre-Socratic philosophers, is made up of 
opposing principles – night/day, hot/cold, mortal/immortal, etc. – and it is imper-
ative that these opposing principles be kept in the proper relation to one another, 
for it is this state of balance that constitutes a well-ordered universe. I contend 
that harmonia and ṛtá are the keys to the maintenance of this relationship, for the 
Pre-Socratics and the Vedic ṛsi-s respectively: there is ample evidence for this 
claim in the fragments of Heraclitus, Empedocles and Philolaus, as well as in 
several hymns of the Ṛgveda. Let us first take a look at the role of opposites and 
dualities before turning to a discussion of how harmonia and ṛtá regulate these.
Opposites
Various hymns, including the famous Nāsādiyasūkta (RV 10.129), mention 
primal waters preexisting anything animate.20 They are prior to the One (tad 
17 Pace Lüders (1959), who claims that ṛtá is identical to ‘Wahrheit’. For more on why 
Lüders’ claim is problematic, see Gonda 1977: 137–8.
18 Gonda 1972: 109.
19 I should note, at the outset, that I will not be comparing harmonia and ṛtá in all their 
domains of application – there will be no further discussion of the ritualistic role of ṛtá, for 
instance, nor will I talk about the structure of human souls; my focus will be on the natural 
domain and its connection to the moral one.
20 It is difficult to isolate a unified cosmogonical account in the Ṛgveda, and I rely on recon-
structions, such as those of Brown (1942), when I discuss Ṛgvedic cosmogony.
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ekam) in RV 10.129 and to all the Gods (RV 10.121, 10.80), presumably includ-
ing the cosmic craftsman, Tvaṣṭṛ. In general, the primal state is one in which 
the basic opposites that define the cosmos as we know it have not yet come into 
existence – there is no night/day, midspace/heaven, or death/deathlessness (RV 
10.129.1–3). Most importantly neither the sat (being) nor the asat (non-being) 
existed then (RV 10.129.1). The cosmos could not have existed without oppos-
ing principles, and it is these very principles that underlie reality. In the Ṛgveda, 
as in the fragments of Empedocles, the cosmos as we know it only comes to 
exist when there is some degree of differentiation.21 In an Empedoclean universe 
dominated entirely by love (philotēs), as described in 31 DK B27 for instance, 
everything is homogeneous; all mortal things have a ‘double passing away’ 
(B17) – complete separation (the rule of strife) causes things to pass away, but 
so too does the coming together of all things (the rule of love) because of the 
absence of recognisable masses like earth, air, fire and water (B38): oppositional 
forces form the very fabric of the cosmos.
The Ṛgveda abounds with descriptions of opposing principles. I have already 
mentioned the fundamental pairs present in RV 10.129 – being/non-being, night/
day, death/deathlessness and midspace/heaven. To these we can add darkness/
light (RV 10.129) and heaven/earth (RV 10.190). Dyaus (Sky) and Prithvi (Earth) 
are the parents of the gods; the gods themselves are broadly divided into Devas 
and Asuras and the struggle between them incarnates the struggle between oppos-
ing principles. Indeed, the very names of some gods stand for abstract principles 
of opposition. Consider, for instance, the Ādityas and the Dānavas. As Brown 
points out, their names are derived from those of their mothers – Aditi and Dānu 
21 Compare Empedocles 31 DK B27 with RV 10.129.1:
ἔνθ’ οὔτ’ ἠελίοιο διείδεται ὠκέα γυῖα
οὐδὲ μὲν οὐδ’ αἴης λάσιον μένος οὐδὲ θάλασσα·
οὕτως Ἁρμονίης πυκινῶι κρύφωι ἐστήρικται
Σφαῖρος κυκλοτερὴς μονίηι περιηγέι γαίων.
Here are distinguished neither the swift limbs of the sun nor the shaggy might of the earth, 
nor the sea; but equal from every side and without end, it stays fast in the close covering of 
harmoniē, a rounded sphere rejoicing in his circular solitude. (31 DK B27)
nā́sad āsīn nó sád āsīt tadā́nīd
nā́sīd rájo nó víomā paró yát
kím ā́varīvaB kúha kásya śármann
ámbhan kím āsīd gáhanan gabhīrám
The nonexistent did not exist, nor did the existent exist at that time.
There existed neither the airy space nor heaven beyond.
What moved back and forth? From where and in whose protection? Did water exist, a deep 
depth? (RV 10.129.1, tr. Jamison and Brereton 2014)
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respectively, the first standing for ‘boundless, infinite’ and the second for ‘bonded, 
restrained’.22 The opposition can also be observed in respect to their functions: the 
Ādityas are associated with creative forces and the Dānavas with destructive ones.
While several Pre-Socratic philosophers describe opposites as fundamental 
principles in the cosmos, nowhere is this more apparent than in the fragments 
of Heraclitus, who describes a range of opposites, such as immortal/mortal (22 
DK B62), death/life (B62, B48), pure/impure (B61), waking/sleeping (B88), 
cold/hot (B126), dry/wet (B126), and young/old (B88). Philolaus of Croton, a 
so-called Pythagorean, describes the limiting (ta perainonta) and the unlimited 
(ta apeira) as the two fundamental metaphysical principles in his account of the 
cosmos (44 DK B1, B6). The basic cosmic principles according to Empedocles 
are love (philotēs) and strife (neikos), forces of attraction and repulsion that are 
engaged in an eternal struggle. We can see opposing principles in his four roots 
or elements (rhizōmata) as well – water/fire and earth/air, the former represent-
ing cold/hot and the latter representing dense/rare.23
This brief survey demonstrates the fundamental role played by opposing 
principles in both Ṛgvedic and Pre-Socratic cosmologies. Yet, what is common 
to both is also the necessity of these opposing principles and the strife between 
them. The cosmos cannot exist in the absence of these principles, and the pre- 
cosmic state is characterised by a lack of differentiation. However, it is not 
enough for these opposites to merely exist in the absence of some principle of 
regulation. I suggest that ṛtá is an ordering principle for the Rgvedic cosmos 
much as harmonia is an ordering principle for the Pre-Socratic one.24
Order in nature
In the Ṛgveda, the sat, the sphere of being and life, is regulated by ṛtá. The sat is 
opposed to the asat, which is ruled by anṛtá (lacking in ṛtá). We can learn more 
about the characteristics of the asat from RV 7.104. There is material opposition 
between them, since the asat is dark and dry whereas the sat is full of moisture 
and light – the conditions necessary for life. As I mentioned earlier, ṛtá is asso-
ciated with images of paths, waters and light. Sat/ṛtá and asat/anṛtá also stand in 
moral opposition – RV 7.104 tells us that an evil person is to be relegated to the 
22 Brown 1942: 90. ‘Aditi’ is formed from the privative ‘a’ and ‘diti’ whose root is ‘da’ (to 
bind; to fetter). ‘Dānu’ comes from the same root as ‘Aditi’ – da – and is a primary deriva-
tive with the suffix -nu. Cf. Brown 1942: 90–1. 
23 Empedocles (31 DK B21) explicitly describes the sun as hot (‘ἠέλιον . . . θερμὸν’) and 
water (rain) as cold (‘ὄμβρον . . . ῥιγαλέον). Cf. Aristotle On Generation and Corruption 
314b–15a. 
24 I refer only to the Pre-Socratic cosmologies I have discussed above. Anaximander, for 
instance, described this principle of regulation as justice (dikē) rather than harmonia. 
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asat, ruled by anṛtá and that the fate of such a person is destruction (niṛrti). The 
evil person is also described as one who strengthens by the darkness (tamovṛdh) 
associated with anṛtá whereas the gods are often described as being strengthened 
by ṛtá (ṛtávṛdh) and, what is more, born in it (ṛtájāta).
In general, various gods are associated with ṛtá and sat. Agni, Indra, Mitra-
Varuṇa and Soma are the primary deities associated with ṛtá. Seventy-eight of 
the hymns to Agni, thirty-five to Indra, forty-two to Soma, fifteen to the Aṣvins 
(the twins), and nine to Uṣa (dawn) mention ṛtá. Agni is often described as 
being the ‘first-born of ṛtá’ (prathamajā́ ṛtásya; RV 10.5), ‘true to ṛtá’ (ṛtāvana), 
and as the ‘guardian of ṛtá’ (ṛtásya gopah). Lüders conceives of Varuṇa’s pri-
mary role as being the master of ṛtá:25 he is said to spread out the cosmos, with 
its three realms, by means of ṛtá (RV 4.42)26 and is even said, at one point, to 
take its form (RV 1.180, ṛtápsu). Indra is described as resting on the seat of ṛtá 
along with the Maruts (RV 4.21) and he, too, is a protector of ṛtá and born in it 
(RV 7.20, ṛtapā́ ṛtejā́ḥ). Indra, Varuna, Mitra and Aryaman are all said to grow 
strong through ṛtá (RV 7.82). Indra is also ‘yoked to ṛtá’ (ṛtāyuj, RV 6.39) when 
he is destroying Vala. The gods are responsible for maintaining ṛtá as the domi-
nant principle – Mitra, Varuṇa and Agni are all guardians of ṛtá (ṛtásya gopah), 
and they (the Ādityas) also grow strong through it (RV 2.27, ṛtenāditya mahi). 
At RV 7.66, we are given a slew of descriptions for Mitra-Varuṇa: true to ṛtá 
(ṛtāvan), born in ṛtá (ṛtājata), strengthened by ṛtá (ṛtávṛdh), and haters of anṛtá 
(anṛtádvis). This last epithet serves to heighten the contrast between ṛtá and 
anṛtá. Furthermore, we can see from the cosmic roles assigned to the gods that 
their proper domain is sat whereas Paṇis and Dānavas have their domain in asat.
Beyond these associations, we also find two myths in the Ṛgveda – that of 
the Indra-Vṛṭṛa battle and that of the Paṇis (RV 10.108) – which demonstrate the 
urgency of threats to this ṛtá. According to RV 10.108, the Paṇis, demons who 
live in the sky, steal various treasures from the Angirases – horses, cows, dawn 
and her rays, ritual fire, the sun, and the path of light and day. Srinivasan high-
lights that these are all items essential to the performance of the sacrifice and this 
sacrifice is crucial because it strengthens ṛtá.27 Eventually, the priests, in alliance 
with Soma, Indra, Agni and Bṛhaspati, are able to have these treasures released 
and to proceed with the ṛtá-strengthening sacrifice. The battle between Indra and 
Vṛṭṛa (whose name aptly means ‘encloser’) has as its consequence the creation of 
the cosmos as we know it.28 Like the Paṇis, Vṛṭṛa had bound various necessities 
25 Lüders 1959: 28–40.
26 ṛténa putró áditer ṛtā́vā/utá tridhā́tu prathayad ví bhū́ma (RV 4.42.4).
27 Srinivasan 1973: 44.
28 The Indra-Vṛṭṛa battle is described in various hymns and I rely on Brown’s (1942) synthe-
sis in my discussion. 
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of the cosmos – waters and the sun, for instance. Indra releases the waters and 
the waters, in turn, give birth to the sun. Indra’s acts of creation after the defeat 
of Vṛṭṛa involve the separation of the sat, which comes to be ruled by ṛtá, from 
the asat, ruled by anṛtá.
However, as Srinivasan points out, neither of these creation myths can be 
considered to formulate a literal cosmogonic account.29 Instead, the main issue 
raised in both is the difficulty entailed in preserving the ṛtá-governed sat. It is 
also significant that neither asat nor anṛtá disappear (RV 2.24). There is still 
some darkness below the earth (RV 5.32, 8.6), where the rakṣasas (demons) 
are believed to dwell. Ṛtá predominates, strengthened and maintained by gods 
and men, but both these accounts – that of the Paṇis and that of Indra-Vṛṭṛa – 
 emphasise its precarious state. There exists a harmonic balance between sat and 
asat as well as between the other opposing principles and realms.
We have already seen how the existence of oppositional principles is nec-
essary for creation. For the universe to be in an ordered rather than chaotic 
state, there needs to be some kind of arrangement between these oppositional 
principles. In the Ṛgveda (as well as in the Pre-Socratic fragments) such an 
arrangement entails predominance of one principle over another without the 
eradication of the other. The goal is not an equilibrium between opposites, but 
a state wherein they are in the proper proportion to one another. It is ṛtá that 
controls the transformation, the balancing and the adjustment of forces in a state 
of tension. Ṛtá is not ‘order’ in the sense of a ‘cosmic blueprint’; it is, rather, a 
dynamic principle of order, regulating the constant struggle between the opposi-
tional forces that are the very fabric of the cosmos. I now attempt to show how 
ṛtá and harmonia regulate the opposites and, in so doing, highlight yet more 
important aspects of these concepts and points of resemblance between them.
Although oppositional phenomena and principles play an important role 
in Ṛgvedic cosmology, I am not claiming that the Vedic ṛṣi-s believed that 
there were neat groups of opposite principles in reality, since RV 10.129 claims 
that everything emanated from a single principle. There are apparent opposites, 
but these are all closely interconnected and interrelated because of ṛtá. In this 
respect, there is a strong resemblance to Heraclitus’ cosmology.
Heraclitus believed that nature (physis) loves to hide (B123) and that for 
this reason the knowledge of this nature was not easy to acquire, even if the 
account (logos) is common to all creatures (B2). He also claimed that the hidden 
harmonia was superior to the obvious one (B54). I contend that this hidden har-
monia refers to the underlying metaphysical organisation of the world, which 
consists in the balance and interconnection of all apparent opposites, some of 
which I have mentioned above. Further, we are told that ‘it is wise to agree that 
29 Srinivasan 1973: 55.
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all things are one’ (ὁμολογεῖν σοφόν ἓν πάντα εἶναι, B50). Such a claim might 
seem less enigmatic if we understand it to mean that there is an inherent har-
monic connection between opposites. This unity of Heraclitus’ opposites can be 
understood as the harmonia of these opposites wherein ‘harmonia’ isn’t just a 
synonym for ‘unity’ but a particular principle of order. For Heraclitus, night/day 
and winter/summer are regarded as one (B57, B67), and, in light of his views 
on harmonia, we could understand this to mean that such natural phenomena 
are regulated by the principle of harmonia. In the Ṛgveda, too, the days and 
the seasons are the clearest example of the way in which ṛtá regulates natural 
phenomena.
Mitra-Varuṇa and Aryaman, the Ādityas, who are described as the chariot-
eers, guardians and strengtheners of ṛtá (RV 7.66), are the ones who establish 
the day, the night, the year and month (RV 7.66.11). The ṛtá-possessing Mitra-
Varuṇa are responsible for bringing the year to completion (RV 7.61). Recall, 
also, that nights and days and years are said to come about only after ṛtá and 
satya were born out of the initial heat (tapas) according to the cosmogony in RV 
10.190. Uṣa (the dawn) is true and obedient to ṛtá (RV 5.80.1; RV 1.123), moves 
according to it (RV 7.75), resides in the seat of ṛtá (ṛtásya sadan, RV 4.51), and 
has her horses yoked to it (RV 4.51). Varuṇa, master of ṛtá, is also supposed to 
have prepared the path of the sun and the stars (RV 1.24). At one point, dawn and 
night are described as the mothers of ṛtá (RV 1.142, 5.5); at another point, sky 
and earth are described as its parents (RV 6.17, 10.5). The terrestrial rivers, too, 
are true to ṛtá (ṛtávarī, RV 3.33, 4.18) and the sun is even described as the wheel 
of ṛtá (RV 1.164.11).30 In general, all the major natural phenomena are related to 
ṛtá, and harmonia played a similarly important role in the natural order described 
by Empedocles and Philolaus.
We know from Diogenes’ Lives (DL 8.85) that Philolaus of Croton was sup-
posed to have written a work entitled On Nature (Περὶ Φύσεως), that this work 
began with the claim that nature is made up out of limiters and unlimited, and 
that both entities need a third to come upon (epigignein) them in order for the 
cosmos to exist. This third entity is harmonia (44 DK B1, B6). The world-order 
as a whole as well as all the individuals within it are regulated by harmonia.
Empedocles, too, recognised the importance of harmonia even though we 
30 duvā́daśāraI nahí táj járāya
várvarti cakrám pári dyā́m ṛtásya
ā́ putrā́ agne mithunā́so átra
saptá śatā́ni vitāánāi ca tasthuā
Twelve-spoked, the wheel of ṛtá [= the Sun] ever rolls around heaven – yet not to old age. 
Upon it, o Agni, stand seven hundred twenty sons in pairs [= the nights and days of the 
year]. (RV 1.164.11, tr. after Jamison and Brereton 2014.)
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have limited evidence for this. According to him, the universe consists of four 
elements being controlled by the cosmic principles of love, which unites the 
elements, and strife, which forces them apart. In the final stage of cosmic devel-
opment, love causes all things to come together (31 DK B35) – there is complete 
unity of the elements in the form of a homogeneous sphere, while strife is left 
completely outside the sphere (B17, B27). Empedocles describes the current 
situation as being one where love predominates but strife nonetheless offers 
enough resistance to prevent all things from becoming homogenised; some ele-
ments are mixed and some are not. When strife prevails, however, there is a 
complete separation of the elements (B35). Love integrates living organisms 
while strife disintegrates them (B20).
However, harmonia holds everything in a fixed proportion. Consider for 
instance B96:
ἡ δὲ χθὼν ἐπίηρος ἐν εὐτύκτοις χοάνοισι
τὰς δύο τῶν ὀκτὼ μοιράων λάχε Νήστιδος αἲγλης,
τέσσαρα δ’ Ἡφαίστοιο· τὰ δ’ ὀστέα λευκὰ γένοντο
Ἁρμονίης κόλλῃσιν ἀρηρότα θεσπεσίῃσιν.
Earth in well-made melting pots got two parts of glittering Nestis, out of its eight 
parts, and four from Hephaestus; white bones were produced, joined by the divine 
glue of harmoniē.
This fragment is remarkable as one of the earliest instances of harmonia being 
used in a case of explicitly numerical proportion – bones are made out of earth, 
fire and water in a numerical ratio. Here, harmonia stands for mixing in a par-
ticular proportion – there is balance and not complete unity or merging and, in 
this, it is importantly different from love. It entails a proper fitting together of 
discrete entities that nonetheless retain their original identity and don’t simply 
blend into one another.
Fragment B23 also provides us with an image of how harmonia regulates 
and, indeed, creates all of nature as we know it:
. . . οἵτ’ ἐπεὶ οὖν μάρψωσι πολύχροα φάρμακα χερσίν,
ἁρμονίηι μείξαντε τὰ μὲν πλέω, ἄλλα δ’ ἐλάσσω,
ἐκ τῶν εἴδεα πᾶσιν ἀλίγκια πορσύνουσι,
δένδρεά τε κτίζοντε καὶ ἀνέρας ἠδὲ γυναῖκας
θῆράς τ’ οἰωνούς τε καὶ ὑδατοθρέμμονας ἰχθῦς
καί τε θεοὺς δολιχαίωνας τιμῆισι φερίστους·
and so when they take pigments of various colours in their hands, mixing them in 
harmoniē, some more, some less, [and] from them prepare forms resembling all 
things, making trees, men, women, beasts, birds water-nourished fish, and long-lived 
gods foremost in honours.
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When read in conjunction with B21, this fragment likens the work of painters 
with their pigments to the effects of love and strife on the four elements – 
Empedocles even uses dual forms to describe the work of the painters (meizante, 
ktizonte), which emphasises their analogy to love and strife. However, love and 
strife alone are not enough – they need to mix pigments in order to bring about 
creation in accordance with harmonia. From what we know, the painters’ task 
did not involve blending different pigments to create new colours, but rather 
juxtaposing (four basic) different pigments in order to create realistic depictions 
– so ‘mixing in harmoniē’ most likely meant mixing in an ordered and fitting 
way.31 In the cosmos as we know it, love and strife are optimally balanced such 
that existence comes about by means of harmonia, partly mixed and partly 
unmixed, since the prevalence of either extreme would result in the destruction 
of our world.
Order in human life
We have seen how harmonia and ṛtá play an exceedingly important role in the 
natural world and are responsible for its orderly functioning. Another significant 
– and closely related – point of comparison lies in the relationship that human 
beings bear to the principles of cosmic order. It is the case, with both ṛtá and 
harmonia, that ordinary human beings are not immediately able to distinguish 
and recognise them, and both the Ṛgvedic and Pre-Socratic writers assert the 
value of this ability. Indeed, in the Greek tradition, perfection of the human soul 
consists in comprehending the cosmic order and living in accordance to it.32 In 
the Ṛgveda, both men and gods live in the realm of ṛtá, but only the latter are able 
to recognise it. Most of the hymns that mention ṛtá emphasise its connection to 
the gods, and some mention that they know and hate anṛtá. Mitra-Varuṇa lives 
in the house of ṛtá and fights the hated anṛtá (RV 7.60.5, 7.66.13), and Varuṇa 
is described as the king who is able to discern ṛtá from anṛtá (RV 10.124.5). On 
the other hand, the Vedic ṛṣi-s have to implore the gods to reveal to them the 
difference between the two:
31 For more on ancient painting, cf. Sections III. 29–44 from The Natural History by Pliny the 
Elder. See also Kranz 1912, Bruno 1977 and Struycken 2003.
32 I have limited myself to a discussion of harmonia in Pre-Socratic writings. However, the 
remarkable account in Plato’s Timaeus (90b6–d7) is worth mentioning, especially since 
it represents ideas that many have taken to be Pythagorean. The universe has a harmonic 
structure and motions that are proper to this structure; the human soul initially has this same 
structure and motion, but these are disturbed when the human soul is first embodied. It is 
only by attending to the harmonia in this world that we can bring disordered human souls 
to their initial harmonic order. This restoration of order to the soul is what happiness and 
the best life consists in. 
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amī́ yé devā sthána
triṣú ā́ rocané diváḥ
kád va ṛtáṃ kád ánṛtaṃ
kúva pratnā́ va ā́hutir.
You gods, who are yonder in the three luminous realms of heaven –
What is ṛtá for you, what is anṛtá? Where is the age-old offering for you?
(RV 1.105.5, tr. after Jamison and Brereton 2014)
This hymn expresses the anxiety of a Vedic ṛṣi about the maintenance of the 
cosmic and the earthly order. He begins by describing both kinds of order and 
then expresses his fears about them being upheld. The verse above expresses his 
fears concerning his lack of insight into ṛtá. This insight is important because it 
allows him to act in accordance with ṛtá and thereby to strengthen and uphold it.
Two hymns describe the ṛṣi-s who have managed to attain this knowledge. 
RV 10.71 describes the degrees of mastery of sacred speech (vāc) attained by 
the ṛṣi-s. This mastery is needed in order for them to perform Soma rites, which 
in turn strengthen ṛtá. Not everyone is able to understand the sacred speech in 
the same way – some, who supposedly hear, do not truly hear, but hear in vain 
(RV 10.71.4, 6). All the ṛṣi-s have the ability – by sensorial means – to grasp the 
sacred speech, but not all have the quickness of mind needed for this task (RV 
10.71.7). Sensory imperviousness to ṛtá is also mentioned in RV 4.23.8, where 
the hymn to ṛtá is said to have the power to open even deaf ears. Being recep-
tive to ṛtá and being able to grasp it is the ultimate goal of any mortal, and this 
is something that some ṛṣi-s are indeed able to do. The path for the enlightened 
ṛṣi-s who seek ṛtá is thornless and easy (RV 1.41.4). In the hymn to Bṛhaspati 
mentioned above (RV 2.24), ṛṣi-s are described as possessing ṛtá and perceiving 
anṛtá (ṛtā́vānaḥ praticákṣyā́nṛtā); they are thus able to aid in the battle against 
Vala and in the upholding of ṛtá. As Mahoney puts it:
Vedic sages . . . understood Ṛtá to be the inherent universal principle of balance and 
concord, a dynamic rule or order in which all things contribute in their own unique 
way to the smooth running of the cosmos as a whole. If they were aligned with Ṛtá, 
therefore, all things would be true to their own given nature and, in so doing, would 
properly express their particular function in that intricate and delicately aligned 
system of order.33
Ṛtá regulates the cosmos and the divine realm but also regulates the human 
realm and dictates human conduct, since the highest kind of human life involves 
understanding ṛtá and being aligned to it. Much the same is true of harmonia for 
the Pre-Socratics.
33 Mahoney 1998: 48.
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Heraclitus chastises human beings for being unseeing and unhearing (B1). 
In echoes of some hymns from the Ṛgveda, humans are described as hearing 
like the deaf and being ‘absent while present’ (B34). Nonetheless, Heraclitus 
claims that the true metaphysical structure of the world is available for anyone 
who searches for it properly even though the search is a difficult one and often 
yields little.34 According to him, the logos, which has strong connections to 
harmonia, is eternal, although men fail to comprehend it (B1).35 Like unskilled 
ṛṣi-s and laymen, most people are unable to distinguish the hidden structure of 
the universe.
As I mentioned earlier, Heraclitus’ hidden harmonia might refer to the 
hidden metaphysical structure of the universe. From this, we may infer that 
only someone who truly listens to the logos will be able to progress from a mere 
perception of the obvious harmonia to the knowledge of the true harmonia that 
governs nature. In the words of Kahn: ‘The concept of harmonie as a unity com-
posed of conflicting parts is thus the model for an understanding of the world 
ordering as a unified whole. And it is the comprehension of this pattern in all its 
applications that constitutes wisdom.’36
Harmonia and ṛtá as dynamic and ontologically independent principles
Having examined how harmonia and ṛtá similarly function as principles of 
order, governing both nature and human life, I will end with two claims about the 
nature of these principles. I argue that, in the Ṛgvedic as well as the Pre-Socratic 
texts considered in these pages, harmonia and ṛtá can both be understood as a 
dynamic principle of order as well as ontologically independent from any divine 
entity. We can perhaps better understand the first claim by paying attention to 
the striking imagery in Heraclitus’ fragment about the harmonia of bow and lyre:
οὐ ξυνιᾶσιν ὅκως διαφερόμενον ἑωυτῶι ὁμολογέει· παλίντροπος ἁρμονίη ὅκωσπερ 
τόξου καὶ λύρης.
They do not comprehend how a thing agrees at variance with itself; it is a harmoniē 
turning back on itself, like that of the bow and the lyre. (B51)
34 χρυσὸν γὰρ οἱ διζήμενοι γῆν πολλὴν ὀρύσσουσι καὶ εὑρίσκουσιν ὀλίγον. Seekers after gold 
dig up much earth, but find little (22 DK B22).
35 I have argued in an as yet unpublished paper for the relationship between Heraclitus’ con-
cept of logos (word, account) and that of harmoniē, and it is beyond my scope here to offer 
a complete explanation of this relationship. We can understand the logos as the account of 
the world, and this account would consist in a description of the metaphysical organisation 
of the world. I contend that, for Heraclitus, harmoniē is the principle that organises the 
world. 
36 Kahn 1979: 200.
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The bow and the lyre are the key to understanding how two or more things that 
are in a state of tension can nonetheless agree. We can understand this harmo-
nia as the sound created when tense strings come together to create consonance 
– they create ‘harmony’ in the musical sense. But the common translation of 
‘attunement’ doesn’t fully capture the meaning of harmonia. Both bow and lyre 
illustrate the unity of entities in tension on account of their shape as well. They 
are similarly constructed and contain at least one string that is in tension. The 
tension between string and frame in both the bow as well as the lyre shows how 
something being stretched apart also comes together in a productive way. Both 
the duality and the unity of opposites is clearly brought out in this fragment as is 
the importance of balance. In a remarkable coincidence, the Ṛgveda, in a hymn 
to Bṛhaspati, also provides us with an image of a ṛtá-possessing bow:
ṛtájyena k̥tájyen bráhmaena pátir
yátra vátra prá tád aśnoti dhánvanā
tásya sādhvī́r íādhv yā́bhir ásyati
nṛcáknāag dŕ̥śáye kárśáyeāag b
The lord of the sacred formulation, with his swift bow whose string is ṛtá – where 
he wishes, there he reaches. To him belong the straight flying arrows [= the hymns] 
with which he shoots – [arrows] to be seen, drawing the gaze of men, and whose 
womb is the ear. (RV 2.24.8, tr. after Jamison and Brereton 2014)
In this hymn, Bṛhaspati is described as slaying Vala with his bow and arrow. 
The string of this bow is described as ‘ṛtájyena’, which can be translated as ‘ṛtá-
strung’ or ‘one whose string is ṛtá’. As with the Heraclitean fragment, we can see 
how fittingly the image of the bow illustrates the manner in which ṛtá balances 
and orders.
It is also notable that both harmonia and ṛtá seem to be ontologically inde-
pendent from any divinity. In the Ṛgveda (10.190), ṛtá and satya (‘what is; the 
truth’) are born out of the primordial heat (tapas) and prior to the Vedic divin-
ities. I have already cited the various instances of the gods being referred to as 
‘born in ṛtá’ – they uphold it and reside in it and even strengthen it, but they are 
not responsible for its creation. The same is true of harmonia. Philolaus took it 
to be an independently existent principle that supervenes upon the existent limit-
ers and unlimited; Heraclitus did not think that either men or gods had anything 
to do with the established natural order; and within Empedocles’ system, love, 
strife and harmonia are responsible for the creation and destruction of all other 
entities.37
37 Franklin also notices the parallels between ṛtá and harmonia in this respect and, in addi-
tion, points out that ṛtá is ‘remote and impersonal . . . but provides the ordered context in 
which all personal experience becomes meaningful’ (2002: 7). 
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Conclusion
Harmonia and ṛtá both refer to the regulation of cosmic principles as well as nat-
ural phenomena. Furthermore, they play an important role in regulating human 
conduct, since the best human life consists in living in accordance with these 
principles. I have also argued that they resemble each other in being dynamic 
principles of order that occupy a central place in their respective systems while 
remaining ontologically independent from any divinity. There still remains much 
to be said about the connection between the two: for instance, a discussion of the 
relations between harmonia and logos on the one hand and ṛtá and satya on the 
other could prove fruitful. The present investigation has also been limited to 
the hymns of the Ṛgveda and to the fragments of three Pre-Socratic thinkers, and 
we could learn yet more about these terms by including other corpora. For the 
present, though, I would like to conclude that at the most abstract level, harmo-
nia and ṛtá are principles of order that stand for the dynamic fitting together of 
disjointed entities. The fitting together takes place in nature, the macrocosm, and 
in human life, the microcosm; furthermore, it also involves adaptations between 
microcosm and macrocosm.38
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Ātman and its transition to worldly existence
Greg Bailey
What can we say about a concept like the ātman when its principal feature is its 
apparent indefinability and impersonal nature? Initially we could do worse than 
utilise Jurewicz’s definition of the term, based mainly on Ṛgvedic sources: ‘This 
word is used to denote the essence of an entity, the whole body (which ensures 
personal identity and existence), its most important parts, which are the head 
(which ensures personal identity and existence – here and in the afterworlds) 
and the breath (which ensures the existence of a living being)’.1 But moving on 
to the Upaniṣads, the final texts in the Vedic corpus, we find a systematisation 
and an impersonalism in the conceptual development of the ātman idea. We are 
confronted in the Upaniṣads with what individual teachers say about it, rather 
than what it is, because what it is defies easy description in words and this has to 
be taken as the axiomatic commencement point for any study of it.
In looking at the possible origin of the idea of such an essence, we could 
draw upon Proferes, who has recently argued for ideas of universal sovereignty, 
associated with the sacred fire2 of the household, clan and tribe, where the rājā’s 
fire combines the parts with the whole. It becomes a political metaphor that could 
be used to develop a metaphysical idea of unity within diversity. For Proferes,
The identity of the king with his dominion and, ultimately, with the cosmos can be 
shown to have directly informed the early Upaniṣadic discourse on the nature of the 
 1 Jurewicz 2007: 130.
 2 See Proferes 2007: 31, ‘The fire is produced in each far-flung household separately, and 
yet is present among them all simultaneously. As such, it marks the presence of a central 
power, . . . it serves to bind together the distinct members of the greater polity and affirm 
a common unity.’ And: ‘What was more revolutionary, however, was the uncoupling 
of the ideological underpinnings of the rite from its social context, and the concomitant 
generalisation of the values expressed through the rite to all twice-born males, regardless 
of political status’ (2007: 136). Jurewicz 2007 is also important here, focusing on the 
 essentiality of fire to life and identity, but does not suggest a political subtext. 
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absolute and the means to achieving spiritual freedom. The evidence is found in the 
substantial number of Upaniṣadic passages in which metaphors of sovereignty are 
employed in immediate connection with the identification of the macrocosm and 
microcosm.3
He gives a series of examples from the two earliest Upaniṣads, in order to 
argue that it is the sense of ‘unlimitedness’ associated with Vedic ideals of freedom 
that becomes disconnected from theories of kingship and translated into a meta-
physical idea of freedom from all limitations. This is necessarily impersonal and 
abstract, but at the same time universal in applying to a definition of personhood.
In this chapter I attempt to explore how the ātman enters the world or relates 
to the world of limitations, where the word ‘world’ designates everything onto-
logically different from the ātman, and ‘relates’ refers to how it can know things 
outside of itself, usually by means of the senses (also part of the world of limita-
tions). Ontologically, ātman and world, consisting of psychological and physical 
constituents, are conceptual opposites. Yet strenuous efforts are made to describe 
how the ātman interacts with the world, most of these descriptions phrased 
in strongly assertive language,4 and in highly elliptical sentences, all showing 
the conceptual difficulties involved in using language to define a concept that 
seemingly defies language. What seems to have happened is that a belief in some 
kind of entity existing beyond temporal and spatial limitations was asserted, then 
logical consistency required exploration of how it might be known by what was 
ontologically separate from it and, in turn, how it managed to cognise that which 
was separate from it.
Definitions of the ātman
There are a range of explanations/paraphrases of the ātman given in Upaniṣads 
of differing time periods, and the later their date of composition, the more and 
more Sāṃkhyan ideas seem to have infiltrated into the teaching of the ātman’s 
entry into the world.5 In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and the Chāndogya Upaniṣads we 
are given fragments of cosmogonic myths – largely demythologised in relation 
to their Vedic antecedents and their Purāṇic successors – where the ātman is 
sometimes depicted as the beginning point in the creation process. I have used 
these first because they genuinely attempt to account for the ātman’s entry into 
the world and simultaneously present definitions of the ātman.
In a brisk reading of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and the Chāndogya Upaniṣads, I 
have totalled up thirty-four definitions of the ātman. We could argue whether or 
 3 Proferes 2007: 143.
 4 See Gren-Eklund 1978.
 5 Of which the best example is found in MaiU 6.17–30.
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not these are definitions, descriptive paraphrases or metaphorical statements, and 
the very number of definitions/paraphrases may signify the difficulty in using 
language to describe such an ethereal concept, one that seemingly needed first to 
be experienced intuitively, then taught. Additionally, and a direct consequence 
of this, it signifies that different teachers – abridged versions of whose teachings 
are collected in the extant Upaniṣads – had their own understandings of what this 
concept may have meant to them. In truth, when it is defined or paraphrased it is 
usually in terms of negative theology or in positive terms – where the criterion 
is complete liberation from all the limitations of the material world – such that it 
is said to be ‘the immortal’ (amṛtá).
Here is a famous passage summarising the ātman’s incapacity to be known:
About this self (ātman), one can only say ‘not–, not––.’ He is ungraspable, for he 
cannot be grasped. He is undecaying, for he is not subject to decay. He has nothing 
sticking to him, for he does not stick to anything. He is not bound; yet he neither 
trembles in fear nor suffers injury . . .6
These qualities are seemingly all physical – though ‘ungraspable’ could be 
 perceptual – as they contradict everything that could be said about the body and 
so are contrary to all the conditions of the material and psychological world. 
Yet, many other paraphrases go beyond this in attempting to explain how some-
thing quite the opposite from the material/psychological participates in it. In the 
Sanskrit the negative definition is communicated in the first three lines by oppo-
sition between passive verbs, and negative gerundives and one negated nominal 
form, then one negative participle form and two finite verbs in the present tense, 
both having an intransitive sense. It is as if such language is utilised so as to 
present the ātman as having no agency of its own, but this may be intended only 
to distinguish it from what does have agency, even where this absence of agency 
will be contradicted in other Upaniṣadic passages.
Additional to this are some single sentences from the same Upaniṣad, all 
repeating this very same clichéd expression, but adding some useful contextual 
interpretations: ‘so indeed, my dear, this self has no distinctive core and surface; 
the whole thing is a single mass of cognition’ (BU 4.5.13).7 And:
 6 sa eṣa neti nety ātmā |
agṛhyo na hi gṛhyate |
aśīryo na hi śīryate |
asaṅgo na sajyate |
asito na vyathate |
na riṣyati | (BU 3.9.26 = BU 4.2.4; 4.5.15) (Olivelle 1998: 101)
Unless otherwise indicated all translations are from Olivelle 1998. Where I write ‘follow-
ing Olivelle’, it means I have modified his translation.
 7 evaṃ vā are ‘yam ātmānantaro ‘bāhyaḥ kṛtsnaḥ prajñānaghana eva |
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This self, you see, is imperishable; it has an indestructible nature (avināśī vā are 
‘yam ātmānucchittidharmā8 BU 4.5.14). For when there is a duality of some kind, 
then the one can see the other, the one can smell the other, . . . and the one can per-
ceive the other. When, however, the Whole has become one’s very self (yatra tv 
asya sarvam ātmaivābhūt), then who is there for one to see and by what means? . . . 
Who is there for one to touch and by what means? Who is there for one to perceive 
and by what means? (kena kaṃ spṛśet tat kena kaṃ vijānīyāt). By what means can 
one perceive him by means of whom one perceives this whole world? (yenedaṃ 
sarvaṃ vijānāti taṃ kena vijānīyāt). About this self (ātman) one can only say . . .9
An ontological quality is given here for the self and a question of how it can be 
perceived is raised. In both cases they are expressed in terms of a negation of 
‘empiricist’ ways of knowing, except for the positivity implied in the ātman’s 
indestructible nature. A distinction is drawn between the pronoun asya and 
ātmā, but it is unclear whether this pronoun refers to the agent who is capable of 
knowing through the senses – as it is elsewhere in the Upaniṣads – or whether 
the neuter sarvam designates the ātman/brahman with all the other worldly 
elements separated from it. The final question, involving the repetition of two 
interrogatives, implies that the ātman may be a conceptual ‘object’, given that 
kam is in the masculine accusative.10 But I wonder if these two interrogative 
sentences are rhetorical, even if not composed in the normal rhetorical style? 
Because, the answer Yājñavalkya gives is simply to restate the idealised defini-
tion of the ātman. I also note the repetition of the prefix vi in avināśī, and three 
times when used with jñā. Given that it often conveys the sense of distinction 
between things, this usage may have been deliberate as a means of emphasising 
the difference between the ātman and everything else.
In Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 2.5.14–15 we are presented with an equally 
elliptical paraphrase – in no sense is it a definition – of the ātman and its connec-
tion to the world.
This self (ātman) is the honey of all beings, and all beings are the honey of this self. 
That radiant and immortal person (puruṣa) in the self and the radiant and immortal 
person (puruṣa) connected with the body (ātman) – they are both one’s self. It is the 
immortal; it is brahman; it is the Whole.
 This very self (ātman) is the Lord of all, the king of all beings. As all the spokes 
are fastened (samārpitāḥ) to the hub and the rim of a wheel, so to one’s self (ātman) 
 8 Would it be possible to read a double meaning in this compound indicating that the ātman 
cannot be analysed?
 9 Olivelle 1998: 129–31.
10 It is not possible to determine if kena is masculine or neuter. If it were the former, to 
what would it refer? If we read further Yājñavalkya recognises there is a problem here: 
vijñātāram are kena vijānīyād ity: ‘Look – by what means can one perceive the perceiver?’ 
(Olivelle 1998: 131).
Ātman and its transition to worldly existence 59
are fastened all beings, all the gods, all the worlds, all the breaths and all these bodies 
(ātman).11
These two prose passages form a virtual conclusion to a fairly lengthy section 
where the visible physical features of the world, as well as dharma, truth and 
humanity, are declared to be the honey of all beings. And as there has to be some 
kind of summing up, so here it is given in our quoted verses. What does ‘honey’ 
mean here? Essence? And should we give it more precedence than the other 
listed components? Additionally, is the ātman simply one amongst a number of 
high-profile concepts that are being listed as part of the larger universe? Even if 
everything ‘real’ can be reduced back to the ātman, all of the other elements of 
the physical, psychological and cultural universe still have to be recognised for 
what they are.
The puruṣa concept emerges here, with a virtually direct identification 
between it and the ātman. This is further suggestive that the puruṣa is the ātman 
in the world – a point taken up below.12 It is into the ātman that the various cate-
gories of things are attached, not into the person, but what kind of relationship is 
this? The root √ṛ may have the sense of ‘attach to, fall down into, fix on to’, but 
surely the use of the prefix sam is important here. It connotes a sense of collec-
tivity within the framework of an emerging unity, such that it is their connection 
with the ātman that provides them with a sense of unity.
Yet another definition conforms more to the absolute ontological distance 
between ātman and other:
‘The self within all is this self of yours.’
‘Which one is the self within all, Yājñavalkya?’
‘He is the one who is beyond hunger and thirst, sorrow and delusion, old age and 
death. It is when they come to know this self that Brahmins give up the desire for 
sons, the desire for wealth, and the desire for worlds, and undertake the mendicant 
life.’ (BU 3.5.1)13
As often, emphasis here is placed on everything the ātman is not, while telling 
us what the ātman is. It does, however, suggest that the negative elements, both 
emotional and physical, which define the world are so well known that they can 
be fully understood even where they are reduced to single code words. By impli-
cation they point us towards what the ātman might be.
Finally, I cite a passage where there are listed some definite positive charac-
terisations of the ātman, which also point out how it may interact with the world 
in functioning cognitively:
11 Olivelle 1998: 73.
12 Two other places where puruṣa and ātman are juxtaposed are ChU 8.7.4 and 8.12.3.
13 Olivelle 1998: 83.
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‘But when both the sun and the moon have set, the fire has died out, and the voice 
is stilled, Yājñavalkya, what then is the source of light for a person (puruṣa) here?’
‘The self (ātman) is then his source of light. It is by the light of the self that a person 
sits down, goes about, does his work, and returns.’ (BU 4.3.6)
‘Which self is that?’
‘It is this person (puruṣa) – the one that consists of perception (vijñānamayaḥ) 
among the vital functions (prāṇa), the one that is the inner light within the heart. He 
travels across both worlds, being common to both. Sometimes he reflects, sometimes 
he flutters, for when he falls asleep he transcends this world, these visible forms of 
death.’ (BU 4.3.7)14
Once again the puruṣa is placed in apposition with the ātman, but consisting of 
vijñāna it is given a clear cognitive function and it could even be argued that 
its function as the inner light also has an epistemological implication. But its 
qualification as antarjyotiḥ (‘inner light’) needs also to be noted, as the contrast 
between inner15 and outer seems to define the relationship between ātman and 
puruṣa even where they seem ontologically identical. Thus its entry into the 
world will always be perceptual.
Cosmogony/cosmology as the ātman’s entry into the world
The well-known cosmogonic description found at Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 
1.4.1ff. offers a very rich conceptualisation of the ātman and its emergence into 
individuality.
In the beginning this world was the self alone16 having the form of a man. He looked 
around and saw nothing but himself. At first he said, ‘Here I am.’ From that the name 
‘I’ came into being. Therefore, even today when you call someone, he first says 
‘This is I’ and then states whatever other name he may have.17 (BU 1.4.1)18
There are some significant lexical forms descriptive of the creative process here 
which recur elsewhere: the use of the verbs √as and √bhū together, occurrence 
14 Olivelle 1998: 111.
15 Cf. BU 1.4.8; contrary is 2.5.19 declaring brahman/ātman to be outside of space and time; 
and 3.7.2–23 where the ātman is the antaryāmin, the ‘inner-controller’, who is different 
from everything but is still influential in governing worldly behaviour.
16 I have modified Olivelle’s (1998: 45) translation of this as ‘a single body’.
17 ātmaivedam agra āsīt puruṣavidha |
so ‘nuvīkṣya nānyad ātmano ‘paśyat |
so ‘ham asmīty agre vyāharat |
tato ‘haṃnāmābhavat |
tasmād apy etarhy āmantrito ‘ham ayam ity evāgra uktvāthānyan nāma prabrūte yad asya 
bhavati |
18 Following Olivelle 1998: 45.
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of the prefix vi and use of personal pronouns to indicate the ātman and the ‘I’. In 
some measure these are associated with a juxtaposition of masculine and neuter, 
where ātmā and puruṣavidhaḥ (‘having the form of a man’)19 seemingly stand 
in apposition with the neuter idam, telling us that the ātman did not exist by 
itself, that it was a totality of all that existed physically and epistemologically. I 
take the imperfect āsīt as indicating not that this was just a primordial state, but 
that it was one potentially constant, beyond change. Yet the ātman here seems 
simultaneously to be in the created world. This is the only conclusion that can 
be drawn from the occurrence of the masculine compound puruṣavidhaḥ, where 
the prefix vi indicates a sense of distinction/modification as it does elsewhere in 
the Upaniṣads.20 Hence I conclude that the ātman is already in some modified 
state, even in a cosmological passage such as this, where it is a question of the 
principles unfolding in primordial creation.
Even though in a modified state already, further development is required and 
this is described in the second line. The self, in the masculine, begins to cognise. 
Both verbs anuvīkṣya and apaśyat have the primary sense of knowing by seeing, 
implying some physical capacity, but both can also have the secondary sense of 
‘to perceive’. Anu and vi may imply that he looked behind and sideways, and it 
is surely significant that vi occurs here, pointing to a movement away from the 
idea of a unified self. But when he has looked around – his first act – he sees – 
his second act – nothing other than the self. Anyat, ‘other’, is in the neuter as 
opposed to the masculine demonstrative pronoun so at the beginning of the line, 
almost mirroring the juxtaposition of ātmā and idam in the previous line. Is this 
ātman also puruṣavidhaḥ? One would assume so as its identity has already been 
established in the previous line.
The process of modification is continued in the next two lines: ‘At first he 
said, “Here I am.” From that the name “I” came into being.’ But why does he 
say ‘Here I am’? There seems to be no connection between his realisation of his 
isolation and his statement of individuality. Yet there are significant repetitions. 
Two pronouns so and aham are being used here, in a manner common in Sanskrit 
where apposition of third and first person pronouns places emphasis on the iden-
tity of the person being described, as reflected in Olivelle’s translation. Use of 
asmi (‘I am’) also invites comparison with the first line of the passage, though it 
is in the present indicative, signifying direct speech as opposed to the narrative 
19 The same compound occurs at TU 2.2–5, MaiU 6.34. 
20 And in earlier Vedic texts. Cf. Smith 1989: 62, ‘The creation myths we have considered, 
then, may also be understood as the tracing of the transition from sarva to viśva, a trans-
formation from a perfect unity without parts to a defective totality. Another step in the 
metamorphosis is required for true cosmos: the reintegration of the totality (viśva) into a 
constructed whole, a composed unity of parts the texts call samāna.’
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imperfect defining an originally existing state. The words asmi with the quotative 
particle iti designate a speech act of naming, thus giving further definition to the 
ātman which existed as a person and now has a kind of psychological and lin-
guistic identity. Further, there is repetition of the preposition agre (‘at first’) and 
the use again of the prefix vi in vyāharat, both strengthening the sense of creation 
through establishment of difference.
The fourth line confirms the sense of individuality, created by naming, that 
is already implied in the second line where he, the ātman as a man, sees nothing 
other than the ātman. This perception has now become self-conscious (asmi) by 
being given a name, and ‘from that’, that is, from the statement of the first person 
pronoun, the name I arises or ‘becomes’, where the word ‘becomes’ (abhavat) 
indicates a change of state already implied by the three-fold repetition of vi.
As this passage proceeds the word ātman is not used. Instead the third person 
pronoun he (sa) continues to be found as a substitute and 1.4.2–3 confirms that 
he is a knowing agent as he becomes the subject of verbs such as ‘to fear’ and ‘to 
like’, both used to indicate that they require an object, though none is present for 
the ātman. They simply extend the range of actions of perception exercised right 
from the time where he exists in the form of a man.
Much of what follows for the next five prose sections elaborates on the 
process of creation as separation and distinction, and at the beginning of 1.4.7 
develops this as a general principle:
At that time this world was without real distinctions (avyākṛtám āsīt); it was dis-
tinguished (vyākriyata) simply in terms of name and visible appearance – ‘He is 
so and so by name and has this sort of an appearance.’ So even today this world is 
distinguished (vyākriyata) simply in terms of name and visible appearance, as when 
we say, ‘He is so and so by name and has this sort of appearance.’21
I am not confident the translation ‘real’ can be justified, because the occurrence 
of āsīt seems to be signifying a primordial state of the kind described in 1.4.1. 
Again there is repetition of the prefixes vi and ā, analogous to vyāharat in 
that same section, and in a similar semantic usage, vy/ā√kṛ can also designate 
the act of making declarations. The ātman thinks itself into consciousness and 
existence, both only making sense when there are distinctions enabling it to dif-
ferentiate itself from objects, with it as the knowing subject. The juxtapositions 
of third person pronouns of masculine and neuter gender exemplify this, as does 
the use of aham to indicate the individualising process.
As this cosmology proceeds it morphs more and more into a definition of the 
ātman, and exposes the difficulty in defining it. Because, we are told that:
21 Olivelle 1998: 47.
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Penetrating this body up to the very nailtips, he remains there like a razor within a 
case . . .22 People do not see him, for he is incomplete (akṛtsno hi saḥ) as he comes 
to be called breath when he is breathing, speech when he is speaking, sight when he 
is seeing, hearing when he is hearing, and mind when he is thinking. These are only 
the names of his various activities (tāny asyaitāni karmanāmāny eva).23
Certainly this is a description of the ātman in the world, specifically as it is when 
it is puruṣavidha. The point is that he is all these things, not just one and so defies 
description simply in terms of designation. As such
A man who considers him to be any one of these does not understand him, for he 
is incomplete within any one of these (akṛtsno hy eṣo ‘ta ekaikena bhavati). One 
should consider them as simply his self (ātmā), for in it all these become one. This 
same self (ayam ātmā) is the trail (padanīyam) to this entire world, for by following 
it one comes to know this entire world . .24
As such the ātman in the world is perceived as functioning somehow through 
the senses, while bypassing the danger that it could be identified with any of 
the individual senses by the assertion that they constitute a unity in the ātman 
itself, that it has no wholeness/completeness when identified with any one of 
them. Completeness does not imply a spatial or ontological limitation, but it 
does contradict any idea of the ātman being limited, which it would be if it were 
identified with a single sense. I note here that bhavati is used in describing its 
incompleteness and their unity in it, as this involves a perceptual awareness of 
correct ontological status. Whilst the ātman may have a permanent status that 
would be designated by the use of √as, its entrance into the world is a product 
of discovery by those who would seek to know it and in that sense involves a 
changed apprehension, hence the idea of becoming (bhavati).
As this cosmology proceeds it transfers its attention to brahman and uses 
language already seen with the ātman when it enters into the world or ‘into 
a state of existence’ we might say: ‘In the beginning Brahmā was (āsīd) this, 
one alone. Being that one, he did not develop (vyabhavat)’ (BU 1.4.11). Use of 
√as suggests primordiality beyond time, contrasting with the entry into time, 
exemplified by the occurrence of the prefix vi before √bhū. Then it proceeds in a 
quite different manner from the cosmology involving the ātman, because for no 
22 Cf. Gren-Eklund 1978: 92, ‘In this passage the notions of nāman and rūpa in the context 
only prepare for the idea of the presence of ātman in everything. sa eṣa iha praviṣṭa ā 
nakhāgrebhyo has been unanimously interpreted as referring to ātman. In an analysis this 
may be corroborated by the sa eṣa, not only a reference to somebody through sa but to 
an eṣa – somebody who should be known (more or less) totally, not so much through the 
preceding text but by given continual attention.’
23 Olivelle 1998: 47.
24 Olivelle 1998: 47.
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stated reason it creates the kṣatra, the viś and the śūdra. Following this it creates 
dharma and a brief discussion about the four classes ensues.
Then, as if deliberately continuing the cosmological theme, another cosmol-
ogy begins in 1.4.17: ‘In the beginning this world was only the self (ātman), only 
one. He desired: “May I have (syād) a wife, then I can father offspring.” Then he 
desired, “May I have (syād) wealth, then I can perform rituals.”’ I note in the first 
sentence a close similarity with 1.4.1: ātmaivedam agra āsīt puruṣavidhaḥ, with 
substitution of eka eva for puruṣavidhaḥ, where the words eka eva are suggestive 
of the ātman in a state of absolute isolation, having undergone no modification 
along the lines of a puruṣavidhaḥ. Yet the verbs which follow: √kam, √jan and 
√kṛ very much define the activities of a puruṣa, certainly not of the ātman in its 
pure form, if, in fact, it is ever in its pure form.
The next line beginning tasmād apy etarhy25 brings this teaching up until 
the present day in declaring that without offspring or wealth a man is incomplete 
(akṛtsnaḥ).26 These expressions occur only in this section of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka 
Upaniṣad. They are significant in juxtaposing the condition/state of the primor-
dial with the condition/desire of a person living in the world where social and 
cultural expectations come into play, and because they raise the very idea of 
completeness and incompleteness in respect of the ātman and the person. Both 
are seen to be complete or incomplete in their own way and either of these could 
be perceptual or ontological, or both at the same time. Here is the text of 1.4.17:
So even today when one is alone, he wishes, ‘May I have a wife, then I can father 
offspring, may I have wealth, then I can perform rituals.’ As long as he does not 
obtain any one of these27 he considers himself to be quite incomplete. Here is his 
completeness: the mind alone is his self (ātmā); his speech is his wife; his breath is 
his offspring; his sight is his human wealth, because through his eye he finds that; 
hearing is divine wealth, because through his ear he finds that. His self (ātmā) is 
certainly the ritual, because through his self he performs the ritual. He is this fivefold 
sacrifice, he is this five-fold animal, he is this five-fold man, everything whatever 
that is five-fold, that all does he gain who knows this.28
To summarise, this final section begins with the ātman in the form of a 
person and ends with it consisting of five components, enabling it to function in 
the world and so providing a completeness it would lack if it consisted only of 
25 Variants also occur in the following passages in the BU: 1.4.1; 1.4.7; 1.4.10; 1.4.17.
26 akṛtsno hi saḥ prāṇann eva prāṇo nāma bhavati |
vadan vāk paśyaṃś cakṣuḥ śṛṇvañ chrotraṃ manvāno manaḥ |
tāny asyaitāni karmanāmāny eva |
sa yo ‘ta ekaikam upāste na sa veda |
akṛtsno hy eṣo ‘ta ekaikena bhavati |
27 Olivelle 1998: 51, ‘either of these’.
28 Following Olivelle 1998: 51.
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one of these components. Such a seminal passage still does not tell us, or point 
towards, what the ātman might be when no qualification is added to it.
Individuation as the ātman’s entry into the world
Each of the passages analysed in the previous section arguably contributes to our 
understanding of the relationship between ātman and the created world. Further 
illustrative of its entrance into the world as both a knowing and experiencing 
being are some passages analysed here.
If (cet) a person (puruṣa) truly perceives (vijānīyāt) the self,
knowing ‘I am he’;29
What possibly could he want,
Whom possibly could he love,
That he should worry about this body? (BU 4.4.12)30
Who has found, fully understood that the self
has entered into this dense body,
He is the maker of everything, because he is the maker of everything,
He possesses the world, and he certainly is the world. (BU 4.4.13)
Though taken out of context both passages are highly instructive. In the first 
instance the relationship between the puruṣa and the ātman is countenanced 
again, the puruṣa being portrayed as different from the ātman whilst also being 
identical with it. Ātman as direct object, implied puruṣa as subject of the verb, 
ayam as a third person pronoun laying emphasis on the implied aham in asmi, 
and puruṣa as standing in apposition or contrast with ātmānam. That the puruṣa 
declares itself to be ‘I am he’, seemingly connotes the idea of some kind of 
bounded entity, at least conceptually speaking, because fundamental emotions 
are denied. But once the puruṣa knows this, does it mean that the ātman ceases 
to be a direct object, such that the puruṣa does as well?
Yet, as the next verse (yasyānuvittaḥ pratibuddha ātmāsmin saṃdehye 
gahane praviṣṭaḥ) tells us, this is only part of the question. For also required 
is an understanding that the ātman has entered into the body, the body which is 
a ‘dense jumble’, as Olivelle’s translation captures it beautifully. Three verbs 
are used here and each is prefixed. Of these, anu√vid implies ‘looking behind’ 
and finding, whereas prati√budh must designate the ‘full understanding’ that 
comes from the ‘finding’, the self is the object of these verbs, and the remainder 
from asmin onwards is the predicate of the self. I assume the relative pronoun 
designates the puruṣa, because as the agent of the discovery and subsequent 
29 Why not ‘this’ instead of ‘he’ for ayam?
30 Olivelle 1998: 123.
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understanding of the ātman in the world, the provisional distinction between it 
and ātman is maintained. The participle form praviṣṭa is also used at 1.4.7 in a 
precisely similar meaning,31 and tells us that the ātman has entered into the body, 
which, as saṃdehya suggests, is a collocation of components. It does not tell us 
how it has entered.
But in the final line of 4.4.13 we are told of the consequence of fully 
understanding this: sa viśvakṛt sa hi sarvasya kartā tasya lokaḥ sa u loka eva. 
Repetition is seemingly used here for emphasis, but I wonder if there is a Vedic 
ritualistic vestige in the implied reference to a person creating his own world? 
Kartā is used in the middle Upaniṣads to designate the person with the ego who 
believes he/she is a unity and whose psyche blocks him from knowing the ātman. 
In this case, though, the sentence seems to be saying that the ātman creates its 
own world, or has the potential to do so, when the puruṣa has recognised that it 
is the ātman, and has entered the world of which it is ontologically not a part.
Yet another passage throws light on the ātman’s creative capacity and there-
fore on its entry into the world in an individualised form:
As a spider sends forth itself by its thread, and as tiny sparks spring forth from a 
fire, so indeed do all the vital functions (prāṇa), all the worlds, all the gods, and all 
beings spring from this self (ātman). Its hidden name (upaniṣad) is ‘The real behind 
the real’, for the real consists of the vital functions, and the self (eṣa) is the real 
behind the vital functions.32 (BU 2.1.20)33
Initially, in the first analogy the spider is the subject, acting intentionally though 
its action may be intransitive, whereas in the second there appears to be no agent, 
even if it is not a passive construction. Rather the verbs seem also to function 
intransitively. The correct meaning seems to be that the spider moves upwards/
outwards by means of its thread, whereas the sparks just move up, almost as 
though without motivation. Then the same verb (√car) is used to designate 
how the fundamental components of the world emerge from the ātman, almost 
without motivation. In saying this, is the author attempting to say that the ātman 
in the world enters the world or creates it, without some motivating agency? 
Secondly, the prefix vi comes into play again in the two instances where it is a 
case of intransitive action, perhaps strengthened by the occurrence of vi in viṣ-
phuliṅgā (‘sparks’)? But if this is a case of modification, it seems different from 
that found in Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 1.4 where it applies to verbs associated 
31 Cf. also ChU 6.3.2–3.
32 sa yathorṇavābhis tantunoccared yathā agneḥ kṣudrā viṣphuliṅgā vyuccaranty evam 
evāsmād ātmanaḥ sarve prāṇāḥ sarve lokāḥ sarve devāḥ sarvāṇi bhūtāni vyuccaranti |
tasyopaniṣat satyasya satyam iti |
prāṇā vai satyaṃ teṣām eṣa satyam || 
33 Following Olivelle 1998: 63–4.
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with cosmology. Thirdly, there is the use of pronouns in conjunction with the 
word ātman: asmād . . . tasya . . . eṣa, ‘from this’, ‘of him’, ‘he’, in contrast 
with the quantifying pronoun sarve. This replicates what we find everywhere in 
the Upaniṣads, but it may have no extra significance since ātman is a masculine 
word, and any referent behind the pronoun itself can be difficult to locate, pos-
sibly deliberately so.
Beyond this, we can ask what it means to say that the components of the 
world spring up, because this is not equivalent to sṛj, ‘to create’, as developed in 
the earlier cosmogony studied? Though identifiable parts of what constitute the 
worlds emerge from the ātman, nothing concrete is said about the ātman itself, 
presumably because it is pure subject rather than object. Even the qualification 
that it is satyam (‘real/truth’) does not help in elaborating its meaning, as satyam 
is as equally difficult to discern in this chapter as is ātman itself.34
Archaeological sidelines
Here I shift tack quite dramatically by asking how the material/social conditions 
of the time might have influenced thinking about ātman and brahman. If there 
is a direct continuity within Vedic thought, including the Upaniṣads, does this 
mean the apparent, substantially changing, socio/political/economic conditions 
after 600 bce had no impact on the intellectuals who developed these theories 
and taught them? That is, if there really were substantial changes apart from the 
emergence of the second wave of urbanism, resting on an increase in agricultural 
production that had probably been occurring since 1000 bce. The more and more 
I read the archaeological material, the more and more I become sceptical of argu-
ments attributing the development of fundamentally innovative philosophical 
concepts as being responses to sudden shifts in material and cultural conditions. 
Where such shifts did occur they seemed to be gradual from 1000 bce onwards, 
if not earlier. Kenoyer gives an excellent summary of the transitional period from 
‘1300/1000 b.c. to approximately 600/300 b.c.’:
The process of transition can be summarised as follows. First, the Harappan socio-
ritual elites had lost their legitimation, and the vast regions that had once been 
integrated were split into different localised polities. Second, other cultural groups 
in the Gaṅgā-Yamunā Doab, who had been on the periphery of the Indus Tradition, 
began to build up regional networks of alliances, probably based on kin related 
hereditary elites. These elites controlled land and cattle and eventually specific 
villages became centres of ritual and political power. Some of these villages began 
34 Though compare Gren-Eklund 1978: 96, ‘satyam is not only the “real”, “the true”, but had 
originally rather to do with “the sum-total”, the manifestable as well as the manifest, all that 
might be an object of man’s thought’.
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to control the trade of important resources such as iron and other minerals as well 
as agricultural produce. Over time we see the emergence of competing towns that 
become the capitals of new regional polities that are referred to as janapada. These 
janapadas were eventually integrated through political, economic and military 
action under Magadhan, and eventually Mauryan rule.35
Most of the archaeological work done over the past three decades which 
is pertinent to the areas where this summary is relevant simply buttresses what 
Kenoyer writes without allowing us to put names or faces to the emerging poli-
ties and hosts of small villages that provide the agricultural and productive base 
for these developments. The impression given is one of gradual change in an 
extended period of slowly increasing production and general prosperity, though 
with emerging class differences, which would have had implications for the dis-
tribution of wealth. Only after about 500 bce does money seem to begin to play 
a significant role. Yet it is this kind of extra intellectual framework that is often 
attributed as the cause of the dramatic expansion in the exploration of ideas about 
the nature of personhood. Rather than climactic changes in socio-economic 
 conditions, the climactic changes were most marked in the realm of thought.
We have to bear in mind that the people who developed and taught these 
ideas about ontology were not the poor and the struggling (about whom we 
know virtually nothing); they were the more materialistically well off. Whilst 
it is often the case that revolutions begin with the disaffected middle class, why 
would their concerns have been expressed metaphysically rather than materi-
ally? Nor should we think there was no economic or political mobility at this 
time. We know that a number of the governing kingdoms were neither Brahmin 
nor Kshatriya. And it may be, as Brian Black implies, that the Brahmins were 
using speculations around the ātman theory to define themselves as a particular 
class, perhaps different from and/or overlapping with the Vedic śākhas.36 This 
then would define them as religio-spiritual specialists an important part of whose 
identification was knowledge of the esoteric nature of the ātman, just as previ-
ously they had emerged as custodians of the highly scholastic workings of the 
ritual and the micro-macro cosmic resemblances it evoked. But if this were a 
mode of ascribed status recognised by others, there is little evidence in the texts 
to support it. However, the idea that the Brahmins were utilising claims to pos-
session of specialised knowledge is given support in the early Pali texts where 
35 Kenoyer 1995: 234–5. See also Singh 2013: 278; Coningham 1995: 72; Chakrabarti 1999: 
260.
36 Black 2007: 27, ‘Taken together, the dialogues tell brahmins how to receive a proper 
education, achieve fame, attract students, receive patronage, get married, and have male 
children, thus indicating that achieving selfhood is closely related to achieving the status of 
a brahmin.’ 
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there occur consistent attacks on the pretentiousness of Brahmins based on their 
claim to received wisdom.
Concluding speculations
What Richard Seaford wants to ask is why certain conceptions of the person 
developed, under what conditions and motivated by what.37 Such questioning 
involves both psychological and material factors, if not metaphysical ones, 
though we tend to assume the latter depend substantially on the former. In the 
Indic context the word ātman, the focus of our study, is found in the earliest 
Sanskrit literature and likely only assumes its later denotation as ‘the permanent 
self’ in the early Upaniṣads. Does this suggest the likelihood of genetic devel-
opment given a concept of personhood, even if just a reflexive pronoun was 
known in pre-Upaniṣadic literature? Does it mean the idea came from outside of 
the Vedic/Brāhmaṇa intellectual pool, as implied in Bronkhorst’s (2007) work?
Even if these questions can be answered in a manner that might be regarded 
as in any way satisfactory – and they cannot – this still does not tell us why the 
idea of an ātman that is beyond time and space and virtually beyond definition 
was developed in the first place. Even before probing into this question, it must 
be acknowledged that the huge body of Buddhist and Jain literature, also spec-
ulating heavily on this question, constitutes a kind of intellectual weight that 
cannot be avoided. It is here that Bronkhorst’s work becomes important. Yet it 
is primarily as a brilliant theory of change that the Buddha’s teachings become 
fundamentally significant at an intellectual level. Change and causality, both 
important themes in the Upaniṣads, dominate early Buddhist psychology and 
metaphysics. But the ātman is beyond change and causality, or so it seems, like 
any absolute concept found in early Indic thought. Even so, change there is and 
transformation, not to forget modification, only not for the ātman itself.
What would cause serious and well-trained minds – operating in a highly 
competitive environment – to allocate so much effort to refining a concept of the 
person that seemingly defies all empirical experience?38 Maybe it was because 
unexplained death at a young age was such a prevalent feature of the world from 
the tenth–fourth centuries bce, death caused by natural causes and internecine 
warfare.39 Would this though have spilled over into sophisticated theories of 
37 Seaford 2004: 12: ‘the emergence of multiplicity from unity in cosmology is premonetary 
(in Hesiodic mythical cosmogony), but the advent of money transforms the unity into a 
general and increasingly abstract, impersonal (non mythical) unity that continues to under-
lie apparent multiplicity’. Cf. also pp. 175, 212, 247, 257 and esp. p. 298.
38 See ChU 8.7.1–8.12.6.
39 This is highly speculative because we have virtually no empirical evidence on the basis of 
which we can draw firm conclusions.
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change, motivated it is true by the belief in multiple births? Was death such a 
profound change that it gave rise to Upaniṣadic and Buddhist metaphysics asso-
ciated both with loka and nirvāṇa? Certainly the question of overcoming death is 
thematically central in both Vedic and early Buddhist literature.
In the final analysis the connection between the development of money 
as concept and practice and the development of metaphysical notions of an 
abstract unity underlying phenomenal appearances needs to be tested in the 
ancient Indian context. My inclination is that the answer may be found in the 
Mahābhārata – though considerably later than the oldest Upaniṣads – because 
there money seems not to be often distinguished from more general senses of 
wealth, and yet the ātman theory is accepted as a given. This may reflect its ‘war-
rior’ concern for wealth as material goods, cattle and horses, rather than money, 
but it may also be a sign that the influence of monetised economies on ancient 
Indian ontologies has already been determined previously, and the transitional 
period is not reflected in later texts.
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Cosmology, psyche and ātman in the Timaeus, 
the Ṛgveda and the Upaniṣads
Hyun Höchsmann
I see that I am about to receive a complete and splendid banquet of discourse. (Plato 
Timaeus  27b)
‘A feast of reason’ – cosmology in the Timaeus
Anticipating ‘a complete and splendid banquet of discourse’, Socrates prompts 
Timaeus to begin his narration about ‘the knowledge of the nature of the uni-
verse’ after calling upon the gods, ‘as custom requires’ (27b).1 To launch the 
‘discourse about the universe’ with the epic convention of the invocation of the 
gods places Timaeus’ description of the origin and the nature of the cosmos in 
the realm of poetic invention – the realm of muthos.2
Timaeus explains that we cannot know the cause of the creation of the cosmos 
with certainty and that his transmission is only a probable story (eikōs muthos, 
29c–d). Why is the origin of the cosmos difficult to ascertain and the pattern on 
which it is built unknowable? For Plato it is not because, as Heraclitus remarked, 
‘nature loves to hide itself’ (B123). If Plato contended that he had some privi-
leged way of knowing the origin of the cosmos, he would be enlisted in the ranks 
 1 I am indebted to Richard Seaford for his insightful comments on this chapter
 2 .Cornford (1997: 31): ‘The Timaeus is a poem . . . There are two senses in which the 
Timaeus is a myth or story (muthos, cf. Frutiger, Mythes de Platon, 173ff.): [in the first 
place] no account of the material world can ever amount to an exact and self-consistent 
statement of unchangeable truth. In the second place, the cosmology is cast in the form of a 
cosmogony, a “story” of events spread out in time. Plato chooses to describe the universe, 
not by taking it to pieces in an analysis, but by making it grow under our eyes.’ Since, as 
Cornford states, for Plato, ‘To find reality you would do better to shut your eyes and think’, 
we might say that Plato makes the universe grow in our minds.
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of a mystic.3 But the cosmos Plato envisages is a formidable construct of reason. 
In How Philosophers Saved Myths Luc Brisson elucidates Plato’s presentation 
of Timaeus’ discourse as both eikōs muthos and eikōs logos as follows: ‘And this 
is because the dialogue is a discourse on the constitution of the sensible world, 
that is the “image” or “copy” of the intelligible world.’4 As Brisson notes, Plato 
contrasts (29b3–c3) the true discourse and a credible discourse in terms of their 
corresponding subjects, the model (paradeigma) and its copy (eikon). Timaeus’ 
discourse is a description of the physical world of becoming which cannot be 
known with certainty.
The starting point of Plato’s cosmology (27d–28a) is the distinction between 
being (‘that which is always real and has no becoming’) comprehensible by 
rational understanding and becoming (‘that which is becoming and is never real’) 
perceived by the senses. The first question regarding the world (‘heaven or the 
world – let us call it by whatever name which would be adequate for it’) is then:
Has it always been or has it come to be, starting from some beginning? (28b)5
Clearly, the world has come to be ‘since it can be seen, touched and has a body 
and all such things are sensible’.
Desiring goodness, beauty and harmony
Desiring that all things should be good, and, insofar as it is possible, nothing imper-
fect, the dēmiourgos took all that is visible – not at rest, but in discordant and 
unordered motion – and brought it from disorder to order since he judged that order 
was in every way better. (30a)
Desiring to make the best universe from a model, paradeigma, with the available 
material in the ‘receptacle’ of the material, khōra, the dēmiourgos builds the 
 3 Einstein (1954: 262) writes in ‘Scientific Truth’: ‘Certain it is that a conviction, akin to 
a religious feeling, of the rationality or intelligibility of the world lies behind all scien-
tific work of higher order.’ Wittgenstein, in his construction of the logical universe in 
the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, which opens with the resounding proclamation, ‘Die 
Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist’ (The world is all that is the case), verges on mysticism 
when it comes to cosmological considerations: ‘It is not how things are in the world that 
is mystical, but that it exists. To view the world sub specie aeterni is to view it as a whole 
– a limited whole. Feeling the world as a limited whole – it is this that is mystical’ (1995: 
6.44–5).
 4 Brisson 2004b: 28. For further expansion on the topic of eikōs muthos, see Brisson and 
Meyerstein 1995 and Burnyeat 2009. Johansen (2004: 54–5) explains that the description 
of the sensible world shares the imperfections of the sensible world itself.
 5 Citations from the Timaeus are adapted from Cornford 1997. I am grateful to Richard 
Seaford for his suggestions and corrections regarding the translations. 
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cosmos as a living being as it is the most beautiful. He makes one unique cosmos 
and not multiple universes since a part is less complete compared to the whole 
(31a–b, 33a–d).6
The true cause (aitia) of the coming to be of the cosmos is the desire of 
the dēmiourgos that all things should be good, ‘insofar as it is possible’. This 
qualification foreshadows another factor operating in the process of ordering the 
pre-existing material.
The generation of this world was a result of a mixed combination of necessity 
(anangkē) and reason (nous). Nous overruled necessity persuading it to guide the 
greatest part of things that become towards what is best. (48a)
As Brisson and Meyerstein explain, ‘A cause, called anangkē, perpetually resists 
the order the demiurge attempts to introduce in the world.’7 Anangkē is an ‘errant 
cause’, a recalcitrant and an intractable feature of the khōra, within which ‘all 
that is visible’ is found. From the contents of the receptacle the dēmiourgos 
separates out four ‘kinds’, fire, air, water and earth. With triangles as the funda-
mental units, he constructs regular solids as the figures for the primary elements 
(53c–55c).
The soul of the universe and the divine part of the individual soul are made 
by the dēmiourgos. The world soul is made from a harmonically proportionate 
combination of sameness, difference and being (35a–b). The compound of the 
three constituents is divided in accordance with the interval of a musical scale 
(harmonia).8 Being endowed with reason and harmony (36e–37a), the world 
soul is a formal ordering principle of the constituents and the interconnected ele-
ments of the universe. The dēmiourgos makes the immortal part of the individual 
souls from the remaining material of the world soul ‘in somewhat the same way, 
but less pure’. The mortal parts of individual souls, made by the gods (created by 
the dēmiourgos) are prone to erratic and discordant motions (41d–42d). The con-
ception of the psyche in the Timaeus as comprising the immortal part (reason) 
and the mortal parts (appetitive and spirited) consolidates the tripartite view of 
the soul in the Phaedrus, Republic and the Laws.9
The rational part of the individual soul must govern the two subordinate 
 6 Seaford (2004: 247–8) accentuates the self-sufficiency of the cosmos in ‘needing no other’ 
and being ‘a sufficient acquaintance and friend for itself’ (Tim. 33d). 
 7 Brisson and Meyerstein (1995: 23) point out that anangkē is usually translated as ‘neces-
sity’ (‘constraint regarded as law prevailing through the material universe’), but this is 
different from the way in which anangkē operates in the Timaeus. 
 8 See Cornford (1997: 60–7) on being, sameness and difference in the creation of the world 
soul. 
 9 Robinson (1990: 105) compares the three parts of the soul in the Timaeus to reason, spirit 
and appetite in the Republic (439a–441d). 
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parts of appetite and spirit and the body as the world soul governs the cosmos. 
But if the world soul and the individual soul are not isomorphic, how can the 
individual soul emulate the order-creating activity of the world soul? The con-
gruence between the world soul and the individual soul is not structural since 
the world soul has pure reason whereas the individual soul is a tripartite com-
posite of reason, spirit and appetite.10 But there is a functional congruence: the 
order-sustaining functions are the same in the world soul and in the individual 
souls (90c–d). The world soul creates and sustains order within the cosmos, the 
individual soul, by studying the harmonious order of the world soul, strives to 
manifest order within itself.11
Cosmogony, ātman and brahman in the Ṛgveda and the Upaniṣads
Then, in the beginning, from thought there evolved desire, which existed as the 
primal seed. (RV 10.129.4)12
The universe comes into being as an activity of desire. Among the various cos-
mogonic poems in the Ṛgveda and the Upaniṣads there is a common premise: 
all things have originated from one primal cause. In one cosmogonic poem the 
creation of the universe takes place through the sacrificial division of the body of 
a primeval progenitor (puruṣa): the sun from the eye, the moon from the mind, 
wind from the breath, sky from the head and earth from the feet (RV 10.90).
The coming to be of the universe in the Ṛgveda and the Upaniṣads could 
be characterised as ‘spontaneous order’ (self-organisation) in contrast to the 
mathematical order in the Timaeus where the cosmos as a living organism comes 
to be not as the result of matter’s internal self-organisation but by rational order 
established from an external cause. However, similar to the conception of the 
universe as a work of a craftsman in the Timaeus the universe is compared to a 
work of a sculptor, a smith or a carpenter in the Ṛgveda (10.81). In the Ṛgveda 
10 Cornford argues that there is ‘an irrational element in the World-Soul’ (1997: 176, 209–10): 
The body of the world ‘contains motions and active powers which are not instituted by the 
divine Reason and are perpetually producing undesirable results. Since all physical motion 
has its ultimate source in a living soul, these bodily motions and powers can be attributed to 
an irrational element in the World-Soul.’ Notwithstanding Cornford’s comprehensive and 
penetrating analysis of the Timaeus, the obduracy of necessity in disorderly motion does 
not entail imputing an irrational element in the world soul. As Cornford emphasises, since 
disorderly motion, chaos, has existed prior to the creation of the world soul and reason can 
mitigate ‘discordant and unordered motion’, by persuading necessity in ‘the greatest part 
of things that become towards what is best’, persistence of disorder does not provide the 
ground for the belief that the world soul is afflicted with an irrational component. 
11 Cornford 1997: 354.
12 Translations of the Ṛgveda are adapted from Jamison and Brereton 2014.
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(10.72) the gods are not at the very beginning but come into being subsequently 
as in the Timaeus. The genealogies and prodigious deeds of various gods (Agni, 
the fire god, Indra, the highest god, Varuna, the sky god, gods of the storm, and 
other major gods) are celebrated with elaboration of ritual and sacrifice through-
out the Ṛgveda (1.26, 1.85, 1.92, 2.12, 4.18, 5.85). There is a closer interaction 
between the gods and the mortals than in the Timaeus as the gods are recipients 
of offerings and sacrifices, dispensers of alleviation of calamities, and averters of 
disasters who can be placated with entreaties.
In a notable later poem in the Ṛgveda all pervious perspectives on cosmog-
ony are abruptly called into question, bringing the uncertainty of knowledge 
regarding the origin of the cosmos into the forefront:
Who really knows? Who shall here proclaim it? – from where was it born, from 
where this creation?
The gods are on this side of the creation of this (world). So then who does know from 
where it came to be?
This creation – from where it came to be, if it was produced or if not –
he who is the overseer of this (world) in the furthest heaven, he surely knows. Or if 
he does not know . . . ? (RV 10.129.6–7)
The uncertainty of the knowledge of the origin of the cosmos persists even with 
recourse to the higher authority of the gods, since what is sought is the primal 
cause before the gods came into existence. Inviting conjectures and disputations 
(perhaps not excluding the possibility of a plurality of universes), the corre-
spondence with the emphasis in the Timaeus that all investigations in cosmology 
are provisional is significant: cosmogonic theses are speculative and incomplete 
as cosmology is not a closed system. With a direct reference to the poets (sages, 
kavi) who sought the connection between ‘the existent’ and the ‘non- existent’, 
enquiry into the beginning of the universe is an open-ended investigation in the 
realm of poetic insight. When regarded as a collection of cosmogonic verses, 
Ṛgveda is also in the realm of muthos. While Timaeus’ discourse aims at alleviat-
ing the uncertainty in presenting itself as an approximation meriting confidence, 
the persistent questions, ‘Who? When? Where?’ in the Ṛgveda ignite a debate 
regarding the origin of the universe.
Continuing the enquiry into the origin of the universe, the Upaniṣads invoke 
Prajāpati, ‘Lord of Creatures’ (BU 3.9.6). Desiring expansion, Prajāpati begins 
to generate a variety of living beings from self-division. Again, desire is the 
cause of partition from the initial unity (Prasna Upaniṣad 1.4). This primeval 
desire as an impetus for the creation of the universe is distinct from the desire 
of the dēmiourgos, ‘that all things should be good’. In the Upaniṣads it is not 
the desire for goodness which provides the motivation for the creation of the 
universe but a morally non-committal impulse for expansion. In the beginning 
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ātman in the shape of puruṣa (person) desired a companion and divided himself 
into two (BU 1.4.1–3). Proceeding from this initial division the world and the 
deities arise out of puruṣa (Aitareya Upaniṣad, 1–2). The origin of the universe 
is not chaos but singularity. The universe comes into being from a process of 
separation and multiplication from simplicity to complexity and from division 
of one substance into the manifold of phenomena. Given this conception of the 
unity of the origin of all things in the universe, the central thesis of the Upaniṣads 
that the essential self (ātman) of each individual entity is identical with or 
incorporated within the totality of all that exists (brahman) can be regarded as a 
corollary (ChU 3.14.1–4; BU 2.5.19).
The earliest mention of ātman is in the Ṛgveda (1.115.1; 1.162.20; 10.16.3; 
10.33.9).13 Similar to the concept of psyche before Plato, ātman has a range of 
meanings.14 Ātman is variously interpreted as breath, soul, essence, or the true 
self which underlies all change. ‘Breath’ in the wider sense includes breathing, 
thinking, speaking, seeing and hearing and is frequently equated with the life of 
the individual self (BU 1.5 21).15 One pervasive meaning of ātman is ‘the ulti-
mate essence of a human being’.16 Ātman is the common essence of all entities 
underlying the multitude of diverse manifestations.17
As from the flames of fire, sparks fly out in every direction, so from this self (ātman) 
the vital functions (prān· a) fly out to their separate places, and from the vital func-
tions, the gods, and from the gods, the worlds. (KauU 4.19)18
Brahman also has a range of meanings as an epistemological and a met-
aphysical concept, including ‘a formulation of truth’ or ‘ultimate and basic 
essence of the cosmos’.19 In the Upaniṣads, two divergent perspectives on ātman 
and brahman are presented: some texts emphasise that brahman is identical with 
ātman while others consider that ātman is a part of brahman.20 What is the iden-
tity or the constitutive relation which holds between ātman and brahman? Like 
rivers flowing in different directions which merge into the ocean and become 
one, individual souls are part of the ocean of one universal soul (ChU 6.10.1). 
Brahman is ātman when embodied within a particular individual entity.
13 Deussen 1906: 86.
14 For expositions of psyche prior to Plato see Snell (1946). 
15 Olivelle 2008: l. The significance of ātman as breath can be compared to psyche in Homer 
as vital breath. 
16 Olivelle 2008: lv. 
17 Raju 1985: 26. 
18 Translations of the Upaniṣads are adapted from Olivelle 2008.
19 Olivelle 2008: lvi.
20 Deussen 1966: 86–111, 182–212.
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That from which these beings are born; on which, once born, they live; and into 
which they pass upon death – seek to perceive that. That is brahman! (TU, 3.1)
When ātman (or brahman or puruṣa) enters into material bodies, the constituents 
of individual bodies are separated parts of universal elements within the individ-
ual embodiment.
Tell me – when a man has died, his speech merges into fire, his breath into air, his 
sight into the sun, his mind into the moon . . . his material body into the earth, his self 
(ātman) into space, the hairs of his body into plants, the hair of his head into trees 
and his blood into water – what then happens to that person? (BU 3. 2.13)21
Both the identification and the incorporation of ātman within brahman aim at a 
comprehensive and fundamental principle underlying the multitude of phenom-
ena.22 When it is identified with ātman, brahman comprises the aggregate of all 
individual ātman and is coextensive with the totality of all that exists:
Ātman is indeed brahman. It is also identified with the intellect, the mind and the 
vital breath, with the eyes and ears, with earth, water, air and sky, with fire and with 
what is other than fire, with desire and the absence of desire, with anger and the 
absence of anger, with the righteous and the unrighteous; this self that is made of 
everything. (BU 4.4.5)23
When the various applications of the concept of ātman are assembled, it can be 
understood as the synthetic unity of the functions of reason, intellect and sense 
perception.
There are significant differences between the world soul and individual soul 
on the one hand, and ātman and brahman on the other. Ātman and brahman are 
not created, as the world soul and the individual souls are in the Timaeus. To the 
extent that the individual souls in the Timaeus are neither identical with the total-
ity of the constituents of the universe nor merge into the world soul, brahman is 
not analogous to the world soul. Even if the three parts of the soul in the Timaeus 
could be understood as forming a unity, this is distinct from ātman merging into 
21 This is similar to the myth of creation of the primordial Titan, Pan Gu, in China, whose 
body is transformed to the sun, the moon, the earth and the ocean.
22 Olivelle 2008: lv. Brereton (1990: 118) observes that: ‘Upanishadic teaching creates an 
integrative vision, a view of the whole which draws together the separate elements of 
the world and of human experience and compresses them into a single form. To one who 
has this larger vision of things, the world . . . forms a totality with a distinct shape and 
character.’
23 Yeats (1975: 9) encapsulates the main thought of the Upaniṣads as follows: to ‘postulate 
an individual self possessed of such power and knowledge [and] to identify it with the Self 
without limitation and sorrow, containing and contained by all . . .’.
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brahman.24 However, brahman can be characterised as the soul of the universe, 
as that which animates the universe.
There are further differences between the Timaeus and the Upaniṣads regard-
ing the goodness of the world. From readily observable phenomena questions 
arise concerning the goodness and the order in the universe emphasised in the 
Timaeus: What of the rampant and seemingly random evil in the world? More 
frequently not nous but ‘the errant cause’ seems to hold sway. One possible view 
of the problem of evil is developed in the Upaniṣads: the world is a battlefield of 
the demonic and the divine.25
There were two kinds of descendants of Prajāpati, the devas (gods) and the asuras 
(demons). The devas were the younger, the asuras were the elder, and they  contended 
for the world. (BU 1.3.1)
The divine, the demonic and the mortal all originate from one primordial being:
The descendants of Prajāpati are of three kinds, the devas, men and the asuras who 
lived as disciples with their father, Prajāpati. (BU 5.2.1)
Prajāpati teaches the same to all:
Prajāpati said ‘We must seek and aspire to know the self which is free from evil, old 
age, death and sorrow, from hunger and thirst, and which desires and envisages what 
it ought to desire and envisage. One who has sought and understands the self attains 
all worlds and all desires.’
The devas and asuras both heard these words and said, ‘Well then, we will search 
for the self (ātman) by which one attains all worlds and all desires.’ (ChU 8.7.1–2)
The life and death struggle between the divine and the demonic for the posses-
sion of the world and attainment of all desires ends with the victory of the gods.
So long as Indra did not understand the self, the asuras (demons) conquered him. 
When he understood it he conquered the asuras, obtaining pre-eminence among all 
gods, supremacy and sovereignty over all beings. (KauU 4.20)
In the Vedas and the Upaniṣads there is no explicit argument for the continued 
existence of the created world as in the Timaeus, but from the eternity of brah-
man the same implication might be drawn. The identification or incorporation of 
ātman with brahman as the totality of all that exists would entail the existence of 
one universe as in the Timaeus. However, in the absence of the goodness of the 
24 According to Guthrie, ‘the three parts of the soul, when they reach the divine level, are not 
merely in harmony but merge into one, namely nous’ (1962: 4:425).
25 In the Mahābhārata one hundred demonic sons are born from the beautiful Gandhari and 
resort to treachery to overthrow the Pandavas, the five sons of gods.
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dēmiourgos which ensures the continuation of the universe (Tim. 41a–b), in the 
Upaniṣads the oceans, the heaven, the constellations and the abodes of the gods 
are ephemeral and immersed in the perennial cycle of destruction and creation:
All this is perishable . . . The great oceans dry up; the mountains fall; the pole-star 
strays; the wind ropes (holding the stars) are cut; the earth is submerged; the gods 
depart from their place –
In such a world of samsara (wandering back and forth) what good is it pursuing the 
enjoyment of pleasures . . . (MaiU 1.4)26
The answer to this question is self-knowledge.
Self-knowledge and the knowledge of the universe
The moral and epistemological significance of self-knowledge or self-realisation 
is pervasive in the Upaniṣads. The most fundamental thesis of the Upaniṣads is 
that the true self, ātman or puruṣa (person) is the same as the self of the universe, 
brahman (Isa Upaniṣad, 6–7; BU 2.5.19).27 Self-knowledge consists in recog-
nising that the true self, ātman, is identical with the totality of reality, brahman, 
and culminates in ‘bliss’.28
In the beginning this world was only brahman; therefore it knew even that the ātman 
is brahman, therefore it became all. It is the same with the sages, the same with men. 
Whoever knows the self as ‘I am brahman’, becomes this entire universe. Even 
the gods cannot prevail against him, for he becomes their ātman. Now, if a man 
worships another god, thinking: ‘He is one and I am another’, he does not know. 
(BU 1.4.10)
Cosmology is the prerequisite for self-knowledge and ethics in the Timaeus 
and the Upaniṣads. The knowledge of psyche and ātman is inseparable from the 
knowledge of the totality of existence and imbued with moral significance. The 
knowledge of the true self within the framework of cosmology is metaphysical in 
the Timaeus in so far as the dēmiourgos, the eternal model of the universe and the 
forms are concerned. But it is also empirical, since the activity of psyche takes 
place neither in solipsistic introspection nor is derived from a priori principles 
but in relation to the order and harmony of the planetary movements correspond-
ing to the laws of musical harmony. The activity of ātman encompasses all that 
is encountered in existence.
The precedence of the soul over the body in Plato and the priority of the 
26 Translations of the Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad are adapted from Roebuck 2014. Olivelle 2008 
does not include the Maitrāyaṇīya.
27 Olivelle 2011.
28 Raju 1985: 35–6.
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spiritual over the transient material world in the Vedic tradition arise from the 
conception of what constitutes a moral life.29 As in the Timaeus the real or true 
self is not the body, but the soul.30 Socrates’ exhortation in the Timaeus for all to 
attend to the divine part within, and his impassioned exhortation for tending to 
the good of the soul in the Alcibiades and in the Gorgias, are analogous with the 
admonition of the attachment to delusions of desire in the Upaniṣads.
Carried along by the waves of the qualities, unsound, inconstant, disconnected, full 
of desires, wavering, he falls into believing, ‘I am he, this is mine’; he binds himself 
with himself, as a bird with a net . . . (MaiU 3. 2)
Self-knowledge, the knowledge of the ātman as brahman, raises human beings 
to the level of the gods.
Whoever knows ‘I am brahman’ becomes the self, ātman, of all, including the gods. 
(BU 1. 4.10)
In the Upaniṣads full equivalence between divine and human reality is affirmed 
by knowledge of the true self as brahman. In the Timaeus there is at most a par-
allelism between the divine and the human existence. Even when a soul attains 
goodness through reason and the result is eudaimonia, it is only an approxima-
tion to the divine.31 As Pindar observed:
Creature of a day – What is he?
What is he not?
Such is man – a shadow in a dream.
The delight of mortals grows in a short time, and then it falls to the ground, shaken 
by an adverse thought.
But when the brilliance given by Zeus comes, a shining light is on man, and a 
gentle lifetime. (Pindar Pythian Ode 8)
The chariot of the soul32
Let us liken the soul to a pair of winged horses and a driver. The horses and drivers 
of the gods are noble and good but those of other beings are mixed . . . the charioteer 
29 Plato emphasises the priority of the soul also at Phaedo 79dff., Phaedrus 245dff. and Laws 
896c (‘the soul is anterior to the body’). In the Laws the soul is the most divine and ‘most 
his own self’ (726a) which governs all things (896dff.). See also Bostock 1986.
30 For early developments of the view that the self is soul in Hesiod, Pindar, Pythagoras, 
Heraclitus and Empedocles, and that it may survive death, see Long 2015.
31 As reason is the divine element in man, in the activity of reason we can ascend to the level 
of the gods, ‘becoming like a god (homoiosis theoi) insofar as it is possible’ for a mortal 
(Theatetus 176a–b).
32 See also Magnone, Forte and Smith, and Schlieter in this volume.
Cosmology, psyche and ātman 81
drives a pair: one of the horses is noble and good but the other is of opposite breed 
and character. So in our case the driving is of necessity troublesome and difficult . . . 
The soul looks after all that is inanimate . . . When it is perfect and fully winged it 
rises up and governs the whole world. But a soul which has lost its wing carries on 
only until it gets hold of something solid and then settles down taking on an earthly 
body . . . The whole now, soul and body fused, is called a living being with the epi-
thet ‘mortal’. (Phdr. 246a–c)33
In the chariot metaphor of the Phaedrus the soul is not a static substance but an 
activity, a dynamic process of its constituents. Psyche and ātman are likened to 
a chariot both in Plato and in the Upaniṣads, signifying the conflicting forces 
within the soul, which need to be harmonised. In the Timaeus, before the souls 
are placed in the bodies, the dēmiourgos placed each in a star, ‘mounting them as 
it were in chariots’ (41d–e).
The star-chariot of the soul in Timaeus, the chariot of the soul in the Phaedrus 
and the Kaṭha Upaniṣad illuminate the composite nature of psyche and ātman 
and the unity and harmony in the soul as the goals of moral autonomy and 
freedom.
Know the self as riding in a chariot, and the body as the chariot. Know the intellect 
as the charioteer, and the mind as the reins. The senses, they call the horses, and the 
objects of the sense are the paths . . . [When] the self is unified with body, senses and 
mind, the wise call him the ‘enjoyer’. (KaU 3.3–3.5)
The emphasis on the intellect and its function has some points of similarity to 
reason represented by the charioteer in the Phaedrus: only when the intellect 
is the driver can the soul attain true understanding of itself as brahman (KaU 
3.6–9).
Immortality, divinity, eudaimonia and dharma
There is one race of men, one race of gods; and from a single mother we both draw 
our breath.
But all allotted power divides us: man is nothing, but for the gods the bronze sky 
endures as a secure home forever.
Nevertheless, we bear some resemblance to the immortals, either in greatness of 
mind or in nature, although we do not know, by day or by night, towards what goal 
fortune has written that we should run. (Pindar Nemean Ode 6)
Pindar’s view of man as having ‘some resemblance to the immortals, either in 
greatness of mind or in nature’, is further developed in the Timaeus as the gulf 
33 The tripartite structure of the soul is further developed in the Republic (435c, 550b, 580d–
581e): the ‘rational’ (logistikon), the ‘irrational’ or appetitive (alogiston or epithumetikon) 
and the ‘spirited’ (thumoeides). 
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between the gods and mortals is bridged, in so far as this is possible, by the 
activity of the soul.
If a man perseveres in pursuing learning and wisdom he will certainly be led to 
immortal and divine thoughts reaching truth and will attain immortality to the full 
extent it is possible for human nature. (90b–c)
Plato concludes the Timaeus with a resounding affirmation of the possibility for 
achieving eudaimonia (happiness) for all those who strive to attend to the divine 
part of the soul.34 Plato’s conception of the divine is not that of the soothsayers 
or inspired poets but firmly grounded in the soul’s activity towards beauty and 
goodness and the study of the natural phenomena, ‘the thoughts and revolutions 
of the whole world’. The alignment of the activity of the psyche with the plane-
tary movements revitalises its original state.
The motions that have an affinity to the divine part in us are the thoughts and revolu-
tions of the universe. These, therefore, are the ones that every one of us should follow. 
We should redirect the revolutions in our head that were thrown off course at the time 
of our birth by coming to learn the harmonies and the revolutions of the universe, and 
bring the intelligent part, in accordance with its original nature, into alignment with 
the objects of the intellect. We shall then attain the fulfillment of the best life set by 
the gods before mankind for the present and for the time to come. (90c–d)
The divine part in us is that which is conducive to the flourishing of the individ-
ual in unison with the order, goodness and beauty of the universe.35
The individual soul is urged to aspire towards goodness by studying the 
order and harmony of the cosmos.36 The soul contemplates the harmony of the 
spheres, not turning inward but outward to the universe. In the contemplation of 
the beauty of the universe the soul reflects the goodness of the universe, linking 
the cosmological and the ethical. But it would seem that the goodness of the 
dēmiourgos and the universe is not moral but aesthetic goodness and beauty 
arising from the transformation of disorder (chaos or undifferentiated matter) to 
34 The soul is divine and immortal and ascends to abide with the gods when it is freed from 
bodily constraints (Phd. 80e–81a).
35 Einstein reinvigorates Plato’s insight on the interconnectedness of the individual and the 
universe: ‘A human being is a part of the whole, called by us “the universe”, a part limited 
in time and space. He experiences himself, his thoughts and feelings, as something sepa-
rate from the rest – a kind of optical delusion of his consciousness. This delusion is a kind 
of prison for us restricting us to our personal decisions and to affection for a few persons 
nearest to us. Our task must be to free ourselves by widening our circle of compassion to 
embrace all living creatures and the whole of nature in its beauty’ (Calaprice 2005: 206). 
36 As Robinson (1990: 105) has pointed out, the goodness of order is emphasised in the 
Gorgias (503–504d). Also in the Republic by creating order and harmony within, the soul 
attains virtue (431d–e, 442c–d, 443c–444a). 
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order. However, to the extent that moral goodness can be conceived as the order 
and harmony of the internal organisation of living beings which enables them to 
flourish together, it could be brought about by the contemplation of the order and 
harmony of planetary movements.
The goodness of the dēmiourgos, cosmos and the world soul are a priori 
and axiomatic. The dēmiourgos is good; the cosmos, being the work of a divine 
craftsman, is good; and the world soul and the divine part of individual souls, 
also the work of the dēmiourgos, are, therefore, good. The goodness of the indi-
vidual soul is a posteriori and can only be achieved through continuous striving 
after the pattern of ordered harmony exemplified in the planetary movements.
By achieving immortality and attending to the divine element Plato means 
the continuous search for knowledge and truth. In the Timaeus, a just soul 
returns to its star, while an unjust soul is reincarnated (42a–d.). Being divine 
and immortal, the rational part of the soul ascends to its star. Only nous is free 
from the cycle of rebirth (42a–d); the appetitive and spirited parts are mortal.37 
The activity and the resulting condition of the soul determine the body it will 
occupy in rebirth: a well-ordered soul will be lodged in a higher form of life, the 
disordered in a lower form. The central place of the transmigration of the soul in 
Plato’s ethics is elucidated by Luc Brisson in ‘Myths in Plato’s Ethics’: Myths 
have ‘a fundamental and permanent’ importance in revealing ‘the emergence 
of a tendency to orient ethics towards physics . . . by resituating man within his 
place on the scale of all living things’.38
The cosmogonic processes in Ṛgveda and the Upaniṣads seem morally and 
aesthetically neutral: the world is not described as good or beautiful. Unlike in 
the Timaeus, there is no motivation of the maker of the world to create a cosmos 
bestowing on it beauty and goodness; there is no eternal model, a paradigm 
of supreme goodness. However, an ethical conception of the cosmic order is 
emphasised in the Ṛgveda, the Upaniṣads and in subsequent Indian cosmolo-
gies.39 While the anthropomorphic conceptions of the process of creation in the 
Ṛgveda and the Upaniṣads are distinct from the mathematical structures and the 
ordered harmony of the cosmology in the Timaeus, both regard the universe as 
a hierarchically organised and interrelated system in which order prevails. The 
concept of ṛtá (order, truth, cosmic order or course of nature) in the Ṛgveda 
can be compared to the concept of order in the Timaeus. Upheld by the gods, 
Varuna and Mitra (RV 1.2.8; 4.5.4–9), ṛtá is pervasive. Agni, the god of fire, is 
37 The customary view that only nous is free of the cycle of rebirth (for instance Guthrie 1971: 
2:223–4) has been contested by Robinson 1990.
38 Brisson 2004a: 63.
39 Olivelle 2008: xlvii. ‘The ethicization of cosmic order evident in the Upaniṣads remains a 
constant feature of later Indian cosmologies.’
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‘the guardian of ṛtá’ (RV 1.1.8; 1.77.5). Usias, the Dawn, does not depart from 
ṛtá (RV 1.123.9). It might seem that ṛtá is similar to anangkē, necessity, in the 
Timaeus because of its inexorability. But unlike necessity, ṛtá has a moral func-
tion in sustaining world order. Cosmic and moral order are not inherent features 
of the universe in the Vedic and the Upaniṣadic texts as they are in the Timaeus 
but are maintained by gods.
(Indra) lead us along the path of truth (ṛtá), across all difficult passages. (RV 
10.133.6)
Ṛtá is the truth and cosmic principle which ensures the functioning of the uni-
verse. Conceived as the laws that sustain the continuity of the universe, ṛtá is 
aligned with the moral laws governing the realm of actions and develops into the 
concept of dharma (duty, justice, right action).40 Dharma is both cosmological 
and ethical: it is that which sustains the world order and upholds justice, right 
action and duty.
Actions in accordance with dharma (in the sense of sacrifice, charity, study, 
asceticism) lead to ‘the realm of the blessed’, but only the knowledge of brah-
man leads to immortality.
The one who abides in brahman achieves immortality. (ChU 2.23.1)
As in the Timaeus, immortality must be achieved by attending to the divine 
dimension. When the universe is divided into human beings, ancestors and 
gods, those who follow the world of the ancestors will return to be reborn in this 
world, while those who follow the world of gods will become immortal (BU 
1.5.16; 6.2). This is partly analogous to the hierarchy of the gods and mortals 
in the Timaeus and the prospect of mortals becoming like gods, in so far as it is 
possible for mortals.
Paralleling the rebirth of discordant souls in the Timaeus (42b–c), the cycle 
of rebirth is also recurrent in the Vedic and the Upaniṣadic texts. The moral laws 
governing rebirth are the same for psyche and ātman: those who perform good 
actions are reborn in good circumstances and those who perform bad actions, 
into the opposite (ChU 5.10.7).
As a man acts, as he behaves, so he becomes. A man of good actions will become 
good, a man of bad actions, bad. He becomes pure through pure actions, bad by bad 
actions. (BU 4.4.5)
‘Thinking thoughts immortal and divine’ and endeavouring ‘to attain immortal-
ity in the fullest extent which human nature is capable of’ (Tim. 90c), the soul 
moves upwards (ChU 8.6.6):
40 For the evolution of the concepts of rita and dharma, see Horsch 1967, Hacker 1965, and 
Jurewicz and Chaturvedi in this volume.
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There is this verse:
‘There are a hundred and one arteries of the heart.
One of them penetrates the summit of the head.
Moving upwards by it, a man reaches immortality.
The others lead to departing in different directions –
In different directions’
Epilogue: Convergent and divergent evolutions of ideas from the Timaeus, 
Ṛgveda and the Upaniṣads to the cosmology of the present
We still do not know one thousandth of one percent of what nature has revealed to 
us.
Whoever undertakes to set himself up as a judge of truth and knowledge is ship-
wrecked by the laughter of the gods.41
These remarks regarding the difficulty of knowing the nature of the universe have 
come down to us not from Greek or Indian philosophy but from Einstein. They 
echo the perspective of cosmology as an open-ended enquiry in the Timaeus and 
in the Ṛgveda. The metaphysical foundations as well as the mathematical and 
empirical aspects of Platonic, Vedic and Upaniṣadic cosmology have been com-
pared to current research in cosmology.42 The comparisons with science tend 
41 Einstein 1954: 28.
42 In the later texts of Purana, the cycles of destruction and rebirth are attributed to the uni-
verse. This aspect of cosmology in Indian thought has been compared to the current views 
of cosmology by Carl Sagan (1980) and Firtjof Capra (1975). ‘Hindu religion is the only 
one of the world’s great faiths dedicated to the idea that the Cosmos itself undergoes an 
immense, indeed an infinite, number of deaths and rebirths. It is the only religion in which 
the time scales correspond, to those of modern scientific cosmology. Its cycles run from 
our ordinary day and night to a day and night of Brahmā, 8.64 billion years long. Longer 
than the age of the Earth or the Sun and about half the time since the Big Bang. And there 
are much longer time scales still’ (Sagan 1980: 213–14). In ‘Worlds on worlds are rolling 
ever’, Shelley describes the cycle of creation and immortality:
Worlds on worlds are rolling ever
From creation to decay,
Like the bubbles on a river
Sparkling, bursting, borne away.
But they are still immortal
Who, through birth’s orient portal
And death’s dark chasm hurrying to and fro,
Clothe their unceasing flight
In the brief dust and light
Gathered around their chariots as they go;
New shapes they still may weave . . .
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to emphasise either the a priori and metaphysical aspects of current cosmology 
or the mathematical and empirical aspects of Platonic, Vedic and Upaniṣadic 
cosmology. Beginning with Heisenberg, the parallels between particle physics, 
chemistry, cosmology and Plato’s ideas regarding the origin of the universe con-
tinue to stimulate discussion.43
The philosophical impulse to seek unity among multiplicity permeating the 
account of the creation of the universe in the Ṛgveda, the Upaniṣads and the 
Timaeus continues to resonate in the present. Tracing the convergence and 
the divergence in the evolution of the concepts of cosmos, psyche and ātman 
aims at a reciprocal enhancement of our understanding of the continuing explo-
ration of the nature of the cosmos and the soul which animate the universe. The 
conceptions of the universe and of the nature of soul in Timaeus, Ṛgveda and the 
Upaniṣads converge and overlap but do not coincide.
The ethics of Timaeus and the Upaniṣads have a thematic and discursive 
correspondence, laying the foundations for moral realism, the view that moral 
values, principles and actions have objective validity beyond individual pref-
erences, cultural norms, conventions or social institutions. The knowledge of 
ātman and psyche prepares the ground for moral universalism and the autonomy 
and responsibility of the individual. Subjectivism and relativism are regarded 
as partial perspectives of the whole. Interpretive analyses of ātman and psyche 
as the constant and enduring self throughout persistent change can enhance our 
understanding of personal identity and continuity of consciousness.44
43 Heisenberg 1974. See also Brisson and Meyerstein 1995: 40–1. Machleidt (2005) explains 
that, as Heisenberg recognised, the ideas of modern particle physics which regard geomet-
ric symmetries as generating the particles from a few elementary components are close to 
Plato’s views. Lloyd (2007) has emphasised the significance of Timaeus in symmetry anal-
ysis in inorganic and physical chemistry. Plato’s questions in the Timaeus are still being 
asked in contemporary cosmology: whether the universe had a beginning and whether it 
has an external cause or is self-generated (Carroll 2010); whether the universe exists in 
time and why the universe exists (Leggett 2010).
44 ‘Whatever the date, those forest Sages began everything; no fundamental problem of phi-





Plato and South Asian yogic traditions espouse various soteriological goals – 
divinisation, nirvāṇa, the identity of ātman and brahman, and yogic aloneness 
(kaivalya) – but their prescribed methods for attaining them present striking 
similarities. In addition to right living and right beliefs, meditation and contem-
plation are valorised as essential means for the deconstruction of the empirical 
person. While the importance ascribed to such practices is widely recognised in 
South Asia, the prominent intellectualism of the Platonic dialogues and of Plato 
scholars has obscured the existential centrality of the practice of inwardness 
and tranquillity for philosophers who aspire to ‘become as like god as possible’ 
(Theaet. 176b1–2).1 The goal of this chapter is to highlight this dimension of 
the Platonic way of life by demonstrating affinities with South Asian meditative 
praxis.
Platonists and Indian yogins embrace a way of life that integrates cognitive 
and affective aspects of human nature on a path that eliminates ignorance and 
suffering through the purification and simplification of consciousness. In Pierre 
Hadot’s formulation, Greek thinkers practised the art of living as
a concrete attitude and determinate life-style, which engages the whole of existence. 
The philosophical act is not situated merely on the cognitive level, but on that of the 
self and of being. It is a progress which causes us to be more fully, and makes us 
better. It is a conversion which turns our entire life upside down, changing the life of 
the person who goes through it. It raises the individual from an inauthentic condition 
of life, darkened by unconsciousness and harassed by worry, to an authentic state of 
life, in which he attains self-consciousness, an exact vision of the world, inner peace 
and freedom.2
 1 Annas (1999) and Sedley (2000) provide valuable accounts of divinisation, but ignore the 
practices that contribute to attaining godlikeness.
 2 Hadot 1995: 82–3.
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I shall begin with the general principles that underlie Indian yogic practices.
• The highest knowledge cannot be conveyed via the written word, but rather 
must be transmitted orally, or even in silence, from teacher to pupil in con-
junction with the practice of meditation.
• Psychology is equivalent to cosmology: the hierarchy of states of conscious-
ness parallels precisely the basic structure of the cosmos.
• Attainment of progressively higher states of consciousness depends on two 
types of meditative practice: one that quietens the mind and calms the pas-
sions and one that inculcates wisdom through direct experiential knowledge 
of transcendent truths.
• Meditation helps to deconstruct the empirical personality, removing external 
accretions and attachments in order to reveal a pure underlying self or undif-
ferentiated reality.
• Enlightenment entails liberation from the cycle of births and deaths.
Commitment to these principles grounds the theory and practice of meditation 
in the early and middle Upaniṣads, the early Buddhist canonical literature, in the 
Mahābhārata, and in the Yoga Sūtra (third–fourth centuries ce). The latter neatly 
schematises Brahminical thought in its well-known formulation of ‘eight-limbed 
yoga’ (aṣṭāṅga). ‘The eight limbs are abstentions, observances, posture, breath 
control, disengagement of the senses, concentration, meditation, and absorption’ 
(yama-niyama-āsana-prāṇāyāma-pratyāhāra-dhāraṇā-dhyāna-samādhayo 
‘ṣṭāv aṅgāni. YS 2.29).3
In both Hindu and Buddhist yogic traditions, aspirants begin with cultiva-
tion of the virtues, right living, and the acceptance of right views guided by faith 
in truths transmitted in scriptures or in authoritative traditions. Faith (Sanskrit 
śraddhā, Pali saddhā) in the Buddha’s dharma and in the community (saṇga) 
and Vedantic reliance on ‘great sayings’ (mahāvākyas) like ‘you are that’ and 
‘ātman is brahman’ provide starting-points for reflection and forging a way of 
life. In Śāntideva’s concise formulation: ‘One who wishes to bring closure to 
pain, and to arrive at happiness’ end, must plant firm faith as the root, and fasten 
the mind to enlightenment.’4 Śraddhā is a multi-faceted virtue that comprises 
beliefs about the human condition as taught by the Buddha and confidence in the 
spiritual benefits to be achieved by practising the dharma.
Progress in right living through abstentions and observances is a precon-
dition for mastering the subsequent limbs of yoga. Similarly, in the Upaniṣads 
one begins with ethical behaviour and quieting the mind. Vedic students are 
enjoined to practice asceticism (tapas), self-control (dama) and tranquillity 
 3 Translations from the Yoga Sūtras are from Bryant 2009.
 4 Kapstein 2013: 107.
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(śama), along with rightness (ṛtá), truth (satya) and Vedic study and recitation 
(TU 1.9). Indeed, all the virtues are considered forms of tapas (Mahānār. Up. 
8). The Upaniṣads espouse inner asceticism in the form of yoking (yoga/yukta), 
i.e. controlling the senses, and concentration (dhyāna) as means to achieve direct 
experiential knowledge ( jñāna) of the revealed truth that ātman is brahman, 
epitomised in the formula ‘I am brahman’ (brahmāsmi). Quieting the externally 
directed mind, or manas, which operates through the sense-organs (indriya), 
instils one-pointedness and tranquillity, the psycho-physical bases of dhyāna. 
Thus, the middle ‘limbs’ of Yoga Sūtra 2.29 – pratyāhāra (withdrawal of the 
mind from sense- objects and from the senses), dhāraṇā (concentration, fixing 
the mind on an object) and dhyāna (P. jhāna = meditation or concentration) 
– formalise practices that appear originally in the Upaniṣads.5 Such cessative 
practices calm the mind and prepare the aspirant for entering the rarefied states 
of samādhi (absorption, trance, ecstasy), yogic kaivalya (aloneness), and the 
Buddhist dhyānas (concentrations or absorptions) leading to nirvāṇa. It can be 
argued that, because the more advanced spiritual exercises aim at transcending 
everyday life, their ethical implications are limited or that they are egoistic.6 
However, in order to discern the heart of ethical philosophies based on purifi-
cation and inner concentration it is necessary to bracket the assumptions of our 
modern individualistic and activist ethics.
Perhaps the earliest passage on knowledge and concentration in the 
Upaniṣads states: ‘He who knows this, therefore, becomes calm, composed, 
quiet, patient and concentrated (samāhita). He sees the self (ātman) in just him-
self and all things as the self’ (BU 4.4.23). He who is freed from desire goes to 
brahman (BU 4.4.6). A later text adds:
Not a man who does not abstain from bad acts, nor one who has not come to peace, 
not one who is not concentrated, nor one whose mind has not come to peace, shall 
reach this by means of knowledge. (KaU 2.24)7
In the Upaniṣads the first stage of concentration involves stilling the externally 
directed mind:
When the five perceptions are stilled along with the mind (manas), and not even the 
higher mind (buddhi) stirs itself, they call that the highest state. This they consider 
yoga, the firm control in concentration (dhāraṇā) of the sense-organs. Then is one 
free from distractions, for yoga is the origin and the passing away. (KaU 6.10–11)8
 5 Pratyāhāra is encouraged for the Vedic student’s domestic life in ChU 8.15.
 6 Steven Collins acknowledges that for Buddhists nirvāṇa is not a moral phenomenon, nev-
ertheless it is the summum bonum (1998: 155). He notes that compassion for all sentient 
beings expresses the overarching ethical concern of meditation.
 7 Trans. Hume 1921: 350.
 8 Translations of the Upaniṣads are from Olivelle 2008 unless noted otherwise.
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The Kaṭha Upaniṣad also employs the dynamic chariot image of the self, which 
is similar to the soul chariot in Plato’s Phaedrus myth,9 to represent how the 
higher part of mind stills the externally directed mind:
3. Know the self as a rider in a chariot,
and the body, as simply the chariot.
Know the intellect (buddhi) as the charioteer,
and the mind (manas), as simply the reins.
4. The senses, they say, are the horses,
and sense objects are the paths around them.
. . .
5. When a man lacks understanding (vijñāna),
and his mind (manas) is never controlled (ayukta);
His senses do not obey him,
as bad horses, a charioteer.
8. When a man has understanding,
is mindful and always pure;
He does reach that final step,
from which he is not reborn again. (KaU 3.3–8)
The Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad offers a similar account in a theistic key.10 Yoking 
the yogin’s mind carries thoughts to the heavens (2.1–3): ‘When he keeps his 
body straight . . . and draws the senses together with the mind into his heart, 
a wise man shall cross all the frightful rivers with the boat consisting of the 
formulation (brahman)’ (2.8); ‘the man practising yogic restraint sees here the 
true nature of brahman, he is free from all fetters, because he has known God, 
unborn, unchanging and unsullied by all objects’ (2.15).
The Mahābhārata clarifies the distinction between lower and higher mind: 
‘The mind (manas) travels far and moves in various directions; its essence is 
desire and doubt. But the person whose mind is well-controlled experiences 
bliss both in this world and the world beyond’ (12.194.37).11 The Mahābhārata 
also explicates the interdependence of ethical and contemplative virtues: ‘Truth 
(satya), tending the sacred fire, living in isolated places, meditation (dhyāna), 
asceticism (tapas), restraint (dama), forbearance (kṣanti), freedom from spite, 
 9 On the soul-as-chariot image in the two cultures see Forte and Smith, Magnone, and 
Schlieter in this volume.
10 Besides dhyāna another term for meditation in the Upaniṣads is upāsanā. Bader (1990: 
40) notes that upāsanā is more devotional than dhyāna. Typically, it specifies one-pointed 
meditation on a deity, in association with self-dedication and surrender, thereby awakening 
the heart.
11 Wynne 2009: 179.
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moderation in eating, withdrawal of the senses from their objects, controlled 
speech, and peace’ (12.196.10–11).12
The Buddhist Pali Canon articulates the stages of meditative praxis more 
precisely than the earlier Brahminical texts. Meditation is an essential compo-
nent of the Buddhist path, which comprises right conduct (śīla), concentration 
(samādhi) and wisdom (prajñā). The last two items in the eightfold noble path 
are mindfulness (S. smṛti, P. sati) and concentration (samādhi), respectively. 
(The scheme influenced Patañjali’s eight-limbed yoga.) Moral intentionality and 
mindfulness, which are cornerstones of the Buddha’s teaching, combine with 
concentration to produce ‘emotional health, making the practitioner much less 
likely to want to violate the commitments of moral discipline’.13 ‘Because the 
Buddha argued that lack of wisdom and mental discipline results in behaviour 
that leads to suffering of both self and others, Buddhist traditions have under-
stood prajñā – the wisdom and insight of understanding the nature of reality 
– and samādhi – the mental discipline and capacity for attention that enables 
equanimity – to be morally significant.’14 The power and value ascribed to intro-
spection and detachment is not a sign of egoism. Rather, the other-regarding 
virtues spring from self-abnegation.
Buddhist meditation (bhāvanā) is designed to remove cognitive delusion 
caused by dogmatism, doubt and ignorance, and emotional turbulence aroused by 
cravings. Reflecting its literal meaning, ‘bringing into being’, bhāvanā  induces 
harmonious bodily and mental states. The Pali Canon features many types of 
meditation, some deriving from the Buddha’s own experience, others from either 
Brahminical or non-Vedic sources. From the Buddha’s encounters with two 
teachers before his awakening, Āḷāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta, he learned 
two cessative meditations – on the ‘sphere of nothingness’ and on the ‘sphere of 
neither perception nor non-perception’. He claimed that neither led to liberation. 
Wynne argues that these meditative practices derive from early Brahminism,
the goal of which was thought to be a nondual state of meditation identical to the 
unmanifest state of brahman. In early Brahminical yoga, liberation was thought to 
be anticipated in a meditative trance which has passed beyond the possibility of cog-
nition, a state in which the subject/object division has been dissolved . . . The adept, 
through his meditative trance, was thought to anticipate in life what he will realise at 
death – the nondual source of creation.15
Some pre-Buddhist yogic practices were probably accepted by the Buddha and 
reformulated into a new scheme, while others were rejected.
12 Wynne 2009: 199.
13 Goodman 2013: 555.
14 Edelglass 2013: 476.
15 Wynne 2007: 108.
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Pali sources attribute to the Buddha the discovery and mastery of four 
states of concentration (S. dhyānas, P. jhānas), which led to the discovery of 
the four noble truths. In Dīgha Nikāya 16 the Buddha enters successively the 
dhyānas of the four form-spheres and then of the four formless spheres, there-
after resuming the four form-meditations in turn. After re-entering and then 
abandoning the fourth dhyāna, he entered nirvāṇa. Since the fourth dhyāna 
represents an advanced stage of cessation and is followed by entrance into nir-
vāṇa, for Buddhists the cessation of mental activity was not an absolute end in 
itself.16 
We find here an articulated scheme of two types of meditation. The dhyānas 
form a progressive series of four calm meditations (S. śamatha, P. samatha), 
whose goal is samādhi. The second type is insight meditation (S. vipaśyanā, 
P. vipasannā), whose goal is wisdom or insight (S. prajñā, P. paññā). While 
śamatha calms and purifies emotions, vipaśyanā eradicates karmic impressions 
(saṃskāras) and the cankers (āsrava), leading to release.17 As teachings were 
systematised, most authorities gave priority to the cultivation of insight over 
the practice of concentration. Nevertheless, influential authorities, like the great 
Tibetan saint Tsong Khapa, believed that the two practices are complementary.
Not knowing this system, some even propound, ‘If you are a scholar, you only do 
analytical meditation. If you are a spiritual seeker or adept you only do stabilizing 
meditation.’ This is not the case, because each must do both . . . you must use dis-
cernment for both of these methods of meditation. If you lack or are deficient in such 
analytical meditation, then you will not develop stainless wisdom, the precious life 
of the path.18
Calm meditation gradually removes the defilements (kleśas) and the five hin-
drances of sensual desire, ill-will, lethargy, excitement/depression, and doubt.19 
These agitate the surface of the mind, obscuring its underlying purity, which is 
thought to be calm and tranquil. As Conze notes,
Concentration results less from intellectual effort than from a rebirth of the whole 
personality, including the body, the emotions and the will . . . before spiritual con-
centration can even be approached, we must have stilled, or suppressed for the time 
being, five vices, which are known as the five hindrances and the observance of the 
moral rules must . . . have become nearly automatic.20
16 See the distinction between enlightenment and final nirvāṇa in Collins 1998: 147ff.
17 On the interaction of the dhyānas and insight-meditation see Collins 1998: 157–60, and 
Gombrich 1996: ch. 4.
18 Tsong Kha-Pa 2000: 113.
19 For the texts see Shaw 2006: 39–58.
20 Conze 1956: 20.
Plato and yoga 93
Likewise, in the Yoga Sūtras (1.30–2) mental disturbances (antarāya) are 
removed through concentration and one-pointedness, preparing the mind for 
insight: ‘Upon the destruction of impurities as a result of the practice of yoga, 
the lamp of knowledge arises. This culminates in discriminative discernment’ 
(YS 2.28).
Buddhist calm meditation takes many forms. Some practices provide initial 
access to concentration, others lead to introvertive trance. Typically, one begins 
with recollection or mindfulness of the Buddha, Dharma, the Sangha, etc., or of 
death. The four dhyānas progressively concentrate on a wide variety of subjects 
such as breathing, the impermanence and foulness of the body, or the divine abid-
ings (brahmavihāra): loving-kindness (maitrī), compassion (karuṇā), empathetic 
joy (muditā) and equanimity (upekṣā). The ethical effects of cultivating these four 
positive attitudes are evident in countering specific unwholesome states of mind 
like hostility, harmfulness, dissatisfaction, envy and honour- seeking, which lead 
to wrongdoing and the urge to distinguish oneself from others.
The four limbs of dhyāna detach the mind from the gross sense-sphere of 
desires and sense-objects (kāmāvacara), redirecting it first to the realm of pure 
forms or subtle materiality (rūpāvacara), and upon attainment of the fourth 
dhyāna, entrance into the formless realms (arūpāvacara). It is likely, says 
Gethin, that ‘the four formless attainments . . . are presented as modifications 
and refinements of the fourth dhyāna’, at which stage ‘stilling and calming the 
mind is essentially complete’.21 The four formless attainments involve cessation 
of thought, feeling and even breathing by concentrating on: infinite space (5), 
infinite consciousness (6), nothingness (7), and neither consciousness nor uncon-
sciousness (8).
The dhyānas standardly possess these features:
(a) first dhyāna: vitarka (applied thought), vicāra (sustained thinking, examination),22 
joy/physical rapture (pīti) and happiness/mental bliss (sukha), one-pointedness 
(ekaggatā)
(b) second dhyāna: joy (pīti) and happiness (sukha), and one-pointedness (ekaggatā)
(c) third dhyāna: equipoise (upekṣā), happiness (sukha), and one-pointedness 
(ekaggatā)
(d) fourth dhyāna: equipoise (upekṣā), one-pointedness (ekaggatā), mindfulness 
(sati).23
21 Gethin 1998: 185. See Vetter (1988: xxi–xxiii) on whether the four formless attainments 
are part of the Buddha’s original teaching. Wynne (2007: 43) cites Brahminic sources for 
these states.
22 Vitarka is the first alighting (of the mind on an object), while vicāra is the examination 
(vicaraṇa) of what has been recognised by vitarka. See Cousins 1992: 144.
23 The four dhyānas are also mentioned in the Mokṣadharma 12.188. See Bryant 2009: 70, 
Bronkhorst 1993: 68.
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It is important to note that conceptual thought ceases in the second dhyāna; and 
tranquillity appears in the third and fourth dhyānas with the absence of joy and 
happiness. Meditation thus begins with rational, discursive thought, but in the 
higher dhyānas the aspirant attains non-conceptual states as she enters the inter-
mediary world of subtle forms.
In the fourth dhyāna, ‘the meditator can focus fully on the development of 
insight and the wisdom that understands the four truths’24 and that all things are 
impermanent, unsatisfactory and not-self. Insight also advances through levels, 
according to the scheme of the seven purifications. Proponents of the superiority 
of insight to calm meditation emphasise the importance of the insight that the 
four calm dhyānas are themselves impermanent and thus must be transcended.25 
Another factor, which cannot be examined here, is that various combinations of 
calm and insight are appropriate for individuals at different stages of the path. 
The essential points I wish to make in this brief survey of Buddhist meditative 
practice are that (a) the transcendent states of wisdom to which adepts aspire 
can only be attained through comprehensive purification of mind and heart, the 
attainment of tranquillity, and intense concentration; (b) wisdom far transcends 
beliefs or discursive intellectual knowledge; and (c) each attainment correlates 
with progressively higher cosmic levels.26
The meditative praxis of the Yoga Sūtra is similar to that of the Upaniṣads 
and the Buddhist suttas. The sense-withdrawal and concentration of awareness 
practised by Brahminic and Buddhist yogins retrace the cosmogony by ascend-
ing through the elements, the psychic faculties and mental states, ending in the 
cessation of thought and feeling.27 The treatise begins by defining yoga as ‘the 
cessation of the fluctuations of the mind’ (citta-vṛtti nirodaḥ). The path leading 
to cessation (nirodha) comprises the eight-limbed yoga, as noted above (YS 
2.29). Although rightly likened to the Buddhist eightfold path, Patañjalan yoga 
does not maintain the Buddhist distinction between calm and insight meditation.
• ‘Concentration is the fixing of the mind in one place’ (YS 3.1).
• ‘Meditation is the one-pointedness of the mind on one idea’ (YS 3.2).
• ‘Absorption is when that same meditation shines forth as the object alone and 
[the mind] is devoid of its own nature’ (YS 3.3).
24 Gethin 1998: 187.
25 Cf. Gethin 1998: 199.
26 ‘The visionary experience that was part of the Buddha’s own Enlightenment process . . . pro-
duced a series of vivid images of the heavenly realms in which the meritorious deeds of men 
were rewarded and of the hells in which men received retribution for their sins. The medita-
tive experience . . . led to the development of conceptions of cosmic worlds corresponding 
to the various levels of meditative consciousness’ (Reynolds and Reynolds 1982: 15).
27 Cf. Bryant 2009: 69, and Wynne 2007: 36ff.
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• ‘When these three are performed together, it is called discipline’ (YS 3.4).
• ‘From mastery of discipline comes the light of wisdom’ (YS 3.5).
The apex of yogic practice is samādhi, which has two types: saṃprajñātaḥ and 
asaṃprajñātaḥ: ‘[The type of samādhi] supported by wisdom is accompanied 
by reasoning, reflection, bliss, and I-am-ness’ (YS 1.17). This progression of 
vitarka, vicāra, bliss and asmitā parallels the mental states characteristic of the 
Buddhist dhyānas, with the exception of the fourth, which, as a purified form 
of self-awareness, does not fit precisely the Buddhist rejection of a persisting 
self. (It is closer to the illuminated awareness of buddhi in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad 
discussed above.) As in the Buddhist scheme, the initial stages of meditation 
include ratiocinative activity, marked here also by vitarka and vicāra. Vitarka is 
directed thought, a recognition that ‘this is a dog’, ‘this is blue’, etc. – the activity 
of bringing different objects into focus before the mind’s eye.28 On this sūtra, 
Vyasa defines vitarka as ‘gross directing of the mind to an object’. Later sūtras 
add further points about these cognitive states:
The attainment with reasoning (vitarka) is associated with concepts arising from 
knowledge of the meanings of words. (YS 1.42)
When memory/mindfulness (smṛti) is pure the attainment without reasoning (nir-
vitarkā) reveals only the object and mind as if empty of its own nature. (YS 1.43)
At this stage, as Bryant indicates, ‘all knowledge of the object as convention-
ally understood has been suspended, and the mind has completely transformed 
itself into the object, free from a cognitive identification or self-awareness . . . 
the object stands out freed from the mental clutter of naming, identification, and 
recognition’.29 Vicārā, the second stage of samādhi, which is more subtle than 
vitarka, is also divided into two sections: ‘The states of samādhi with subtle 
awareness (savicārā) and without subtle awareness (nirvicārā), whose objects 
of focus are the subtle nature [of things], are explained in the same manner’ (YS 
1.44). These objects are the imperceptible, subtle elements (tanmatras) which 
are causes of the gross elements, the objects of vitarka. The attainment of nir-
vicārā brings ‘lucidity of the inner self’ (adhyātmaprasādaḥ YS 1.47), a state of 
wisdom (prajñā). The second type of samādhi, asaṃprajñātaḥ, like the formless 
Buddhist dhyānas, leads to cessation (nirodha) of impressions (saṃskāras YS 
1.18, 50–1), a non-conceptual state.30 Beyond this lies classical yoga’s ultimate 
goal of aloneness or singularity (kaivalya, YS 2.25, 4.34), the luminosity of pure 
28 Cf. Cousins 1992: 139.
29 Bryant 2009: 148.
30 Cf. Bryant 2009: 71.
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consciousness (puruṣa) that lacks activity or object. ‘Trance . . . approaches a 
condition of rapt attention to an objectless inwardness.’31
Plato
Plato scholars typically analyse arguments more than they explore the care of the 
self and philosophy as a way of life. This rationalist bias yields generalisations 
like Charles Kahn’s that ‘the fundamental conception of the Forms . . . is linguis-
tic rather than visual in its orientation’.32 Certainly, Socrates – as represented by 
Plato – seeks definitions and discursive knowledge, but this intellectual training 
is only a prelude to higher wisdom and ultimate liberation. Socrates observes 
‘There is likely to be something such as a path to guide us out of our confusion’ 
(Phd. 66b2–3) about the true nature of the soul and its destiny. He exhibits deep 
confidence, hope and faith that after death good men will be welcomed by good 
gods and good men (63b5–c4), and that the mystery-teachings about the after-
life are true (63c1, 5, 67b7, 68a8). To conclude that these are merely corrigible 
beliefs, and hence inferior to discursive knowledge of forms as linguistic enti-
ties or propositions, fails to grasp the force of these existential commitments. 
Repetition of ἐλπίς (hope), and its verbal form ἐλπίζω, is one of many examples 
of the incantatory language Plato uses to complement dialectic. Socrates exhorts 
his interlocutors to be persuaded of the reality of the imaginal worlds depicted 
in the eschatological myths. Those who are not persuaded suffer, he says, from 
‘untrustworthiness and forgetfulness’ (ἀπιστίαν τε καὶ λήθην, Grg. 493c3; cf. 
Phd. 69e3, Phdr. 240c). The Orphic-Pythagorean virtues of persuasion, trust, 
memory and truth condition the philosopher for transcendent perception of invis-
ible realities.
Platonic recollection begins, as does yogic meditative praxis, with sense- 
perception, discursive thought, and belief in transcendent truths, but only gains 
access to unchanging Being by transcending these preparatory stages. Like 
Buddhist mindfulness towards the truths discovered by the Buddha, Platonic 
recollection is a type of meditation directed to the substantial reality of Forms, 
the experiences of the immortal soul in the imaginal realms of the afterlife, 
and the cosmic structures underlying the mechanisms of karma and rebirth. 
Of course, Socrates defends his metaphysical beliefs with arguments, but such 
‘true doctrines’ are often introduced when the normal cognitive operation of 
his interlocutors has been suspended. For example, only when Meno’s mind is 
numbed into perplexity does Socrates introduce immortality and recollection 
31 Conze 1956: 19.
32 Kahn 1997: 354–5. Similarly, Cross 1965: 27–8, ‘a Form, so far from being a “substantial 
entity” is much more like “a formula”. It is the logical predicate in a logos.’
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and say: ‘I trust that this is true’ (Meno 81a5–e2). There and in the Gorgias 
(493a) Socrates invokes as authorities certain priests and priestesses, Pindar and 
Orphic-Pythagoreans for the beliefs that the soul is immortal, that it must pay a 
penalty for wrongdoing, that it experiences post-mortem rewards and punish-
ments, and that it is reborn many times. The Seventh Letter insists that ‘we must 
always firmly believe the sacred and ancient words declaring to us that the soul is 
immortal, and when it has separated from the body will go before its judges and 
pay the utmost penalties’ (335a2–5).33
The purpose of such ‘true beliefs’ and the spiritual virtues or attitudes that 
support them is to inspire seekers to tread the path of divinisation. It should be 
noted that Hadot’s rich account of philosophy as a way of life, drawing as it does 
mostly on Hellenistic philosophy and on the Socrates of the early dialogues, 
largely ignores the otherworldly dimension of the later dialogues. Thus, his pic-
ture of Platonic spiritual exercises, which reflect the equivalence of psychology 
and cosmology, is incomplete.
The way in which the Socratic elenchus works on the minds of interlocutors 
in the early dialogues prepares for advanced forms of concentration described in 
the later dialogues. A passage in the Sophist summarises the cognitive, affective 
and ethical effects of Socratic refutation:
The people who purify the soul . . . likewise think the soul, too, won’t get any advan-
tage from any learning that’s offered to it until someone shames it by refuting it, 
removes the opinions that interfere with learning, and exhibits it purified, believing 
that it knows only those things that it does know, and nothing more. (230c5–d4)
The refutation of each false belief empties the mind of one thought after another, 
inducing successive non-conceptual states, ending in numbness and shame. 
Repeated refutations parallel the initial stages of yogic practice in breaking down 
the empirical ego. Final aporia indicates that no discursive account of virtue – 
even were it forthcoming – would be sufficient for being virtuous.
Deeper Platonic affinities with yogic meditation are evident in the middle 
and later dialogues. The Phaedo’s spiritual exercises intensify the purification 
begun with the elenchus. Here Plato is indebted to the Pythagorean way of life 
and in particular to its practice of stillness and silence. ‘Among the Pythagoreans 
the practice of remaining silent for long periods – one of the most effective means 
for maintaining composure – is to some extent a continuation of the practice of 
shamans and yogis.’34 Pythagorean silence does not mean total muteness; it also 
involves reticence to speak about esoteric practices and ‘deep attentive listening 
33 See the ‘true accounts’ of the mechanisms of karma and karmic ethics in Laws 870d5–e3, 
872e–873a, 903d3–904e3, 959b3–c2, and Bussanich 2013a.
34 Burkert 1972: 179.
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to the word of the Master and to the divine within and outside individuals’.35 
Parmenides’ practice of stillness, a widespread Pythagorean mental discipline 
(DL ix.21), can be taken as meditative preparation for making the mind change-
less and timeless like being.36 Similarly, the practice of purification Socrates 
presents in the Phaedo withdraws consciousness from sense-objects through 
introspective concentration (64e5–6, 65c7–9, 66a, e2–4, 67d1, 79d, 81bc).37 
‘Purification . . . [is to] separate the soul as far as possible from the body and 
accustom it to gather itself and collect itself out of every part of the body and 
to dwell by itself as far as it can both now and in the future, freed, as it were, 
from the bonds of the body’ (67c6–d1).38 Inasmuch as philosophy is ‘practice 
for dying and death’ (64a3, 67d12–e6, 81a1–2), meditation on the separation 
of the soul from the body initiates the inward journey. By withdrawal from the 
sensible world, ‘The soul of the philosopher achieves calm (γαλήνην) from such 
emotions; it follows reason and ever stays with it contemplating the true, the 
divine’ (84a6–8). The meditative practice of stillness is what enables the mind 
to attain direct perception of the Forms: ‘When the soul investigates by itself it 
passes into the realm of what is pure, ever existing, immortal and unchanging, 
and . . . its experience (τὸ πάθημα) then is what is called wisdom’ (79d1–7). The 
striking description of wisdom as experience suggests that this is a non-concep-
tual state of awareness. Received scholarly opinion that the procedure described 
here is simply abstraction in search of discursive definitions and propositions is 
a woefully inadequate account of Plato’s views.
Direct knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) of the Forms is also infallible, non- 
representational and non-propositional.39 The Republic adds the crucial point 
that knowing the Forms requires ‘grasping’ the Good as the first principle of all 
(Rep. 511b). The highest knowledge is a state as compared to dialectic, which 
is a method. In its movement among Forms (511b7–c2) dialectic is likened to 
gymnastics (539d8–10).40 At best it yields dianoia, the discursive, representa-
tional kind of knowledge that leads to but is transcended by vision of the Forms 
35 Gemelli Marciano 2014: 144.
36 Cf. Burkert 1969: 28, Kingsley 1999: 173–83, 250–1, and Gocer 2000: 18.
37 The Phaedo’s introspective concentration is like Bhagavad Gītā viii.12: ‘Having restrained 
all the doors of one’s body, and arresting the mind in one’s heart, one practices the Yoga of 
steadfast concentration by gathering the entire vital force on the top of the cranium.’
38 Cf. Gernet 1981: 360. Vernant 2006: 126–32, 144–8, and Detienne 1963: 71–3; see in 
these passages the concentration of the vital energies of a person into her essence and 
implicit reference to breathing exercises. Detienne cites parallels with the Hippocratic Περὶ 
διαίτης (Peri diaites) on detachment from bodily awareness in sleep (73–6), and with the 
Pythagorean practice of incubation, shamanism and ecstasy (76–81).
39 See Gerson 2003: 158–64.
40 See Gerson 2003: 186–90.
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(532c), an experience that is happy (516c), intensely blissful (like living in the 
Isles of the Blessed, 519c) and ‘a rest from the road . . . and an end of journeying 
for the one who reaches it’ (532e). Only after practising dialectic for five years 
and bearing political responsibilities for many years (539d–540a), can philoso-
phers experience the complete cognitive and psychic transformation necessary 
to achieve the vision of the Form of the Good.41 Another striking metaphor for 
a non-conceptual unified state of being that transcends the distinction between 
subject and object appears earlier in the dialogue:
It is the nature of the real lover of learning to strive for what is, not remaining with 
any of the things that are believed to be, but as he moves on, he never loses the edge 
of his eros, never falls back from it, until he grasps the being of each nature itself 
with the part of his soul that is fitted to grasp it, because of its kinship with it, and 
that, once getting near what really is and having intercourse with it (μιγεὶς τῷ ὄντι 
ὄντως) and having given birth to understanding and truth, he knows, truly lives, and 
is nourished. (Rep. 490a–b)
This movement from discursive to intuitive knowledge of the Forms, which are 
unified in grasping the Good, and finally to a non-conceptual, ecstatic union is 
analogous to the progression in the yogic traditions through ever more concen-
trated forms of blissful absorption. A key difference is that Plato employs the 
language of religious vision to characterise the supra-rational mind and light 
imagery to convey the luminosity of Being.42 The classical yogic texts eschew 
visual metaphors, but nevertheless speak of the light of wisdom and bliss.43
In Platonic care for the self, training to achieve internal repose looms large. 
At the end of the Phaedo Socrates admonishes his pupils to ‘keep quiet and 
persevere’ (107e2) as they witness his death. In the Republic (604b–e) Socrates 
counsels stillness when overcome with grief and suffering. After drinking the 
hemlock Socrates remarks: ‘I am told one should die in good-omened silence. So 
keep quiet and control yourselves’ (Phd. 117e2). The stillness Socrates praises 
in the Phaedo is necessary for progress in dialectic. As this remarkable passage 
from the Republic shows, the ‘reason’ active in the highest sense is not discur-
sive or inferential or instrumental:
I suppose that someone who is healthy and moderate with himself goes to sleep 
only after having roused his rational part (λογιστικὸν) and feasted it on fine argu-
ments and speculations (λόγων καλῶν καὶ σκέψεων), and having attained clear 
41 See the brilliant discussion of the visionary and affective dimension of Platonic contempla-
tion in Nightingale 2004: 110–14.
42 See Nightingale 2004 passim on how Platonic and Aristotelian theōria borrowed from 
religious pilgrimage and viewing sacred sites.
43 Popular Buddhist literature like the Jātaka tales features visionary tours of the deva-worlds, 
corresponding to the dhyānic states. See Collins 1998: 297–319.
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 self-consciousness (σύννοιαν αὐτὸς αὑτῷ); second, he neither starves nor feasts 
his appetites, so that they will slumber and not disturb his best part with either their 
pleasure or their pain, but they’ll leave it alone, pure and by itself, to get on with its 
investigations, to yearn after and perceive something in the past or present or future 
that it doesn’t know. He’s also calmed down his passionate part and doesn’t go to bed 
in an emotionally disturbed state because he’s been angry with someone. And when 
he has quieted these two parts and aroused the third, in which reason (τὸ φρονεῖν) 
resides, and so takes his rest, you know that it is then that he best grasps the truth 
and that the visions that appear in his dreams are least lawless. (Rep. 571d6–572b1)
The Platonic practice of ἡσυχία, like yogic śamatha, purifies and simplifies the 
mind, bringing it to higher states of consciousness. Here, detaching the higher 
mind from bodily sensations and emotions activates a meditative state in which 
the soul transcends time and apprehends the truth. The reference to ‘past, pres-
ent, and future’ echoes Homer’s (Il. i 70) description of the μάντις Calchas, ὃ 
ᾔδη τά τ᾽ἐόντα τά τ᾽ ἐσσόμενα πρό τ᾽ἐόντα. It is not in fact a simple regimen in 
preparation for sleep.44
A fascinating passage in Aelian suggests connections between this spiritual 
exercise in the Republic and passages in the Timaeus and Laws: ‘The Peripatetics 
say that during the day the soul is enveloped by the body and is a slave to it, 
unable to see the truth clearly; but at night it is freed from this servitude and, 
taking the form of a sphere in the parts around the chest, it becomes more pro-
phetic’ (Aelian Varia Historia iii.11). Some texts express homologies between 
cosmos and psyche. Inasmuch as axial rotation is most appropriate to intelli-
gence (νοῦς), the Demiurge caused the universe ‘to turn about uniformly in 
the same place and within its own limits and made it revolve round and round’ 
(Tim. 34a4). Divine thinking is a kind of meditative state depicted as ‘rotation, 
an unvarying movement in the same place, by which the god would always think 
the same thoughts about the same things’ (Tim. 40a). Laws 897d–898b expands 
on the image and stresses the ineffability of this ‘motion’:
ATHENIAN: ‘So what is the nature of rational motion (νοῦ κίνησις)?’ (897d3) ‘It 
is impossible to look directly at νοῦς – it’s like looking at the sun . . . that [motion] 
taking place in a single location necessarily implies continuous revolution round a 
central point, just like wheels being turned on a lathe; and this kind of motion bears 
the closest possible affinity and likeness to the cyclical movement of reason (νοῦς).’ 
(898a)
44 Detienne 1963: 77–9 cites several texts on the soul apprehending the truth in sleep. Cicero 
De divinatione i.30: ‘When, therefore, the soul has been withdrawn by sleep from contact 
with sensual ties, then does it recall the past, comprehend the present, and foresee the 
future. For though the sleeping body then lies as if it were dead, yet the soul is alive and 
strong, and will be much more so after death when it is wholly free of the body.’ 
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E. N. Lee explores the phenomenology: ‘this sort of “circling” is a motion that 
does not move toward any goal – not even itself . . . it is complete at every 
moment of its course’.45 ‘It is a dynamic wholeness . . . [showing] involvement 
or co-ordination of all its parts in that motion, its total absorption in the motion’; 
‘the image conveys a compelling sense of a fully focussed . . . non-localized 
 consciousness . . . elimination of perspective. There is thus a kind of cancelling 
of perspectivity effect’.46 I see here a Platonic adaptation of Parmenides’ image 
of unchanging, eternal Being as a sphere in order to represent symbolically, 
through the figure of axial rotation, a divine, non-intentional meditative state that 
can be compared with yogic samādhi.
The Platonic practice of stillness and concentration, in conjunction with the 
cultivation of intellectual virtue, leads to the transformation of a person’s sub-
stance by the removal of hindrances and defilements, as in the yogic traditions. 
The effects of pains, pleasures and unjust actions on the soul are likened to scars 
and stamps (Grg. 525a), rivets (Phd. 83d)47 and incrustations (Rep. 611d–612a) 
attached to the soul, which, like karmic impressions (saṃskāras and vasanas) in 
yogic traditions, determine future births and one’s experiences in heaven and hell 
states. Without eradication of such impressions, the soul cannot be free, unified 
and wise. The Republic passage presents the image of the sea-god Glaucus. Once 
incrustations accumulated through repeated embodiments have been removed 
from his body, one can ‘see the soul as it is in truth . . . as it is in its pure state’. 
For Plato the soul’s ultimate goal is to be freed from the cycle of births and 
deaths in order to achieve blissful immortality. Certainly, Plato is not as explicit 
on this point as are the South Asian traditions, but I believe that the preponder-
ance of evidence supports this reading.48
45 Lee 1976: 78.
46 Lee 1976: 80, 81.
47 In Phd. 81cd disembodied souls that are bound to the senses and the physical world wander 
as ghosts around graves ‘paying the penalty for their previous bad upbringing’.
48 (a) Socrates claims that ‘those who have purified themselves sufficiently by philosophy 
live in the future altogether without a body; they make their way to even more beautiful 
dwelling places which it is hard to describe clearly’ (Phd. 114c). (b) Philosophers who 
have served the kallipolis ‘will depart for the Isles of the Blessed and dwell there’ (Rep. 
540b5–7). (c) ‘When the mind conforms to the universe’s harmonies and with the forms, 
it returns to its original condition. And when this conformity is complete, we shall have 
achieved our goal: that most excellent life offered to humankind by the gods, both now and 
forevermore’ (Tim. 90d). (d) ‘The law of Destiny is this: If any soul becomes a companion 
to a god and catches sight of any true thing, it will be unharmed until the next circuit; and if 
it is able to do this every time, it will always be safe’ (Phdr. 248c2–5, emphasis added). (e) 
Upon completion of a cycle souls return to their celestial starting point, except for philo-
sophical lovers who, ‘with the third circuit of a thousand years, if they choose this life three 
times in succession, on that condition become winged and depart, in the three thousandth 
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The Platonic dialogues do not describe meditative techniques as extensively 
as South Asian texts do. However, Plato does not represent Socrates solely as a 
master of dialectic; he is also much like a yogic figure, who is regularly subject to 
daimonic, ecstatic experiences. At the beginning of the Symposium, Aristodemus 
reports that Socrates fell behind on the way to the drinking party and stood in a 
porch. ‘It’s one of his habits, you know; every now and then he just goes off like 
that and stands motionless, wherever he happens to be. I’m sure he’ll come in 
very soon, so don’t disturb him; let him be’ (Symp. 175b2–5). In the final section 
of the dialogue, Alcibiades reports that at Potidaia Socrates astonished his fellow 
soldiers by standing in the same spot ‘lost in thought’ from sunrise to sunrise. On 
the second morning ‘he said his prayers to the sun and went away’ (220d4–5).49 
Scholars claim that these episodes simply involved intense thinking, a view that 
strains credulity and which is belied by the physical circumstances.50 The fact 
that Socrates stood motionless for twentyfour hours, without ill effects, is strong 
evidence that Socrates’ mind and his body were in an altered state. In light of his 
spiritual experiences – his dreams51 and daimonic interventions – it is more likely 
that Socrates was absorbed in a meditative trance of complete detachment from 
normal sensory awareness and his normal conscious, interactive self.52 I believe 
that Socrates’ own perplexity, his unknowing, is the mental residue of these 
non-conceptual, absorptive states. That they may persist in the midst of external 
action is suggested by Alcibiades’ report about Socrates’ preternatural calmness 
on the battlefield at Delium (Symp. 221b; cf. Aristophanes Clouds 362–3) and his 
detachment from temperature extremes (219b–220b), even to the extent of walk-
ing barefoot through ice and snow. Xenophon admired his self-sufficiency and 
freedom from desire (Memorabilia 1.2, 5–6, 2.1.1), asserting that self- control 
(enkrateia) was the foundation of virtue (1.5.5) and necessary for achieving 
wisdom (4.5.6, 7, 9).
The detachment of the yogic kind (vairagya) that Plato attributes to 
Socrates, which he also valorises in his portrait of the philosopher in the 
Republic, cannot be achieved by discursive intellectual activity. As we have 
seen, concentration and the practice of stillness are essential components of the 
care of the self and the pursuit of wisdom. These Pythagorean practices lived on 
in the Academy. Diogenes says of Xenocrates, Plato’s second successor as head 
of the Academy: ‘Being most free of pride, he often during the day would retire 
year’ (Phdr. 249a3–5, emphasis added). In Bussanich 2013a I argue that these and other 
passages express Plato’s commitment to the philosopher’s liberation from the rebirth cycle.
49 On Pythagorean identifications of the sun/Helios with Apollo see Burkert 1972: 149–50.
50 See Vlastos 1991: 97 n51, and Dover 1980: 173.
51 For Socrates’ dreams see the opening frames of the Crito, Phaedo, and even the Protagoras.
52 On the remarkable variety of scholarly opinion on Socrates’ religious experiences see 
Bussanich 2013b. 
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into himself, and he devoted, it is said, a whole hour to silence’ (DL 4.11). In 
late antiquity, such spiritual exercises were the animating heart of Neoplatonic 
philosophy.53
53 See Plotinus Enneads V.1.2.14ff., VI.9.11.8–16.
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Technologies of self-immortalisation in 
ancient Greece and early India
Paolo Visigalli
Nowadays, the mention of ‘technologies’ and ‘immortality’ in the same breath 
brings to mind futuristic biochemical methods to stop bodily decay, restore 
youth, and transfer a mind’s contents and processes to an artificial, unalterable 
substratum. And yet of course a wide variety of past cultures have also been 
concerned with attaining some sort of immortality. This essay explores the idea, 
present in both ancient Greece and early India, that immortality can be achieved 
through some structured methods, what I call ‘technologies of self-immortalisa-
tion’. At the outset, three key terms require qualification: ‘immortality’, ‘self’ 
and ‘technologies’.
What, then, is immortality? Despite the variety of beliefs about immortality, 
we may envision two main models: as a never-ending bodily existence, and as 
the indefinite continuation of one’s ‘self’ in an afterlife.1 The former model, 
for example, is the one advanced by Daoist and Western alchemists. In their 
mountain dwellings and hidden laboratories, they sought to make their body 
eternal through a regimented lifestyle, sexual techniques, the manipulation of 
substances and the ingestion of elixirs.2 The latter model, common to many reli-
gious traditions, is the one relevant to this essay.
The notion of ‘self’ is a complex one. This term, it would appear, sits together 
with a number of other concepts, most notably the ‘soul’. And, as emphasised by 
 1 A third model of immortality as an eternal bodily afterlife is also worth mentioning. Most 
notably, such a model is adopted in (early) Christianity and Islam. A useful treatment of 
different kinds of immortality is Andrade 2015. 
 2 Pregadio (2014) offers an informative introduction to Daoist alchemy. For an influential 
yet controversial attempt to interpret the nature and function of alchemical practices from a 
phenomenological perspective, see Eliade 1978. For a recent and comprehensive treatment 
of Western alchemy, see Principe 2012.
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philosophers, classical scholars and anthropologists,3 it is inherently linked with 
a set of yet other themes, such as ‘self-awareness’, ‘introspection’, ‘personhood’ 
and ‘identity’. For the purposes of this chapter, I look below not at unanalysed 
assumptions about the self, however this latter may be understood, but at con-
sciously formulated ideas about how to produce an immortal self through the 
application of certain methods.
I call such methods ‘technologies’, borrowing the term from Michel 
Foucault’s influential ‘Technologies of the Self’.4 In that essay, Foucault defines 
‘technology’ as a set of practices, literary genres, and attention to certain ways 
of thinking, all of which contribute to producing a particular kind of self- 
understanding. I take from Foucault the notion of ‘technology’ as a hybrid 
network of both practice (e.g. letter writing) and mental habit that is nourished 
by psychophysical exercises (e.g. meditation). There is a difference, however. 
While Foucault is concerned mainly with the exploration of how these technol-
ogies of self-caring and self-knowledge produce a certain self-understanding, 
I will emphasise below how composite psychophysical practices are aimed at 
producing a post-mortem immortal self.
I focus on two case studies. For India I explore the ritual creation of an 
immortal self (ātman) in the ritual of the construction of the fire altar (agnic-
ayana). For Greece I examine the theme of self-immortalisation through the 
practice of philosophy in Plato’s Timaeus. I begin with the latter.
Ancient Greece: immortality as a rational choice
Recent scholarship has shown that there was an intense preoccupation among 
Greek and Latin philosophers with the idea of what makes one an individual 
‘self’.5 Although the related notion of an immortal self or soul has also been 
subject to scrutiny, there is no consensus among researchers on some signifi-
cant respects. Specifically, scholars disagree on when and how the idea of an 
immortal soul emerged in Greece. Thus, to select two authoritative voices, Jan 
Bremmer emphasises that the rise of this idea is the result of a process internal 
to Greece, which took place among the Pythagoreans and in the Orphic cults. It 
is in these diversified yet loosely connected cultural milieus, Bremmer argues, 
that there was an ‘enormous re-evaluation of the soul’, an ‘upgrading’ of the 
 3 See, inter alia, Frede and Reis 2009; Gill 2006 and 2001; Remes and Sihvola 2008; Sorabji 
2006; Taylor 1989; Carrithers, Collins and Lukes 1985.
 4 Foucault 1988.
 5 Thus, for example, the varieties of self in Greece and Rome have been ably examined by 
Richard Sorabji and Christopher Gill in several contributions, some of which are referred 
to in note 3 above. 
106 Paolo Visigalli
soul, which from its shadowy presence in Homer came to be seen as divine and 
immortal.6 By contrast, Walter Burkert contends that the notion of an immortal 
soul, a psyche or pneuma that reaches a heavenly abode, is not the result of 
an internal development, but rather comes from outside Greece. He proposes 
identifying the sources of such an idea in the ‘melting pot of influences’7 which 
constitute the background of the origins of Greek thought in the wider context. 
Thus, Burkert suggests that the idea of the ascent of the soul to heaven, where 
it attains ‘celestial immortality’, represents the influence of Iranian sources, in 
particular, the Zoroastrian Avestan, whereas the notion of ‘[t]ransmigration, con-
nected with Pythagoras and “Orpheus” and wrongly credited to the Egyptians by 
Herodotus, must ultimately derive from India’.8
This striking difference of opinion evinces the difficulties faced by scholars 
grappling with early Greece’s lacunose and fragmentary evidence. Analogous 
difficulties inherent in the oldest Greek sources persuaded me to focus on Plato, 
rather than to venture into some supposedly older material. In particular, I ini-
tially considered exploring the interplay of ritual and immortality in early Greece 
as a way to think comparatively about the Indian ritual I focus on below. It 
seemed especially promising to explore the role of ritual in mystery religions’ 
‘transformative experience’,9 or to look at the ritual prescriptions among the 
Pythagoreans.10 But this initial project foundered because of the dearth of evi-
dence concerning mystery cults’ rituals, and the discrepancy in time between the 
available sources and the earlier period I wanted to investigate.11
It appears that in early Greece, however, there was perhaps another ‘technol-
ogy of immortality’, which from early on ran parallel to the mysteries’ mystical 
path: the path of philosophy. Immortality was within the philosopher’s purview; 
it could be attained by deliberately choosing to lead the theoretical life. Here two 
points are worth recalling. First, as Pierre Hadot has taught us,12 we should not 
forget that philosophy was for many Greek thinkers not a disembodied intellec-
tual practice, but a holistic way of life. And it is within such a wide notion of 
 6 Bremmer 2001: 23.
 7 Burkert 2008: 74.
 8 Burkert 2008: 74.
 9 ‘Verwandelnde Erfahrung’ is the title of the fourth chapter of Burkert’s (1991) German 
edition of his 1987 Ancient Mystery Cults. In the English version, the title reads ‘The 
extraordinary experience’.
10 On the ritual rules and the ‘countless prohibitions and obligations’ among Pythagoreans, 
see Riedweg 2005 (= 2002): 63–7.
11 As Albinus (2000: 101) notes, although the Orphic tradition might even stretch back to the 
seventh century bce, ‘most of the surviving fragments and references stem from informants 
of Hellenistic or Roman times’. 
12 However, for a criticism of Hadot’s understanding of ancient philosophy, see Cooper 2007: 
20–3; 2012: 17–21. 
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philosophy that we need to place the search for immortality. Second, the theme of 
self-immortalisation which I am investigating here is closely tied to, and must be 
considered in relation with, the theme of self-divinisation. This latter is already 
found in Pre-Socratic philosophy. Most notably, the theme is developed in some 
of Empedocles’ fragments portraying the practitioner of the theoretical life, the 
philosopher, as someone that rises above the human and becomes, at least in part, 
divine. For Empedocles, because understanding is a divine practice, to do phi-
losophy is not only a method for self-cultivation, but also for self-divinisation.13
The idea that thought is divine, and that its cultivation enables one to over-
come the gap between human and divine, filtered down to later traditions. It was 
appropriated and redrawn most notably by Plato as part of his ‘project of making 
ourselves as godlike as possible’.14 It is in this connection that Plato elaborates 
on the theme of the soul’s immortality.
Plato discusses this theme in several passages, developing not one notion 
of immortality, but several. Three main Platonic kinds of immortality have been 
identified recently by David Sedley: 1) immortality is part of the soul’s essential 
nature; 2) immortality is conferred on the soul by an agent or cause, such as the 
demiurge; 3) immortality is won by each individual. Sedley calls these three 
kinds ‘essential’, ‘conferred’ and ‘earned’ immortality.15 According to him, fur-
thermore, Plato is less an innovator than an interpreter and defender of tradition, 
because his threefold treatment of immortality ‘seek[s] to incorporate, interpret 
and build on existing religious traditions’.16
In what follows, I attend to ‘earned immortality’ only.17 Focusing on the 
Timaeus, which Sedley identifies as the locus wherein earned immortality is treated 
most fully, I intend to consider some aspects of Plato’s argument more closely.
At a first level of analysis, we see that in the Timaeus immortality marks the 
divide between the demiurge and its creatures. While the former is intrinsically 
immortal, the latter, the gods and the universe, are not. Unlike their creator, 
the gods are not ‘altogether immortal and indestructible’ (41b).18 Nonetheless, 
13 Consider Michael Puett’s (2002: 57–62) suggestive interpretation of fragments 6, 17, 21, 
27, 111, 115, 117, 128, 132, 133, 136. 
14 Sedley 2009: 145.
15 As Sedley emphasises, these three are not the only kinds of immortality touched upon by 
Plato; thus, for instance, Plato also discusses immortality in a weaker sense, by vicarious 
prolongation through one’s progeny or one’s glorious deeds (e.g. literary or intellectual 
heritage).
16 Sedley 2009: 145.
17 Sedley considers it as ‘reflecting the religious idea of apotheosis as a reward for high- 
achieving mortals’ (2009: 157).
18 Citations form Timaeus are from Robin Waterfield’s (2009) recent translation, with some 
minor modifications in a couple of passages.
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they do partake of immortality because the demiurge wants them to be immor-
tal (a situation that readily fits under the heading ‘conferred immortality’ in 
Sedley’s classification). Man, on the other hand, is portrayed as a hybrid being, 
an admixture of mortal and immortal components. The human body and all the 
organs that are created by the gods at the behest of the demiurge are mortal; 
immortality belongs only to the highest, rational part of the human soul that is 
generated directly by the demiurge. Accordingly, we would expect the highest 
soul to enjoy the same kind of conferred immortality as the gods. But the text 
intriguingly adds that, although they undergo the same creational process, the 
soul-stuff with which the demiurge first created the gods and the soul-stuff with 
which he made the human soul present different grades of purity. This difference 
is nowhere elaborated further, however.
The human soul is not uniform, but composite. It consists of three parts that 
are given ‘separate residences’ (72a) in the body. The head is the location of the 
immortal, rational soul, which is also called δαίμων (90a;c); the chest harbours 
the passionate soul, and the abdomen the appetitive soul. Thus, although man’s 
soul is immortal, it is associated with the body and all its passionate and appeti-
tive drives. Nevertheless, however grim the soul’s condition may at first appear, 
the text repeatedly emphasises that the human constitution is the best possible 
one. By closely following the demiurge’s instructions, the gods made humans 
in such a way as to ensure that they could best avoid coming ‘to an end straight 
away, without having attained its proper end (ἀτελὲς)’ (73a).
But what, then, is the proper end (τέλος; 90d) of human existence in posi-
tive terms? And what is immortality’s role in all of this? The text is fairly clear: 
man is placed in the best condition ‘to give himself the best chance of living the 
life of reason (κατὰ λόγον ζῴη)’ (89d). That is, the end of man’s existence is to 
attend ‘to the most divine part (τοῦ θειοτάτου) of us’ (73a). While the cultivation 
of one’s rational soul demands strenuous exercise, the ‘desire of the most divine 
part of us for wisdom (τὸ θειότατον τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν φρονήσεως)’ is in-built in man’s 
constitution as one of ‘the two fundamental desires that human beings possess’, 
the other being ‘the bodily desire for food’ (88b).
It is especially revealing that for Plato attending to the rational soul is part 
and parcel of a composite method of self-care involving taking care of one’s 
body. One must tend to the ‘bodies and the minds’ (87c); one ‘creates’ a ‘sound 
constitution’ (88e) in the same way as one perfects one’s soul. Both intellectual 
and physical ‘exercises’19 are two interlinked aspects of one and the same train-
ing aimed at attaining the good life.
To conclude, even though the rational part of the soul is essentially immor-
19 Note the several occurrences of derivatives of γυμνάζω in the Timaeus’ concluding section; 
e.g. γύμνασις (89a), γυμνάσιον (89e).
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tal, because, like the gods, it is the product of the demiurge, it remains up to us 
to enhance, and perhaps even to rediscover, its immortality. The way to do so is 
through the technology of philosophising, a composite psychophysical training. 
Because we deliberately choose whether or not to pursue the theoretical path, it 
seems proper to borrow David Sedley’s words and speak of an ‘immortality by 
self-definition’.20
Early India: ritual construction of immortality
Several recent contributions have investigated the notion of the ‘self’ in classic, 
medieval and pre-modern India.21 Although many of these contributions explore 
perceptively a wide variety of Hindu and Buddhist notions of the self, they do 
not take into account the Vedic evidence; pre-Upaniṣad texts are only briefly 
mentioned, if at all. While it is of course reasonable to focus on the Upaniṣads 
and the later traditions, it should not be forgotten that sophisticated reflections 
about man’s constitution, his place in the universe, and his ‘self’ are also evident 
in earlier Vedic literature.22
In this respect, other scholars have persuasively argued that there is a close 
connection between the speculations on the self in the Upaniṣads and the earlier 
ritual speculations in the Brāhmaṇas. In particular, it has often been suggested, 
though perhaps never fully explored, that the speculations on the agnicayana 
ritual, ‘the piling of the fire [altar]’, play a central role in the formation of 
the Upaniṣadic notion of an immortal self (ātman). The locus classicus here 
is the tenth book of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, a large text of ritual herme-
neutics composed around the eighth century bce and traditionally attributed to 
Yājñavalkya.23 In what follows, I will reconsider some key aspects of this text to 
gain clarity on the question ‘How does one construct ritually an immortal self?’ 
Before I do so, it will be necessary to provide a brief description of the agnic-
ayana ritual ceremony.
The agnicayana is one of the most elaborate Vedic rituals. Its defining 
feature is the construction of an offering altar, which is piled from a thousand 
kiln-bricks. The altar is built on the eastern end of a delimited ritual enclosure 
that is provided with a roof. Made of five layers of bricks, the altar can assume 
various shapes. In its most recognised form it takes the shape of a bird of prey. 
20 Sedley 2009: 159. 
21 An incomplete reference list would include Dasti and Bryant 2014, Ganeri 2012a, 2012b, 
2007, Kuznetsova, Ganeri and Ram-Prasad 2012, Siderits, Thompson and Zahavi 2010.
22 For a brief presentation of the Vedic notions of the soul and personhood, see Oberlies 1998: 
497–506, with references. On the key term ātman and its complex semantics, see Renou 
1952, Jurewicz 2007, and Kulikov 2007; cf. also Pinault 2001.
23 See Eggeling 1882: 30ff.
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To study this ancient Vedic ritual, we not only have texts, but can also take into 
account the living tradition. From the late 1960s, scholars became aware that the 
agnicayana was still being performed, if only occasionally, in some relatively 
secluded areas of India. In particular, attention was drawn to the community of 
the Nambudiri Brahmins in Kerala, in the southwest corner of India. There a few 
families of Brahmins had preserved the Vedic ritual tradition alive. The merit for 
drawing attention to this largely self-contained community goes to the Indologist 
and philosopher Frits Staal (1930–2012). On his solicitation, some Nambudiri 
ritual experts agreed to perform the ceremony of the twelve-day agnicayana, 
from 12 to 25 April 1975. It was meticulously documented by a troop of experts 
led by Staal, and the outcome of this work was published in 1983, in two 
mammoth volumes including a fifty-minute recording documenting the salient 
aspects of the ritual performance.24
The following description takes the twelve-day agnicayana as a model and 
covers only some notable aspects of the ritual performance, barely enough to 
give an impression of the ritualists’ extraordinary attention to detail.25
After the proper time and place have been established, it is necessary to take 
the measurement of the patron of the sacrifice (yajamāna), the man on whose 
behalf the ritual is performed. The sizes of the ritual enclosures and of the fire 
altars are functions of his physical size. As I will elaborate below, this is an 
important point as the fact that the ritual is tailored to the patron of the sacrifice 
will enable him to obtain the sacrifice’s result, immortality. Then the patron and 
his priests enter the ritual enclosure together, carrying in pots the three sacred 
fires belonging to the patron. Ritual objects made of clay are prepared, such as 
the head of a horse, a man, a bull, a ram and a he-goat, which are then built into 
the altar. In ancient times, these heads may have been those of sacrificed victims. 
Afterwards, the five main priests who will play the most important role in the 
ritual performance are selected. Then there is the consecration of the patron. He 
is made to sit on an antelope skin, a turban is wrapped around his head and he 
is given a staff. For the next twelve days, until the end of the ritual, the patron 
will have to carry around the staff and sit on the antelope skin. He will also have 
to abstain from washing himself, from sexual intercourse and from speaking, 
except for the recitation of the sacred verses.
On the fourth day of the performance, stalks of the sacred Soma plant are 
ritually purchased, outside the ritual enclosure. They are placed on a bullock 
skin and carried on the Soma cart into the ritual arena. The Soma is treated as 
24 Staal 1986.
25 For a more detailed description of this complex ritual, see Eggeling 1897: xiii–xxvii, Kane 
1941: 1246–55, and Staal 1986: 55–8. See also Glucklich’s (2008: 36–42) brief, yet per-
ceptive, discussion. Cf. also Dumont 1951. 
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if it were a royal guest – it is installed on a throne, and homage is paid to it. 
After that, the ground for constructing the fire altar is prepared. The preparation 
requires the burial of the clay object made on the first day of the ritual as well 
as of a live tortoise and a golden image of a man. Then, the first layer of brick 
is laid. Over the course of the next four days, one further layer of the fire altar is 
laid each day. Each of the five layers consists of 200 bricks. The odd layers point 
in one direction, the even layers in another. In the first, third and fifth layers a 
‘naturally perforated stone’ (svayamātrṇṇa) is put in the middle of the fire altar. 
These stones are not artefacts, but perforated pebbles found in nature. If fully 
perforated pebbles cannot be found, pebbles with dents or small depressions are 
also acceptable. Once the altar is completed, Agni, fire, is installed in the centre 
of the last layer of the brick altar. A long offering of clarified butter is poured into 
it, followed by several other offerings.
From the tenth day, the ceremony will continue throughout the next two 
days including the nights. At daybreak the morning pressing of Soma is carried 
out. After a complex series of minor rituals, the priests crawl all together towards 
the fire altar and make an oblation. Then they drink the Soma. During the midday 
Soma pressing the priests are offered the compensation for the ritual perfor-
mance and the patron of the sacrifice is anointed as in a royal consecration. After 
the evening Soma pressing a series of chants, recitations, oblations to Soma and 
Soma drinking are performed. This is completed at dawn on the twelfth day. 
After the performance of an expiation rite, whose aim is to remove potential 
ritual mistakes made during the performance, the patron and his wife, together 
with the priests, take the ritual bath which concludes the ritual. Then the patron 
carries home the three sacred fires to which he will offer an oblation of clarified 
butter in the morning and the evening, for the rest of his life. Finally, the ritual 
enclosure is set on fire.
What is this extremely elaborate ritual all about? According to the Nambudiri 
ritual experts interviewed by Staal, they perform the agnicayana in order to 
obtain immortality. This belief is in line with the traditional interpretations found 
in Vedic literature.26 Specifically, the agnicayana is supposed to bring about a 
twofold result: to provide the patron of the sacrifice with 1) wealth, prosperity 
and a ‘whole life’ (sarvam āyus), that is, a life extended to its full span, tradition-
ally fixed at 100 years; and 2) post-mortem immortality.27
The most detailed interpretation of the agnicayana is found in the tenth 
chapter of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa. Traditionally known as the agnirahasya, 
26 See, for instance, Taittirīya Saṃhitā 5.4.11: ‘He who desires heaven should build a fal-
con-shaped altar because the falcon is the fastest among all birds. Having become a falcon 
himself, the sacrifice flies up to the heavenly world’ (trans. Glucklich 2008: 40).
27 See Eggeling 1897: xxiii. 
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‘the secret of the fire’, this chapter provides a wide variety of interpretations. In 
reconsidering this text, my concern is to gain clarity on the question ‘How does 
the patron of the sacrifice obtain immortality?’ Or, more precisely, ‘How does he 
ritually construct for himself a “divine self/body” (daiva ātman)?’
For the ritual to be effective, two interrelated requirements must be ful-
filled: the flawless performance of all ritual acts, and the concomitant awareness 
on the part of the ritual participants of the acts’ symbolic, hidden import. Rather 
than adopting an evolutionary reading of the history of Brāhmaṇa thought, and 
subjectively considering ritual speculations as a later accretion, a more ade-
quate description of the ancient ritualists’ intention would regard both ritual 
performance and the attendant speculations as two sides of the same coin. This 
interpretation seems to be in line with what is stated at Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 
10.4.3.9: ‘one becomes immortal . . . by means of knowledge (vidyā) or ritual 
action (karman)’.28 This statement does not mark an either/or alternative, but 
identifies ritual action-cum-knowledge as the necessary instrument for attaining 
immortality: there follow the words ‘it is this fire altar that is knowledge, and this 
fire altar that is ritual action’. Speculations play an important part, yet, unlike in 
some Upaniṣadic passages, they do not involve a depreciation of the ritual acts. 
Both ritual practice and speculations are equally essential components of the 
ritualists’ technology of immortality.29
It is difficult to provide a lucid description of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa spec-
ulations. Intertwined with fragmentary references to cosmogonies and myths, 
speculations about specific ritual episodes and about the names of particular ritual 
stages and implements follow each other without interruption. To try to bring 
order to this dizzying speculative vortex would be to force it into a straitjacket. In 
spite of their variety, however, these speculations tend to converge on a central 
point: the identification of the patron of the sacrifice with a set of other entities.
Because the notion of identification plays a central role in the ritualists’ 
speculations, a few more words are in order here. It has often been observed that 
the Vedic thinkers conceived of the universe as a complex web of connections 
underlying the seemingly disparate elements of reality.30 Their central concern 
was to identify these hidden connections, which are most typically designated 
by the technical term bandhu, ‘bond, connection’,31 whereby they presumed to 
28 A similar formula occurs in ŚB 10.4.4.4.
29 The close connection between action and knowledge seems to be reinforced by the etymo-
logical elucidation in ŚB 6.2.3.1, which links ci, ‘to pile up [the fire altar]’ and cit, ‘to think 
hard on something’; cf. Silburn’s (1989: 66) remarks on this passage.
30 For a clear and informative description of this central feature of the Vedic worldview, see, 
e.g., Jamison and Brereton 2014: 23–4, and Olivelle 1998: 24–7.
31 This term has been studied by Renou 1946, Gonda 1965, Oguibenine 1983, and Smith 
1989. Among the other terms designating the Vedic connections, ādeśa (for which see, 
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obtain powerful knowledge about the way things really are. Modern commen-
tators refer to these connections with a variety of terms (e.g. ‘identifications’, 
‘homologies’, ‘connections’, ‘interlinkages’), which reflect more or less diverg-
ing interpretations of their nature and function. For our purposes, suffice it to 
say that the Vedic system of connections is the ‘episteme’32 informing some 
of the ways in which Vedic thinkers thought, and that the identifications of the 
patron of the sacrifice in the agnicayana must be understood within this wider 
thought-world.
Among the multiple and ever-shifting identifications obtaining in the 
Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, the fundamental one links Prajāpati, the year, the fire altar 
(commonly simply referred to as agni, ‘fire’), and the patron of the sacrifice. This 
veritable identification chain provides the basis for the ‘sacrificial metaphysics’33 
of the agnicayana performance, in which different frameworks of reference and 
attendant symbolic meanings are integrated in one polyvalent discourse. Thus, to 
explain, the text often relates the cosmogonic myth of Prajāpati, ‘the lord of crea-
tures’, the main divine figure in the Brāhmaṇas. Prajāpati was the first being and 
generated all creatures out of his own body. Because this act left him exhausted 
and disunited, a ritual reintegration of all creatures into his body was then neces-
sary to assure his wholeness. The performance of the agnicayana is seen as the 
re-enactment of this primordial reintegration. Prajāpati is, furthermore, identified 
with the year, which in turn symbolises time both in its entirety as unlimited 
extent and in its destructive aspect as death, ‘the one that puts an end’ (antaka) 
to one’s lifespan. The fire altar is another element in the identification chain; it 
stands for the spatial dimension and symbolises the whole universe. Lastly, the 
identification between the fire altar and the patron (and consequently between the 
latter and all the other entities above) introduces yet another dimension, that is, 
the individual ‘self’ (ātman).
The interrelatedness of the identification chain’s multiple dimensions is 
enacted and reinforced through the ritual performance. Thus, the ritual placing 
of the fire altar’s bricks in the right order does not only symbolise the creation 
of space through the reconstruction of a miniature representation of the visible 
universe; it also operates on the other levels of the identification. Accordingly, 
by doing so it reintegrates Prajāpati’s scattered limbs into a whole body, and 
organises the disunited time’s portions into a temporal structure. Also, and more 
germane to our concerns here, such a performance produces a cohesive,  immortal 
‘self’ (ātman).
Thieme 1968, Kahrs 1998: 178–83, and Pontillo 2003) and upaniṣad (see, e.g., Falk 1986 
and Olivelle 1998: 24) have attracted particular attention.
32 See Smith 1989: 47–8; Smith references Michael Foucault’s work.
33 Eggeling 1897: xvii.
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But how exactly is the agnicayana supposed to make the patron immortal? 
It is useful to attend briefly to the vocabulary qualifying the ways in which 
immortality is attained. Most fundamentally, the immortal self is won through 
an act of (re-) construction, which is commonly expressed in Sanskrit with forms 
of saṃ-skṛ, ‘to put together’, from the same root as ‘Sanskrit’.34 This finding 
is in line with B. K. Smith’s thesis that ritual has a predominantly constructive 
function in Vedic India. As Smith has convincingly argued,35 ritual is the means 
by which Vedic ritualists constructed their world; most notably, with ritual they 
constructed existence on the level of cosmogony (reintegration of Prajāpati’s dis-
membered body), on the level of human beings (the saṃskāra ‘rite of passage’ 
marking the important stages in the highborn’s life), and on the level of life after 
death. Thus, the agnicayana can be regarded as a complex ritual of reintegration 
enabling the patron to gradually and painstakingly construct his immortal self.
In addition to the central notion of ‘constructing’, yet other terms are used; 
immortality can also be ‘reached’ (naś), ‘obtained’ (āp) and ‘enclosed’ (ava-
rudh).The idea would seem to be this: by ritually reconstructing the universe one 
encompasses space and time within the ritually constructed fire altar, becomes 
lord over the universe, and thereby reaches immortality.
How can we envision the patron’s transition from the mortal to the immortal 
sphere? Paul Mus has long since offered a fascinating answer to this question.36 
In his view, the agnicayana is premised on the recognition of a radical disconti-
nuity between the contingent and finite world of men and the permanent world 
of immortality. In sharp contrast to the Upaniṣads, in which the identification of 
the individual ātman and the immortal brahman is based on the recognition of a 
deeper, ontological continuity between the two, the Brāhmaṇas manifest a frag-
mented universe. Immortality is accessible to the patron of the sacrifice only by 
means of the fire altar, which becomes his ritually constituted self. Recall that 
the sizes of the ritual enclosures and of the fire altar are functions of the patron’s 
physical size. A ‘rupture of plane’ takes place whereby the patron’s ‘substitute 
body’,37 the fire altar, is transposed into a cosmic, enduring reality. Francis 
Clooney gives a lucid summary of Mus’ main ideas:
In building the sacrificial altar in the carefully prescribed manner, the sacrificer is 
constructing his own self out of temporal, discontinuous, and finite elements such as 
bricks. This construction identifies the sacrifice with Prajāpati and the cosmos, not 
34 See Smith 1989: 101 and Thieme 1982.
35 Smith 1989.
36 Mus 1935. I regret that Mus’ book was not available to me at the moment of writing; I 
therefore rely on the summary of Mus’ main themes given in Reynolds 1981 and further 
developed by Clooney 1990: 196–205.
37 See Reynolds 1981: 231.
Technologies of self-immortalisation 115
by some direct imitative (iconic) resemblance, but by an imitation of Prajāpati’s pri-
mordial self-construction in the original act of the sacrifice. Acknowledgment of the 
contingency of human effort and human materials leads not to a cessation of action, 
but to a particular arrangement of actions in order to transcend their limitations; for 
through the finite the finite can be transposed into the unlimited.38
To conclude, the agnicayana is a complex ritual technology whereby the 
patron constructs an immortal, extracorporeal self for himself. This immortal self 
is ‘projected into another ontological sphere, into a loka [“world”] other than the 
earthly one’,39 and will be accessible only after death.
Some comparative considerations
The comparison of the Greek and Indian evidence allows us to ask some intrigu-
ing cross-cultural questions about immortality. What is the relation between the 
immortal being and the person that once lived? Is there any continuation of a 
personal identity? In other words, what does one retain of ‘oneself’ in immor-
tality? A little thought experiment might be helpful here. If someone were to 
visit Plato or Yājñavalkya in their respective states of immortality, would it still 
make sense to speak of a ‘Plato’ and a ‘Yājñavalkya’? Would they respond to 
such  appellations – ‘I am Plato’, ‘I am Yājñavalkya’? The latter would perhaps 
answer with a faint nod; the former would surely be silent.
In ancient India, there is not one immortal self, but there are as many selves 
as ritual actors. The ritual performance through which immortality is attained 
is not regarded as the operation of a particular subject, but derives its efficacy 
from nothing other than itself.40 The ritual event is thus foregrounded, whereas 
the human element is ‘decentred’.41 Nonetheless, each such performance con-
tributes to constructing an individual, immortal self. That is, because the divine 
self (daiva ātman) is the result of one’s ritual, such a self is individually specific 
in that it correlates with one’s ritual performances in this world. In this respect, 
it is helpful to cite B. K. Smith again: ‘The collective oblation one offers over 
the course of the years – that is, the quantity and quality of his sacrificial history 
– determines the daiva ātman as it is transformed from offering to transcendent 
identity.’42 There are, therefore, different grades of immortality.
In Timaeus, immortality is in essence a process of depersonalisation. It 
is a return to the primordial moment when all individual souls created by the 
38 Clooney 1990: 196–7; see also Silburn 1989: 90ff. 
39 Smith 1989: 103.
40 See Silburn 1989: 57.
41 This notion is developed in Clooney 1990: 163ff.
42 Smith 1989: 117.
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demiurge were exactly identical to one another (41e). The soul’s diversification 
into distinct human beings, man and women, animals and lower living creatures 
results from the individual souls’ behaviour in their successive reincarnations. 
The individual’s pursuit of immortality, the training for becoming immortal, can 
thus be seen as the attempt to reabsorb one’s individual chain of reincarnation in 
a way that corresponds to the reverse order of the development and history of this 
universe. After death, the individual who has perfected himself by following his 
immortal soul and living a philosophical life will return to the star with which it 
was originally associated (42b).
Immortality is represented differently in the two texts under scrutiny. In 
stark contrast to some Upaniṣad passages portraying the self as inhabiting the 
innermost core of ourselves and lying beyond life’s changes and experience – 
beyond the grip of death43 – the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa describes an external, 
disembodied self, the immortality of which is precarious. The ritual construction 
of one’s divine self correlates with the quality and quantity of the ritual per-
formed, which determines the kind and duration of the ritually constructed divine 
life. Immortality is not won once and for all, but is provisional and reversible; 
once the patron dies, his ritually constructed divine self needs his progeny’s 
ritual acts to continue to exist.
Conversely, in Plato’s Timaeus man’s immortality is a given. The ‘immortal 
principle of soul (ἀρχὴν ψυχῆς ἀθάνατον)’ (69c) is planted in one’s own consti-
tution. It is true that immortality needs to be regained, as it were, by strenuous 
bodily and intellectual exercise. Nonetheless, it can be attained precisely because 
it is already there. In ancient India, on the other hand, there appears to be an 
ontological rupture between man’s predicament and immortality. Being mortal 
by definition, man can obtain immortality not by centralising all his efforts on his 
immortal core – such a thing is in fact absent – but through ritually fashioning a 
substitute body. For Plato, the path to immortality consists in cultivating some-
thing which is already in ourselves; for Yājñavalkya, immortality is a ritually 
constructed extracorporeal residence.
Even though both kinds of immortality can be fully realised only post- 
mortem, they differ as to the degree to which they inform the present life. In 
order to attain their final, sidereal immortality, Plato’s disciples must culti-
vate their rational soul in this life. A more rational and therefore ethically just 
behaviour seems to be this training’s necessary outcome. For the ancient Indian 
practitioners, the pursuit of immortality happens entirely through and within the 
highly technical domain of ritual. Once he has built a divine body for himself, 
nothing would seem to change in the sacrificial patron’s daily life. In short, while 
43 See BU 1.3.12; 3.1.3.
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Plato’s search for immortality emphasises this life, Yājñavalkya’s ritual technol-
ogy is centred on this ritual.
We must however avoid reading the above observations through the con-
ventional lens magnifying a reified view of the Greek and the Indian traditions. 
It would be especially misleading, I believe, to read the correlation between 
immortality and ethics in Plato and the apparent absence of ethical implications 
in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, as well as the former’s emphasis on self-definition 
and the Indian centrality of a ritual-cum-knowledge, as reinforcing the die-hard 
stereotypes about rational Greece and mystical India. While the differences iden-
tified above are, in my opinion, real, they do not readily fit that old-fashioned 
yet still partly dominant model. In this respect, note that Plato’s fundamentally 
positive belief in the teleology of the cosmos and the highest soul’s immortal-
ity appears as more mystically oriented, and perhaps farther removed from our 
modern sensibility, than the Brāhmaṇas’ vision of a precarious immortality, 
always in need of reinstatement.
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Does the concept of theōria fit the beginning 
of Indian thought?
Alexis Pinchard
Is early Indian thought more interested in salvation than in truth?
In ‘Philosophy and the Crisis of the European Man’,1 while aiming at characteris-
ing the intellectual attitude of the primeval European thinkers in contradistinction 
with other wise men of the same time in India and China, Edmund Husserl attrib-
utes the concept of ‘philosophy’, understood as the quest for the firm basement 
of any future science, only to the Greek Pre-Socratics. Of course both Indian and 
Greek thinkers consider the universe as a whole and they try to explain it from 
a single principle inasmuch as it constitutes a whole. They both care about what 
is universal, and might have expressed true assertions about it. But, according 
to Husserl, the purpose of such global explanations is different on each side, 
and therefore Indian thinkers still belong to the so-called ‘mythical-religious’ 
mentality whereas only Greece reaches the pure philosophy that implies the 
autonomy of rational thought. With the word ‘autonomy’ Husserl does not only 
mean that the individual mind thinks by itself, without considering tradition or 
sacred revelation,2 but also and mainly that rational thought has rational goals. In 
Husserl’s view rationality did exist in the mythical-religious mentality of India 
and China, but not in a sovereign way. Only the early Greek thinkers would be 
concerned with the research for truth for the sake of truth. This love of truth 
would be independent from the benefits that the possession of truth may bring to 
the lover, for example immortality. Thus, thanks to the Greek starting point, the 
 1 Husserl 1965: 164–6.
 2 Bernabé-Mendoza (2013: 32–3) has shown that the Vedic cosmogony of RV 10.129 
already claimed to be independent from any previous tradition. This relatively autonomous 
thinking reminds us of the Pythagorean appearance of rationality in the same realm of 
cosmogony. But real autonomy does not only consist in independence from tradition, as 
Husserl rightly noticed. The question of what purpose rationality is used to remains crucial.
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discovery of truth can appear as the main task of all mankind, progressing gen-
eration by generation, step by step in infinitum. Europe would be responsible for 
this spiritual inheritance of a continuous progress in pure knowledge. By contrast 
Indian thinkers would be mainly interested in personal salvation. In India knowl-
edge could be useful, and even necessary to escape death and every evil, but it 
is not the highest goal by itself and in itself. It is just a means to release the soul 
from the bounds of body, disease, fear and death. The evidence for such a thesis 
would be the fact that real philosophy, i.e. the Greek quest for the knowledge of 
the first principles of the universe and of thought, is born from wonder (thau-
mazein), as Aristotle states in the Metaphysics A2, because to wonder implies 
acknowledging one’s own ignorance:
That it is not a productive science is clear from a consideration of the first philoso-
phers. It is through wonder that men now begin and originally began to philosophise; 
wondering in the first place at obvious perplexities, and then by gradual progression 
raising questions about the greater matters too, e.g. about the changes of the moon 
and of the sun, about the stars and about the origin of the universe. Now he who 
wonders and is perplexed feels that he is ignorant (thus the myth-lover is in a sense 
a philosopher, since myths are composed of wonders); therefore if it was to escape 
ignorance that men studied philosophy, it is obvious that they pursued science for 
the sake of knowledge, and not for any practical utility. (Aristotle Metaphysics A2, 
982b)
According to Aristotle, the common rooting in wonder makes the link 
between the Pre-Socratics, Plato and Aristotle, even if the doctrines about the 
first principle are not the same since several Pre-Socratics were materialist, as 
for example Thales. It brings out philosophy as a spiritual phenomenon endowed 
with an intrinsic unity. According to Husserl, the concept of theōria, as elab-
orated by Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics and Metaphysics, would not fit 
the beginning of Indian thought, although it does fit the Pre-Socratic beginning 
of philosophy. In Greece too, the knowledge of the highest principle produces 
some benefit for the knower, especially pleasure, but it is only in Greece that this 
external benefit is not the main motive for undertaking metaphysical researches. 
Moreover, pleasure supervenes on Greek theoretical activity only if pleasure is 
not consciously intended therein. It is only in Greece that reflection about the 
universe as a whole ruled by a unique principle constitutes the expression of a 
spiritual freedom.
Of course this thesis of Husserl is quite simplistic and in this chapter I aim 
at refuting it, but it is not very easy to do so because it implies a change in our 
views both of Greek and of Indian early philosophy. In this chapter I do not 
directly address the cause of the famous striking similarities between Greek and 
Indian early thoughts, but rather the question of the extent of these similarities. 
The question of their possible origin will come later.
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First, let us see what seems to sustain Husserl’s view.
In the Upaniṣads the knower globally identifies with the object of his 
knowledge, or rather he realises that since the very beginning of his conscious 
existence he already was secretly the same thing as what he knows. Therefore 
he becomes himself the highest principle which constitutes the universe as a 
whole when he gets an intuition thereof. Such a process of identification seems to 
concern not only the intellect but every aspect of the person, including its body, 
because the highest principle may be related to the body, when it is for example 
breath or fire. The highest knowledge does not necessarily have a meta-physical 
object, although the highest principle is always invisible and concealed inside 
the human being. Therefore the presentation of the highest knowledge cohabits 
in the Upaniṣads with magic tricks and aggressive spells (see for example the 
parimara ritual, ‘death around’, of KauU 2.12) in order to get power, wealth and 
glory in society:
Verily, he who knows the chiefest ( jyeṣṭham) and best (śreṣṭham), becomes the 
chiefest and best of his own [people]. Breath (prāṇa), verily, is chiefest and best. He 
who knows this becomes the chiefest and best of his own [people] and even of those 
of whom he wishes so to become. (BU 6.1.1)
Even the gods obtain some benefit from their knowledge of the highest prin-
ciple. Indeed they are gods, endowed with immortality and universal power, just 
because they unite with it:
Verily, those gods who are in the brahman-world meditate upon that Self (ātman). 
Therefore all worlds and all desires have been appropriated by them. He obtains 
all worlds and all desires who has found out and who understands that Self. (ChU 
8.12.6)
Because of its supposed power in the realm of everyday life, the highest 
knowledge is a useful treasure jealously kept in the circle of family and initi-
ates, just like the family-maṇḍalas of the Ṛgveda, which were composed and 
transmitted in the same real or symbolic male lineage.3 Sacred knowledge is 
not exhibited on the agora in order to be tested through a free dialogue with 
anybody. The process of transmission occurs generation by generation along 
an initiatory thread and is organised by fixed rules. It is not spread out among 
citizens so that each one could contribute to its indefinite development. Such a 
selective teaching creates both power and obligations for the recipients. These 
obligations consist in ritual, pedagogical and spiritual duties.
But there is a crucial difference between the knowledge of a mere magic for-
 3 maṇḍala II to VII. For the same restriction of transmission concerning the Avesta, see 
Panaino 2003. 
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mula and the Upaniṣadic highest knowledge, which is always a self- knowledge: 
whereas the magic formula destroys a certain evil or a certain enemy in cer-
tain circumstances, the self-knowledge releases man from every aspect of his 
finiteness because the self he identifies with is infinite. Such a knowledge really 
brings salvation. Moreover it is said that every aspect of his person is completely 
saved because only the part of him that identifies with his true secret self, be it 
intellectual or not, constitutes his real person. There is no real division between 
a spiritual part and a social part because one of them is unreal. The assertions 
concerning the glory and the power of the one ‘who knows thus’ (ya evaṃ veda) 
have to be interpreted: who is this one? Of course the visible body remains 
mortal but the wise man, with all its real parts, reaches immortality:
akāmó dhī́ro amŕ̥taḥ svayaṃbhū́ rásena tṛptó ná kútaś canónaḥ /
tám evá vidvā́n ná bibhāya mṛtyór ātmā́naṃ dhī́ram ajáraṃ yúvānam //44//
Free from desire, wise, self-existent, satisfied with sap [ritual drink], not deficient in 
any respect, one is not afraid of death if one knows this wise, immortal and unaging 
One as oneself. (AV 10.8.44, hymn devoted to Skambha, the cosmic pillar)
The self-knowledge provides victory, but such a victory does not follow a 
fight against a particular enemy. It deals with a victory against everything that 
has a form and a name in the world. Victory here means access to an absolute 
transcendence:
He obtains the victory of the sun, indeed, a victory higher than the victory of the sun 
is his, who, knowing this thus, reverences the sevenfold Sāman, measured in itself, 
as leading beyond death – yea, who reverences the Sāman! (ChU 2.10.6)
This salvific function of self-knowledge in the Upaniṣads constitutes their 
real unity beyond the multiplicity of the doctrines concerning the nature of the 
Self. It implies that this Self is impassive even though it works as the subject of 
every experience, including the experience of pain. It is the light which illumi-
nates pain, but not pain itself, and it is the same for pleasure.
sūryo yathā sarvalokasya cakṣuḥ na lipyate cākṣuṣair bāhyadoṣaiḥ /
ekas tathā sarvabhūtāntar ātma na lipyate lokaduḥkhena bāhyaḥ //11//
As the sun, the eye of the whole world, is not sullied by the external faults of the 
eyes, so the one Inner Self of all things is not sullied by the evil in the world, being 
external to it. (KaU 5.11–12)
Therefore the specific immortality of the Self is not a merely temporal con-
tinuation of our everyday life, with its various pains and pleasures, but a sudden 
getting in touch with eternity. Therefore the ātman is not the bhokṛ, the agent of 
enjoyment, which has preferences and aversions. For example, while Prajāpati 
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teaches Indra about the true nature of the self, Indra wants to obtain something 
enjoyable (bhogyam) and, at the beginning, he does not understand that the pure 
consciousness – unlike the relationship consisting in enjoying4 something – is 
not an object relationship:
‘Now, when one is sound asleep, composed, serene, and knows no dream – that is 
the Self (ātman)’, said he [Prajāpati]. ‘That is the immortal, the fearless. That is the 
brahman.’
Then with tranquil heart he [Indra] went forth.
Then, even before reaching the gods, he saw this danger: ‘Assuredly, indeed, this 
one does not exactly know his Self (ātmānam) with the thought “I am he”, nor 
indeed the things here. He becomes one who has gone to destruction. I see nothing 
enjoyable (bhogyam) in this.’ (ChU 8.11.1)
Thus the kind of benefits the Upaniṣadic mystic knowledge can bring are 
at the same time greater than any benefit that a mundane power may bring, and 
more abstract. Moreover these benefits are not external to knowledge since they 
result from the features of the very object of knowledge, that is, the Self. Here 
knowledge is not a mere means that one could leave once it has worked. Self-
knowledge is so important that it changes life: it does not mean that it is a mere 
tool. The power of the old Indian self-knowledge is perhaps not as remote from 
the purity of the Greek theōria as Husserl thought.
Back to Greece: searching for immortality through philosophy
Second, Husserl’s view about the Pre-Socratics is quite idealistic. Indeed he 
confuses their passionate interest in knowledge with Immanuel Kant’s ethics. In 
the Pre-Socratics we can also find rivalry, challenge, the quest for dominion. The 
well-known imitation of god that we find in Plato (homoiōsis tōi theōi) worked 
earlier as an imitation of divine power on earth. For example Empedocles praised 
his own wisdom inasmuch as it made him ‘immortal god instead of mortal’ (θεὸς 
ἄμβροτος, οὐκέτι θνητός), bringing him also glory and political success (31 DK 
B112). The imperishable fame provided to heroes by poets like Homer (kleos 
aphthiton)5 has echoes in such a self-narrative. Moreover Parmenides’ deity is 
supposed to deliver knowledge which makes the philosopher able to master the 
world of appearances in which he lives. Through the cosmological knowledge 
the philosopher can anticipate the phenomena better than other mortals and thus 
better survive and succeed on the political level:
τόν σοι ἐγὼ διάκοσμον ἐοικότα πάντα φατίζω,
ὡς οὐ μή ποτέ τίς σε βροτῶν γνώμη παρελάσσηι.
 4 See the Sanskrit root BHUJ-, ‘to enjoy’, ‘to make use of’.
 5 See Homer Iliad 3.276 = 320; 7.202; 24.308.
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This order of things I declare to you to be likely in its entirety, in such a way that 
never shall any mortal outstrip you in practical judgment. (28 DK B8.60–1)
But concerning the knowledge of ‘the unmoved heart of truth’ itself, Eleaticism 
does not neglect its internal benefit for the soul. Being, which has to be seized 
by an intellectual intuition after the sensuous cognition has been refuted, stands 
beyond every pair of contraries including pain and pleasure, disease and health:
So then the all is eternal and infinite and homogeneous; and it could neither perish 
nor become greater nor change its arrangement nor suffer pain or distress. If it expe-
rienced any of these things it would no longer be one; for if it becomes different, 
it is necessary that being should not be homogeneous, but that which was before 
must perish, and that which was not must come into existence. If then the all should 
become different by a single hair in ten thousand years, it would perish in the whole 
of time. And it is impossible for its order to change, for the order existing before 
does not perish, nor does another which did not exist come into being; and since 
nothing is added to it or subtracted from it or made different, how could any of the 
things that are change their order? But if anything became different, its order would 
already have been changed. Nor does it suffer pain, for the all could not be pained 
since it would be impossible for anything suffering pain always to be; nor does it 
have power equal to the power of what is healthy. It would not be homogeneous if 
it suffered pain; it would suffer pain whenever anything was added or taken away, 
and it would no longer be homogeneous. Nor could what is healthy suffer a pang of 
pain, for both the healthy and being would perish, and not-being would come into 
existence. The same reasoning that applies to pain applies also to distress. Nor is 
there any void, for the void is nothing, and that which is nothing could not be. Nor 
does it move, for it has nowhere to go to, since it is full; for if there were a void it 
could go into the void, but since there is no void it has nowhere to go to. It could not 
be rare and dense, for it is not possible for the rare to be as full as the dense, but the 
rare is already more empty than the dense. (Melissus, 30 DK B7, emphasis added)
Of course, if the One is the only reality, what knows it on the one hand and, 
on the other hand, the One itself, cannot be different. Therefore what applies to 
it applies also to the soul of the perfect philosopher. This emancipation from 
becoming and from the various psychological affects that becoming implies 
clearly reminds us of Upaniṣadic salvation. The Upaniṣadic Self too stands 
beyond the alternation of night and day, of good and evil:
Then, just as one driving a chariot looks down upon the two chariot-wheels, thus 
he looks down upon day and night, thus upon good deeds and evil deeds, and upon 
all the pairs of opposites. This one, devoid of good deeds, devoid of evil deeds, a 
knower of brahman, unto very brahman goes on. (KauU 1.4)
Furthermore Husserl defines the emergence of Pre-Socratic thought as the 
emergence of the common project to develop knowledge of the universe in 
infinitum. But how could Eleatic being, which is absolutely one, give place to 
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a progressive and possibly infinite inquiry? Being, because of its simplicity, 
can only be entirely known or ignored. It is seized by an instantaneous intuition 
which, so to speak, immediately brings the intellect to the very middle of abso-
lute being itself: τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι, ‘the same is to think and 
to be’ (Parmenides, B3). Noeîn implies a jump to a new level of experience, but 
it does not deal with the progressive analysis of normal empirical data. This is 
why such knowledge, in Greece too, can have a soteriological dimension. Our 
finiteness is not a fatality. Such knowledge is not the result of a previous break 
with the sensuous cognitions through which we act in order to save our life with 
its intrinsic vulnerability, but the break itself. The various metaphysical argu-
ments about Being prove only that there is no other real object of knowledge, 
but they do not result in an increasingly precise knowledge of Being. Therefore 
Husserl’s view about progress in philosophy would better apply to the Ionian 
school, which addresses phusis, or to Eleatic cosmology as a mere arrangement 
of phenomena, but does not fit the whole Pre-Socratic movement. For example 
it works with just a part of Xenophanes’ thought: ‘In the beginning the gods did 
not at all reveal all things clearly to mortals, but by searching men in the course 
of time find them out better’ (21 DK B18).
The Eleatic stress on immediate intuition as the only way to know the high-
est principle offers another great similarity with the Upaniṣads:
pratibodhaviditaṃ matam amṛtatvaṃ hi vindate /
When it is found by intuition, it is thought: so one finds immortality. (KU 2.4a)
Of course, in Greece, the idea that this intuition of absolute reality immediately 
produces immortality for the soul of the wise man is not clearly expressed before 
Plato and Aristotle. When the soul is the subject of a certain knowledge, this 
knowledge can change the knowledge of which the soul is the object, because 
to be the subject of this very knowledge changes the soul itself: this fact is only 
alluded to in the Pre-Socratics. Nevertheless, we can find in the Pre-Socratics 
some traces of this salvific power of knowledge inasmuch as philosophy and 
mystery cults echo each other.
Against Husserl’s rejection of the question of salvation from the earliest 
Greek philosophy, let us first note that the philosophers who have elaborated 
the concept of pure theōria – I mean Plato in his Theaetetus and Aristotle in his 
Metaphysics – are exactly the same as those who claimed that this very theōria, 
while applying to the highest principle of reality, lets the thinking part of the soul 
(nous) reach a special degree of immortality, beyond space and time, whether the 
common soul of human beings possesses a finite or an infinite duration:6
 6 Adluri-Bagchee (2012) has shown that these two levels of immortality occur in ancient 
Brahmanic culture. It is one more Indo-Greek parallel.
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If then the intellect is something divine in comparison with man, so is the life of the 
intellect divine in comparison with human life. Nor ought we to obey those who 
enjoin that a man should have man’s thoughts and a mortal the thoughts of mortality, 
but we ought so far as possible to achieve immortality, and do all that man may to 
live in accordance with the highest thing in him; for though this be small in bulk, in 
power and value it far surpasses all the rest.
 It may even be held that this is the true self of each,7 inasmuch as it is the dominant 
and better part; and therefore it would be a strange thing if a man should choose to 
live not his own life but the life of some other than himself.
 Moreover what was said before will apply here also: that which is best and most 
pleasant for each creature is that which is proper to the nature of each; accordingly 
the life of the intellect is the best and the pleasantest life for man, inasmuch as the 
intellect more than anything else is man; therefore this life will be the happiest. 
(Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics X, 7)
Already in Diotima’s speech Plato has established such a connection between 
the contemplation of the highest reality, i.e., the intelligible Form of Beauty, and 
the access to a peculiar immortality, not exceeding the brief moment of the intel-
lection, different from the temporal immortality of the soul as a principle of life 
demonstrated in the Phaedo and in book X of the Republic:8
ἢ οὐκ ἐνθυμῇ, ἔφη, ὅτι ἐνταῦθα αὐτῷ μοναχοῦ γενήσεται, ὁρῶντι ᾧ ὁρατὸν τὸ 
καλόν, τίκτειν οὐκ εἴδωλα ἀρετῆς, ἅτε οὐκ εἰδώλου ἐφαπτομένῳ, ἀλλὰ ἀληθῆ, 
ἅτε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἐφαπτομένῳ· τεκόντι δὲ ἀρετὴν ἀληθῆ καὶ θρεψαμένῳ ὑπάρχει 
θεοφιλεῖ γενέσθαι, καὶ εἴπέρ τῳ ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπων ἀθανάτῳ καὶ ἐκείνῳ;
‘Do but consider’, she said, ‘that there only will it befall him, as he sees the beauti-
ful through that which makes it visible, to breed not illusions but true examples of 
virtue, since his contact is not with illusion but with truth. So when he has begotten 
a true virtue and has reared it up he is destined to win the friendship of the divinity 
and, above all men, to become immortal.’ (Symp. 212a)
Therefore it would be strange if the salvific power of the prōtē philosophia 
(the ‘primary philosophy’, later called ‘Metaphysics’: Aristotle Metaphysics E, 
1026a 24) were incompatible with the freedom and the disinterestedness which 
define it. Furthermore, the prōtē philosophia is free from any mundane interest 
 7 Unlike Sorabji (2006: 118), I do not think that the verb doxeiē means that Aristotle wanted 
to express some distance from the view that intellect is the true self of the man. For the view 
that intellectual life brings pleasure, which is typically Aristotelian, cannot be separated 
from the selfhood of the intellect.
 8 For the immortality of the unfair and anti-philosophical soul, see Plato, Republic X, 610e. 
It is consistent with Leges X, where every soul is defined as a self-moving movement, and 
thus as a permanent movement, whatever kind of movement it gives to itself. The circular 
movement of intellection is only one kind among the various kinds of movement a soul can 
produce for itself. 
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just because it is a ‘twice divine’ science which implies a kind of salvation by 
itself: it has the autonomous divinity as its object but also as its subject (Aristotle 
Metaphysics A2), so that he who has got this science merges into divinity and so 
into its essential self-sufficiency and immortality inasmuch as he knows. Deity 
is not a slave, even of its own needs, because it has no need. Therefore spiritual 
divinisation is the condition of disinterestedness. Subsequently the intellective 
knowledge of the first principles is not a mere means to gain immortality, a 
means that one could leave once the goal is reached. This knowledge pro-
duces immortality when it is desired for itself, just like it produces pleasure, I 
mean like youth produces the flower according to Aristotle’s very words. Indeed 
immortality is not an effect of the intellective knowledge, standing outside this 
knowledge, but just a way to express the fact that such a knowledge gets in touch 
with what is universal and necessary. Theoretical immortality is not something 
more which would be added to the normal existence. It is not a ‘plus’. It concerns 
the level of being, but not the level of having. This is why Greek immortalisation 
through and in philosophy consists in focusing on oneself, if the self is correctly 
understood: the intellect is the very self of man, the man of the man so to speak, 
as Plato shows in the theriomorphic allegory of the soul which is to be found at 
the end of the Republic.9
Second, in the Pre-Socratics knowledge appears as endowed with a salv-
ific dimension only when its transmission takes on the form of an initiatory 
revelation reflecting mystery cults. For example, Empedocles seems to use the 
vocabulary of the mysteries10 in order to describe the destiny of wise men. Their 
intellectual virtue is supposed make them equal to the gods. They will share the 
table of the gods,
εἰς δὲ τέλος μάντεις τε καὶ ὑμνοπόλοι καὶ ἰητροί
καὶ πρόμοι ἀνθρώποισιν ἐπιχθονίοισι πέλονται,
ἔνθεν ἀναβλαστοῦσι θεοὶ τιμῆισι φέριστοι.
ἀθανάτοις ἄλλοισιν ὁμέστιοι, αὐτοτράπεζοι
ἐόντες, ἀνδρείων ἀχέων ἀπόκληροι, ἀτειρεῖς.
 9 See Plato Republic IX, 588d. Sorabji (2006: 116–17) correctly underlines Plato’s view that 
the intellect is the true self of the man, but he does not clearly distinguish the two kinds of 
immortality that Plato considers. Of course the relation between these two ways to escape 
our bodily finiteness is very problematic, but an afterlife of pure thinking (see Sorabji 2006: 
314) is not the only Platonic afterlife. Indeed the immortality of pure thinking can begin 
right now and has not to wait for any afterlife, even if it can develop better in the afterlife. 
The intellect is the true self of the man, so that any kind of human immortality must concern 
the intellect, but the problem is that some intellects are not faithful to their true nature and 
give up thinking.
10 For a compelling demonstration of the narrative and stylistic parallels between Empedocles 
and the Orphic gold tablets, see Herrero de Jáuregui 2013: 31–55.
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Finally they come among earthborn humans as soothsayers, poets, physicians and 
war chiefs. Hence they rise up as gods full of honours, sharing the hearth and the 
table of the other immortals, taking part neither in the sorrows of men nor in tired-
ness. (B146–7)
This privilege looks like the privilege of ‘the ritually pure men’ according to 
some writings attributed to Musaeus and his son Eumolpus by the itinerant 
Orphic priests.11 Such an elevation put an end to the exile of the daimon from 
its original divine condition. Since the similar knows the similar, philosophical 
knowledge is a way to restore the primeval unity of the sphairos (the divine and 
homogeneous mass of being constituting the first step in Empedocles’ cosmog-
ony [B29]), which has been disturbed, at the individual level, by a voluntary 
ritual fault (to sacrifice animals, see B115). Universal knowledge reintroduced 
Love into the microcosm. Therefore to understand Empedocles’ lesson guaran-
tees salvation, even if the macrocosm remains under the common influence of 
Love and Strife.
Other allusions could be found in Parmenides, Heraclitus and in the Derveni 
Papyrus.12 But they are only allusions. The Hinterwelt, in the sense of Nietzsche, 
relies on a Hintertext: the modern reader has to insert the fragments into a web of 
symbols and similes that are not directly included in the text in order to show the 
immortalising dimension of the personal practice of philosophy.
Nevertheless, in Greece as well as in India, there is an analogy between 
ritual knowledge and knowledge of the highest principle of the universe inas-
much as both aim at immortalising men and both are reserved for the happy 
few; in both cases the analogy reveals a concealed but essential aspect of what is 
compared. But the dynamic of the comparison is inverted between these cultures. 
What is obvious and superficial on one side is obscure and essential on the other 
side and reciprocally. In the Veda immortalising knowledge first appears as ritual 
knowledge, but then it must disclose itself as knowledge of the highest principle 
of the universe in order to reach its actual goal, which is the immortalisation of 
the individual. This transformation is possible only inasmuch as the elements of 
rites – thoughts, words, actions – are viewed as real things, existing by them-
selves forever, but not as peculiar cultural manifestations. Progressively the 
ritual injunctions appear as the true laws of nature and the inquiry about the real 
meaning of ritual acts, while obtaining the immortalising value of the external 
practice of the ritual itself, becomes a global attempt to give sense to the whole 
cosmos. The immortalising activity becomes an intellectual one. Between the 
11 About the συμπόσιον τῶν ὁσίων in Hades according to the Orphic tradition, see Plato, 
Republic II, 363c.
12 For the Pre-Socratics in general see Bernabé 2002. For Parmenides see Feyerabend 1984 
and Pinchard 2009: 563–73. For the Derveni Papyrus see Betegh 2004: 360–4.
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beginning and the end of this process the form of transmission remains the same: 
oral, esoteric and finally intuitive.
Now in Greece the knowledge of the first principle is initially positive and 
public. But it must disclose itself as bearing the same form as certain ritual 
knowledge – that is, the secret knowledge imparted in mystery cults – in order 
to take over its immortalising power. The prōtē philosophia can evolve thus 
inasmuch as, on the one hand, mystery cults, by consisting of the re-enactment 
of an archetypical gesture, are for the soul a way to reintegrate its divine origin, 
and, on the other hand, the intuitive knowledge of the first principle implies 
a merging of the ego with the principle itself. This slow transformation is not 
necessarily and mainly chronological: rather it deals with an exegetical dialectic 
going deeper and deeper.
Wonder and love of truth in the Upaniṣads
Just like the Pre-Socratics, the Upaniṣads claim that the mystic knowledge, 
inasmuch as it brings out immortality, has to be understood in the perspective 
of a dialogue with the ritual tradition because the ritual tradition also faces our 
finiteness. There is a rivalry between two kinds of immortalising knowledge. In 
the older stratum of the Vedas, the Brāhmaṇas intended to let the ‘sacrificer’ 
(yajamāna) reach ‘immortality by means of what is mortal’, that is by sacrificial 
victims correctly laid out in space and time (martyenāmṛtaṃ īpsaty, AiĀ II, 3, 
2). The knowledge presented in the Brāhmaṇas is supposed to point out the 
correct actions to be done in order to become immortal. Such a knowledge has a 
practical value but it is not immediately immortalising by itself. It just supplies 
a pattern for the crucial deed. By contrast Upaniṣadic wisdom has to be immedi-
ately immortalising by itself, and so cannot work as a mere means.
Finally the desire for truth for the sake of truth and the wonder really play a 
crucial part also in the Upaniṣads, maybe even more so than in Greece.
First, there is a real worrying about the essence and the definition of the Self 
(ātman), not only about its power. The Greek tí esti question (‘what is it?’), so 
simportant in Plato13 and Aristotle,14 has echoes in this ChU passage:
Prācīnaśāla Aupamanyava, Satyayajña Paulushi, Indradyumna Bhāllaveya, Jana 
Śārkarākshya and Buḍila Āśvatarāśvi – these great householders, greatly learned in 
sacred lore (śrotriya), having come together, pondered: ‘What is our Self? What is 
the brahman (ko na ātmā kim brahma)?’ (ChU 5.11.1)
13 For the connection between this question and the intelligible Forms, see Plato, Timaeus, 50b 
1: the sensible qualities inscribed in the chōra cannot work as a satisfying answer to the ques-
tion ‘what is it?’ This question fits only intelligible Forms if some specification is expected.
14 See for example Aristotle, Metaphysics 1026a 4.
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But in India this question does not receive any definitive answer because the 
ātman is even stranger than what it is supposed to explain. In the Vedas there 
is a real wonder about natural phenomena, but the most wonderful thing is the 
paradoxical nature of the Self which offends the law of non-contradiction:
katháṃ vā́to nélayati katháṃ ná ramate mánaḥ / 
kím ā́paḥ satyáṃ prépsantīr nélayanti kadā́ caná //37//
mahád yakṣáṃ bhúvanasya mádhye tápasi krāntáṃ salilásya pṛṣṭhé /
tásmin chrayante yá u ké ca devā́ vṛkṣásya skándhaḥ paríta iva śā́kʰāḥ //38//
How is it possible that the wind does not cease? How is it possible that the mind 
does not rest? Why do the Waters, seeking to attain truth, at no time so ever cease? 
The great marvel in the midst of nature (mahád yakṣáṃ bhúvanasya mádhye) strode 
in penance on the back of the Ocean – in it are set whatever gods there are, like 
branches of a tree roundabout the trunk. (AV 10.7.37–8, to Skambha, the cosmic 
pillar, emphasis added)
The syntagma mahád yakṣáṃ bhúvanasya mádhye occurs elsewhere in a similar 
context, while alluding again to the chief principle of all the world :
dūré pūrṇéna vasati dūrá ūnéna hīyate /
mahád yakṣáṃ bʰúvanasya mádʰye tásmai balíṃ rāṣṭrabʰŕ̥to bʰaranti //15//
In the distance it dwells with the fullness, in the distance it is devoid of deficiency – 
the great marvel in the midst of nature: to it the kingdom-bearers bear tribute. (AV 
10.8.15, to Skambha, the cosmic pillar, emphasis added)
The word yakṣa itself (‘marvel’) is connected with the brahman in the Upaniṣads. 
The brahman is superior even to the gods to whom it grants immortality, so that 
it goes beyond their understanding. When the brahman directly appears the gods 
must acknowledge their inferiority:
brahma ha devebhyo vijigye / tasya ha brahmaṇo vijaye devā amahīyanta / ta 
aikṣantāsmākam evāyaṃ vijayo ‘smākam evāyaṃ mahimeti /
tad dhaiṣāṃ vijajñau / tebhyo ha prādur babhūva / tan na vyajānata kim idaṃ 
yakṣam iti . . .
Now, the brahman won a victory for the gods. Now, in the victory of this brahman 
the gods were exulting. They bethought themselves: ‘Ours indeed is this victory! 
Ours indeed is this greatness!’
Now, It understood this of them. It appeared to them. They did not understand 
It. ‘What wonderful being (yakṣa) is this?’ they said. They said to Agni (Fire): 
‘Jātavedas, find out this – what this wonderful being is.’ ‘So be it.’ (KU 3.1–2)
The chief principle of all the world is a ‘marvel’ because, like a riddle, it 
offends the law of non-contradiction. It can contain contraries because it stands 
beyond:
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pūrṇā́t pūrṇám úd acati pūrṇáṃ pūrṇéna sicyate /
utó tád adyá vidyāma yátas tát pariṣicyáte //29//
The full from the full he bends up; the full is poured with the full; also that may we 
know today, whence that is poured out. (AV 8.29, to Skambha, the cosmic pillar)
yád éjati pátati yác ca tíṣṭʰati prāṇád áprāṇan nimiṣác ca yád bhúvat / 
tád dādhāra pṛthivī́ṃ viśvárūpaṃ tát saṃbhū́ya bhavaty ékam evá //11//
What stirs, flies, and what stands, and what is breathing, not breathing, winking – 
that, all-formed, sustains the earth; that, combining, becomes the One. (AV 10.8.11, 
to Skambha, the cosmic pillar)
Since contradiction belongs to the very nature of the chief principle, human 
wonder is not destined to disappear with the reaching of ultimate knowledge, but 
to become more and more intensive. The search is to be continued. Therefore 
Prajāpati as cosmic god is sometimes called ‘Who’ by name (Ka), when he [?] 
has his anirukta (‘unarticulated’) form, which is the primeval one.15 His very 
essence is a perpetual question, asked by himself. This permanent wondering 
is just the contrary of what Aristotle attributes to the course of metaphysical 
research:
The acquisition of this knowledge, however, must in a sense result in something 
which is the reverse of the outlook with which we first approached the inquiry. All 
begin, as we have said, by wondering that things should be as they are, e.g. with 
regard to marionettes, or the solstices, or the incommensurability of the diagonal of a 
square; because it seems wonderful to everyone who has not yet perceived the cause 
that a thing should not be measurable by the smallest unit. But we must end with 
the contrary and (according to the proverb) the better view, as men do even in these 
cases when they understand them; [20] for a geometrician would wonder at nothing 
so much as if the diagonal were to become measurable. (Aristotle Metaphysica A2, 
983a 11–20)
Therefore the desire for mystical knowledge does not cease when the knowl-
edge is obtained. The desire for truth and the possession of truth cannot be 
contrasted, whereas Aristotle said that the stable possession of the truth was 
better than researching the truth.16 Vedic contemplation is active, although it 
does not deal with the consumption relationship expressed by the Sanskrit root 
BHUJ-. Thus the Self himself is said to love truth just like the mystical ascetic. 
15 See TB II, 2, 10.60–1. See also AiB XII, 10, 1: aham etad asāni yat tvam aham mahān 
asānīti / sa prajāpatir abravīd atha ko ‘ham iti yad eva etad avoca ity abravīt / tato vai ko 
nāma prajāpatir abhavat (‘[Indra:] “I want to be what you are, I want to be great!” Then 
Prajāpati answered: “Who [shall] I [be]?” [Indra] said: “Just what you uttered!” Therefore 
Prajāpati truly became Who by name.’) Commented by Gonda 1985.
16 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.7, 1177a 26–7.
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Satyakāma is both a name of the ultimate ātman and the name of a wisdom hero, 
beyond all the social proprieties and all varṇa-laws:
Once upon a time Satyakāma Jābāla addressed his mother Jabālā: ‘Madam! I desire 
to live the life of a student of sacred knowledge. Of what family, pray, am I?’ Then 
she said to him: ‘I do not know this, my dear – of what family you are. In my youth, 
when I went about a great deal serving as a maid, I got you. So I do not know of what 
family you are. However, I am Jabālā by name; you are Satyakāma by name. So you 
may speak of yourself as Satyakāma Jābāla.’ Then he went to Hāridrumata Gautama, 
and said: ‘I will live the life of a student of sacred knowledge. I will become a 
pupil of yours, Sir.’ To him he then said: ‘Of what family, pray, are you, my dear?’ 
Then he said: ‘I do not know this, Sir, of what family I am. I asked my mother. She 
answered me: “In my youth, when I went about a great deal serving as a maid, I got 
you. So I do not know this, of what family you are. However, I am Jabālā by name; 
you are Satyakāma by name.” So I am Satyakāma Jābāla, Sir.’ To him he then said: 
‘A non-brahman (a-brāhmaṇa) would not be able to explain thus. Bring the fuel, my 
dear. I will receive you as a pupil. You have not deviated from the truth (satya).’ 
(ChU 4.4.1–5, emphasis added)
And now satyakāma as an epitheton:
ya ātmā apahatapāpmā vijaro vimṛtyur viśoko vijigʰatso ‘pipāsaḥ satyakāmaḥ sat-
yasaṃkalpaḥ so ‘nveṣṭavyaḥ sa vijijñāsitavyaḥ /
‘The Self (ātman), which is free from evil, ageless, deathless, sorrowless, hunger-
less, thirstless, whose [object of] desire is the truth (satyakāma), whose conception 
is the truth – He should be searched out, Him one should desire to understand. He 
obtains all worlds and all desires who has found out and who understands that Self.’ 
Thus spake Prajāpati. (ChU 8.7.1, emphasis added)
Of course, if the mystic knowledge is an identification process, the ātman 
as highest object of knowledge must bear in itself the desire of the knower for 
truth. Furthermore the ātman is satya (KauU 5). Therefore the absolute reality 
has to be defined as dynamic self-love. The self is what it is just because it is 
determined by this reflective process. The Self is not a dead thing:
tad dha tadvanaṃ nāma / tadvanam ity upāsitavyaṃ / sa ya etad evaṃ vedābhi 
hainaṃ sarvāṇi bhūtāni sam̐vāñchanti
It (the brahman) is Desire-of-it by name (tadvana).17 As ‘Desire-of-it’ it should be 
worshiped. For him who knows it thus, all beings together yearn. (KU 4.6)
17 The compound tadvana is difficult for several reasons. How should we understand the rela-
tionship between its two parts? Here I do not follow Hume’s translation (‘It-is-the-Desire’) 
and I take the proper name tadvana as a tatpuruṣa because elsewhere the ātman is qualified 
with the bahuvrīhi satyakāma (ChU 8.7.1) which obviously means ‘who has the truth as an 
object of desire’. The second difficulty is the word vana-. It seems to rely on the Ṛgvedic 
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Thus ultimate knowledge, inasmuch as it is knowledge of the Self by the 
Self, consists in a certain internal behaviour defined by its intrinsic quality, but 
not in the specification of an object distinguished from other possible objects. It 
is expressed by the negation of the principle of excluded middle: ‘It is other than 
the known, and other than the unknown’ (KU 1.3). The Self is desire of desire, 
in infinitum: the desire of desire is desire for its own self, but the self is desire, 
so the circle is closed. Such a circle is more important than the starting point and 
the arrival point.
Now we can distinguish the authentic disinterestedness of the theoretical 
attitude which belongs to philosophy and the negation of selfhood. There is no 
real negation of selfhood in philosophy:
Then spake Maitreyī: ‘What should I do with that through which I may not be immor-
tal? What you know, Sir – that, indeed, explain to me.’ Then spake Yājñavalkya: 
‘Though, verily, you, my lady, were dear to us, you have increased your dearness. 
Behold, then, lady, I will explain it to you. But, while I am expounding, do you 
seek to ponder thereon.’ Then spake he: ‘Lo, verily, not for love of the husband is a 
husband dear, but for love of the Self (ātman) a husband is dear. Lo, verily, not for 
love of the wife is a wife dear, but for love of the Self a wife is dear. Lo, verily, not 
for love of the sons are sons dear, but for love of the Self sons are dear. Lo, verily, 
not for love of the wealth is wealth dear, but for love of the Self wealth is dear. Lo, 
verily, not for love of the cattle are cattle dear, but for love of the Self cattle are dear. 
Lo, verily, not for love of Brahmanhood is Brahmanhood dear, but for love of the 
Self Brahmanhood is dear. Lo, verily, not for love of Kṣatrahood is Kṣatrahood dear, 
but for love of the Self Kṣatrahood is dear. Lo, verily, not for love of the worlds are 
the worlds dear, but for love of the Self the worlds are dear. Lo, verily, not for love 
of the gods are the gods dear, but for love of the Self the gods are dear. Lo, verily, 
not for love of the Vedas are the Vedas dear, but for love of the Self the Vedas are 
dear. Lo, verily, not for love of the beings (bhūta) are beings dear, but for love of 
the Self beings are dear. Lo, verily, not for love of all is all dear, but for love of the 
Self all is dear. Lo, verily, it is the Self (ātman) that should be seen, that should be 
hearkened to, that should be thought on, that should be pondered on, O Maitreyī. Lo, 
verily, in the Self’s being seen, hearkened to, thought on, understood, this worldall 
is known. (BU 6.4.4–6)
This text does not prove the impossibility of disinterestedness in human 
activities. But if the theoretical attitude brings us in touch with the absolute real-
ity, and if this absolute reality is self-desire, the theoretical attitude implies the 
love of oneself inasmuch as the core of the person is nothing individual but the 
noun vánas-, ‘desire’, but it is a hapax. But the whole compound might imply a pun on 
tattva- (‘reality’), which is well attested concerning the brahman (see for example KaU 
6.12–13).
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most universal power. Therefore the cult of selfhood typical for Indian philos-
ophy is very different from a restricted selfishness, and the disinterestedness of 
the theoretical attitude cannot be restricted only to Greek thought. Husserl was 
wrong to do so.
9
Self or being without boundaries: 
on Śaṅkara and Parmenides
Chiara Robbiano
There can be no difference anywhere that doesn’t make a difference elsewhere . . . 
The whole function of philosophy ought to be to find out what definite difference it 
will make to you and me, at definite instants of our life, if this world-formula or that 
world-formula be the true one.
William James, ‘What Pragmatism Means’1
This chapter focuses on a similar argument made by Parmenides2 and Śaṅkara3 
involving the claim that boundaries between everyday entities are superimposed 
and not real. I hereby continue my exploration of the similarity of the arguments 
of the two philosophers, who, so far, have been compared only either as adher-
ents of monism, or in order to show historical dependence, mostly of Greek 
thought on the Veda.4 I will show how Parmenides and Śaṅkara argue that any 
boundary that we believe to be real and capable of separating the many individu-
als and things can be proven to be superimposed by humans on being rather than 
being real.
As a foil, I will mention an alternative metaphysical framework – which has 
 1 McDermott 1978: 379.
 2 Parmenides was a Greek philosopher of the early fifth century bce, i.e. before Socrates 
and Plato. He wrote a poem in which he describes a journey that takes him first beyond the 
Gates of Night and Day and then beyond what can be seen as all opposites and dualities, the 
duality of knowing and being or subject and object included. Of this poem only quotations 
by other authors survive. 
 3 Śaṅkara was an Indian philosopher of the eighth century ce; his school was called Vedānta, 
meaning the last part of the Veda. He wrote commentaries on the Vedānta or Upaniṣads 
and on other important texts like the Brahmā Sūtra. He is an exponent of Advaita Vedānta, 
i.e. non-dual Vedānta, which signals that he interprets literally the Upaniṣadic claim that 
ātman, or our Self, is the same as brahman, i.e. the essence of reality.
 4 For a comparison between Śaṅkara’s and Parmenides’ arguments based on separation or 
discrimination, see Robbiano (2016). In this paper I also offer an extensive review of the 
existing comparisons between these two philosophers.
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been adopted for instance by Descartes, and which might be regarded as part 
of the default everyday Western metaphysical framework – according to which 
reality is fundamentally fragmented in separate things and individuals.5
Parmenides and Śaṅkara acknowledge the existence of a fundamental real-
ity: undivided being or Self. The other side of the coin of an undivided being is 
the lack of reality of the boundaries superimposed on being.6 The question is: 
what makes them regard anything that differentiates one thing from the next as 
a superimposition, which is less real than undivided being? I will show that the 
argument involves the ‘epistemological weakness’ of what is superimposed on 
undivided being. This argument points at the impossibility of ‘knowing’ – in a 
special sense that is radically different from having opinions – anything other 
than being, which involves the impossibility of knowing any boundary. The step 
from the impossibility of knowing anything other than being to the lack of reality 
of any second being might sound like a fallacy, since it takes an unwarranted step 
from epistemology to ontology. However, for a certain conception of knowing 
and being that entails their identity, there is no fallacy. I argue that this identity 
makes sense on both Parmenides’ and Śaṅkara’s terms. I will show this by sug-
gesting how to interpret what they refer to as ‘knowing’ or ‘higher knowledge’, 
and by trying to shed light on the assumption on which the undividedness of 
being is based.
Finally I will look at hints in their writings which suggest that understanding 
the identity of knowing and undivided being might facilitate experiencing the 
lack of boundaries, which in turn might result in experiencing invulnerability, 
‘unshakenness’, liberation and compassion.
The common starting point – the certainty
Both Śaṅkara and Parmenides, like many other philosophers, were prepared to 
submit any accepted opinion to a rational test. In different traditions there have 
 5 In Robbiano (forthcoming) I sketch this contrast between Śaṅkara, on the one hand, and 
Avicenna and Descartes, on the other, in order to show that many interpreters of Parmenides 
who look for the implicit subject of the subjectless ‘is’ in DK B2 embrace the Aristotelian 
assumption that predicates and attributes must be owned by a substance, as Avicenna and 
Descartes had done. In that paper I argue that scholars, rather than taking an assumption 
for granted, should argue to support it. I try to make scholars aware of the assumption they 
perhaps unconsciously superimpose on Parmenides’ fragment, by making them aware 
of an alternative assumption, which has been chosen by Śaṅkara (a thinker similar to 
Parmenides) and which leads him to regard any substance as an illusory superimposition 
on trustworthy being.
 6 I write ‘being’ for the trustworthy reality in Parmenides’ philosophy and ‘being’ for any 
other less marked occurrence of this word.
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been philosophers who were prepared to regard everything they had believed so 
far as mere opinion and illusion; they wanted to doubt everything and to start 
from scratch. Think, for instance, of the process of Cartesian doubt, which stops 
only at the realisation that the activity of thinking, notwithstanding any incor-
rectness of the thoughts, cannot be doubted. At this point, Descartes’ assumption 
kicks in: if the attribute of thinking is indubitably there, there must be a substance 
supporting it, more specifically a thinking substance: a mind or a soul.
Śaṅkara and others asked themselves a similar question in their quest for the 
foundation of the knowledge of reality: does anything exist beyond doubt? The 
first step in answering this is similar both in Descartes and Śaṅkara: they called 
it either ‘being self-aware’, or ‘thinking’, or ‘being’ or ‘am’ or ‘is’. I appreciate 
the difference between ‘being self-aware’, ‘thinking’ and ‘being’; however, at 
this point of their argument, which I am calling the first step, they seem to play 
the same role: they are used by different philosophers to refer to their recogni-
tion of an immediate certainty whose content or description they offer in what I 
call the second step. None of them doubted that there is a fundamental certainty. 
In Meditation 2 Descartes writes:
in that case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me; and let him deceive me 
as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think 
that I am something. So after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally 
conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put 
forward by me or conceived in my mind.7
Likewise, Śaṅkara says: ‘everyone is conscious of the existence of (his) Self and 
never thinks “I am not”’ (BSB I.1.1: 200). Both Descartes and Śaṅkara take a 
similar first step in the common journey or quest for what is real and what we 
really are: nobody would or could deny being self-aware or thinking. I submit 
that the following lines from Parmenides’ poem refer to this same first step:
Come now, I will tell you, and once you have heard my story take it with you, what 
routes of the quest are the only ones to know:
the one that ‘is’ and that it is not possible not to be
– it is the course of trust, for reality follows – (28 DK B2.1–4)8
I interpret these lines of Parmenides’ poem as communicating that the indu-
bitable starting point about which nobody can have doubts is ‘is’. Parmenides 
expresses the trustworthiness of the subjectless ‘is’ and that it is impossible 
that ‘is not’. Many different interpretations have been given of these lines and 
 7 Adam and Tannery 1964–76: VII, 25, translation in Cottingham 1985: II, 16–17.
 8 Unless otherwise specified, all translations from Parmenides are mine. I have attempted to 
stay as close as possible to Parmenides’ Greek. 
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of the lack of a subject of the phrase ‘that is’ – and the vast majority of them 
concentrated on supplying a subject.9 On the contrary, I maintain that the lack of 
a subject is crucial to Parmenides’ message that contrasts the trustworthiness of 
the mere fact of being with the opinions that we might have about what subject(s) 
might be said to display the property of being.
Descartes, Parmenides and Śaṅkara and their different second step
It seems that philosophers who agree that there is a certainty, which might be 
referred to as ‘being self-aware’ (or ‘thinking’, ‘knowing’, ‘being’) to start 
with, can take two different steps. The disagreement seems to be between those 
who, like Descartes – after agreeing on the trustworthiness of being self-aware 
– regard the addition of a subject to this being self-aware as a necessary and 
equally trustworthy step as the initial certainty, and those who, like Parmenides 
and Śaṅkara, regard the addition of a subject as an untrustworthy next step.
For Descartes, when the need for characterising this indubitable starting point 
emerges, the characterisation is not presented as a second step, but as obvious, 
natural and necessary. In Descartes’ metaphysics the certainty is characterised as 
belonging to the thinking-thing that is doing and owning the thinking. Descartes 
takes for granted the Aristotelian assumption that predicates must be owned by 
substances and adapts it to his new kind of dualism.10 He regards this assumption, 
not as something one might choose or not, but as ‘something very well known 
by the natural light’: ‘we should notice something very well known by the nat-
ural light . . . wherever we find some attributes or qualities there is necessarily 
some thing or substance to be found for them to belong to’.11 Descartes adapts 
Aristotle’s assumption that predicates must be owned by substances, and does not 
ascribe the attribute of thinking to the Aristotelian individual, consisting of matter 
and form, but to a disembodied individual thinking substance, to start with.
However, the inference from ‘there is some thinking’ to ‘there is a “me”’ – 
be it an embodied individual or a disembodied mind (thinking thing) – who owns 
the thinking does not go without saying. This is just one of the possible assump-
tions that have been chosen by those who wanted to articulate this certainty. A 
different assumption has led other philosophers to a different metaphysics, with 
possibly different existential and ethical implications.
 9 See Robbiano (forthcoming) for a detailed analysis of the problems involved in regarding 
‘estin’ as having an implied subject. 
10 This innovation costs him some quite precarious steps before he can rescue the existence of 
the body from the flames, but this is another story and a quite well-known one.
11 Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, Part 1.11, in Adam and Tannery 1964–76: VIII, A 8, 
translation in Cottingham 1985: I, 196.
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Śaṅkara – just like Descartes – observes himself thinking and, reflecting 
on what must be real and trustworthy, finds that one cannot doubt being self-
aware. But, differently from Descartes, he claims that if he is certain of being 
self-aware, then his certainty is of undivided existence, which he expresses as 
certainty of the existence of brahman, which is the same as ātman, the Self:
the existence of brahman is known on the ground of its being the Self of every one. 
For every one is conscious of the existence of (his) Self, and never thinks ‘I am not’. 
(BSB I.1.1: 200)
The superimposition of our psychophysical make up on the undivided being 
or Self – which might be described as a witness12 – which we recognise imme-
diately by being self-aware, is a mistake made by ignorant people, according 
to Śaṅkara.13 Śaṅkara would accuse Descartes of exactly this mistake: the one 
of ascribing existence or self-awareness (regarding it as a predicate in need of 
a subject) to a separate substance, e.g. an individual, a body or a soul.14 Their 
mistake is a fruit of the human mind superimposing what is not Self, e.g. sepa-
rated individuals, on the Self.15 The question is: do they have an argument for 
concluding that Self or being is undivided? If they do, on what assumption is 
their argument based?
The argument of epistemological weakness of boundaries
In order to find out how Parmenides and Śaṅkara come to conclude that being 
is undivided, we will have to look at why there is nothing that they recognise to 
12 Śaṅkara: ‘Attributes of the body are superimposed on the Self, if the man thinks of himself 
(his Self) as stout, lean, fair, as standing, walking, or jumping. Attributes of the sense- 
organs, if he thinks “I am mute, or deaf, or one-eyed, or blind.” Attributes of the internal 
organ when he considers himself subject to desire, intention, doubt, determination, and so 
on. Thus the producer of the notion of the Ego (i.e. the internal organ) is superimposed on 
the interior Self which, in reality . . . is the witness of everything’ (BSB I.1.1: 198).
13 Śaṅkara: ‘That the Self, although in reality the only existence, imparts the quality of 
Selfhood to bodies and the like which are Not-Self is a matter of observation, and is due to 
mere wrong conception’ (BSB I.1.5: 205). 
14 In Siderits, Thompson and Zahavi’s words, Descartes is a substantialist, i.e. someone who 
‘thinks of the self as a substance, with consciousness as its essential nature – hence belong-
ing to a distinct ontological category from that of consciousness’. Śaṅkara and – I suggest 
– Parmenides belong to what they call non-substantialist self theorists: those who ‘hold that 
the self is not a substance or property-bearer standing in relation to consciousness that is in 
some sense distinct from it’. They see ‘the self as just consciousness itself’ (2010: 4).
15 Śaṅkara: ‘As the passages “I am Brahman”, “That art thou”, and others, prove, there 
is in reality no such thing as an individual soul absolutely different from Brahman, but 
Brahman, in so far as it differentiates itself though the mind (buddhi) and other limiting 
conditions, is called individual soul, agent, enjoyer’ (BSB I.1.31: 209).
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be as trustworthy as the initial, indubitable certainty – referred to as ‘is’, being, 
brahman, Self.
The first certainty has a phenomenological hue. It is the reflection on an 
indubitable experience: there is being or thinking; self-awareness guarantees 
the trustworthiness and reality of this first given. A second certainty – a cer-
tainty of something different – would be the only way to secure the trustworthy 
existence of something else next to the first certainty. A second certainty would 
also be the only way to secure the existence of the first boundary between two 
equally certain existents. However there is no such ‘second certainty’. There is 
no ‘knowledge’ of a second being, no ‘knowledge’ of a boundary.
The scare quotes around knowledge signal that both Parmenides and Śaṅkara 
agree on there being two kinds of knowledge available to human beings: one that 
consists of untrustworthy opinions that focus on individuals and on change; the 
other, trustworthy, that realises undivided being, which is at the same time the 
only reality and the only real ‘knowing’.16 Being is therefore regarded as undi-
vided and more fundamental than its alleged fragmentation along the boundaries 
that separate things and individuals, by appealing to the impossibility of ‘know-
ing’ anything other than being.
In more detail, Parmenides’ argument of epistemological weakness goes 
along these lines: ‘is’ is the indubitable starting point, since we are certain that 
‘is’ is the case (‘it is the course of trust’ [B2.4]). Whereas ‘is’ is an immediate 
certainty, there can never be a second certainty as strong as this one. The alleged 
second certainty would be certainty of something next to being, and different 
from being. B2 explains that one cannot trust both ‘is’ and anything next to it. In 
fact, there is no knowing of anything else next to ‘is’, i.e. of what is not ‘is’, of 
what is other than ‘is’. 
the other that ‘is not’ and that should not be
I point out to you that this route is a journey we have no experience of,17
for not-being can you neither recognise, since it is impossible to accomplish [such 
a journey] nor can you ever point out [not-being]. (B2.5–8)
Knowing something different from ‘is’ would postulate the possibility of being 
aware of two ‘beings’: one which we might call ‘being’, the other which we 
16 Parmenides: ‘And you are required to find out everything, / on the one hand, the unshaken 
heart of the trustworthy reality, / on the other hand, the opinions of mortals, where there is 
no true trust . . .’ (28 DK B1.28–30). Śaṅkara: ‘Brahman is apprehended under two forms; 
in the first place as qualified by limiting conditions owing to the multiformity of the evolu-
tions of name and form (i.e. the multiformity of the created world); in the second place as 
being the opposite of this, i.e. free from all limiting conditions whatever’ (BSB I.1.1: 206). 
17 Or ‘that cannot be inquired into’. But see Robbiano (forthcoming) for the justification of 
this translation.
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might call not-being, since it is not the same as what we called ‘being’. An exam-
ple of the alleged second certainty would be the alleged certainty that there is an 
owner of this certainty, which is different from this certainty. Śaṅkara makes this 
point very clearly: one cannot have two selves.
the Self within is one only; two internal Selfs are not possible. But owing to its 
limiting adjunct the one Self is practically treated as if it were two; just as we make 
distinction between the ether of the jar and the universal ether . . . (BSB I.2.20: 210)
In parallel with the distinction between Parmenides’ ‘is’, which is trustworthy 
and cannot not be, and the ‘is not’ of which we have no knowledge, Śaṅkara 
stipulates the importance of the distinction between what is real and eternal 
(brahman) and what is not eternal (any superimposition). A justification of this 
discrimination is epistemological: it impossible to have any proof of the exist-
ence of what is not eternal, next to what is eternal:
there can exist nothing different from brahman, since we are unable to observe a 
proof for such existence . . . ‘Being only this was in the beginning, one, without a 
second.’ (BSB III.2.32: 253)
The epistemological weakness of the assumption of plurality consists of showing 
that we are never acquainted with anything with the same – complete – degree of 
certainty that accompanies our knowing the first fundamental fact.
Therefore being is undivided and more fundamental than its alleged frag-
mentation along the boundaries that separate things and individuals. Is this a 
fallacy since it jumps from not knowing to not being? To find out if this is a 
fallacy we must look at what kind of knowing is assumed to count as real, trust-
worthy knowledge.
The assumption is that ‘knowing’ is self-awareness. The fundamental cer-
tainty is phenomenological: it is the only indubitable experience, referred to as 
‘is’, ‘being’, ‘thinking’, ‘knowing’, ‘being conscious’. If being is the same as 
knowing, there is no fallacy.
One way to make sense of this undivided ‘Self’, ‘being’ or ‘is’ is that it is 
what is fundamentally there in each of our experiences; different experiences 
might be distinguished by means of words, but what can be said with certainty of 
all of them is just ‘is’. In other words, there cannot be any experience of anything 
separated from this ‘is’; that is, we have different words and descriptions for our 
different experiences, but they are all experience of ‘is’, they are never experi-
ence of ‘is not’. There is no experiencing of not experiencing: no awareness of 
not being aware. Whatever we are doing we could never qualify it as ‘not-being’: 
always as ‘being’. There are not two separate domains in our experience, which 
we can access in the same way as we access the immediate certainty of being (or 
being self-aware).
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In conclusion, according to our philosophers, we need to  epistemologically 
discriminate between what is real and trustworthily accessible, and what is 
superimposition, which is not trustworthy: what we superimpose is not a second 
being, but some kind of illusion or opinion ‘projected’ onto the only real being.18
As a consequence of the impossibility of knowing anything other than being, 
we cannot know any boundary with certainty. We cannot claim trustworthy 
knowledge of any boundary, since there is no not-being – the alleged second 
being might be called not-being – which would imply the existence of the bound-
ary between being and not-being. With no first trustworthy boundary, no other 
boundary can be regarded as trustworthy, thus no knowledge can be claimed of 
the many things, separated by unreliable boundaries.
Parmenides’ and Śaṅkara’s reasoning contrasted to Descartes’
Both Parmenides and Śaṅkara argue along these lines: everybody agrees that 
‘is’ is the case, rather than ‘is not’. They both shared this step with Descartes: 
there is something indubitable, which I have paraphrased above as ‘there is 
self-awareness’.
At this point Descartes went for the following assumption: thinking and 
being must belong to a substance, i.e. an independent portion of reality. This 
assumption led him to the next step: When I say ‘there is thinking’, then thinking 
and being must belong to a substance; this substance is ‘me’: therefore I am.
Descartes concluded: ‘I’ is an independent substance: an individual mind. 
In other words: ‘thinking’ or ‘is’ or ‘am’ belong to me: a mind separate from the 
rest of reality. I will not go into the well-known arguments by means of which 
Descartes ‘proved’ the existence of bodies; at the end of the story, according to 
him, reality is full of separate individuals and separate things, some of which are 
endowed with a mind.
Parmenides and Śaṅkara went for a completely different assumption: ‘is’ 
or being is the only trustworthy reality: nothing other than ‘is’ is knowable in 
18 Śaṅkara: ‘This superimposition thus defined [of the Non-Self superimposed on the interior 
Self] learned men consider to be Nescience (avidyā), and the ascertainment of the true 
nature of that which is (the Self) by means of the discrimination of that (which is super-
imposed on the Self), they call knowledge (vidyā) . . . The mutual superimposition of the 
Self and the Non-Self, which is termed Nescience, is the presupposition on which they 
base all the practical distinctions . . .’ (BSB Introduction: 197). Discrimination or division 
(krisis, viveka) is a crucial methodological tool, which does not separate two domains of 
being, but two aspects: it draws a distinction, an epistemological division, i.e. a discrimi-
nation between lower and higher knowledge, or two ways of ‘looking’ at the same. About 
the method of discrimination for these two philosophers, and other similarities in their 
 methods, see Robbiano (2016).
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a reliable way. In other words: I cannot know ‘is not’ or not-being. Part of this 
assumption is their conception of knowing, which is the same as being (B3), and 
which can be made sense of by dubbing both knowing and being as being self-
aware. Our experience, which is all we have or are, can be described in terms 
of being, but also in terms of knowing. They are not two separate items. It is a 
kind of ‘knowing’ in which there is no fundamental division between the subject 
that knows and the object that is known, since there are not two fundamentally 
separated realities that we can experience next to each other. Therefore knowing, 
or being-aware, is being.
Parmenides and Śaṅkara concluded: being – that is the same as ‘knowing’, 
or brahman that is the same as the Self (ātman) – is fundamentally undivided. 
In fact, the first alleged boundary is not knowable, not possible to experience; it 
is not part of the indubitable ‘is’. Therefore the boundary between knower and 
known and any other boundary or distinction we superimpose on being, in order 
to make sense of it, are the fruit of our custom, our language or our theories.
Existential consequences of boundaries are superimposed and not real
The choice of the assumption that knowing is being self-aware – which leads to 
the conclusion that the fundamental reality is undivided, that is, not admitting of 
any division, not even the subject-object division – is quite a strong choice.
On the one hand, the exclusive trust accorded to undivided being, leads 
our philosophers to dismiss any specific knowledge. In fact, both scientific 
knowledge (cf. Parmenides’ opinions about astronomy [B10, 11, 12, 14, 15] or 
embryology [B17]) and moral knowledge (e.g. on what rituals and actions to 
perform) are regarded as untrustworthy: as non-reliable opinions or Nescience.19 
Śaṅkara tells us that all practical distinctions are based on ignorant superimposi-
tion. Parmenides claims that postulation of two entities, which is needed for any 
scientific inquiry, creates a deceitful cosmos or order.20
Does the tenet that boundaries, being epistemologically untrustworthy, are 
therefore superimposed rather than real have any existential relevance? What 
difference might it make to take a step in the direction of such a metaphysics, 
19 Śaṅkara: ‘The mutual superimposition of the Self and the Non-self, which is termed 
Nescience, is the presupposition on which they base all practical distinctions – those made 
in ordinary life as well as those laid down by the Veda – between means of knowledge, 
objects of knowledge (and knowing persons), and all scriptural texts . . . For such texts as 
the following, “A Brāhmaṇa is to sacrifice”, are operative only on the supposition that on 
the Self are superimposed particular conditions such as caste, state of life, age, outward 
circumstances, and so on’ (BSB, Introduction, 197–8).
20 28 DK B8.51–3: ‘And after this, learn the opinions of the mortals / listening to the deceitful 
order of my words. / For they decided to name two forms . . .’
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which rejects the reality of individuals and, by doing so, might sound much less 
palatable than the step taken by Descartes, who assumed that the immediate 
certainty of existing (or of being conscious or of thinking) must be owned by an 
individual? After all, it might seem more ‘natural’ to identify with and be sure of 
this individual that carries our name, rather than being certain of and identifying 
with undivided being.
I hereby enter the terrain of the ‘pragmatic consequences’ of Parmenides’ 
and Śaṅkara’s metaphysics. In the last part of this chapter I will follow James’ 
advice about the function of philosophy quoted as my epigraph. I would like to 
suggest that a metaphysics like that embraced by Śaṅkara and Parmenides might 
have an existential relevance that can be expressed in terms of invulnerability 
and unshakenness (Parmenides), and freedom and compassion (Śaṅkara).
The existential relevance for Parmenides: undivided being, on which 
boundaries are superimposed, is invulnerable and unshaken
According to Parmenides, being is undivided and homogeneous. There cannot be 
divisions or discontinuities in ‘is’, since only not-being could have drawn divi-
sion into being. But not-being is not knowable (B2.5–8) and knowing is being 
(B3), therefore there is no not-being: not-being is just an opinion and not real.
neither should it be bigger at all
nor smaller at all whether on one side or another.
In fact, there is neither not-being which would stop it from coming
towards the same, nor is being in such a way as to be
more than being on one side or less on another, since it is all inviolable . . . 
(B8.44–8)
The absence of not-being, which has been ruled out since it is unknowable, is 
what allows ‘is’ to be safe, and homogeneous, with no interruption, discontinu-
ity, separation:
Neither is it divisible, since it is all the same:
nor more anywhere in any respect, which would prevent it from being united, nor in 
any respect inferior, but all is full of being,
thus [it] is all continuous . . . (B8.22–5)
Reality ‘is’: after an ‘is’ there is another ‘is’ and then another ‘is’ with no discon-
tinuity between them: ‘for being draws near being’ (B8.25).
As soon as we talk about an edge, a boundary, or about two different kinds of 
beings, or two beings, or being and not-being, we enter the territory of the opin-
ions. The only limit or boundary that applies to being is the oxymoronic ‘ultimate 
boundary’ made invincible by anangkē: it is not a boundary that  separates two 
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domains but a very unique one that has no outside. Such an ‘ultimate boundary’ 
suggests that being is protected, inviolable,21 since there is nothing on the out-
side that might endanger it. Being is invulnerable and can be trusted to always 
be there.
Remaining the same and in the same it lies by itself
And thus it remains where it is firmly; for mighty anangkē
holds [it] in the bonds of the limit, which bars its way all around . . . (B8.29–31)
But since the limit is ultimate, [being] is perfect
from every point of view . . . (B8.42–3)
The absence of not-being, i.e. anything trustworthy next to being, ensures that 
being is not only undivided but also undisturbed by any incursion: there can be 
no diminishing, dying, changing: it is safe and invulnerable. Being is called per-
fect or complete22 and full.23
Might these characterisations of perfection and invulnerability hint at the 
quality of the experience of non-dually knowing being? Might Parmenides’ 
being refer to the undivided inner self,24 which, unthreatened by anything out-
side of it, is not only invulnerable but also unshaken? When the quest for being 
is announced, the goal of the search is pointed to as the unshaken heart of the 
trustworthy reality:
And you are required to find out everything,
on the one hand, unshaken heart (atremes ētor) of the trustworthy reality. 
(B1.28–9)
Unshaken refers in Homer to the untroubled state of mind, e.g. of gods or heroes 
peacefully sleeping25 or standing calm and untroubled on the battlefield.26 Coxon 
observes that ‘ētor [heart] is never used in Greek except of a human or divine 
person, of whom it refers to the heart or inner self as the seat of emotion, virtue 
21 28 DK B8.48: ‘all is inviolable’ (πᾶν ἐστιν ἄσυλον).
22 28 DK B8.42–3: ‘But since the limit is ultimate, [being] is complete / from every point’ 
(Αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πεῖρας πύματον, τετελεσμένον ἐστί / πάντοθεν).
23 28 DK B8.24: ‘but all is full of being’ (πᾶν δ’ ἔμπλεόν ἐστιν ἐόντος).
24 Coxon 1986: 168.
25 In Homer we do not find the adjective atremēs, but the adverb atremas. There are passages 
where Zeus (Il. 14, 352: Thus in quiet slept the Father on topmost Gargarus) and Odysseus 
(Od. 13, 92: but now he slept in peace, forgetful of all that he had suffered) sleep atremas 
(peacefully). Cf. Śaṅkara, BSB I.1.19 (Essential Vedanta: 206–7): ‘But when he, by means 
of the cognition of absolute identity finds absolute rest in the Self consisting of bliss, then 
he is freed from fear of transmigratory existence.’
26 Cf. the passage at Il. 13, 278–87 with the comparison between the two kinds of warriors: 
the one who is afraid, changes colour and does not stand atremas, and the one who does. 
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and life’.27 This might suggest that one who realises and holds on to the trustwor-
thy ‘is’ has nothing to fear:
But akinēton (unmoving or unshaken) in the limits of huge bonds
[it] is without start and without stop, since birth and death have strayed very far 
away, pushed away by true trust. (B8.26–8)
Coxon puts akinēton here in relation with the atremes ētor of B1, suggesting that 
it could refer to ‘other than local stillness’, and quoting a passage where akinēton 
means ‘steadfast’.28
Being is safe, and invulnerable, protected from any intrusion, since the 
existence of any intruder, i.e. anything next to being, has been ruled out as a 
consequence of the untrustworthiness of our knowledge about it. The suggestion 
might be that, if being is self-awareness, if undivided self-awareness is what we 
trustworthily are, then there is nothing we should fear.
The existential relevance for Śaṅkara: freedom and compassion
For Śaṅkara, the choice of the assumption that makes him interpret the first cer-
tainty as the undividedness prior to any form or division (rather than something 
belonging to an individual) is not only metaphysically and epistemologically 
significant, but also existentially relevant. Regarding separate individuals as 
superimpositions might pave the way towards experiencing the lack of divisions 
or boundaries, i.e. towards the non-dual experience of brahman.
When one identifies with the only existent, one can also experience fullness 
in the sense of perfection.29 If nothing can get in one’s way and limit one, not 
only perfection and lack of fear might result, but also freedom. Śaṅkara describes 
the experience of brahman in terms of liberation. This freedom can also be seen 
as freedom from identification with something changeable and vulnerable such 
27 Coxon 1986: 168. Cf. Seaford’s chapter in this volume, who, from a different perspective, 
points to Parmenides’ appeal to introspection in his search for being, to the subjective 
dimension suggested by the words atremes and ētor, and to the ‘positive psychological 
effects of the merging of subject with object’.
28 Coxon 1986: 206. ‘The adjective akinēton is older than Parmenides (Hes. Op. 750), and 
is used in the fifth century by Pindar, Sophocles, Aristophanes and the historians. That it 
alludes in Parmenides, as often elsewhere, to other than merely local stillness is shown by 
the phrase atremes êtor (fr. 1,29) which foreshadows the argument of fr.8; cf. Soph. Ant. 
1027, akinētos pelei (“is steadfast”); 1060, takinēta (“secrets”).’
29 In the words of one of the most authoritative scholars of Advaita (Deutsch 1973: 9), realis-
ing brahman leads to the experience of the timeless plenitude of being: ‘Brahman, the One, 
is a state of being. It is not a “He”, a personal being; nor is it an “It”, an impersonal concept. 
Brahman is that state which is when all subject/object distinctions are obliterated. Brahman 
is ultimately a name for the experience of the timeless plenitude of being.’
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as an individual. Śaṅkara explicitly identifies the non-dual reality of brahman 
with liberation:
this [mokṣa / liberation] is eternal . . . without undergoing any changes . . . 
 omnipresent as ether, free from all modifications, absolutely self-sufficient, not 
composed of parts, of self-luminous nature . . . It [i.e. mokṣa] is, therefore, the same 
as brahman . . . (BSB I.1.4: 202–3)
Moreover, the experience of the lack of divisions might well be an experience 
of continuity, of a shared common ground, of connection to others, seen as non- 
different from or continuous with us. A compassionate attitude might well result 
from seeing others as part of us, which might manifest itself as sharing suffering 
and joy, i.e. spontaneously attempting to remove their suffering and rejoicing at 
their happiness:
a Master . . . continually established in the Absolute, calm like the flame when its 
fuel is consumed; a boundless ocean of spontaneous compassion for which there is 
no reason, a friend to all good people who surrender to him.30
Śaṅkara’s enlightened or liberated person – i.e. the one who has not only under-
stood but also experienced his or her own identity with brahman (undivided 
being or absolute reality) – will be a boundless ocean of spontaneous compas-
sion. Deutsch comments:
The quality then that ought to inform human action is non-egoism, which, posi-
tively expressed, is what the Advaitin understands to be ‘love’. One must interrelate 
with ‘others’, one must conduct oneself, with the knowledge that the other is non- 
different from oneself. Love, the meeting of another in the depth of being, must 
be grounded in knowledge, and when it is so grounded, it expresses itself in every 
action that one performs.31
Compassion springs from the assumption that the connection between what I 
call ‘me’ and what I call ‘the other’ is stronger than our apparent separation. 
Our separation is secondary since it is result of superimpositions, for instance, of 
this body and these thoughts, on what I more fundamentally am, which is non- 
different from what the other is.
Conclusion
Both Parmenides and Śaṅkara agree with Descartes and others that there is a 
trustworthy, indubitable phenomenological starting point, which is both episte-
30 Śaṅkara, Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 34–5, in Grimes 2004: 76.
31 Deutsch 1973: 102.
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mological and metaphysical, and which might be hinted at as ‘being’, or ‘being 
self-aware’.
Neither Parmenides nor Śaṅkara have Aristotle in their tradition to suggest 
that an activity must always be a characteristic, predicate or accident of a sub-
stance. They can both conceive of a predicate without a subject. They can both 
conceive of unowned being.
Both Parmenides and Śaṅkara show that the existence of anything singled 
out from being is a matter of opinion, since we cannot trust any of the boundaries 
we project on being. I have argued that the fundamental argument for drawing 
conclusions on the status of boundaries is the one based on their ‘epistemological 
weakness’. It is the distinction between two kinds of knowledge, the one untrust-
worthy and the other trustworthy, that allows Parmenides and Śaṅkara to label 
the reality of boundaries and separate individuals and things as less fundamental 
than the reality of undivided being. Our knowledge of boundaries and separate 
entities is of a radically different kind than the higher, trustworthy ‘knowing’, 
which is being and which is assumed to be phenomenological knowledge or 
self-awareness.
We can trustworthily know undivided being, which is what we are: being, 
which is the same as knowing, interpreted as self-awareness. On the contrary, we 
cannot trustworthily know anything other than that; therefore we cannot trust any 
of the boundaries we project on being. The existence of any individual substance, 
like a mind or a body, is not something we can have trustworthy knowledge of: 
any second ‘item’ next to being is the fruit of untrustworthy opinions.
One who holds a metaphysics of the undividedness of reality and who sees 
boundaries between separate things and individuals as superimpositions might 
enjoy the experience of the lack of divisions: an experience of inviolability, 
freedom and connection to others. Parmenides’ and Śaṅkara’s arguments seem, 
in fact, to point to their existential consequences, which lead one from the impos-
sibility of knowing not-being to the unreality of any boundary, and, possibly, to 
the experience of invulnerability, unshakenness, liberation and compassion.
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Soul chariots in Indian and Greek thought: 
polygenesis or diffusion?
Paolo Magnone
Not only the classicist, but even the layman with a casual interest in Greek 
philosophy is familiar with the allegory which Plato employs in the Phaedrus 
to describe the nature of the soul in terms, as he says, that are ‘within human 
power’:
Let [the soul] be likened to the composite inborn power of a pair of winged horses 
and of a charioteer . . . (246a)
Both classical scholars and cultivated laymen alike, on the other hand, have 
seldom been aware of a strikingly similar allegory occurring in one of the most 
celebrated works of the final period of Vedic literature, the Kaṭha Upaniṣad:
Know that the Self is the rider in a chariot, and the body is the chariot; and know that 
the intelligence is the charioteer, and the mind is the bridle. They say that the senses 
are the horses, and the sense objects are their lanes . . . (KaU 1.3.3)
For their part, indologists have taken due notice of the puzzling similarity from 
early on, albeit with differing assessments. Already a century ago, in connection 
with the Kaṭha passage, Keith observed that ‘the contrast with the Platonic meta-
phor of the Phaidros is as obvious as the parallel’, further on passing his judgement 
that in spite of the interesting parallelism ‘the details of the two [metaphors] are 
perfectly distinct, for Plato uses the conception to illustrate the struggle between 
the rational and the irrational elements in the soul, and his distinction of θύμος and 
ἐπιθυμία has no real parallel in the Upaniṣads’.1 On the other hand, Belvalkar and 
Ranade evidently did not share his caution, as they enthusiastically aver that ‘the 
extraordinary resemblance of the two descriptions down to the smallest details 
staggers us, and we must confess we do not know how to account for it’.2 Almost 
 1 Keith 1989: 555, 613.
 2 Belvalkar and Ranade 1974: 263.
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in between there is Radhakrishnan’s opinion that ‘in spite of difference in details, 
the Kaṭha and Plato agree in looking upon intelligence as the ruling power of the 
soul . . . and aiming at the integration of the different elements of human nature’.3 
More recently McEvilley, who must be credited with the first serious attempt to 
posit with amplitude and lucidity the question of possible reciprocal influences 
between early Greek and Indian thought in his path-breaking essay on The Shape 
of Ancient Thought, confines himself to observing that ‘the similarity in imagery 
is intriguing’ but answers Friedländer’s4 wondering whether the figure might 
have travelled from the Far East to Plato with the milder suggestion of a possible 
common Indo-European heritage.5
This last remark introduces us to our subject: are the two metaphors linked 
by a process of westward diffusion, or did they originate independently,6 possi-
bly as independent developments of a common Indo-European stock? This paper 
purports to show that the former hypothesis (i.e. the hypothesis of westward 
diffusion) appears to be the more plausible one. However, because assessments 
of this sort, in the lack of direct proof, are to such a great extent influenced by 
theoretical assumptions, I will premise some considerations of a general meth-
odological nature.
Methodological considerations
A major stumbling block for any comparative enterprise investigating possible 
influences between ancient Greek and Indian thought has always been the his-
 3 Radhakrishnan 1994: 623.
 4 Friedländer 1964: 205.
 5 McEvilley 2002: 185. He goes so far as to suggest that ‘the allegory of the Self [may be] 
a development of the Homeric chariot hero on the one hand and of the hero of the Bhārata 
war on the other’, which is scarcely tenable, as the Mahābhārata epic is generally believed 
to be later than the Upaniṣads.
 6 Both Schlieter and Forte-Smith, in their contributions on the same subject to the present 
volume, subscribe to the hypothesis of independent origination, albeit on different grounds. 
While our respective appraisal of the many aspects involved may be different, I appreciate 
Schlieter’s perspective – stressing the primacy of cognitive metaphors in shaping conceptual 
thought and positing a shared metaphorical ground as a precondition for the independent 
(in his view) origination of the philosophical chariot metaphors (or rather allegories) in the 
Phaedrus and the Kaṭha Upaniṣad – as capable of throwing complementary light on my 
own. On the other hand, while I also appreciate Forte and Smith’s stress on intertextuality as 
a useful, nay, indispensable key to a proper understanding of texts – of which they offer many 
apt examples (if at places a bit far-fetched, in my opinion) – I think they rely too one-sidedly 
on it to make sense of any given text. I believe there is more to Parmenides’ proem or the 
Kaṭha Upaniṣad than can be made out by falling back on their Homeric and Vedic intertexts 
– but of course here we border on the domain of fundamental philosophical options: I do not 
defer to Derrida’s différance, but rather side with Vedantic (and Parmenidean) astikatva.
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torian’s unwillingness to concede anything in the absence of sound historical 
documentation. To me this is just a particular instance of the scholars’ partiality 
for their own favourite method of going about a subject of research – a partial-
ity which is understandable, but nevertheless a bane to the progress of science. 
If historical documentation were always indispensable, whole disciplines like 
folklore would ipso facto simply dissolve into thin air. Folklorists are hardly 
ever able to document the historical vicissitudes of transmission of folk tales, 
customs, rituals, etc., which has not prevented them from developing significant 
and fruitful discourse about their subject matter.7
What is needed to satisfy the historian, in my view, is merely to establish 
that the historical conditions were actually there which could have made cross- 
cultural contacts possible. Being myself no fully-fledged historian, I will just 
refer to the opinion of one such, who, writing a booklet with the explicit intent 
of debunking what he regarded as (in his own words) the ‘inflated, doubtful, 
simplistic and misleading’ claims of the proponents of the ‘Indian hypothesis’, 
had nevertheless to concede:
Historical circumstances appear to favor lasting exchanges between India and the 
East in the ancient world. Phoenician traders were carriers of Indian commodities 
for centuries. Persia imposed a long rule on north-western India, bridging east and 
west [emphasis added]. Alexander the Great’s hellenising crusade . . . brought in 
his wake artists, philosophers, historians and naturalists, thus preparing ground for 
the remarkable Greco-Bactrian kingdoms of the following century. The powerful 
empire of the Kushans was in touch with the masters of Rome, and the Roman eagle 
adorned trading posts on the coast of Coromandel . . . Persian, Greek and Roman 
officials, civilians and military, had direct experience with India for about seven 
hundred years.8
So much for the viability of the hypothesis of influences between early Greek 
and Indian thought.9 Since, however, we cannot progress further on this ground 
 7 For a detailed examination of the various flavours of the comparative method as employed 
in anthropology and folklore see, e.g., Dundes 1986.
 8 Stunkel 1979: 1.
 9 Forte and Smith object that cross-cultural contacts concerning the secret lore of the 
Upaniṣads would be virtually impossible, because the persons involved ‘would have had to 
be Vedic initiates and committed to memory the corpus of Kaṭha texts before instruction in 
an Upaniṣad would be permitted’. Of course, this is true, in principle. But the very fact that 
the Upaniṣads repeatedly inculcate the prohibition to divulge certain doctrines to unfit per-
sons (examples quoted in Deussen 1906: 11) speaks for the actual, if sporadic,  occurrence 
of such divulgations, which could involve just those particular rahasyas, detached from the 
embedding corpus. After all, the same strict requirements for Vedic transmission had been 
in force at least up to the inception of Western Indology, which did not prevent Anquetil 
Duperron from coming by the mysterium tegendum of the Oupnek’hat (on its own account 
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by way of direct historical verification of actual contacts and transmissions, we 
are left with the only option of arguing from similarities that could bespeak a 
common origin or a filiation. I submit that there is nothing inherently unsound in 
this endeavour. On the contrary, it is part and parcel of the method of other disci-
plines, such as, again, folklore, or, to add a fresh example, philology. Philologists 
are usually unable to reconstruct the historical vicissitudes of the copying of man-
uscripts, but are guided in postulating stemmatic relationships by coincidences of 
details (errores coniunctivi). Of course, care must be exercised: all coincidences 
of scribal errors are not suitable to postulate dependencies, for trivial mistakes 
related to common scribal propensities could have arisen independently.
In much the same way, all similarities between cultural constructs are not 
apt to establish connections. Stunkel summarises the argument from similarities 
as ‘the postulation of a mechanism of intellectual and spiritual transmission 
beyond historical verification, but which one must adopt and respect if parallels 
[allegedly] “not easy to ascribe to chance” are to be explained’, lamenting that 
‘the diffusion of religious attitudes and ideas is construed as tenuous, piecemeal, 
unconscious, fragmented in time and unspectacular in the act of transmission and 
reception’.10 This is not the place to examine the import of each of these charges 
in detail: suffice it to say that in my view, some are correct, some are not, indeed, 
they find fault with what I actually regard as conditions of effectual comparisons.
As to the charge of tenuity, I agree that parallels of a very general nature, 
not substantiated by similarities of details, are inconclusive, for similar general 
ideas could very well have cropped up independently from shared psychological 
and cultural grounds. This is akin to the aforesaid scribal proneness to mistakes 
due to homoioteleuton, haplography, dittography and the like. On the other hand, 
as to the charge of fragmentariness, I actually regard it rather as a requisite of 
fruitful comparison, in the same way as the more haphazard scribal errors are, 
the more telling they are and the more apt to function as errores coniunctivi to 
establish stemmatic dependencies.
Let me clarify with a well-known example taken from the more congenial 
field of comparative mythology and folklore. As is well known, the deluge 
myth has enjoyed a wide diffusion all over the Eurasian continent and beyond,11 
prompting the inevitable question of polygenesis versus monogenesis and dif-
fusion. All versions agree on but few fundamental points: mankind is swept 
away by a deluge, except for one or more people surviving in a vessel, who are 
entrusted with the task of the renewal. However, we should hardly be justified 
already the fruit of a disclosure to a Muslim prince – hardly a worthy recipient of the sacred 
Vedic lore!). 
10 Stunkel 1979: 4.
11 For an ample survey see Dundes (ed.) 1988.
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in grounding any presumption of a common origin on the strength of such sim-
ilarities: after all, flood is one of the few fitting ways to end the world which 
experience suggests to primitive folks; to survive a flood you need a vessel 
of sorts; and in the aftermath survivors must find a way to repeople the empty 
world. On the other hand, more particular coincidences of casual details not inte-
gral to the overall structure of the myths make a strong case for diffusion. For 
instance, within the fold of the biblical and near-eastern versions of the deluge 
myth, the correspondences in the episode of the birds sent out as scouts are too 
precise to admit of an independent origin. When the existence of a Chaldean 
account of the deluge myth was first brought to the attention of the world by 
George Smith’s famous lecture in 1872, the sheer force of such coincidences 
was enough to unsettle the cherished certitudes of confessional biblists about the 
absolute originality of the Bible, whose dependence on Sumero-Accadian arche-
types was established even in the utter lack of historical documentation and has 
never been called to question ever since.12
In much the same way, I contend that there may not be much to be gained for 
the comparatist interested in investigating possible cognations by taking stock of 
wide-ranging similarities between ancient Greek and Indian doctrines, like, say, 
the Parmenidean, or rather Melissian, principle: οὐδὲν ἐκ μηδενός (Melissus, fr. 
1), and its intriguing counterpart (although lacking all the speculative elabora-
tion) in the Upaniṣadic master Uddālaka’s rhetorical question: katham asataḥ 
saj jāyeta, ‘how could being be born from non-being?’ (BU 6.1.2). After all, it 
is only reasonable that overarching conceptions like the metaphysics of Being 
may have developed independently in different cultures, possibly (in this case) 
against the common Indo-European backdrop of shared linguistic categories. 
On the other hand, the concurrence in details of lesser import, such as are not 
required either by logical necessity or psychological inclination does require an 
explanation, to the extent that the concurrence is too specific to be ascribed to 
mere chance.
One such instance is, in my opinion, the parallel occurrence of the allegory 
of the soul chariot in Plato’s Phaedrus and in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad. Let us briefly 
review the passages in question.
The chariot allegory in Plato’s Phaedrus
The Phaedrus is a very complex dialogue, whose chief aim is to establish the 
superiority of philosophical discourse, caring for truth, over rhetorico-sophistic 
12 On the other hand, the utter lack of any such correspondences, together with other consid-
erations, in my view provides a good reason for establishing the originality of the Indian 
flood myth vs. the Classical and Near-Eastern versions. See Magnone 2000, 2004.
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discourse, geared only to success. Socrates runs into Phaidros on his way back 
from listening to a lecture by Lysias, in which the celebrated rhetor claimed to 
demonstrate the extravagant assumption that it be better for the beloved to please 
the unloving rather than the loving one. In order to defuse the young man’s 
enthusiasm and win his admiration, Socrates undertakes to improvise a lecture in 
the same strain, but soon professes to repent the ‘sacrilege’ against the god Eros, 
and feels obliged to pronounce in atonement a second discourse of retraction, 
after the manner of Stesichoros’ famous Παλινῳδία. In this second discourse 
Socrates impugns Lysias’ thesis according to which the unloving one should be 
preferred on account of being more reasonable: the lover’s presumed folly is no 
human foolishness, but divine μανία: a superhuman possession aroused when 
the sight of human beauty awakens the dim memory of divine beauty, which the 
immortal soul once beheld in the region ‘above the heaven’ before incarnating 
in a mortal body.
Against this backdrop, the chariot allegory is immediately preceded by a proof 
of the immortality of the soul (Phdr. 246ff.), after which Socrates introduces the 
theme of its ‘aspect’13 (ἰδέα). To define its essence, namely what the soul really is 
(οἷον μὲν ἐστι), is beyond the reach of human capabilities, says Socrates, but it is 
indeed possible to say what it is like (ἔοικε). Let us read Plato’s words:
Let [the soul] be likened to the composite inborn power of a pair (ζεῦγος) of winged 
horses and of a charioteer. However, both the horses and the charioteers of the gods 
are all good, and of good descent; but as for those of the others, it is a mixed affair; 
and first of all our driver leads an ill-assorted pair (συνωρίς), and secondly one of the 
horses is himself noble and of like descent, but the other is quite the opposite, and of 
opposite descent: so that difficult indeed and troublesome is of necessity the driving 
for us [mortals]. (Phdr. 246a–b)14
It is worth noticing, with Robin,15 that although ζεῦγος is the word usually 
employed for a pair of horses, in applying the metaphor to the human soul Plato 
makes use of the word συνωρίς instead (which I have accordingly translated as 
‘ill-assorted pair’) to signify that the human horses are not really paired, or ‘on 
the same par’, so to speak, but they are extrinsically conjoined (συν-ωρίζω) in 
spite of their different natures.
13 Thus translates Velardi (2002: 185), on account of the fact that here, as Plato himself says, 
we are dealing with a metaphoric image of the soul.
14 ἐοικέτω δὴ συμφύτῳ δυνάμει ὑποπτέρου ζεύγους τε καὶ ἡνιόχου. θεῶν μὲν οὖν ἵπποι τε 
καὶ ἡνίοχοι πάντες αὐτοί τε ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων μέμεικται. καὶ πρῶτον 
μὲν ἡμῶν ὁ ἄρχων συνωρίδος ἡνιοχεῖ, εἶτα τῶν ἵππων ὁ μὲν αὐτῷ καλός τε καὶ ἀγαθὸς καὶ 
ἐκ τοιούτων, ὁ δ᾽ ἐξ ἐναντίων τε καὶ ἐναντίος: χαλεπὴ δὴ καὶ δύσκολος ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡ περὶ 
ἡμᾶς ἡνιόχησις. (All translations are mine).
15 Robin 1970: lxxx n. 1.
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Plato does not specify the other constituents of the chariot; since, however, 
he says further on, while distinguishing between the mortal and immortal living 
beings, that the whole soul is the one who ‘takes care’ (ἐπιμελεῖται) of the soul-
less, viz. the body, the supposition lies near at hand that the chariot represents 
the latter. Although the tenor of the Platonic text is not quite clear at places, it 
seems that both the souls of the gods and those of men are joined to motionless 
bodies which acquire the appearance of self-mobility in the union, thanks to the 
inherent moving power of the soul. Nevertheless, there are differences in either 
case, namely: in the first place, the souls of the gods never lose their wings; and 
secondly, they are forever joined to their respective bodies. So much for the 
souls of the immortals, as Plato himself does not wish to belabour the matter, 
relinquishing it to godly placet.
As for ourselves, beings called ‘mortals’ were originated in consequence 
of the loss of the wings and the ensuing fall of the soul from heaven to earth, 
where it clung to a solid body in which it established its dwelling. But how 
did the loss of the wings come about? It pertains to the nature of the wings to 
lift what is bound downwards, and for that reason they are the most godlike 
among corporeal things. Therefore, as the divine is beautiful, wise and good, 
the wings are nourished and grown by similar things, but they are consumed 
and destroyed by the opposite. Now the gods led by Zeus revolve in the heaven 
in their winged chariots governing the universe in good harmony, followed by 
whoever so wishes and is able, for gods know no jealousy (φθόνος). But when 
they convene to a banquet, they proceed towards the culmination of the interior 
cusp of heaven (ὑπουράνιος ἁψίς) and they pass to the other side, where the 
plain of truth (ἀληθείας πεδίον) stretches out in the region above the heaven 
(ὑπερουράνιον τόπον). There the charioteers sate themselves on the sight of 
the substances that really are and feed on the pure science which is not affected 
by becoming and variability, but only pertains to true being. And once they are 
sated, they revert to their seats under the vault of heaven, unharness their horses 
and feed them on nectar and ambrosia. But mortals have a hard time trying to 
follow the gods, because the horses are difficult to control, so that the charioteers 
can only take a glimpse of some of the true substances, or of none at all; and in 
the ensuing flurry and in the collision of chariots vying for the precedence some 
horses are maimed and lose their wings. And the charioteers who do not get a 
view of the pure science of reality have to feed on opinion, which in turn entails 
the loss of the wings.
The chariot allegory in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad
The Kaṭha Upaniṣad in its present form consists of six chapters termed vallīs 
(‘creepers’) in two sections of three chapters each, but the original core may 
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have comprised only the first two (or three) vallīs,16 dealing with the teachings 
imparted by the death god Yama to the boy Naciketas, who had reached while 
still living the abode of the dead through his father’s curse. To acquit himself 
of faulty hospitality Yama grants the boy three wishes, and Naciketas chooses 
as third the solution of his doubts about the continuation of existence beyond 
death. After a few vain attempts to elude the question by offering various boons 
in exchange, finally Yama praises the boy’s steadfastness and reveals to him the 
doctrine of the knowledge of the Self (ātman) which rescues the wise from the 
wheel of rebirths and of reiterated death.17 The high-flown celebration of ātman 
which concludes the second vallī links up with the third, which purposes to show 
the path to reach the supreme abode of the ātman through the practice of yoga, 
introduced precisely by the chariot allegory:
Knowers of brahman . . . call Shadow and Light the two, drinkers of Truth (ṛta) in 
the world of their deeds,18 [the one] installed in the cave of the heart, [the other] in 
the supreme region beyond. . . . Know that the Self (ātman) is the rider in a chariot, 
and the body is the chariot (śarīra); and know that the intelligence (buddhi) is the 
charioteer, and the mind (manas) is the bridle. They say that the senses (indriya) 
are the horses, and the sense objects (viṣaya) are their lanes (gocara). The wise 
call Enjoyer (bhoktṛ) the yoke (yukta) of Self, senses and objects. But as for him 
who has no understanding (vijñāna) and whose mind is ever unyoked (ayukta), 
his senses are unrestrained, like bad horses for a charioteer; on the other hand, for 
him who has understanding and whose mind is ever yoked (yukta), his senses are 
16 The first three, according to Deussen (1897: 264); or just the first two, according to Olivelle 
(1998: 372). However, as Deussen (1897: 278) remarks, the last two strophes of the third 
vallī look like the epilogue of the original Upaniṣad. 
17 According to Forte and Smith there is ‘no self-realization or arcane knowledge about brah-
man’ taught in this Upaniṣad, nor any philosophical doctrine of monism or of whatever 
other description; indeed, their paper purports to be ‘an attempt to demonstrate that the 
chariot in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad still refers to the sacrifice and constitutes a metaphysical 
theorisation of the operations of the fire altar’. This is indeed an astounding proposition, 
which runs counter to all the commonly held lines of interpretation of the Upaniṣad both 
Western and Indian. Of course, it is impossible to go into its merits in the space of a foot-
note; I shall be content with pointing out what I regard as the fundamental flaw in Forte and 
Smith’s analysis, namely that it begs the question, in that it only deals with such passages 
as are amenable to be read in connection with the ritualistic brahmanical background (the 
first vallī up to the grant of the second boon; and the beginning of the third vallī, up to [and 
obviously including] the chariot metaphor), whereas it omits to take stock of those very 
passages (the concluding part of first vallī with the request of the third boon, of paramount 
importance; and the whole of the second vallī, devoted to the praise of the path of knowl-
edge, culminating in the realisation of the ātman, as Yama’s fulfilment of the request) 
where the Upaniṣad really comes into its own, pouring, as it were, the new wine of the 
metaphysics of brahman-ātman into the old wineskins of ritualistic thought.
18 Reading with Śaṅkara svakṛtasya; otherwise sukṛtasya ‘of good deeds’.
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indeed restrained, like good horses for a charioteer. He who has no understanding, is 
mindless and ever impure, does not reach that region, and incurs rebirth in the flux 
of existence (saṁsāra); but as for him who has understanding, is mindful and ever 
pure, he does indeed reach that region whence he is not born again. A man whose 
understanding is his charioteer and whose mind his bridle reaches the end of the 
road, that supreme region (parama pada) of Viṣṇu. (KaU 1.3.1; 1.3.3–6)19
In this short passage there occurs three times the word yukta, from root yuj, ‘yoke, 
join’, which, beside its literal meaning referring to the action of yoking or harness-
ing draught animals, is also employed in the figurative meaning of ‘subjugating’ 
passions and the like. The latter meaning lies at the foundation of the name of 
Yoga, one of the six classical schools of Indian philosophy, in so far as the proper 
object of Yoga is precisely the subjugation of psychical functions.20 As a matter of 
fact, the passage quoted above is immediately followed by a rudimentary sketch 
of the way of introversion advocated by Yoga, which (sketch) is considered one 
of the most ancient documents of the proto-history of that school of thought.21 
According to the retroversion procedure elsewhere imaginatively styled as pra-
tiloma22 (i.e. literally ‘against the hair’), which lies at the core of Yoga, each of 
the psychical faculties, which normally act outwardly, must be made to flow back 
inwardly to its source, or, as our Upaniṣad says, it must be ‘curbed’ by the fac-
ulty which stands higher in a hierarchy comprising, from low to high, senses and 
their objects, mind, intellect, the ‘great Self’ (ātmā mahān) and the  unmanifest 
19 ṛtaṃ pibantau svakṛtasya loke guhāṃ praviṣṭau parame parārdhe | chāyātapau brahma-
vido vadanti . . . || . . . || ātmānaṃ rathinaṃ viddhi śarīraṃ ratham eva tu | buddhiṃ tu 
sārathiṃ viddhi manaḥ pragraham eva ca || indriyāṇi hayān āhur viṣayāṁs teṣu gocarān 
| ātmendriyamanoyuktaṃ bhoktety āhur manīṣiṇaḥ || yas tv avijñānavān bhavaty ayuktena 
manasā sadā | tasyendriyāṇy avaśyāni duṣṭāśvā iva sāratheḥ || yas tu vijñānavān bhavati 
yuktena manasā sadā | tasyendriyāṇi vaśyāni sadaśvā iva sāratheḥ || yas tv avijñānavān 
bhavaty amanaskaḥ sadāśuciḥ | na sa tat padam āpnoti saṁsāraṃ cādhigacchati || yas 
tu vijñānavān bhavati samanaskaḥ sadā śuciḥ | sa tu tat padam āpnoti yasmād bhūyo na 
jāyate || vijñānasārathir yas tu manaḥpragrahavān naraḥ | so ‘dhvānaḥ pāram āpnoti tad 
viṣṇoḥ paramaṃ padam.
20 Cf. Yoga Sūtra 1.2: yogaś cittavṛttinirodhaḥ.
21 Under their presumption that the Kaṭha Upaniṣad be nothing more than a ‘poetic recre-
ation’ of its ‘source [Brāhmaṇa] text’, Forte and Smith quickly dispose of this passage 
in a couple of sentences as ‘definitions of ātman and puruṣa contoured by Vedic ritual 
reveal[ing] that the text describes the [ritual] transmission of the terrestrial self to the heav-
enly self’. It might be so – but here again, one would expect a bit more of careful reasoning 
when calling into question the unanimous interpretative tradition both Western and Indian, 
which envisages this very text as the foundation stone of the classical Yoga darśana.
22 As explained in the Rājamārtaṇḍa commentary at Yoga Sūtra 1.2: ‘The mental organ is an 
evolute of pure sattva and the psychic functions are its secondary modes. Yoga consists in 
their inhibition, namely in their dissolution in their source by stopping their extroversion by 
means of a process “against the hair” of introversion’ (cf. Magnone 1999: 25).
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 (avyakta), to finally end up in the awareness principle (puruṣa) which is the final 
goal (parā gatiḥ) of the process. It is worth observing that the term that I have 
translated as ‘curb’ is a form of root YAM, ‘restrain’, which once again is fre-
quently employed in connection with riding and draught animals.
These details of lexical usage manifest the close relationship between the 
chariot imagery and the beginnings of Yoga in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad. We must 
not overlook that what we have here is something more than just an allegory of 
the soul and the physio-psychic complex. The reining of the horses by the char-
ioteer through the reverberations of the lexical choices distinctively hints at the 
process of Yoga, and the final goal of the journey, the supreme region of Viṣṇu, 
represents the final resolution in the awareness principle termed puruṣa which is 
the goal of the yogic process.
Actually, the technical term puruṣa (literally ‘man’ in the sense of ἀνήρ), 
which designates the awareness principle in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophy, has 
evolved from very ancient roots in the cosmogonic hymn Ṛgveda 10.90 (end of 
II millennium bce?), and on the religious side has acquired strong connections 
within the fold of Hinduism with the aspect of supreme Godhead named Viṣṇu. 
This explains why the resolution into the puruṣa is intimated within the allegory 
by the attainment of the supreme region (parama pada) of Viṣṇu. The parama 
pada is likewise well-known from the most ancient Vedic hymns in connection 
with Viṣṇu in his capacity as Trivikrama, i.e. the ‘Thrice-Strider’, his three 
strides supposedly representing the three stations of the sun in its diurnal course. 
According to the lexical values of the word, which include ‘step, footstep and 
place’, the parama pada connotes at one and the same time the ‘supreme place’ 
carrying the footprint of the third step of Viṣṇu as the sun traversing the horizon.
We shall presently turn to the convergences and discrepancies evidenced in the 
allegories as they appear in each text, in order to evaluate whether the similarities 
occur in traits that are arbitrary enough to enhance the probability of borrowing, 
according to the criterion laid down previously.
In case borrowing should be deemed likely, its direction would still remain 
to be determined. Should Plato have borrowed the allegory from the Kaṭha or 
the other way round? As always, chronology does not help in an Indian setting, 
since the dating of Indian texts is, at best, aleatory and highly speculative.23 The 
utmost that can be said is that the Kaṭha may very well be anterior to Plato, or 
roughly contemporary, without being able to absolutely rule out the possibility 
of the contrary.
23 As one recent Upaniṣadic scholar puts it rather bluntly: ‘any dating of these texts that 
attempts a precision closer than a few centuries is as stable as a house of cards’ (Olivelle 
1998: 12).
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But one additional criterion may be resorted to, which finds ready applica-
tion in the present circumstance, namely, the criterion of integrality, that might 
be conveniently expressed thus: the more an element appears to be organically 
integrated in its surrounding structure, the lesser the probability of its having 
been borrowed from somewhere else.
Now the allegory of the soul chariot is not particularly called for in the 
context of the Phaedrus: it works, but as far as I can see there is no compelling 
reason that makes it specially suitable to express the ruling function of the intel-
lect over the other psychic faculties in the way Plato understands it, so that it 
is not unthinkable that he could have borrowed it from an external source. On 
the other hand, as we have seen, the allegory of the soul chariot in the Kaṭha 
Upaniṣad, with its attendant imagery of yoking and bridling, is conjured up by 
the very name of the Yoga doctrine it is meant to illustrate, so much so that it 
would be utterly unreasonable even to suppose that it might be of alien origin.24
The persuasiveness of this conclusion is reinforced if we extend the applica-
tion of the criterion of integrality to the whole of the Greek and Indian scenarios. 
I have reviewed occurrences of the soul chariot allegory in both literatures 
elsewhere,25 and space constraints do not permit to go over it now. I must be 
content with stating the conclusions: leaving hints of a questionable nature aside, 
a fully-fledged soul chariot allegory is unknown in Greece before Plato (with the 
possible exception of the locus Parmenideus, the allegorical nature of which, 
however, is moot).26 On the other side, soul chariot allegories occur in India 
in at least three works belonging to the Upaniṣad genre – i.e. the Mahaitareya, 
the Chāgaleya and the Kauṣitaki – all of them probably antedating the Kaṭha; 
and two more – the Śvetāśvatara and the Maitrāyaṇīya – almost certainly more 
recent, but interesting nevertheless, in that both uphold Yoga as a means of 
deliverance and so corroborate the structural link obtaining between Yoga and 
the chariot allegory.
24 Richard Seaford alerts me to the concurrent option that it might be precisely the (preexist-
ing) terminology of the Yoga doctrine that made the expression of the doctrine receptive 
to a possible influence of a chariot metaphor borrowed from elsewhere (e.g. Greece). 
Irrespective of the problems posed by chronology, here I subscribe to the tenet of the con-
ceptual metaphor theory as advocated by Schlieter, according to which abstract thought is 
inherently metaphorical, and cognitive metaphors precede and structure (or are at least con-
terminous with) abstract thought. In other words, the verbal notion of yoga, having a literal 
meaning in the domain of activities concerning draught animals, could not have acquired 
its figurative meaning in the domain of activities concerning the human psyche, before the 
metaphor connecting both domains as source and target was in place.
25 Magnone 2012.
26 On the subject see Latona 2008.
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Comparative assessment
The foregoing scrutiny has evidenced the following areas as most amenable to a 
comparison: in the first place, the correspondence of the distinct components of 
the chariot with certain psychic faculties; secondly, the discipline of the driving; 
and thirdly, the use of the chariot for the journey to the world beyond. Let us 
begin with the last one.
The chariot as a vehicle for the world beyond
Both in the Homeric epics and in the Vedic hymns the chariot is sometimes 
envisaged as a means of communication between the world of men and the world 
of gods;27 likewise, in both literary traditions chariot imagery is employed as 
a metaphor of the poetic word granting the poet access to other planes of con-
sciousness.28 Because it is so, it is unnecessary to suppose external influences in 
this connection, as the Phaedrus and the Kaṭha allegories may very well have 
drawn on elements belonging to their respective traditions. Nevertheless, it is 
worthwhile pointing out some striking parallels in the two conceptions of the 
final goal of the journey:
a. The ὑπερουράνιος τόπος, the region above the heaven, is conceptually iden-
tical to the parama pada, the supreme region of Viṣṇu, for we have seen that 
the latter connotes at once the footprint (pada) of the third step (pada) of 
Viṣṇu ‘whose eye is the sun’; at the same time, as representing the highest 
step, the parama pada corresponds to the zenith, or the ὑπουράνιος ἁψίς 
which is the threshold to the world beyond.
b. Besides, it may be no more than a baffling coincidence that the ‘region above 
the heaven’ is also qualified as the ‘plain of truth’, i.e. (ἀληθείας) πέδιον, 
where the word πέδιον is linguistically cognate to pada in parama pada.
c. According to the Phaedrus, in the ὑπερουράνιος τόπος the gods and their 
followers apply themselves to the contemplation of the true essences. In like 
manner in Ṛgveda 1.22.20 the parama pada is said to be perpetually contem-
plated by gods (or sages).29
27 E.g. Iliad V, 355ff. (Ares and Aphodite); V, 720 ss. (Hera and Athena); VIII, 41 ss. (Zeus); 
VIII, 381 ss. (Hera and Athene); XIII, 23 ss. (Poseidon); on the Indian side, see Macdonell 
(1981: 18) and in the entries of individual deities about gods riding in chariots; Sparreboom 
(1986: 18) about chariots as vehicles for the world of heaven.
28 On the Greek side, see, e.g., Simpson 1969; on the Indian side, Sparreboom 1986: 20f., also 
Magnone 2012: 102ff.
29 RV 1.22.20: tád víṣṇoḥ paramáṃ padáṃ sádā paśyanti sūráyaḥ. Sūri may mean a god, a 
lord or a sage.
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d. In the ὑπερουράνιος τόπος the gods and their followers enjoy the pleasures 
of the banquet; likewise in Ṛgveda 8.29.7 the gods and elsewhere (1.154.5) 
their worshippers rejoice in the parama pada, where flows the fountain of 
honey: ‘O that I could reach that dear place where men sacred to the gods 
rejoice; for there, in Viṣṇu’s supreme region, is the fountain of honey!’30
e. After reaching the ὑπερουράνιος τόπος the chariots come to a stand and are 
carried round by the revolution of the heavenly sphere; this reminds one of 
an (admittedly rather obscure) passage where the lord of the parama pada 
is said to have ‘set his steeds in swift motion . . . like a turning wheel’ (RV 
1.155.6).
On the other hand, in the Phaedrus the ὑπερουράνιος τόπος can only be attained 
thanks to the horses’ being provided with wings, and this undoubtedly consti-
tutes the major discrepancy with respect to the image of the Kaṭha. Of course, 
winged hybrids are well-known to Greek mythology, so that we must look no 
further for an explanation.31
The steering of the chariot
Both the Phaedrus and the Kaṭha agree in stressing the need for disciplined 
steering of the chariot in order to reach the journey’s destination. The notion 
of discipline is conveyed in the Kaṭha through the metaphor of the ‘subju-
gated’ (yukta) horses, and we have already drawn attention to the close lexical, 
semantic and conceptual relationship obtaining between the terms employed for 
subjugating and restraining the horses on the one hand and some key concepts of 
the burgeoning school of Yoga as a method for subjugating and restraining psy-
chic faculties on the other. The seamless integration of the chariot imagery in the 
conceptual array of proto-Yoga, which is unparalleled in the Phaedrus, speaks 
for the native status of the metaphor in the Kaṭha, as we have already remarked.
However, we may perhaps discern some faint echo of it in the lexical usage 
of the Platonic dialogue. The Sanskrit term yoga, literally meaning a ‘yoke’, is 
linguistically cognate to the Greek ζεῦγος which designates the pair of divine 
horses harnessed to the chariot. Although the figurative meaning of ‘subjugation’ 
30 RV 1.154.5: tád asya priyám abhi pā́tho aśyāṃ náro yátra devayávo mádanti / urukramásya 
sá hí bándhur itthā́ víṣṇoḥ padé paramé mádhva útsaḥ.
31 Nevertheless, the idea of wings as means to reach the supreme region is not unknown even 
in India: in the strophe immediately before the last quoted one, it is said that no one dares 
to approach Viṣṇu’s third step, not even the birds flying with wings: tṛtī́yam asya nákir ā́ 
dadharṣati váyaś caná patáyantaḥ patatríṇaḥ. (It is just a noteworthy curiosity that the 
word patatrin, literally ‘winged’, hence ‘bird’, is also attested in post-Vedic times in the 
meaning of ‘horse’).
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is ostensibly absent in the Platonic passage, it may not be devoid of significance 
that, as we pointed out, Plato employs a different word (i.e. συνωρίς) to designate 
the unruly pair of human horses of opposite temperaments; so that by implication 
the word ζεῦγος seems to acquire the additional value of connoting the divine 
horses as unanimous and obedient to the charioteer: that is to say, ‘subjugated’ 
in the same sense as yukta.
But the most notable point of similarity with respect to the steering of the 
chariot is without doubt the one concerning the difficulty caused by the opposi-
tion between good and bad horses, although such opposition wears quite different 
aspects in either case, for in the Phaedrus one horse is congenitally good and the 
other the reverse, whereas the horses of the Kaṭha do not admit of an internal dis-
parity, but they are only susceptible of being, all of them, well-behaved, or else 
ill-behaved. This divergence stems from the different symbolic function of the 
horses, and above all from the paramount difference in the underlying ontology, 
as we shall presently see; nevertheless, even the coincidence of the mere idea of 
the antithesis is worthy of note.
The chariot as an allegory of psychic functions
We finally come to the most important congruence, i.e. the application of the 
chariot imagery as a sustained allegory for the psychic functions. We have 
already observed that, although the motif of the chariot as a vehicle for a jour-
ney to the other world had been common to both literary traditions since hoary 
antiquity, on the contrary the motif of the ‘soul chariot’ appears to be more or 
less specific to the Indian literary tradition, at least in the earliest period, being 
attested in several Upaniṣads, whereas it is virtually unknown to the Greek liter-
ature before Plato (with the possible if controversial exception of Parmenides).
The table given in Appendix I outlines a synopsis of the correspondences 
between the single parts of the chariot and the constituents of the physio-psychic 
complex in some of the most meaningful texts, while the bottom line high-
lights the several goals of the journey in the same texts. Items appearing in all 
texts, albeit possibly in different connections, are marked in ALL CAPITALS; 
whereas correspondences of a more opinable nature by reason of not being 
expressly declared in the text, but only inferred from the context (or, in the 
case of Parmenides, from Sextus’ interpretation) have been enclosed in square 
brackets.
What impresses one on first perusing the table is that, to start with, the cor-
respondences are much more articulate in the Indian texts than in the Phaedrus, 
irrespective of their variability in the detail. The chariot is everywhere found to 
represent the body (albeit not explicitly in the Greek texts). The charioteer, on the 
other hand, severally corresponds to the mind (manas), the intellect (buddhi) or 
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the soul in different texts both Indian and Greek. The alternation between manas 
and buddhi may be ascribed to a terminological indetermination characteristic of 
the older Upaniṣads. As for the equation of the charioteer with the soul, it occurs 
on the Indian side only in the Chāgaleya, which is peculiar in many respects, and 
seemingly cut off from the line of development connecting the Mahaitareya to 
the Maitrāyaṇīya through the Kaṭha.
What interests us more is that both in the Kaṭha and in the Phaedrus the 
charioteer represents the rational faculty: buddhi / vijñāna in the Indian text and 
νοῦς / διάνοια in the Greek one, viz. the intelligent (or ‘intelligible’, in Scholastic 
parlance) aspect of the soul (τὸ λογιστικόν, according to the psychology of the 
Republic).
The bridle, which represents the mind in the Kaṭha, is not expressly men-
tioned in the Phaedrus, but is implied in the Greek word for ‘charioteer’, which 
is ἡνίοχος,32 i.e. ‘he who holds the reins’ (ἡνία).
As for the horses, their correlates are totally different in India and Greece, for 
in the Indian tradition they stand for the indriyas, i.e. the ‘faculties’ without dis-
tinction (in the earliest period), and later, at the time of the Maitrāyaṇīya, when 
the rising Sāṃkhya cosmo-psychology had started distinguishing between sense 
organs and action organs,33 the latter ones. On the Greek side, in the Phaedrus 
the two horses represent the irrational aspects of the soul, which would later be 
called in scholastic parlance the irascible and the concupiscible (τὸ θυμοειδές 
and τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν according to the psychology of the Republic). In the proem 
of Parmenides according to Sextus’ interpretation, the mares likewise stand for 
desires and irrational impulses of the soul.34
The distinction of three aspects of the soul – τὸ λογιστικόν, τὸ θυμοειδές 
and τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν – finds no equivalent in the ancient Upaniṣadic psychol-
ogy. However, the rudiment of an analogous conception may perhaps be seen 
in the stereotyped pair kāma and krodha (‘desire’ and ‘anger’) which occurs 
several times in the Bhagavad Gītā35 in the capacity of arch-enemies of jñāna 
(‘knowledge’). For example, in a passage which calls to mind the chariot alle-
gory through the use of certain words and images, Kṛṣṇa admonishes Arjuna as 
follows:
32 Phdr. 246a, 247b, 247e, 248a, etc. (ἡνίοχος); 246b (ἡνιοχέω, ἡνιόχησις). Elsewhere the 
charioteer is termed ἄρχων (‘commander’, 246b) and κυβερνήτης (‘pilot’, 247c).
33 The psychology of classical Sāṃkhya reckons, in addition to the five usual sense organs 
(buddhīndriya), also five action organs (karmendriya): speaking, grasping, going, ejaculat-
ing and evacuating.
34 See Latona 2008.
35 E.g. BG 2.62–3; 16.18; 16.21; 18.53, and especially the passage quoted below.
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This is desire (kāma), this is anger (krodha), fostered by the element of ardour 
(rajoguṇa) . . . as fire is enveloped by smoke and a mirror is clouded by dust . . . 
in the same way is knowledge obfuscated by this relentless opponent of the knower 
. . . the senses, the mind and the intellect are its abode, as they say, and through 
them it deludes the embodied [soul] by obfuscating knowledge. Therefore, restrain 
(niYAM) the senses in the first place, and then kill that iniquitous destroyer of knowl-
edge and science. (Bhagavad Gītā 3.37–41)36
Admittedly, the Bhagavad Gītā properly speaking is no Upaniṣad, being 
embedded in the Mahābhārata epos, datable after the close of the Vedic period, 
and for that reason must on all likelihood be ascribed to a later time than the 
Phaedrus. Nevertheless, the couple of kāma and krodha already occurs in one 
of the most ancient Upaniṣads, in a passage enumerating as components of the 
(world-immanent) universal Self, in addition to the faculties and the elements, 
also kāma-krodha and their opposites (BU 4.4.5).
In general terms, it may be observed that the Indian tradition is more inter-
ested in articulating the physio-psychic complex in its entirety, in order to 
account for the ordinary, world-affirming sensory experience as well as for its 
opposite, the extraordinary, world-negating practice of sensory restraint (yoga) 
leading to the suprasensory. For its part, the allegory of the Phaedrus only con-
templates the nature of the soul with its essential components, the intelligible, the 
irascible and the concupiscible, represented by the joint agency of the charioteer 
and the pair of horses.
Against the backdrop of all the varying degrees of similarity between the allegor-
ical correlates examined above, one item of the allegory has been left unreviewed 
thus far, which appears in one way or another in all Indian texts, but is conspic-
uously absent in the Greek ones:37 namely, the idle passenger on the chariot. In 
all of them (except for the odd Chāgaleya) its regular correlate is the soul: for 
the soul, according to the standard Indian view, coincides neither with any of the 
several psychic functions signified by the different parts of the chariots, nor with 
their joint agency (as is the case with the Phaedrus).
Indeed, here lies the paramount disparity between the Greek and Indian ver-
sions of the chariot allegory, which is rooted in the widely differing ontologies of 
Plato and of the school of Sāṃkhya-Yoga at its dawn in the Kaṭha. Those ontolo-
gies diverge essentially with respect to where they set the boundary line between 
the respective pertinences of body and soul. According to Plato, the soul is tripar-
36 The strophe immediately following overtly quotes KaU 3.10, which speaks for the likeli-
hood that the author had in mind the Kaṭha chariot allegory when he composed the passage 
in question.
37 This difference is also discussed by Schlieter in this volume.
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tite in its functions, this tripartition being reflected in the image of the charioteer 
and the pair of horses; but, according to the same image, it is up to the rational 
faculty to oversee the other two. On the other hand, in the Indian texts one meets 
the distinct figure of the rathin, that is to say, literally, the ‘owner of the chariot’, 
or he who makes use of the chariot as an instrument, while remaining distinct and 
detached with respect to it. The reason for this is that, according to the dualistic 
psychology of Sāṃkhya-Yoga, there exists a radical opposition between the soul 
(puruṣa), which is the pure luminosity of awareness as the horizon of the appear-
ance of objects, and nature (prakṛti), which is the physical substrate of the outer 
world as well as of the inner physio-psychic complex, inclusive of the rational, 
volitional and desiderative faculties. To put it succinctly, the intellect is part 
(indeed, the best part) of the soul, according to Plato, whereas it is non-soul, but 
merely a part of the body, according to Sāṃkhya-Yoga.
Conclusion
The above tentative analysis, albeit needing further refinement, has brought to 
light both similarities and differences between the chariot allegories in the Kaṭha 
Upaniṣad and in the Phaedrus, which can be summed up as follows. We may 
count as points of similarity:
a. the overall idea of the chariot as an allegory of the psychic functions (for 
which there are more and still earlier instances on the Indian, but not on the 
Greek side);
b. the identification of the charioteer with the rational faculty;
c. the analogous characterisation of the parama pada and, respectively, the 
ὑπερουράνιος τόπος / ἀληθείας πέδιον as the final goal of the journey;
d. the general notion of the necessity of a ‘subjugation’ of the psychic faculties 
in order to reach the journey’s end;
e. the broad concept of an opposition between good and bad horses (however 
differently declined in either case).
On the other hand, we can count as major discrepancies:
a. the different symbolic significance of the horses; and, above all,
b. the absence of the separate figure of the idle traveller in the Phaedrus;
both of them grounded in the crucial diversity of the underlying ontology of the 
two works.
It lies with the reader to judge for himself of the plausibility or otherwise of the 
considerations propounded; as for my own assessment, I am of the opinion that 
the similarities evinced may be momentous enough to justify the supposition, 
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pending further research, that Plato might have been acquainted (either directly 
of indirectly) with the chariot allegory and the attendant doctrines of the Kaṭha 
Upaniṣad, and might have drawn inspiration from them, while contextually 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































‘Master the chariot, master your Self’: 
comparing chariot metaphors as hermeneutics 
for mind, self and liberation in ancient Greek 
and Indian sources
Jens Schlieter
In ancient Greece and India, the real use of chariots encompassed sports, cults, 
journeys and combat. These uses of the supposedly most complex mobile tech-
nology of early Greek and Indian culture suggest a potentially similar complex 
metaphorical or ‘symbolic’ use of the chariot. It can be assumed that steering 
fast chariots was a demanding and fascinating task: an intensive experience 
of speed and mid-distance travel, but also a dangerous device, as numerous 
reported instances of chariot accidents in ancient sources show. Thus, it should 
not astonish that chariots (and chariot rides) were taken as a source domain, 
forming a dynamic ‘anthropo-therio-technological metaphor’ for the interpre-
tation of abstract target domains such as gods, or the philosophical reflection of 
body, soul and liberation. In fact, in both (and other Eurasian) traditions chariots 
were depicted as vehicles of gods such as the sun, i.e. as a symbol of cosmic sta-
bility; they were, moreover, used as symbols of royal power and social prestige, 
e.g. of kings and warriors (in the Iliad, Vedic hymns, and poetic literature); and, 
finally, chariots served as metaphors for the ‘person’, the ‘mind’ and the ‘way 
to liberation’.
The parallel application of chariot imagery for the ‘Self’ and its salvific 
progress in both Greek and Indian contexts is indeed most astounding – yet it 
must be remarked that a certain Indian influence on pre-Alexandrian Greece is, 
although highly unlikely, theoretically possible, since the absolute (and even 
relative) chronology of the Upaniṣads is still a matter of academic dispute. 
Applying conceptual metaphor theory as a hermeneutic tool, I will try to outline 
subtle but important differences between the Greek and Indian chariot metaphors 
for ‘mind’, the ‘Self’ and ‘liberation’ – for instance in respect to a ‘chariot pas-
senger’ able to descend from the ‘chariot’ at a final destination, or with regard to 
the ‘horses’ as either ‘parts of the soul’ or (neutral) ‘senses’, to be mastered by 
the charioteer. A cognitive analysis of chariot metaphors, may, in other words, 
be a valuable tool for highlighting those (sometimes hidden) philosophical pre-
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conceptions prevalent in abstract domains such as the ‘mind’, the connection of 
‘body and mind’, the relationship between the ‘rational’ and the ‘emotional’ part 
of the ‘mind’, the relation between a ‘steering mind’ and the ‘Self’, etc.
Methodology: Hans Blumenberg and conceptual metaphor theory
Actually, there are as many different metaphor theories as there are – to apply 
a metaphor – grains of sand on the oceans’ beaches. For my purpose, it will 
hopefully suffice to name some insights of the cognitive approaches towards 
metaphors (used also by Jurewicz in this volume), leaving aside theories that 
treat metaphor as a poetic or rhetorical device. The basic approach has been put 
forth by Mark Johnson and George Lakoff, namely, that mental activities, such 
as visualising problems, orientation in time and space, etc.,
are metaphorical in nature. The metaphorical concepts that characterise those activ-
ities structure our present reality. New metaphors have the power to create a new 
reality. This can begin to happen when we start to comprehend our experience in 
terms of a metaphor, and it becomes a deeper reality when we begin to act in terms 
of it. If a new metaphor enters the conceptual system that we base our actions on, 
it will alter that conceptual system and the perceptions and actions that the system 
gives rise to’.1
Lakoff and Johnson distinguished between a ‘source domain’ that, grounded 
in human experience, is used to visualise a ‘target domain’, a more abstract 
realm – the human mind, the psyche, emotions, philosophical concepts, etc. The 
target domain, the authors hold, is ‘constituted by the immediate subject matter’, 
whereas the source domain
provides the source concepts used in that reasoning. Metaphorical language has literal 
meaning in the source domain. In addition, a metaphoric mapping is multiple, that 
is, two or more elements are mapped to two or more other elements. Image-schema 
structure is preserved in the mapping – interiors of containers map to interiors, exteri-
ors map to exteriors; sources of motion to sources, goals to goals, and so on.2
In their later work of 1999, Philosophy in the Flesh, Lakoff and Johnson 
champion three elementary principles: ‘The mind is inherently embodied. 
Thought is mostly unconscious. Abstract concepts are largely metaphorical.’3 
However, only occasionally do they point to the fact that the ‘embodiment’ 
 experience is, nevertheless, manipulated through the age-old use of technology 
 1 Lakoff and Johnson 2003: 146.
 2 Lakoff and Johnson 2003: 266.
 3 Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 3. These maxims can be followed without subscribing to the 
author’s claim that ‘reason’ is to be fully ‘naturalised’ (cf. ibid.: 4).
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and artefacts,4 which provide, therefore, relevant metaphors, too. Accordingly, 
in the field of chariots one will find – as source domain – the metaphorical use of 
elements of the chariot as whole or in part (wheels, reins, centre/pivot, hub, body, 
horses), chariot riding (speed, road, sound and heat of the axle; wind; steering, 
etc.), or the broader use (sports, war, representation). As target domains, the 
chariot had been used to represent heroic virtues; the mind/soul; the movement 
of the sun and stars and the passing of time; air travel; etc. Declaring metaphors 
to be part of the ‘cognitive unconscious’, Lakoff and Johnson argue in line with 
a theory of ‘primary metaphors’ which are ‘part of the cognitive unconscious’:
We acquire them automatically and unconsciously via the normal process of neural 
learning and may be unaware that we have them. We have no choice in this process. 
When the embodied experiences in the world are universal, then the correspond-
ing primary metaphors are universally acquired. This explains the widespread 
 occurrence . . . of a great many primary metaphors.5
A more recent development of the ‘cognitive’ (or ‘conceptual’) metaphor 
theory has been initiated by Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner as a theory of 
‘conceptual blending’.6 Mental frames, they argue, may not only encompass a 
single ‘source domain’ but combine various ‘input fields’ which are ‘blended’ 
(or co-activated) in the metaphorical process. These input-domains may include 
senso-motoric schemata or triggers of certain emotions, and even incompat-
ible ‘input spaces’ can be creatively combined in the ‘blend’. The result is a 
more encompassing, complex model of a combination of metaphorical domains, 
which are held to be the original process of ‘creative’ thinking, because the 
mapping allows us to solve complex problems by fusing distinct realms to an 
integrated whole.
Highlighting the more existential meaningfulness of metaphors, I will 
turn to Hans Blumenberg, who, in the tradition of ‘history of concepts’ 
(Begriffsgeschichte), developed a ‘Metaphorology’ exemplified in various stud-
ies of philosophically meaningful metaphors (e.g. the metaphor of a ‘book’ or 
‘text’ for the readability of the ‘world’; or the metaphor of ‘light’ as imagery 
of ‘truth’). Metaphors put themselves in place of the otherwise unimaginable 
reality of the ‘world’, ‘life’ or the human ‘self’. In his early work, Blumenberg 
speaks of those metaphors that can principally not be reformulated as ‘concepts’ 
 4 Cf. the ‘hard and soft energy’ metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson 2003: 157), or their remark, 
that ‘science’ has been successful in extending ‘our basic-level capacities for perception 
and manipulation via technology. Instruments like telescopes, microscopes’, and, in addi-
tion, computers, have enlarged the capacities for ‘manipulation’ or ‘calculation’ (Lakoff 
and Johnson 1999: 91). 
 5 Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 59.
 6 Cf. Fauconnier and Turner 2002.
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as ‘absolute metaphors’: ‘The absolute metaphor . . . springs into a void, projects 
itself on the tabula rasa of what cannot be fulfilled by theory; here it has taken 
the place of the no-longer living absolute will. Metaphysics often proved itself 
to us to be metaphorics taken literally; the disappearance of metaphysics calls 
metaphorics back to its place.’7 A core function of those metaphors figures an 
‘existential’ quality: to provide understanding of the ‘non-conceptualisable’, 
and, therewith, to reduce fear: ‘absolute metaphors “answer” those supposedly 
naive, principally unanswerable questions whose relevance lies quite simply in 
the fact that they cannot be eliminated because we don’t ask them but find them 
asked in the foundation of existence [Daseinsgrund]’.8 For Blumenberg, meta-
phors fulfil functions of human survival and self-assertion strategies – metaphors 
do not reveal reality. Their function is to appease, because they help to reduce 
unknown (reality) to something known (within the lifeworld); they relieve the 
angst of ‘the monstrous and outrageous’.9 Metaphors allow us to speak of the 
powerful and frightening in indirect ways; in so doing they help to keep the fear-
ful at a distance. In that respect, metaphors fulfil functions that have been 
explained by sociologists of religion as ‘contingency formula’ (Niklas Luhmann, 
Hermann Lübbe), i.e., to transform the contingent into something that can at 
least be addressed. Metaphors, therefore, describe the fundamental anthropolog-
ical position of man, his relation to reality being ‘indirect, complicated, delayed, 
selective, and, most prominently, “metaphorical”’.10 How these ideas, sketched 
only roughly here, help to elucidate chariot imagery will be shown below. In 
addition to the ‘grand theory’, Blumenberg argues that metaphors assumed the 
negative image of being merely illustrative due to the fact that they appear to be 
‘genetically secondary’, a pure ornamentation – however, ‘the secondary signif-
icance of metaphors is only the pretence an author creates by the reversal of the 
genetic relationship in the representation’.11 In other words: for the construction 
of meaning in abstract domains, metaphors are not secondary (even though they 
may be secondary in reference to the lifeworld domain, as seems obvious in the 
case of chariot imagery). On the contrary: they structure understanding right 
from the initial moment.
Significant for the case of chariot metaphors, the following observation of 
Blumenberg actually builds on the ‘wagon’: ‘A metaphor demands a faithful 
interpretation of all of its functional moments; if this is violated, the metaphor 
regresses into allegory, in which the wheels of the wagon of any goddess may be 
 7 Blumenberg 1999: 23. All translations of Blumenberg are by myself.
 8 Blumenberg 1981a: 15.
 9 Cf. Blumenberg 2006: 10, 424.
10 Blumenberg 1981b: 115.
11 Blumenberg 2001: 179.
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designated as the four cardinal virtues.’12 This remark will prove to be helpful in 
analysing the phases of metaphor-use – allegory, for whatever reason, no longer 
takes the lifeworld-use seriously.
Sports, prestige, war: chariot and chariot use in Greece and India
In the first millennium bce, to which the texts discussed below belong, chari-
otry can be conceived as an already well-established technology in Greece and 
in India. Therefore it is not necessary to enter the intense and sometimes grim 
debate on the ‘true origin’ of the light and fast two-horse vehicle with one axle 
and spoked wheels. However, I would like to express sympathy with the view 
of Peter Raulwing, starting from evidence of the semantic field of chariots and 
their parts:
If we take all the available philological, linguistic, archaeological, archaeo- zoological 
and cultural historical evidence into account, the most plausible solution seems to be 
that the chariot must be regarded as a product of the city states of the ancient Near 
East in the early 2nd Millennium bc.13
More relevant for my purpose is the technical structure, the supposed range of 
use, and the ‘driving experience’ of the chariot.
The chariot as a fast-moving car for usually one or two persons was, of 
course, dependent on several independent innovations: First, the revolutionary 
invention of spoked wheels (reinforced with a flat metal rim) replacing heavy 
and massive, tripartite wooden wheels; second, the breeding of horses able to 
provide motive power while bridled and yoked together (as a pair, or in the case 
of the quadriga, four); third, a light body-construction or basket with a D-shaped 
floor; fourth, a durable hub with an equally durable axis. The chariot complex 
as a whole, however, presupposes an environment in which there were tracks, 
roads, or, at least, a somehow ‘drivable’ ground. The latter remark may be trivial 
– nevertheless, it will be seen that chariot metaphors build on this aspect, too.
Comparing roughly Greek chariot constructions of the first millennium bce 
with those of Indian chariots (known to us, apart from textual evidence, e.g. from 
depictions on the Buddhist stūpa in Sāñchī, first century bce), the most obvious 
difference seems to be the wheel: Indian chariot wheels had a large number of 
thin spokes (in the earliest depictions of Sāñchī,14 ca. 12–33 spokes), whereas 
Greek chariots, such as the Mycenaean box-chariot, were fitted with four-spoked 
wheels (compare, e.g., the Apulian Calyx krater with Helios riding a quadriga of 
12 Blumenberg 2001: 183.
13 Raulwing 2000: 99. 
14 Cf. Sparreboom 1985: 14, 93–113.
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four winged horses, ca. 430 bce, now in the British Museum, London). In regard 
to functionality, this and other differences, such as the comparatively larger size 
of Indian chariots, seem to be of minor importance. Metaphorically relevant is 
the fact that chariots in Greece were more often steered by a single charioteer. 
Additionally, both in Greece and in India the individual shape of the chariot 
differed regionally and in regard to the intended usage: as racing vehicle, mobile 
platform in war, for royal festivals and ritual procession, or means of everyday 
transport for the aristocracy. Although the military usage was important and has 
been very often depicted (e.g. in Egypt or the Middle East), it has been argued 
by Peter Greenhalgh and others that its predominant early use was in sports and 
cults, whereas the military career came later.15 There are famous early descrip-
tions of chariot races in Homer (Il. 23.249–623) and in the Veda.16 It was a 
highly demanding sport – due to the difficult high-speed interplay of horses, the 
artefact and the human charioteer – leading to various kinds of sometimes deadly 
accidents reported in the sources. Dangers of driving included the breakdown of 
the chariot itself (broken axes, spokes or wheels, etc.), runaway horses, clashes 
of chariots, and so on.
If I may add some more phenomenological comments on the experience of 
driving this ‘anthropo-therio-technological’ artefact, it seems that, in the epoch 
before riding of horses became common, nothing could equal the experience of 
speed offered in chariot rides. The swiftness of chariots, Max Sparreboom sum-
marises, and their use as a racing car, are the most prominent element of chariot 
imagery in Vedic texts.17 The Indian and Greek chariots were not fitted with 
suspension (some kind of basic suspension had been invented in Egyptian char-
iotry);18 the off-road ride, leaving prepared tracks behind, must have been rather 
rough and bumpy. On sandy ground, turning the chariot at high-speed must 
almost inevitably lead, the pole being stiffly fixed to the chariot box, to a drifting 
chariot. Graphic illustrations are the famous chariot race scenes in movies such 
as Ben Hur. Tackling a narrow curve might even cause an overturn due to the 
centripetal force,19 as can be acknowledged in replicas tested in experimental 
archaeology. Large jumps of the chariot box are equally attested. This lends plau-
sibility to the ancient conceptualisation of ‘flying’ not only as an imagined bird’s 
flight but also as a ‘chariot ride’. For the driver – and probably even more so for 
a purely observing passenger not involved in steering – the experience of speed 
15 Greenhalgh 1973: 29f.; Sparreboom 1985: 32f.
16 See Forte and Smith (in this volume); cf. Sparreboom 1985: 28–43. 
17 Cf. Sparreboom 1985: 119f.
18 Cf., for the Greek chariot, Plath 1994.
19 Cf. Paipetis 2010: 74–6 (on Nestor’s advice how to drive the chariot around the U-turn 
post).
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must have been breath-taking. The same holds true for spectators of racing chari-
ots. The thundering sound of hooves at full gallop, the cracking of the wheels and 
the whistling of the turning axles, initiated and controlled by a human charioteer: 
all this must have contributed to the prestigious image of chariots. Additionally, 
the chariot was not only one of the most complex technological artefacts of early 
civilisation – it was also a very expensive technology,20 likewise in manufacture, 
maintenance, and in the fodder supply for the horses.
As a matter of fact, the chariot, ‘a widespread symbol of élite transport for 
monarch and nobles’, and ‘the mystique of chariotry’ as such, were to lose their 
prestige ‘in favour of the ridden steed by the first millennium bc’.21 Nevertheless, 
in the late antique world, the chariot continued to be of importance in some 
Eurasian regions, so that one should conceive of a long period of slow decline. 
And even after having lost most its everyday use, it was, for instance in the 
Roman period, still fashionable as a racing car. In India, Sparreboom observes, 
the chariot survived the Vedic period as an important literary device, while 
its lifeworld meaning had been marginalised, due to the fact that it had been 
advanced and transformed into slower, taller, more representative, and often 
four-wheeled vehicles (still named ratha).22
Chariots of the sun
A major metaphorical enrichment of the chariot (gr. ἅρμα; skt. ratha) had been 
its remarkably parallel application to the sun and its movement. In several ancient 
cultures including Greece and Vedic India, the sun had been conceptualised as 
a ‘rotating wheel’ (λάμπρος ἡλίου κύκλος; lat. solis rota; skt. kālacakra).23 
Sometimes, the golden, flamed wheel is the wheel and axis of the sun-god’s 
chariot; in other depictions, it is the shining aureole or crown of the sun-god as 
the anthropomorphic chariot driver.24 Of metaphorical benefit had been obvi-
ously the fast and steady drive of the celestial bodies from sunrise to sunset. 
In Greek mythology, there are various narrations of the four horses yoked in 
the early morning, whereas in the night, they are unharnessed and brought to 
a heavenly watering place with ambrosia.25 In Orphic and Vedic hymns, the 
horses and the chariot of the sun are praised as fast and steady runners. In India, 
the sun-god Sūrya was closely connected to Kāla, ‘time’. Apart from those 
20 Cf. Piggott 1992, Littauer, Crouwel and Raulwing 2002.
21 Piggott 1992: 41.
22 Sparreboom 1985: 92f.
23 Cf. Roscher 1965, vol. III.2 (Phaethon), vol. I.2 (Helios), sp. 1996.
24 Cf. Gelling and Davidson 1969.
25 The question how the chariot returns from west to east in nighttime had been answered by 
a travel through the underworld.
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depictions on the stūpa of Sāñchī, there is a second example, to be dated to 
the first century bce, forming part of a relief at the Bhājā vihāra. Here Sūrya is 
shown on – or, as driving – a quadriga.26 We have to refrain from delving into 
the details of sun-mythology here, but shall ask how this astonishing fact can 
be explained, that a human artefact, the chariot, was used to illuminate ‘natural’ 
activities of the gods. Obviously, the chariot drive was plausible in connection 
with the image of the ‘celestial paths’ of the sun and the moon. Accordingly, the 
sun-chariot is depicted as running on a ‘heavenly’ track. Sunrise and sunset had 
also – in Greece and India – been conceptualised involving an artefact, namely, 
as the opening of reinforced gates through which the chariots of dawn, sun and 
the moon pass while beginning or ending their daily journey.
Moreover, the chariot, being largely independent of the contingencies of 
natural movements (e.g. the rhythm of rivers), could be equipped with a human-
like driver – human-like in respect of human intentions, namely, to drive along, 
to stop, or to deviate from a scheduled journey. By conceptualising them as god-
driven chariots, the ancients were able to appeal to the sun-god not to deviate 
from the usual path. Any deviation, they thought, would lead to draughts, forest 
fires, etc., as depicted in the unauthorised use of Helios’ chariot by his teenage 
son Phaethon. Heraclitus of Ephesus states: ‘Helios (the sun) will not overstep 
his measures; if he were to do so, the Erinyes, handmaidens of justice, would 
seek him out for punishment’ (22 DK B94). Another very interesting aspect can 
be seen in the description of the godly chariot drivers looking down on the world. 
In the Ṛgveda (hymn 1.50), we hear: ‘Seven bay mares carry you in the chariot, 
O sun god with hair of flame, gazing from afar’;27 in Ovid’s Metamorphoses, the 
chariot-driving sun-god is even called mundi oculus (4, 228) (cf. Plato Politeia 
6, 508a–c). In Greece and in India the god of the sun is the ‘bringer of light’, and, 
as such, also a precondition for ‘orientation’.
To summarise, the chariot, and the chariot ride as intentional, continuous 
travel on a given track, elevated from the sphere of the ‘ordinary pedestrians’, 
can be seen as a remarkable example of what we may call ‘techno-therio-an-
thropomorphisation’. As can be seen from the descriptions of the chariots of 
emperors in the lifeworld, the imagined sun-chariot was soon to exert an inverse 
influence: representative chariots of emperors, kings and generals are variously 
described as gold-coloured or even gold-plated vehicles of incredible represent-
ative value, and it was obviously hoped that the qualities of the sun would be 
metonymically transferred to the chariot driver or passenger. We may assume 
that not only ‘young gods’ in heaven and earth were fascinated by this horse-
26 See Coomaraswamy 1927: pl. VII, fig. 24. 
27 Doniger 1981: 190. Cf. RV 127.6, 128.1, 129.1.
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driven machine and ‘burning in ardent desire for [driving] the chariot’ (lat. 
flagratque cupidine currus, Ovid Metamorphoses II, 104).
Chariots as ‘anthropo-therio-technological’ metaphor for Self and 
liberation: Parmenides, Plato and the Kaṭha Upaniṣad
The next move in chariot imagery that will be discussed here can be illustrated 
in Parmenides’ famous proem, in which the Pre-Socratic philosopher describes 
a young man, probably himself, as driving a chariot from the ‘halls of night’ to 
the light. According to the approach chosen here, we will focus mainly on the 
metaphors used, and will try to elucidate them without referring in detail either 
to the respective author’s philosophical propositions or to his poetic precursors: 
the metaphors shall, as far as possible, stand for themselves. The beginning of 
the proem narrates:
The mares that carry me kept conveying me as far as ever my spirit reached, once 
they had taken and set me on the goddess’ way of much discourse, which carries 
through every stage to meet her face to face, a man of understanding. On this I was 
carried, for on this the sagacious mares were carrying me, straining at the chariot 
and guided by maidens along the way. The axle in the naves kept blazing and utter-
ing the pipe’s loud note, driven onwards at both ends by its two metalled wheels, 
whenever the daughters of the sun made haste to convey me . . . There stand the 
gates between the journeys of night and day, enclosed at top and bottom by a lintel 
and threshold of stone, and themselves fitting closely to a great architrave in the 
aether . . . Whereupon the maidens drove the chariot and mares straight on through 
the gates along the road. And the goddess received me warmly, and taking my right 
hand in hers spoke as follows and addressed me: ‘Welcome, O youth, arriving at our 
dwelling as consort of immortal charioteers and mares which carry you; no ill fate 
sent you forth to travel on this way, which is far removed indeed from the step of 
men, but right and justice. You must be informed of everything, both of the unmoved 
heart of persuasive reality and of the beliefs of mortals.’28
In these introductory verses, the philosopher describes a chariot journey to an 
extra-terrestrial place. A certain ambiguity remains as to whether the journey 
ascends to ‘heavenly gates’ or descends to the underworld, Tartaros.29 The jour-
ney itself, on which he is accompanied by goddesses of the sun, obviously serves 
a narrative function – the young philosopher being ‘initiated’ (although the 
content of these initiations are rather philosophical insights) into a central idea 
of his famous philosophical vision: that being is, whereas the non-being not only 
is not, but cannot even be thought. While the ‘daughters of the sun’ guide and 
steer the chariot, the philosopher seems to perceive the impressive ride with all 
28 Coxon 2009: 50–4.
29 Cf. Miller 2006: 18–24.
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of his senses: the loud sound of the axle in the naves, the blazing – emitting heat 
and light. The wheels turn, on ‘this way, which is far removed indeed from the 
step of men’, beyond the human-inhabited world: Here again, we encounter the 
conception of an extra-terrestrial ‘road’ on which chariots drive. Interestingly, 
we encounter another artefact on the chariot’s way: the obviously massive gates 
(of dawn and sunset, cf. Homer, Il., 8.389–96) through which the chariot passes 
– again on a ‘road’ (ἀμαξιτὸς).
From Hermann Diels’ study onwards30 it has repeatedly been argued that the 
chariot ride is only an allegory for the travel of the ‘soul’, i.e. a ‘shamanic flight’. 
Some hold that a travel to the underworld, again as ‘flight of the soul’, is depicted 
– e.g. of an initiate into secret mystery cults dying his ‘spiritual’ death.31 In most 
interpretations, however, the chariot ride is only a literary device, paying tribute 
to the ecstatic motivation of visionary poetry.
As outlined above, and despite any poetic precursors, I would prefer to take 
the narrated experience of chariot riding more seriously. Parmenides’ young 
man is a passenger (comparable, in that respect, to the detached and purely 
observing ‘enjoyer’, skt. bhoktṛ, of the Upaniṣadic chariot imagery discussed 
below). As such, the passenger ‘desires’, as do the horses, to start the ride. He 
enjoys his elevated position of observing the lifeworld of men. The ride in the 
chariot, intensively experienced, not only justifies the ‘superhuman’ truth-claims 
by the mode of travel to a ‘transcendent’ place (arrived at the divine place, the 
philosopher claims his insights to be disclosed by the goddess of truth) – the ride 
itself seems to be a preparatory part of the insights. Taking the ride seriously 
implies that real-world chariot rides exerted an impact on Parmenides and on 
the thoughts that he communicates. In other words, it bears characteristics of a 
technologically mediated, ‘modernist’ experience. We call it ‘modernist’ here to 
counter the tendency to read Pre-Socratic philosophy as a traditional and some-
how naïve philosophy of nature.
Further, the chariot imagery had already been enriched by two other 
important input-domains: one being the aristocratic wealth, splendour and rep-
resentative quality of a chariot in a technologically advanced environment (the 
fortified gates, the road). Depicting a chariot passenger, the ‘proem’ entrusts 
the ‘observing’ philosopher as traveller with aristocratic dignity. The second 
input-domain is the metaphorised travel of the celestial chariot, especially the 
chariot of the sun. In that respect, the chariot ride of Parmenides’ young man is 
enriched by the quality of ‘light’ and ‘vision from above’ (long-standing met-
aphors of ‘truth’ and ‘abstract overview’), but also by intentional steadiness, 
reliability and responsibility. Even if out of sight in cloudy, foggy or stormy 
30 Diels 1897: 46.
31 Cf. Kingsley 1999: 115.
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weather, the chariot of the sun moves on. Likewise the Parmenidean philoso-
pher: he stays on track – being moved on a track, but unmoved in his thought that 
there is only being, or: being is all that is. In other words, being on the chariot 
of light itself, he looks from that perspective, the enlightened perspective being 
the light-emitting vision of all there is – which is equivalent to: of all there is 
to be seen. Therefore, the journey itself demonstrates already the highest view, 
which is fully achieved in the final conversation at the destination. It is not only 
a religio-philosophical justification strategy – it demonstrates what an elevated 
driving-experience may achieve. Although there are first hints that the chariot as 
an entire complex, including the driving sun-goddesses, interacts with the ‘saga-
cious mares’ in an almost intentional way, it is, in my view, not yet a full-fledged 
metaphor of the soul and its temporary or even final liberation.32 The most prom-
inent examples of this kind of metaphor-use are, in Greece, Plato’s well-known 
chariot simile in the Phaedrus, and, in India, the Upaniṣadic chariot simile,33 to 
both of which I will now turn.
As is well known, Plato uses the chariot imagery in a complex simile for 
describing the difference between the souls of humans and of gods by pointing 
to the ambivalent nature of the human soul’s parts, its heavenly ascent, and its 
return to earth, i.e., rebirth (Phdr. 245c–256b). In Plato’s dialogue, the chariot 
imagery is introduced by Socrates for proving the thesis that all souls are immor-
tal, for ‘she is the source of all motion both in herself and in others’ (245c). 
Everything that moves itself must be immortal. If the soul is that which moves 
itself, it must be immortal. The Olympian gods may drive their chariot from the 
heights of the Olympus to a stable place outside of the revolving world (κόσμος), 
to the stable hyperuranian realm (ὑπερουράνιος τόπος) where they – after a turn-
around, in which they cross the border of the moving fixed-star heaven towards 
the ‘non-located location’ at the back – can descend34 from the chariot, take a 
rest, may look down at the world, and then return after a full turn of the sub-lunar 
heaven (cf. 274d) to their Olympian home.
In contrast, the human soul is compared to the ‘composite nature’ of a 
winged chariot and its driver. Whereas, however, the chariots and steeds of the 
32 A defense of the full allegorical reading (such as Sextus Empiricus’ reading of Parmenides) 
may be found in Latona 2008: 199–223.
33 Cf. Slaveva-Griffin 2003.
34 Forte and Smith (in this volume) are able to show, very convincingly, various parallels (or 
‘intertexts’) of the Parmenidean poem and the Iliad (the chariot race in Il. 23). The only 
parallel that I would consider less plausible pertains to the equation of the Parmenidean 
‘path of thought’ with a lap in a chariot race. To me, it seems very important that the 
outward journey arrives at a destination where the passenger descends and receives his 
philosophical insights, and returns only thereafter – whereas the racing charioteer will turn 
in high speed, without ever descending the chariot.
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gods are of an excellent nature, the human chariot must cope with two very 
different steeds. One, the white one, the ‘mindful’ (possessing ‘moderation’, 
σωφροσύνη), is of noble descent; the other, the black one, of inferior descent. 
One is able to understand the commands of the charioteer, whereas the other, 
‘appetitive’ part, or ‘desire’ (ἐπιθυμία), respects only the whip. While the chari-
ots of the gods are equipoised and easy to handle, the human chariot is difficult to 
steer, in constant danger of crashing. Steering, therefore, is immensely difficult. 
The obnoxious steed of poor breeding wants to return to earth, to human desires, 
and gets inflamed and sexually agitated if the chariot meets other chariots in the 
sky. The noble steed, on the other hand, wants to ascend; if the charioteer could 
steer the whole complex accordingly, the chariot would leave the inner space and 
would enable the human soul to see being itself, reality, as it were.
Actually, the whole chariot imagery does not follow a coherent logic of 
lifeworld chariots in all details but alludes to a mythical picture (e.g. with its 
‘wings’), as G. W. F. Hegel already observed, commenting that this ‘myth’ 
has somehow an inconsistent ‘potpourri’ character.35 Even though the cognitive 
analysis of the metaphors is still a valid undertaking, we have to note that Plato’s 
chariots in some respect head into allegory. The imagery, however, is quite 
clear: it builds on a tripartite nature of the soul as the chariot-compound, made 
of the charioteer (as driver and passenger in one person) – who is the ‘rational’ 
(λογιστικόν), and whose bliss is realised in steering to the Imperishable; the 
‘mind’ (νοῦς) is held to be the ‘pilot of the soul’ (ψυχῆς κυβερνήτης, 247c) – and 
of the two forces (τὼ δυνάμεις), symbolised in the horses: the innate nature of 
‘desire’ (ἐπιθυμητικόν), aiming for lust and sensual pleasures, and the ‘striving’ 
or ‘courageous’ (θυμοειδές), aiming for the higher, the (cultivated) striving for 
the better. We may comment in passing that the imagery of an understanding, 
obedient, white steed (on the right-hand side, of course) and a low-breed black 
steed of stubbornness and sexual indulgence, unable to communicate (the white 
one understands and follows the logos!), seems to allude to the Greek concep-
tions of the ‘barbarians’ (e.g. of Ethiopia).36 The human driver of the winged 
chariot must handle the antagonistic forces – only then will he realise autonomy 
and steer his life for the better; finally, he will be able to steer his soul after 
death to the immortal sphere of being. The simile, moreover, depicts what may 
happen when two chariots meet, but these details may not be followed here. 
Socrates concludes that, if the noble force within the winged chariot dominates, 
and self-control prevails, then
35 Hegel 1986: 49.
36 Cf. Phaethon’s chariot travel that led to the ‘nigrification’ of the Aethiopians (Roscher 
1965: sp. 2184). Belfiore, in contrast, argues that Plato alludes with the black horse to the 
‘satyr-like’ characteristics of Socrates (Belfiore 2006: 201–5).
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they pass their lives in the greatest happiness which is attainable by man . . . But if 
they choose the lower life of ambition they may still have a happy destiny, though 
inferior, because they have not the approval of the whole soul. At last they leave the 
body and proceed on their pilgrim’s progress, and those who have once begun can 
never go back. (255c–256a).37
Humans are not able to enjoy a steady view, because they are not able to reach the 
final destination of the heavenly journey, where the ‘immortal souls’ of the gods 
‘having travelled out stood upon the back of heaven’ (ἔξω πορευθεῖσαι ἔστησαν 
ἐπὶ τῷ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ νώτῳ, 247b–c). Of course, in the context of the Phaedrus, 
the chariot imagery can be taken as an example of how to counter the challenge 
of a ‘desire-driven life’, but to decipher it only as a ‘justification of the best life’, 
as Elizabeth Schiltz does,38 cuts off important soteriological dimensions.
As has been variously observed, this Platonic simile of the chariot as the soul 
has a very interesting parallel in the corpus of early Indian texts, namely, in the 
Kaṭha Upaniṣad. Before discussing the metaphorical dimensions of the simile, 
the relevant passage shall be quoted in full:
Know the self (ātman) as a rider in a chariot,
and the body, as simply the chariot.
Know the intellect (buddhi) as the charioteer,
and the mind (manas), as simply the reins.
4 The senses (indriyāṇi), they say, are the horses,
and sense objects (viśaya) are the paths (gocara) around them;
He who is linked to the body (ātman), senses, and mind,
the wise proclaim as the one who enjoys (bhoktar).
5 When a man lacks understanding,
and his mind is never controlled [ajuktena],
his senses do not obey him,
as bad horses, a charioteer.
6 But when a man has understanding,
and his mind is ever controlled,
his senses do obey him,
as good horses, a charioteer.
7 When a man lacks understanding,
is unmindful and always impure,
he does not reach that final step,
but gets on the round of rebirth (saṃsāra).
37 Jowett 1871: 589. This soteriological ideal of life as a complex psychosomatic procedure of 
‘steering’ to the border of the supra-empirical realm, detached from the realm of becoming, 
is in line with Plato’s simile of the ‘divided line’ in the Politeia (509d–511e). The vertical 
ascent in the chariot-soul simile would then correspond to the ‘c’-point of the simile of the 
line.
38 Cf. Schiltz 2006.
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8 But when a man has understanding,
is mindful and always pure,
he does reach that final step,
from which he is not reborn again.
9 When a man’s mind is his reins,
intellect, his charioteer,
he reaches the end of the road,
that highest step of Viṣṇu . . .39
Looking at the Upaniṣadic simile, the thematic similarity with Plato is indeed 
remarkable. As astonishing may count not only the fact per se, that chariot 
imagery is used for exemplifying the human soul, but moreover, that it is done 
so in soteriological contexts. In the Kaṭha Upaniṣad the simile of the chariot and 
the horses aims at explaining the soul’s way to liberation, i.e., immortality (‘the 
highest step of Viṣṇu’ depicts the place of final emancipation of transmigrating 
‘souls’). The ātman, the ‘self’, is the driver. The chariot, ratha – obviously the 
body of the wagon – metaphorises the human body. It is steered by the ‘intellect’ 
(buddhi), which is, by means of the ‘mind’-reins, guiding the horses.40
But may we conclude that the authors of these similes are somehow depend-
ent on each other, or did they use other common sources that did not survive? 
A closer comparative look reveals that both similes, while phenotypically quite 
close to each other, are, in terms of metaphorical systematics, rather distinct. The 
Upaniṣadic simile, presumably older than the Platonic simile,41 presents a differ-
ent anthropological model, as is shown in the table below.
chariot passenger
[or ‘serving commander’, 
skt. rathin]
Phaedrus
soul (psyche) [commander and driver one 




charioteer (driver) rational part of soul(to logistikòn méros)  reason / intellect (buddhi)
reins [connection between soul and abilities] mind (manas) 
horses (steeds) 1. desire (to epithymetikón)
2. striving (to thymoeidés)
sense organs (indriyāṇi),
i.e. touch, taste, smell, etc.
chariot (body) [not metaphorically relevant] body (śarīra)
path / road [air-lane as road] sense objects (viṣaya); i.e. perceptible world
end of road / end of travel
gods: back of heaven (intermediate station)
humans: (epiphanic) vision of eternity [at 
death?]
the unborn; highest realm
39 KaU 3.3–9; Olivelle 1998: 238–40 (Sanskrit text and translation).
40 Cf. MaiU 3.2.6 (trans. e.g. Buitenen 1962).
41 Cf. Olivelle 1998; Lupaşcu 2008: 347.
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While the highest command of the chariot is, in both similes, in the hand 
of the ‘self’, these ‘selves’ take on different roles. The Platonic ‘soul’, a skilled 
charioteer by himself, may only enjoy the travel’s envisaged finish, the view of 
‘being’. The Upaniṣadic ‘self’ is purely a passenger (in that respect comparable 
to the Parmenidean simile), not involved in the steering, that is conducted by a 
second ‘person’, the charioteer.42 The passenger is a detached observer, already 
enjoying the journey while still travelling to the place without return. In the 
Upaniṣadic simile, the ‘self’ is depicted as fully liberated at the arrival – if so 
achieved – or it has to return in the samsaric world. The latter, the Greek ‘metem-
psychosis’, seems to be an even more inescapable fate of the Platonic ‘self’. 
However, the Indian ‘self’ is only loosely dependent on the chariot, and may 
leave the chariot in the final destination – just as the Olympian gods may do. In 
the Greek simile, the charioteer (the rational part of the soul) has to govern espe-
cially one side of his two-fold nature, namely, ruthless ‘desire’, the black steed. 
In the Upaniṣadic simile, the case is different, as it depicts the central task as 
‘controlling’ the mind (i.e. the ‘well-tensed [reins]’, yuktena), whereas the horses 
– as the senses – are not in themselves ‘bad’, simply because their behaviour 
can be either ‘good’ (controlled) or ‘bad’ (uncontrolled). The worldly side of the 
charioteer, his body, senses, etc., is not in itself of an inferior, or ‘evil’, nature.43
Obviously, we may see at play here the yogic idea that the senses should be 
retrieved from their sense objects, and this is exactly the point where meditation 
techniques assume their indispensable function. The Upaniṣadic simile builds 
on continuous self-cultivation and self-transformation. It depicts the empirical 
mind, if not properly reined, as ‘loose’, which will result in unrestrained horses. 
By this, the ‘senses’ are handed over to their manifold sense objects, so that the 
chariot will not stay on track (gocara), and will therefore remain in Saṃsāra. In 
this respect, the Platonic simile offers a lower complexity: the horses are simply 
antagonistic forces; the reins, or the proper connection of the charioteer and the 
horses, do not come into the picture. The track, explicitly mentioned in the Indian 
case,44 ensures that there is a road to be followed; the end of the road – as in 
Parmenides, an elevated place beyond the world of becoming – will be reached by 
the chariot on a track prolonged into heaven (leading to final liberation, mokṣa),45 
42 This important difference, which is discussed by Magnone in this volume, is not mentioned 
in Schiltz 2006, and only noticed in passing in Lupaşcu 2008: 343, 349.
43 ‘It is like this – as a man driving a chariot would look down and observe the two wheels 
of his chariot, so he looks down and observes the days and nights, the good and bad deeds, 
and all the pairs of opposites. Freed from his good and bad deeds, this man, who has the 
knowledge of brahman, goes on to brahman’ (KauU 1.5; Olivelle 1998: 329). 
44 A more thorough interpretation of the philosophic background of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad can 
be found in Lupaşcu 2008.
45 Cf. Lupaşcu 2008: 341.
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whereas the Platonic chariot seems to fly as a winged chariot right through the air. 
The Greek ‘soul’ profits as being a ‘pilot’, and his task is to overcome worldly 
desire;46 his Indian counterpart, the ‘self’, profits from his chauffeur, a charioteer 
who is able to train ‘his’ mind and to cognise himself, so that he manages to steer 
the horses on their track into heaven. Andrew Domanski points out that the ‘Self 
(ātman), as the lord of, and passenger in the chariot, is the animating presence, the 
formless essence, the source which remains perfectly still, does nothing at all, and 
yet enables all the activity of the chariot and horses’.47 Yet, the organic interplay 
of senses, mind and intellect in the Upaniṣadic simile should not obscure the fact 
that in yogic discourse it is repeatedly emphasised that the ‘intellect’ is unable 
to cognise itself. It cannot cognise that there is an inner ‘self’ that is sometimes, 
although not in the Upaniṣadic simile, called an ‘inner driver’.48
Chariot metaphors in India and Greece: historical dependency or 
coevolution?
In the form of a logical cascade, we may summarise the discussion above as 
follows:
The imagery (metaphorical systems) of chariots could unfold in India and Greece 
in parallel ways:
a. as myth of the travel of the chariot of the sun (and moon);
b. as chariot race in cult and sports;
c. as aristocratic symbol of power.
These three metaphorical systems enabled the use of:
d.  The chariot imagery of the anthropologically and soteriologically mean-
ingful simile of the chariot of the soul.
The latter (d.) developed largely autonomously in both traditions and had 
explanatory power as long as
e.  the metaphorical systems of chariot imagery (input-domains a., b., c.)
could convince.
Indeed, Parmenides, Plato and the author(s) of the Upaniṣad could build on 
the mythical metaphorisation of the sun-chariot and the lifeworld presence of 
real chariots. Obviously, the similes present ‘metaphorical blends’ of these 
46 Cf., in contrast, the interpretation in Griswold 1986.
47 Domanski 2006: 50.
48 On the ātman as hidden inner driver cf. BU 3.7.
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 heterogeneous input-domains – to which in the case of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad 
one should add, as Alexander Forte and Caley Smith aptly demonstrate (in this 
volume), the intertextual dimension of chariot imagery in the Vedic sacrifice. By 
interpreting human psychology and soteriological philosophy with the chariot 
imagery, it becomes clear that they established an ‘anthropo-therio- technological’ 
idea of the human body-and-soul: it is the ‘steerable soul’ (Aristotle preferred the 
metaphor of the ship’s pilot)49 – a new, technologically mediated model of a 
‘kybernetic’ soul (ψυχῆς κυβερνήτης), which, at least in Greece, made a career 
as a metaphorical model for steering any kind of complexity, e.g. the ‘state’ (cf. 
Plato’s imagery of ‘steering the ship of the state’, e.g. Republic IV 488–9). But 
why apply technological metaphors in the first place? The ‘manoeuvrability’, 
such as it is, seems to reduce contingency. Applying the (in part) character of an 
artefact to the ‘soul’ and the ‘self’ makes it possible to discuss an objectifiable 
‘self’ – a great cultural innovation (or, in more romantic terms, the beginning of 
the ‘soul’s’ decline into the ‘mechanics’ of the ‘psyche’).
Surely, it seems tempting to think that Plato might have borrowed the chariot 
imagery from the East, given the ‘identity of the religious logic which subtends 
Phaidros . . . and the Kaṭha Upaniṣad’.50 However, by paying close attention to 
the metaphors used, we can also find remarkable differences. The most important 
aspect pertains to the agency handed over to the chariot driver, the ‘intellect’ 
(buddhi), in the yogic system of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad. The charioteer may, by 
concentration of the mind, rein the horses for reaching final emancipation, i.e. 
the accomplished goal. There, the passenger and chariot owner, the ātman, may 
descend. Arrived at his destination, he is no longer interested in any view of the 
world, even if very elevated. In comparison, Plato’s simile offers full agency 
only for the gods. The human soul-chariot may only very rarely, if at all, catch a 
glimpse of the place where ‘being’ resides. While alive, the human ‘soul’ is ever 
absorbed with steering the bad-natured horse.
Although it is still tempting to construe an Eastern, Upaniṣadic influence on 
Plato, as Paolo Magnone does (in this volume), it is much more likely that the 
metaphorical use of chariots developed without direct historical dependency. 
Already scholars in the nineteenth century voiced the opinion that the chariot 
simile in Plato and the Kaṭha Upaniṣad may count as ‘one of the most interest-
ing examples of accidental correspondence’.51 Yet, as argued above, I would not 
describe the correspondence as purely accidental. Seen from a greater distance, 
the two instances – and, we should add, the Parmenidean chariot ride – within the 
early Indian and Greek traditions should be construed, as Lupaşcu argues, as a 
49 Cf. Aristotle de anima (On the Soul) 406a.
50 Lupaşcu 2008: 349.
51 Muir 1879: xxxviii.
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result of open spaces of ‘plurivalent, reciprocal communication, of the exchange 
of philosophical, moral, and religious values . . . between the Athenian intellec-
tual milieu of the Vth–IVth centuries bce and the milieu of ancient Hinduism’.52 
Both traditions share a mythical conceptualisation of the chariots of the sun, an 
aristocratic experience of chariot riding, and the pleasure of chariot technology. 
Therefore, each tradition could establish the ‘chariot soul’ for their specific 
psychological and soteriological purposes, which are parallel, though not, as 
Lupaşcu or Schiltz argued, nearly identical.
A final strikingly parallel development (to be discussed elsewhere) may 
be envisaged with the ‘end’ of the ‘heroic’ chariot imagery in both traditions 
(above: d.). Our assertion is that in late antiquity, which saw the end not only 
of the light and fast chariot but also of a certain ideal of embodied self-mastery, 
chariot imagery was no longer fully ‘functional’ (an early example of this can be 
seen in Sextus Empiricus’ allegorical reading of the proem).53 The Buddhist use 
of chariot imagery in India, and the Christian use in late antiquity, may, there-
fore, both best be described as a final allegorical phase, resulting in a rigorous 
deconstruction of the ‘chariot (ride)’ and of its metaphoric force for visualising 
the movement of the sun, human self-mastery, the soul, and the path to liberation.
52 Lupaşcu 2008: 348.
53 Cf. Latona 2008: 202–4.
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New riders, old chariots: poetics and 
comparative philosophy
Alexander S. W. Forte and Caley C. Smith
Scholars have claimed that similarities between the Greek poem of Parmenides 
and the Indic Upaniṣads demand an explanation from either historical contact 
between Greece and other cultures, or a commonly inherited Indo-European phi-
losophy.1 Several striking similarities between Parmenides and the Upaniṣads 
supposedly reveal borrowing or a genetic relationship: first, monism, the idea 
of metaphysical unity;2 second, the rejection of empirical knowledge;3 third, the 
 1 Editions are van Nooten and Holland 1994 (Ṛgveda), van Thiel 1996 (Iliad), Olivelle 1998 
(Upaniṣads), Weber 1964 (Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa), Dumont 1951 (Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa), 
Palmer 2009 (Parmenides), and Inwood 2001 (Empedocles). Translations are our own 
unless noted. The editorial principles of the Diels-Kranz edition of Parmenides require 
re-examination; see Kurfess 2013, 2014.
 2 From a Greek perspective, the nature of Parmenides’ monism is a source of schol-
arly debate, due to both the conceptual difficulties and fragmentary nature of the text. 
Parmenides is variously termed a strict monist (Guthrie 1965), a logical monist (Owen 
1960), a speculative monist (Mourelatos 2008), a predicational monist (Curd 2004), a 
modal monist (Palmer 2009), or a mystic (Kingsley 1999). For an argument emphasising 
Parmenides’ mystical affiliations and arguing against the analytic approach, see Gemelli 
2008. For a useful treatment of the status quaestionis as regards Parmenides’ affiliations, 
see Granger 2008 (thanks to John Bussanich for these two references). Therefore, making 
an a priori equation between the fragmentary representation of Parmenides’ monism and a 
fully preserved external tradition is circular logic; even worse, the Kaṭha Upaniṣad is not 
monist. This is not an argument from diaphonia; it suggests that one needs to understand 
the intellectual culture of Parmenides before external comparison. Monism is a response to 
the ambiguity of ‘the beginning’ (e.g. Aristotle Physics 1.2.184b15–25). This is a contro-
versial metaphysical question, but external explanation is unnecessary.
 3 Doubt relating to the reliability of empirical knowledge is present in Homer’s Iliad, with 
which Parmenides clearly engaged, cf. Il. 2.484–93. One difference is that Parmenides 
provides an account of reliable knowledge, see Lesher 2008: esp. 472–6 contra Most 
1999: 353. Cf. also Il. 23.450–98, where Idomeneus and Oelian Ajax break into a verbal 
quarrel in the stands based on their differing visual and intellectual judgements. Although 
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potential for allegory;4 and fourth, the chariot imagery. This last similarity will 
be the focus of this chapter, which will argue that Parmenides’ poem engages 
with the chariot race during Patroclus’ funeral games in book 23 of the Iliad. 
Then, it will argue that the Kaṭha Upaniṣad’s chariot imagery draws on the use 
of chariots in the Ṛgveda.5 Therefore, these supposedly anomalous chariots func-
tion perfectly well within their respective Greek and Indic intellectual traditions.6
We contend that there is no need to posit Indo-European philosophy to 
explain the striking, but ultimately incidental parallels between these two texts.7 
In short, an Indo-European explanation of the chariot in this case would only be 
applicable to Homeric poetry and the Ṛgveda. This itself is unlikely, because the 
Parmenides’ discussion of the senses is metaphysically sophisticated, this very sophisti-
cation is a development of pre-existing Greek thought. For a general account of Homeric 
phraseology in Parmenides, see Mourelatos 2008: 1–17. On the journeys of the Odyssey 
compared to the journey of the kouros in Parmenides, see Mourelatos 2008: 17–25, build-
ing on Havelock 1958. An account of Parmenides’ thought as a development from his 
predecessors tempers some of the more extreme claims of Parmenides’ ‘big bang’ of 
rationalism, e.g. Popper 1998: 71, 102. See B1.28–32, . . . χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι / 
ἠμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ / ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, τῇς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής. 
/ ἀλλ’ ἔμπης καὶ ταῦτα μαθήσεαι, ὡς τὰ δοκοῦντα / χρῆν δοκίμως εἶναι διὰ παντὸς πάντα 
περῶντα. ‘It is right for you to learn all things, both the unshaken heart of well-circled 
reality and of the opinions of mortals, in which there is no true trust; nevertheless you 
shall learn these as well, how it was right that the things that seem do seem, permeating all 
things from end to end.’ It also must be recognised that λόγος in Greek philosophy is often 
assumed to be equivalent to ‘logic’, and its presence in Parmenides B7 is taken by some to 
indicate that he is an orthodox rationalist. This is problematic because λόγος in Plato and 
Aristotle frequently means ‘explanatory account’, see Moss 2014.
 4 There is a tradition of allegory that precedes Parmenides in the Greek intellectual tradition, 
in the works of Pherecydes of Syros and Theagenes of Rhegium, both of whom were oper-
ative in the sixth century bce. Parmenidean ‘allegory’ has clear antecedents in the Greek 
tradition, so explaining this as somehow being due to contact or Indo-European philosophy 
begs the question. On early allegorists and ‘riddles’, see Ford 2002: 67–89, Struck 2004: 
21–9, Gemelli Marciano 2008: 22, Bierl 2014.
 5 For students of philosophy, any intertextual relationship between a philosophical text and 
an antecedent or contemporary source provides additional empirical data that can help one 
to characterise how a given thinker ‘does philosophy’, or at the least, what sources he or 
she chooses to draw upon. On the importance of an understanding of intellectual history 
and culture as a precondition for philosophical analysis, see Mourelatos 2008: 350–63.
 6 This chapter agrees with the conclusions in Staal 1955 and Bucca 1964, both of whom treat 
Greek and Indic philosophy as independent, with the latter focusing on the chariot imagery. 
For a cognitive approach to chariot metaphors, see Schlieter, in this volume.
 7 This is contra Latona (2008: 208) and Ježić (1992), whose lexical evidence for inherited 
philosophy is overly general and unconvincing on linguistic grounds. For a helpful discus-
sion on comparative methodology, see Barr 1995.
188 Alexander S. W. Forte and Caley C. Smith
earliest evidence of the chariot in Greece (sixteenth century bce) long post-dates 
any speaker of late Indo-European.8
There is perhaps even less of a reason to posit historical borrowing or 
‘diffusion’ to account for the similarities in the chariot imagery.9 There is no 
historically reliable evidence for an extended conversation between a Greek 
speaker and Indic speaker before the time of Alexander. Nor is there any his-
torically reliable evidence that any Pre-Socratic philosopher had any contact 
with Iranian, let alone Indic priests.10 Unless new primary source evidence from 
antiquity is discovered, there is no way to argue either point with probability.11 
Contextualisation is source criticism: one must examine what a document is, 
how it relates to other evidence, and how it has come to us.12
In the case of Parmenides, this chariot imagery, and indeed most of 
Parmenides’ language, has been analysed in terms of earlier hexameter poetry.13 
However, there is an unrecognised density of intertexts between Parmenides’ 
poem and a limited episode in the Iliad, the chariot race in Patroclus’ funeral 
games.14 The structure of the narrative is as follows: the organisation of the 
race (23.262–361), the race itself (23.362–447), a conflict between Idomeneus 
and Oelian Ajax in the stands (23.450–98), and the end of the race and the 
ensuing prize-ceremony (23.499–652). The didactic speech of Nestor to his 
son Antilochus before the race (23.301–50) shares several intertexts with 
Parmenides’ poem:
τῶν δ’ ἵπποι μὲν ἔασιν ἀφάρτεροι, οὐδὲ μὲν αὐτοὶ
πλείονα ἴσασιν σέθεν αὐτοῦ μητίσασθαι.
 8 We, following Hooker (1999: 65–86), cannot agree with Drews 1988, which posits that 
Greeks ‘arrived’ on chariots based on linguistic evidence.
 9 Contra, recently, Magnone 2012: 122–3 (and this volume); Kahn 2001: 19. McEvilley 
(2002) argues that monism and reincarnation diffused from India to Greece (122), but that 
the chariot allegory is an independent innovation owing to common heritage (185). For 
a review of McEvilley 2002, see Bussanich 2005. For a culturally situated treatment of 
Parmenides’ ideas as related to monetary systems, see Seaford 2004: 185–9, 244–65. The 
concept of ‘borrowing’ itself is simplistic. Even if one is prepared to (re-)construct an unat-
tested historical moment of contact, what would the cultural and personal preconditions of 
such a dialogue be? 
10 See Seaford, this volume.
11 See Kahn 1979: 297–302, who says of the need to posit a ‘historical’ explanation for com-
monalities between Greek and Indo-Iranian thought: ‘It also tends to produce historical 
fiction, as in West’s (1971) concluding hypothesis . . . (299).’
12 As a young Frits Staal (1955: 82) pointed out, we must also consider ourselves. See Lincoln 
1999: 209, ‘If myth is ideology in narrative form, then scholarship is myth with footnotes.’
13 For Homeric poetry, see Coxon 2009: 9–12, Havelock 1958, Lesher 1984, Mourelatos 
2008: 1–25; for Hesiodic poetry see, most recently, Pellikaan-Engel 1974.
14 Fränkel (1960a) omits the chariot race.
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ἀλλ’ ἄγε δὴ σὺ φίλος μῆτιν ἐμβάλλεο θυμῷ
παντοίην, ἵνα μή σε παρεκπροφύγῃσιν ἄεθλα.
μήτι τοι δρυτόμος μέγ’ ἀμείνων ἠὲ βίηφι·
μήτι δ’ αὖτε κυβερνήτης ἐνὶ οἴνοπι πόντῳ
νῆα θοὴν ἰθύνει ἐρεχθομένην ἀνέμοισι·
μήτι δ’ ἡνίοχος περιγίγνεται ἡνιόχοιο.
ἀλλ’ ὃς μέν θ’ ἵπποισι καὶ ἅρμασιν οἷσι πεποιθὼς
ἀφραδέως ἐπὶ πολλὸν ἑλίσσεται ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα,
ἵπποι δὲ πλανόωνται ἀνὰ δρόμον, οὐδὲ κατίσχει·
ὃς δέ κε κέρδεα εἰδῇ ἐλαύνων ἥσσονας ἵππους,
αἰεὶ τέρμ’ ὁρόων στρέφει ἐγγύθεν, οὐδέ ἑ λήθει
ὅππως τὸ πρῶτον τανύσῃ βοέοισιν ἱμᾶσιν,
ἀλλ’ ἔχει ἀσφαλέως καὶ τὸν προὔχοντα δοκεύει.
The horses of these men are faster, but they themselves do not
know how to be more crafty than you.
Remember then, dear one, to cast every kind of craft
into your mind, so that the prizes may not escape you.
The woodcutter is far better by craft than he is by force. It is by
craft that the pilot keeps true his swift ship,
though torn by winds, over the wine-faced sea. By craft
charioteer surpasses charioteer. He who is confident in his
horses and chariot and recklessly spins this way and that,
does not control them. But the man, although
driving the lesser horses, who knows his advantage, and constantly
watching the post turns closely, nor does it escape his notice,
how he first will pull with the ox-hide reins,
he holds steady, and watches the leader. (Il. 23.311–25)
In Parmenides’ poem the mortals who do not understand the reality of 
the world are described using phraseology that is either inverted from that of 
Nestor’s good charioteer (B1.39 ἐπιφραδέως ~ Il. 23.320 ἀφραδέως), or consist-
ent with that of the poor charioteer (B8.54 ἐν ὧι πεπλανημένοι εἰσίν ~ Il. 23.321 
πλανόωνται).15 Moreover, Parmenides’ use of σῆμα as an indicator of knowl-
edge, specifically referring to signs along the path of knowledge, recalls Nestor’s 
polysemous use of this word in the middle of his speech to Antilochus:16
15 See Mourelatos 2008: 30 on 23.316–19, 20–1 and their relationship to Parmenides. 
Menelaus calls Antilochus’ driving ἀφραδέως (23.426).
16 This is in agreement with the perceptive analysis of Latona 2008: 218–27, which sees 
Parmenides’ poem in terms of a chariot race. Where this chapter differs is the identification 
of this race especially (but not exclusively) with that of Iliad 23, and a disagreement about 
Latona’s definition of the term ‘allegory’ as an ‘extended metaphor’ (199), which does not 
reckon with the recent advances in the study of allegory, esp. Struck 2004: 1–20, see also 
note 4 above.
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μόνος δ᾿ ἔτι μῦθος ὁδοῖο
λείπεται, ὡς ἔστιν· ταύτῃ δ᾿ ἐπὶ σήματ᾿ ἔασι
πολλὰ μάλ᾿, ὡς ἀγένητον ἐὸν καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν,
οὖλον μουνογενές τε καὶ ἀτρεμὲς ἠδ᾿ † ἀτέλεστον,
Only one story of the way is still left: that (it) is. On this
way there are very many signs: that Being is ungenerated and
imperishable, entire, unique, unmoved and without end; (B8.1–4)
The ‘signs’ as the basis of understanding recall the centre of Nestor’s extensive, 
didactic speech to his son:
σῆμα δέ τοι ἐρέω μάλ’ ἀριφραδές, οὐδέ σε λήσει.
ἕστηκε ξύλον αὖον ὅσον τ’ ὄργυι’ ὑπὲρ αἴης
ἢ δρυὸς ἢ πεύκης· τὸ μὲν οὐ καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ,
λᾶε δὲ τοῦ ἑκάτερθεν ἐρηρέδαται δύο λευκὼ
ἐν ξυνοχῇσιν ὁδοῦ, λεῖος δ’ ἱππόδρομος ἀμφὶς
ἤ τευ σῆμα βροτοῖο πάλαι κατατεθνηῶτος,
ἢ τό γε νύσσα τέτυκτο ἐπὶ προτέρων ἀνθρώπων,
καὶ νῦν τέρματ’ ἔθηκε ποδάρκης δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς.
I will tell you a distinct sign, and it will not escape you.
There stands a dry stump a fathom above the ground,
either oak or pine, which is not rotted away by rain,
and two white stones lean against it on either side,
at the joining place of the road, and there is a smooth track for horses around it.
Either it is the grave-sign of some long-dead man,
or was established as a racing mark by earlier men.
And now swift-footed, shining Achilles made it the turning-post. (Il. 23.326–33)
The σῆμα in both cases is the basis of knowledge, but used as a term of ‘imag-
ination’ rather than vision. Nestor’s instructions depend on Antilochus’ ability 
to map the visual instructions onto a specific portion of the physical world, and 
the emphasis on the application of the ‘sign’ to Antilochus’ actual sense percep-
tion differentiates Nestor’s sign from Parmenides’ signs. Although Parmenides’ 
message is more abstract, the ‘sign’ in both poems is the instructional key, and 
located upon a path. Combined with other local lexical parallels, this suggests 
Parmenides’ close engagement with book 23.17 Both texts, moreover, share a 
similar internal audience: the addressee is a young man, in Parmenides’ poem the 
anonymous kouros and in the Iliad Nestor’s son Antilochus.
Parmenides’ physical description of reality is highly reminiscent of lan-
guage found elsewhere within the chariot race of book 23:
17 On B8 see McKirahan 2009.
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αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πεῖρας πύματον, τετελεσμένον ἐστί
πάντοθεν, εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ,
μεσσόθεν ἰσοπαλὲς πάντῃ· τὸ γὰρ οὔτε τι μεῖζον
οὔτε τι βαιότερον πελέναι χρεόν ἐστι τῇ ἢ τῇ.
But since its limit is final, it is completed from all sides,
like the weight of a spherical ball, and similarly balanced in all ways
from the centre: for it must not become at all greater or at
all smaller in one way than in another. (B8.42–5)
This comparison of being to a sphere shares phraseology with the chariot race, 
including exact lexical parallels:18
Ἀλλ’ ὅτε δὴ πύματον τέλεον δρόμον ὠκέες ἵπποι (≈ 23.768)
ἂψ ἐφ’ ἁλὸς πολιῆς, τότε δὴ ἀρετή γε ἑκάστου
φαίνετ’ . . .
But when the swift horses were finishing the final run
back towards the grey sea, then the virtue of each
was apparent . . . (Il. 23.373–5)
The three-dimensional circularity of the sphere can be in turn compared with the 
two dimensional circularity of the chariot race itself.19 Parmenides characterises 
his own path of inquiry as recursive:
ξυνὸν δὲ μοί ἐστιν,
ὁππόθεν ἄρξωμαι· τόθι γὰρ πάλιν ἵξομαι αὖθις.
It is the same to me whence I begin,
for to that place I shall come back again. (B5)20
Therefore, one can envision Parmenides’ ‘path of thought’ as being a diaulos, 
or a lap, just as a chariot race. In addition to the foregoing similarities, the case 
of Eumelus in the Iliad presents several points of comparison to Parmenides’ 
proem:
18 Cf. Il. 23.410: ὧδε γὰρ ἐξερέω, καὶ μὴν τετελεσμένον ἔσται·, Il. 23.672: ὧδε γὰρ ἐξερέω, 
τὸ δὲ καὶ τετελεσμένον ἔσται·. See Mourelatos 2008: 31 discussing Onian’s translation of 
τετελεσμένον ἔσται· ‘it will be bound (to happen)’.
19 See Jameson 1958. Tarán (1965: 159) argues that Parmenides’ being is not spherical, it is 
compared to that which is spherical.
20 The misguided inquiry of mortals employs similar language, B6.9: πάντων δὲ παλίντροπός 
ἐστι κέλευθος, ‘but the journey of all men turns back on itself’. B6.4–6: αὐτὰρ ἔπειτ’ ἀπὸ 
τῆς, ἣν δὴ βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδὲν / πλάζονται, δίκρανοι· ἀμηχανίη γὰρ ἐν αὐτῶν / στήθεσιν 
ἰθύνει πλακτὸν νόον . . . uses the same verb (ἰθύνει) as Nestor describing the captain who 
guides his ship (23.317). Likewise, as the bad charioteer’s horses wander (πλανόωνται, 
23.321), so do deceived mortals in Parmenides’ poem (πλάζονται . . . πλακτὸν νόον).
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οὐδ’ ἄρ’ Ἀθηναίην ἐλεφηράμενος λάθ’ Ἀπόλλων
Τυδεΐδην, μάλα δ’ ὦκα μετέσσυτο ποιμένα λαῶν,
δῶκε δέ οἱ μάστιγα, μένος δ’ ἵπποισιν ἐνῆκεν·
ἣ δὲ μετ’ Ἀδμήτου υἱὸν κοτέουσ’ ἐβεβήκει,
ἵππειον δέ οἱ ἦξε θεὰ ζυγόν· αἳ δέ οἱ ἵπποι
ἀμφὶς ὁδοῦ δραμέτην . . .
Nor did Apollo’s obstruction of Diomedes escape Athena’s
notice, and especially quickly she aided the shepherd of the
host, and gave his whip to him, and imbued his horses with
vigour. But she angrily approached the son of Admetus, and the
goddess broke the yoke of his horses: and his mares ran around
the path . . . (Il. 23.388–93)
Eumelus is exceptional in the Iliad for having two mares as his horses.21 So a 
young man driving a chariot pulled by two mares is sabotaged by a goddess. In 
Parmenides’ proem, a young man on a chariot pulled by two mares (B1.1) is 
guided by a goddess (B1.22). It may also be relevant here that in the proems both 
of the Iliad (1.1) and of Parmenides’ poem, the goddess (θεά) is anonymous.
Parmenides’ engagement with book 23 of the Iliad puts him in good com-
pany, since a fragment of Empedocles’ also engaged specifically with the chariot 
race:
στεινωποὶ μὲν γὰρ παλάμαι κατὰ γυῖα κέχυνται,
πολλὰ δὲ δείλ’ ἔμπαια, τά τ’ ἀμβλύνουσι μέριμνας.
παῦρον δ’ ἐν ζωῆισι βίου μέρος ἀθρήσαντες
ὠκύμοροι καπνοῖο δίκην ἀρθέντες ἀπέπταν,
αὐτὸ μόνον πεισθέντες ὅτωι προσέκυρσεν ἕκαστος,
πάντοσ’ ἐλαυνόμενοι, τὸ δ’ ὅλον <πᾶς> εὔχεται εὑρεῖν·
οὕτως οὔτ’ ἐπιδερκτὰ τάδ’ ἀνδράσιν οὔτ’ ἐπακουστά
οὔτε νόῳ περιληπτά . . .
    . . . σὺ <δ’> οὖν, ἐπεὶ ὧδ’ ἐλιάσθης,
πεύσεαι. οὐ πλεῖόν ἠὲ βροτείη μῆτις ὄρωρεν.
For narrow devices are poured throughout their limbs,
but many wretched things are embedded, and they blunt their meditations.
And having seen [only] a small living in their lives,
they swift-doomed soar and fly off like smoke,
persuaded of only that very thing which each crashes into,
being driven in all directions. But <each> boasts to have found the whole.
In this way these things are neither seen by men nor heard
Nor grasped with the understanding . . .
    . . . But you, then, since you have stepped aside here,
you will learn. Mortal craft has certainly risen no further. (31 DK B2)
21 The only other hero not to have a stallion is Iphinous, killed by Glaucus (Il. 7.13–16).
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We have already seen how Nestor’s advice regarding μῆτις (‘craft’) (Il. 
23.311–18) features prominently in the lead up to the race, and Empedocles’ 
mention of the limitations of craft here could be seen as an agonistic reference 
to Nestor’s discourse. In moving to specifics, during the race itself, Antilochus’ 
interpretation of his father’s advice involves a dangerous manoeuvre to overtake 
Menelaus, who yells a warning to Nestor’s son:
Ἀντίλοχ’ ἀφραδέως ἱππάζεαι, ἀλλ’ ἄνεχ’ ἵππους.
στεινωπὸς γὰρ ὁδός, τάχα δ’ εὐρυτέρῃ παρελάσσαι,22
μή πως ἀμφοτέρους δηλήσεαι ἅρματι κύρσας.
Antilochus, you are recklessly charioteering. Restrain your horses.
For the road is narrow, and it will soon be wider to pass,
lest you crash into my chariot and wreck both of us. (Il. 23.426–8)
We find here a significant overlap in lexicon with the Empedoclean passage: the 
adjective στεινωπός, ‘narrow’, and verb forms of ἐλαύνειν, ‘drive’, and κυρεῖν, 
‘strike’.23 Antilochus’ dangerous use of μῆτις, according to Menelaus, risks the 
disaster of mutual destruction, and it is in these terms that Empedocles discusses 
the limits of mortal craft (βροτείη μῆτις). By standing apart from the chaos, 
Pausanias, Empedocles’ addressee, will learn precisely how to transcend these 
limitations.
The Iliadic chariot race also introduced a topos to post-Parmenidean and 
Empedoclean philosophical texts. Specifically, Nestor’s speech to Antilochus is 
the locus classicus of Socratic ἐπαγωγή, usually termed ‘induction’, but perhaps 
more rightly, ‘analogy’.24 Later authors use the phraseology of Nestor’s advice 
as the material for analogical arguments about knowledge and technique.25 
Eustathius’ comments (on Nestor’s speech) are as follows:
Then, arguing inductively via a woodcutter (δρυτόμου) and a pilot (κυβερνήτου) and 
a charioteer (ἡνιόχου) that all things are achieved rightly by means of counsel and 
skill – for here first, they say, Homer uses induction like philosophers, namely, the 
argument establishing the general from specifics. (Eustathius Commentary on the 
Iliad 4:736.8–13)
22 We adopt West’s (2000) reading of the aorist infinitive active.
23 Cf. στεινωπῷ ἐν ὁδῷ (Il. 23.416). Kingsley 2002: 360–6 is a more exhaustive treatment 
of the intertexts between Empedocles B2 and the chariot race of Iliad 23, emphasising the 
associations of Pausanias with Achilles and Empedocles with Apollo. 
24 See Ausland 2002: 46–60, esp. 48 n28 for more on the relationship between the priamel, 
induction, and analogy; cf. Vlastos 1991: 267–9.
25 Ausland 2002: 49, n29, citing Eustathius Commentary on the Iliad 4:736.8–11, Aristotle 
Top. A.12, 105a13–16, Ovid Ars Amatoria, incip., referencing Plato Prot. 318b1–d4, Grg. 
448b4–c9.
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This statement is borne out by the evidence when one turns to Plato’s Ion, where 
Socrates’ ultimate point is that a rhapsode does not have skill, but rather is 
inspired. Plato is not here engaging in induction, but analogy, since the rhapsode 
is negatively compared to skilled/artistic professions:
Socrates: Why, does not Homer speak a good deal about arts, in a good many places? 
For instance, about chariot-driving (περὶ ἡνιοχείας): if I can recall the lines, I will 
quote them to you.
Ion: No, I will recite them, for I can remember.
Socrates: Tell me then what Nestor says to his son Antilochus, advising him to be 
careful about the turning-post in the horse-race in honour of Patroclus. (Plato Ion 
537a5–7, trans. Lamb)
Now the Ion is specifically about Homeric recitation, so the presence of this pas-
sage would not necessarily be evidence for book 23’s special place in Platonic 
thought were it the lone instance of charioteers and pilots appearing in Platonic 
arguments. However, Plato elsewhere uses the terms of book 23 to ask about the 
aptness of analogical comparisons between earthly rulers and the gods:26
Athenian: But to which kind of rulers are they like? Or which are like to them, of 
those rulers whom we can fairly compare with them, as small with great? Would 
drivers (ἡνίοχοί) of rival teams resemble them, or pilots (κυβερνῆται) of ships? 
(Plato Leges 905e5–8, trans. Bury)
It is not just that charioteers are mentioned here, but that these are also compared 
to pilots of ships using the exact terminology of Nestor’s speech. This does not 
necessarily imply a direct or intentional ‘intertext’ between Nestor’s speech and 
the use of charioteers and pilots in inductive or analogical arguments in Classical 
philosophy. It more likely indicates that the authority of the Iliad created a topos, 
wherein the charioteer (ἡνίοχος) and the pilot (κυβερνήτης) were the default 
terms in induction/analogy. It also seemingly demonstrates that Iliad 23 was not 
as neglected in antiquity as it has been in modern scholarship. Aristotle, using 
the examples of both the pilot and the charioteer, similarly refers to this process 
as ἐπαγωγή:
Induction (ἐπαγωγή) is the passage from specific things to the general; for exam-
ple, if the knowledgeable pilot (κυβερνήτης) is best and likewise the charioteer 
(ἡνίοχος), generally speaking even the knowledgeable person is best concerning 
each thing. (Aristotle Top. A.12, 105a13–16)27
26 Cf. Xenophon Memorabilia 1.1.9.7.
27 See Polybius Sardianus De Figuris 614.4–10 Walz cited by Ausland 2002: 50, n30: ‘It is 
induction (ἐπαγωγὴ δέ ἐστιν) when, having proposed something from similar things, we 
adduce the point for which we will persuade. For example . . . (citing Il. 23.315–18).’
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Therefore, book 23 of the Iliad is a source of ‘philosophical’ authority for 
Classical philosophy. Nestor’s examples of induction/analogy are precisely the 
same as Plato’s and Aristotle’s. Parmenides’ engagement with the chariot race, 
therefore, aligns him with Empedocles as well as the later philosophical tradition.
One might speculate on the nature of Parmenides’ conceptual relationship 
to the Iliad. Parmenides has used the metrical language of Homeric poetry, and 
specifically of the chariot race, in his metaphysical poem. Moreover, he specifi-
cally uses the competitive language of chariot racing:
τόν σοι ἐγὼ διάκοσμον ἐοικότα πάντα φατίζω,
ὡς οὐ μή ποτέ τίς σε βροτῶν γνώμη παρελάσσῃ.
So I will tell you each thing, seemingly well-ordered,
So that no judgement of mortals will ever surpass you. (B8.60–1)
In Homeric poetry, παρελαύνειν, ‘to pass in one’s chariot’, appears only in 
the chariot race (Il. 23.382, 427, 527).28 Based on Parmenides’ use of verbs of 
competitive chariot racing, it is conceivable that he is portraying not only the 
conceptual journey of his philosophy, but also his kouros as participating in a 
race of insight against his contemporaries, predecessors and successors.29 The 
conceptual metaphor of a chariot race, as a culturally prestigious and deeply 
embedded mental image of Parmenides’ audience, might have been the perfect, 
to use I. A. Richards’s term, ‘vehicle’ through which to impart knowledge.
To sum up, the precondition for assessing the degree of conceptual innova-
tion or conservatism within Parmenides’ poem is a nuanced understanding of the 
intellectual culture in which he lived. The contribution of this study is the idea 
that Parmenides’ text is among the oldest instances of the reception of the char-
iot race in book 23 of the Iliad, with which Empedocles also directly engaged. 
Moreover, Nestor’s advice to Antilochus in the lead up to the chariot race is the 
locus classicus for inductive reasoning and/or analogy in later philosophical 
writing. One cannot explain economically this chariot imagery via either a lost 
tradition of Indo-European philosophy or historical interaction with early Indic 
philosophy. Parmenides’ interaction with Homeric poetry renders Indo-European 
or contact-based explanation of the role of the chariot in Parmenides and the 
Upaniṣads unnecessary. Regarding the correspondences between the chariots of 
Plato’s Phaedrus and the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, we side with Jens Schlieter’s judge-
ment, in this volume, of ‘coevolution’ rather than any kind of diffusion. On the 
Greek side, it remains to be said that the representation of the soul as a chariot 
28 Noted by Lesher 1984: 23–8; Kingsley 2002: 364; Latona 2008: 219.
29 The chariot race, the most culturally prestigious act of physical agonism within fifth- 
century Greek society, potentially reflects a competitive relationship between Parmenides 
and his poetic predecessors.
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in Phaedrus potentially engages with the chariot in Parmenides’ poem. Svetla 
Slaveva-Griffin (2003) has argued for a precise intertextual relationship between 
Parmenides and the Phaedrus, specifically focusing on their common use of 
Zeus’ chariot ride in Iliad 8.41–52.30 Moreover, Plato’s wider attention to ear-
lier poetry in this dialogue is well documented. As Moore (2014) has treated in 
detail, Socrates’ quotation of Pindar at 227b6–10 reveals a more systematic rela-
tionship between the chariots of the Phaedrus and the chariot team of Isthmian 
2. Furthermore, Pender (2007) has independently argued that Plato’s Phaedrus 
engages intertextually with the poetry of Sappho and Anacreon.
The chariot also captured the imagination of the hieratic traditions of north-
ern India. The Vedic texts routinely deploy the chariot journey as a metaphor 
for the sacrifice. The germ of this idea, seen already in the Ṛgveda, has been 
re-shaped by generations of Vedic theologians. It will be claimed in this chapter 
that the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, when restored to its proper canonical context, also uses 
the chariot as a metaphor for the sacrifice.
The Upaniṣads are a discrete genre of texts from the perspective of Śaṅkara, 
the great Advaita Vedānta philosopher of the eighth century ce. The earliest 
Upaniṣads, however, were not distinguished from their respective Vedic canons. 
Typically considered the oldest Upaniṣad, the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad is 
in fact the terminus of the White Yajurvedic canon, which begins with the 
Vājasaneyi Saṁhitā, a text containing all the sacrificial mantras. It is followed by 
the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, a text replete with variations and exceptions to ritual 
praxis as well as exegetical commentary. Placed at the end of the Śatapatha 
Brāhmaṇa is the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.
The first chapters31 of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, a Black Yajurvedic text, would 
have been the capstone of Kaṭha education in its respective canon. Essentially, 
Parmenides, or his informants, would have had to be Vedic initiates and com-
mitted to memory the corpus of Kaṭha texts before instruction in an Upaniṣad 
would be permitted.32 Outsiders to Vedic practice do not appear in depictions of 
30 On the particular relationship between Parmenides and the Phaedrus, see Slaveva-Griffin 
2003: 244–9. She does not discuss the chariot race of Iliad 23 as a textual antecedent.
31 A few remarks on the document’s history will allow us to contextualise Kaṭha Upaniṣad 
within its own time, rather than through the lens of later Indian traditions. The consensus, 
based on thematic correspondences and manuscript divisions, is that the six chapters, or 
vallīs, consist of two halves. The latter three chapters are not reliably pre-Alexandrian. 
As the image of the chariot is located in the third vallī, it is the first half of the text which 
will receive attention. If indeed the first three chapters are pre-Alexandrian, then the text 
predates writing in India and must be an oral composition. Witzel (1977) suggests the first 
three vallīs originally belonged at the end of the lost Kaṭha-Śīkṣā-Upaniṣad. 
32 This is still true of Vedic transmission today. Knipe (2015: 32): ‘In any case, if successful 
at memorizing passages from either the third or fourth section of the Taittiriya Samhita 
the student will persevere until he has mastered all seven sections before going on to the 
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studentship in the earliest Upaniṣads; only a senior student who has mastered the 
visible mechanics of the sacrifice is permitted to learn its arcane metaphysics. 
After all, these Vedic texts are the intellectual property of priestly clans and are 
orally transmitted exclusively within the family.
While the Saṁhitās were performed in public,33 the Āraṇyakas and Upaniṣads 
were not. The Āraṇyakas, ‘wilderness books’, were studied privately away from 
settled populations.34 The word upaniṣad is often translated as ‘secret’,35 and 
indeed these texts were even less accessible. Their depiction of studentship is 
always master and pupil.36 In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, Yājñavalkya only 
tells Janaka his secret after they go ‘off-camera’ such that the transmission is 
hidden even from the text itself.37 As Parmenides would have encountered both 
linguistic and social barriers, a contact scenario is impractical. While this analy-
sis treats the chariot imagery employed by the Kaṭha Upaniṣad and Parmenides, 
once restored to their respective intertextual relationships, any philosophical 
similarities become much more uncertain as well.38
In turning now to the chariot imagery, it merits pointing out that just as the 
Upaniṣads are the inheritors of Vedic traditions of ritual exegesis, they are also 
the inheritors of poetic and rhetorical traditions going back to the Ṛgveda.
next three major texts in his tradition, the Taittiriya Brahmana, Taittiriya Āraṇyakas, and 
Taittiriya Upanisad.’
33 In fact, there is a tradition of recitational acrobatics, still popular today at temples, in which 
the Saṁhitā is recited with word order transformed by algorithm. The more complex the 
recitation the more impressive and respectable.
34 Staal (2008: 116) notes that some Sāmavedic chants are grāmageyagāna, ‘to be sung in 
the village’, but a category of complex and powerful melodies are araṇyageyagāna, ‘to be 
sung in the forest’. While the village was a public space, the forest was a remote, dangerous 
and private place. Concerning the Āraṇyakas, Staal (2008: 117) adds ‘Renou characterized 
all these “Forest Compositions” as “meta-ritual esotericism”, stressing their secretive char-
acter as well as the fact that they are still pervaded by ritual technicalities and often exhibit 
ritual structures.”
35 The oldest of this stratum of texts, the Jaiminīya Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa, clearly positioned 
itself in relation to the older Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa as the ‘secret Brāhmaṇa’ of the Jaiminīya 
Sāmavedins.
36 Indeed, Kaṭha Upaniṣad depicts studentship this way; only in private does Death teach 
Naciketas how to pile the fire altar who recites the instructions back to him. 
37 Staal (2008: 160) notes with irony: ‘Secrecy is the last remnant of the originally secret 
oral traditions of families and clans. There is one paradox: the Upaniṣads became the most 
famous part of the Vedas.’
38 The specifics of Parmenides’ monism are controversial, but the monism of Kaṭha Upaniṣad 
is no less problematic. The text claims a special relationship between the ātman, ‘the 
self’, and brahman, typically taken to be a panentheistic conception of the cosmos. These 
ideas are still developing, and to use these simple definitions bleaches the words of their 
ritual dimensions. If restored to their proper Vedic context, ātman and brahman are quite 
 different from anything in Eleatic thought.
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Already in the Ṛgveda, the chariot is a frequent locus of metaphor and simile 
for a number of reasons. We will enumerate a few here. Firstly, the root yuj, ‘to 
yoke’, is extended to new semantic domains much as the English verb ‘to har-
ness’ can be; thus the chariot is used in the context of technique, for example RV 
9.88.2a: á īṃ rátho ná bhuriṣā́ḷ ayoji, ‘(Soma) is yoked like a much- conquering 
chariot.’ Secondly, the chariot is symbolic of competitive sport, so it is iconic 
of any agonistic endeavor. Employing both a metaphor and a simile is RV 
9.94.3ab: pári yát kavíḥ kā́viyā bhárate / śū́ro ná rátho bhúvanāni víśvā, ‘When 
the poet encompasses all poetics, like the champion chariot, [he encompasses] 
all worlds.’ In this diptych, the winning poet is compared to a winning chariot, 
and not just any chariot, but the champion chariot who races in the largest track: 
the Sun. Thirdly, the chariot, being a constructed item, features in similes and 
metaphors of creation, sometimes called ‘craft metaphors’. Consider examples 
such as RV 1.130.06ab: imā ́ṃ te vā́caṃ vasūyánta āyávo / ráthaṃ ná dhī́raḥ 
suápā atakṣiṣuḥ, ‘Seeking wealth, the Āyus fashioned this poetic speech for you, 
like an insightful artisan does a chariot.’ The most famous iteration of chariot 
metaphor in the Ṛgveda may be that of 10.135.3, in which a boy mourning his 
deceased father hears a voice that tells him yáṃ kumāra návaṃ rátham / acakrám 
mánasā ́kṛṇoḥ / ékeṣaṃ viśvátaḥ prā́ñcam / ápaśyann ádhi tiṣṭhasi // ‘Boy, you 
have made a new chariot with your mind, wheel-less, single-axled yet facing all 
directions, without seeing you stand atop it.’ This chariot may well be a meta-
phor for the sacrifice that has the power to reunite father and son, but because the 
son lacks vision, he cannot see the chariot and does not understand the sacrifice.
What follows is an attempt to demonstrate that the chariot in the Kaṭha 
Upaniṣad still refers to the sacrifice and constitutes a metaphysical theorisation 
of the operations of the fire altar. The Kaṭha Upaniṣad, like the Maitrāyaṇīya 
Upaniṣad and the Taittirīya Upaniṣad, belongs to a priestly śākhā, or school, 
of the Black Yajurveda. The chief representative of the Black Yajurveda on the 
ritual ground is the adhvaryu who is responsible for, among other things, piling 
the fire altar. A close examination of all three of these Upaniṣads reveals a focus 
on fire and the fire altar.39 The first vallī of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad reimagines a dia-
logue in verse originally present in the lost Kaṭha Brāhmaṇa.40 In the Brāhmaṇa 
account, a boy, Naciketas, goes to Death’s house to discover the secrets of undi-
minishing merits and ritual. Death reveals that the secret is the proper piling of 
the nāciketa fire altar. Many altars take the sacrificer to heaven, but this fire altar 
allows one to avoid punarmṛtyu, ‘re-death’, and remain in heaven indefinitely.
The text then describes how the altar is constructed. It utilises twenty-one 
39 Readings of KaU that ignore Bodewitz 1985 are intellectually moribund.
40 Selections of the Kaṭha Brāhmaṇa survive as quotations in the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, see 
Witzel 1977: 140. Plato quotes neither text.
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golden bricks in a ring as the base of the altar, called the ātman, upon which one 
piles a layer of clay bricks. The golden base establishes a golden, heavenly abode 
for the patron of the sacrifice, and this is explained through an aetiology of gold. 
The primordial sacrificer, Prajāpati, created tapas, ‘heat’, from which sprang 
gold. After tossing it into the fire, he is unsatisfied and casts it into two other 
fires. These three fires of the Vedic sacrifice still do not please him. He is only 
satisfied after placing the gold into the fire of his own heart, Agni Vaiśvānara.
The Kaṭha Upaniṣad repeats the same opening prose sentence as its source 
text before going into its poetic recreation. In oral texts in the Vedic tradition, the 
repetition of the incipit, or pratīka, immediately recalls the quoted text. This first 
vallī tells much the same story, focusing on Naciketas and Death. Naciketas visits 
Death who teaches him how to pile the nāciketa altar. Naciketas demonstrates 
his ability to memorise and repeat what Death instructs, and Death rewards him 
with a golden circle. Death repeatedly explains that the fire altar connects the 
ātman, hidden in the cave of the heart, to the brahman which is beyond. From the 
perspective of its source narrative, the ātman is Agni Vaiśvānara, the fire hidden 
in heart of Prajāpati. Rau argues that brahman’s ‘birth’ in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad 
refers to the Sun rising in the east:41
triṇāciketas tribhir etya sandhiṃ / trikarmakṛt tarati janmamṛtyū / brahma jajñaṃ 
devam īḍyaṃ viditvā / nicāyyemāṃ śāntim atyantam eti //
Uniting the three, he is the three nāciketa man. Doing the ritual threefold, he crosses 
birth and death, perceiving brahman as the one being born, as the god to be wor-
shipped. Recognising this (golden disc), he goes to endless peace. (KaU 1.17)
Rau compares this passage with one found in an Atharvavedic hymn to 
the Sun, the incipit of which is brahma jajñānáṃ prathamáṃ purástād, ‘the 
brahman first born in the East’.42 Although Rau does not mention it, this verse 
also occurs in the piling of the fire altar.43 The thesis of this vallī, read from the 
perspective of the Kaṭha canon, is that there is a latent connection between the 
internal fire, the fire altar and the Sun. That is why sacrifices work, and that is 
why they achieve the heavenly world. The reductive label ‘monism’ can hardly 
capture this ritual metaphysics, which joins microcosmic, mesocosmic and mac-
rocosmic theatres. If anything, the text emphasises a threefold model of reality. 
We have already established the Ṛgvedic antiquity of the chariot as a metaphor 
for the sacrifice, but in the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, a Black Yajurvedic school 
closely related to the Kaṭhas, the nāciketa fire altar is directly likened to a chariot:
41 Rau 1971: 162.
42 Śaunaka Saṃhitā 4.1.1.
43 Taittirīya Saṃhitā 4.2.8.2; Kaṭha Saṃhitā 16.15.
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anantám̐ ha vā́ apārám akṣayyáṃ lokáṃ jayati
yò ‘gníṃ nāciketáṃ cinuté
yá u ca enam eváṃ véda //
átʰo yáthā ráthe tíṣṭhan pákṣasī páryāvártamāne pratyápekṣate
evám ahorātré pratyápekṣate
nā́syāhorātré lokám āpnutaḥ
yò ‘gníṃ nāciketáṃ cinuté
yá u ca enam eváṃ véda //
He who knows this and piles the nāciketa fire (altar) wins a world beyond, one end-
less and undecaying. Just like one standing on a turning chariot looks down upon 
either side, he looks down upon Night and Day. He who knows this and piles the 
nāciketa fire (altar), Day and Night do not obtain his world. (TB 3.11.7.5)
The Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa informs us that the world beyond is one without spatial 
(anantá) or temporal (akṣayyá) boundaries. It lacks divisions of day and night. 
These qualities, however, apply excusively to the heavenly world gained through 
proper sacrifice using a nāciketa altar. It is not a theory of monism or masked by 
the illusion of plurality; these are separate worlds.
The following section of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad is particularly relevant since it 
opens the chapter featuring the chariot metaphor:
ṛtaṃ pibantau sukṛtasya loke / guhāṃ praviṣṭau parame parārdhe
chāyātapau brahmavido vadanti pañcāgnayo ye ca triṇāciketāḥ
The brahman-knowers, who maintain the five fires and the triple nāciketa altar, say 
that shadow and light entered: (one) a cave (the other) yonder beyond. Both drinking 
in the world of proper ritual actions. (KaU 3.1)
Knowers of brahman assert there are two entities: one inside the heart and 
one in heaven. This could hardly be characterised as monism. While the two have 
a relationship, they are not identical, just as light and shadow have a relationship 
but are not identical. Further, this world is one of proper ritual; knowledge is use-
less without praxis.44 The knowers of brahman are also maintainers of the five 
fires, which are the three used in sacrifice (gārhapatya, āhavanīya, dakṣināgni), 
as well as the domestic fire (āvasthya) and that of the king’s court (sabhya).45 
Bodewitz (1973) argues that a doctrine of five fires is mapped to the five breaths 
as a way of internalising the sacrifice. Bodewitz (1985) argues that the triple 
nāciketa altar is not synonymous with the three fires of Vedic sacrifice, but rather 
44 Other readings of the text give svakṛtasya, ‘one’s own (ritual) actions’; both possibilities 
are captured by the translation ‘proper’, see Olivelle 1998: 606.
45 This means they have done the ādhana ritual and become āhitāgni, ‘one whose fires are 
set’, a prerequisite to performing more advanced śrauta rituals like an agniṣṭoma or agnic-
ayana. See Knipe 2015: 190–4.
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three altars in three theatres.46 Hardly rejecting Vedic orthopraxis, the Kaṭha 
Upaniṣad is theorising it. The text continues:
yaḥ setur ījānānām akṣaraṃ brahma yat param
abhayaṃ titīrṣatāṃ pāraṃ nāciketaṃ śakemahi
May we master the nāciketa (fire altar), which is the bridge of those who have sacri-
ficed, beyond which is unwithering brahman, for those who desire to cross to the far 
shore without fear. (KaU 3.2)
The speakers (‘we’) must be Kaṭha priests, those who can master the nāciketa 
to secure the heavenly shore for their financiers. No self-realisation or arcane 
knowledge about brahman is necessary for the patron of the sacrifice, only for 
the priests who must construct the altar correctly.
pra te bravīmi tad u me nibodha svargyam agniṃ naciketaḥ prajānan anantalokāp-
tim atho pratiṣṭhāṃ u viddhi tvam etaṃ nihitaṃ guhāyām
I proclaim this to you, so pay attention Naciketas! Recognising the heavenly fire 
(altar) is one which attains an endless world – but know this: its foundation is hidden 
in the cave (of the heart). (KaU 1.14)
Here there is an explicit identification of brahman with the heavenly fire (altar), 
svargya agni, and the foundation, pratiṣṭhā, of that altar is in the cave (of the 
heart).47 These are the two which the chapter opened with: Light and Shadow, 
brahman and ātman, the visible Sun and invisible altar in the heart; the nāciketa 
fire altar connects them.
Finally, in Kaṭha Upaniṣad 3.3, the players appear: the ātman is a rathin, 
‘chariot passenger’, and the śarīra, ‘body’, is ratham eva, ‘merely the chariot’. 
The buddhi, ‘awareness’, is sārathi, ‘chariot driver’. The manas, ‘thought’, is 
pragraham eva, ‘merely the bridle’. Finally, the indriya, ‘senses’, are the haya, 
‘horses’.48 The Indian chariot is almost always depicted with a driver conveying 
a warrior or king, and so already different from its single-occupant Parmenidean 
46 Typically termed microcosmic, mesocosmic and macrocosmic, but perhaps better con-
ceived of as internal, performative and universal. This emphasis on all three theatres, not 
simply microcosmic and macrocosmic, suggests that the internalisation of the ritual is a 
component of the ritual performance and not its replacement.
47 KaU 2.20 tells us ātmāsya jantor nihito guhāyām, ‘the ātman is hidden in the cave of this 
person’. A full treatment of the second Vallī is currently in preparation.
48 Even this compositional metaphor, in which two wholes are homologised by the equation 
of their parts, has a precedent in the Ṛgveda, in which the sacrifice is equated to the year 
by equating its components to the seasons: yát púruṣeṇa havíṣā / devā́ yajñám átanvata / 
vasantó asyāsīd ā́jyaṃ / grīṣmá idhmáḥ śarád dhavíḥ // ‘When the gods extended the sac-
rifice with the Puruṣa as the oblation, Spring was its butter, the kindling was its Summer, 
and Autumn was its oblation’ (RV 10.90.6).
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counterpart.49 The chariot, as the method of conveyance of kings, suggests the 
rathin is of higher social station than the sārathi.50 None of these nuances is pres-
ent in the Greek metaphor. The sārathi has one task, then, to deliver the rathin 
safely to the destination:
vijñānasārathir yas tu manaḥ pragrahavān naraḥ /
so ‘dhvanaḥ pāram āpnoti / tad viṣṇoḥ paramaṃ padam //
A man who possesses the bridle of the mind, whose chariot-driver is discerning,
he reaches the end of the road: Viṣṇu’s ultimate step. (KaU 3.9)
What follows are three verses that describe a taxonomy of the consistent com-
ponents of an individual. The lowest elements are the sense faculties, then the 
mental faculties, then the great ātman, then unmanifest, and then the cosmic man 
(puruṣa) which occupies the supreme position.
Definitions of ātman and puruṣa contoured by Vedic ritual reveal that the text 
describes the transmission of the terrestrial self to the heavenly self.51 Passages 
of the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa that describe the nāciketa fire altar portray the ātman 
of Prajāpati, synonymous with the cosmic man (puruṣa), as the fire inside his 
heart. Elsewhere the piling of the fire altar is depicted as the reassembling of 
Prajāpati, who sacrificed himself at the beginning of time to create the universe. 
Piling the altar reassembles his body and restores the universe to its proper state. 
The Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa claims that the altar will transport the patron of the 
sacrifice together with a body (saśarīra) to a world beyond.52
The chariot is indeed a metaphor, but one that is geared towards a theori-
sation of ritual success in the late Vedic period. For the sacrifice to work the 
yajamāna, the patron of the sacrifice, must become Prajāpati, the first sacrificer 
and cosmic man.53 While the yajamāna has an invisible fire within his body, his 
ātman, the cosmic man has a great ātman within his body: the Sun. The bricks of 
the nāciketa fire altar are also a body for its ātman, which is the ring of gold at its 
49 ŚB (Mādhyandina) 5.3.1.8: sáyonī vā́ aśvínau sáyonī savyaṣṭhṛsārathī́ samānaṃ hi rátham-
adhitíṣṭhatastás, ‘Same-wombed are the Aśvins, and same-wombed both fighter and driver 
for they stand upon the same chariot.’ Here the connection between chariot fighter and 
driver is given a charter in the Aśvins.
50 Clear from later texts like the Māhabhārata where Karṇa is disrespected at the assembly 
as merely the son of a chariot driver. The Bhagavad Gītā inverts this paradigm by having 
Kṛṣṇa drive Arjuṇa’s chariot just prior to revealing himself as God.
51 This notion is wholly justified by the constant references to ritual executed through both 
narrative choice and style.
52 Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad provides more details about this heavenly journey; however, the dif-
ficulties of travelling through heaven are also sources of anxiety in the Ṛgveda; see RV 
10.135. 
53 See Gonda 1978: 376.
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base.54 Proper piling and pacifying of this altar produces the interpenetration of 
these three ātmans (self, gold, Sun) effecting the transit to heaven and preventing 
rebirth on earth.55 The chariot, then, refers to the body of the nāciketa fire altar, 
which transports the sacrificer’s ātman to a heavenly world.56
In conclusion, this study has been a collaborative demonstration that these 
two texts are contoured by their use of earlier sources. To ignore this intertextual 
dimension reduces the amount of empirical evidence that can inform scholarly 
analysis. The innovations of Parmenides and the Kaṭha Upaniṣad against their 
respective traditions deserve further treatment, but such an analytic process can 
only achieve the best results once these earlier sources are fully appreciated.
54 The dimensions of the altar and the sacrificial grounds are all relative to the physical meas-
urements of the yajamāna himself; see Staal 2010: 196.
55 KaU 3.13 refers to three ātmans: a jñāna, ‘recognitive’, amahat, ‘immense’, and a śānta, 
‘pacified’, ātman, which in the Vedic context refers to the fire altar. Staal (2010: 508): ‘It 
is believed that if the adhvaryu steps on the altar, he will die. The completed altar is now 
ferocious (krūra), vibrating with power, and dreadful (ghora). Its powers have to be chan-
neled and it has to be pacified and made to be at peace (śānta).’
56 This is consistent with the early Vedic ideology of the fire altar. Proferes (2007) argues 
that the fire of the clan chief, known as Agni Vaiśvānara, is depicted as supreme over the 
individual fires of the allied clans just as the Sun is supreme over terrestrial fires.
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The interiorisation of ritual in India and 
Greece
Richard Seaford
To the intriguing similarities that have been observed between Greek and 
Indian thought around the middle of the first millennium I will here add 
another: the interiorisation of ritual (specifically, the cosmic rite of passage), 
a process connected to the advent both of monism and of the all-importance 
of the inner self. The interiorisation of ritual is an idea that has been used by 
Indologists but not, so far as I know, by Hellenists. This is not to deny that 
there are differences between the two cultures in the way that the ritual is inte-
riorised, and in the nature of the sources. But this chapter focuses on the basic 
similarity, and indicates a way of explaining why interiorisation occurred. I 
should add that, of the three kinds of explanation (listed in the Introduction) 
for the early similarities between Greek and Indian ‘philosophical’ thought, I 
favour – for the period before Alexander crossed the Indus – autonomous par-
allel development. Pre-Socratic and Upaniṣadic thought both exhibit coherent 
internal development, influenced in my view by the monetisation that made 
Greece and India (and China) different in this period from other societies. This 
is an argument that I will pursue in detail in a monograph. But the importance 
of monetisation will emerge even from within the relatively narrow confines 
of this chapter.
The interiorisation of Vedic sacrifice
Early Vedic sacrifice is based on a large series of imagined equivalences (or cor-
respondences, or identifications) through which, especially in the Brāhmaṇas, 
what is within one’s control (especially ritual control) corresponds with what is 
outside it. Ritual correspondence is defined by Clemens Cavallin as ‘a relation 
between two or more entities, which connects them in a way that makes it pos-
sible to influence one of them through the ritual manipulation of the other (or 
to explain e.g. the use of one entity in terms of the other)’.1 Such equivalences 
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allowed sacrifice to be used as a means of encapsulating – so as to acquire or 
control – a wide range of phenomena.1
However, this system of correspondences was not static. For the period 
of the Brāhmaṇas and early Upaniṣads the system of correspondences was 
transformed into monism, in a way that involved the individualisation and inte-
riorisation of the sacrifice. I will describe how several scholars come to this 
view from different perspectives, so that my argument does not depend on the 
reliability of any one of them.
I begin with J. C. Heesterman. The sacrifice as presented in the Brāhmaṇas 
and Śrauta Sūtras centres on the single yajamāna, who is the sole beneficiary. 
But ‘underneath the classical system’, according to Heesterman, ‘a different, 
older pattern can be discerned’.2 The differences detected by Heesterman in the 
older pattern are threefold. It was characterised by exchange, by the participa-
tion of the group, and by conflict or competition. The marginalisation of these 
three characteristics within the sacrifice results in its individualisation, which 
has its mythical expression in the figure of Prajāpati: ‘Prajāpati, the cosmic man 
and incorporation of the classical ritual doctrine, is the prototype of the single 
yajamāna, who performs without the intervention of a rival party and for his sole 
benefit the ritual of cosmic renewal.’3
The Jaiminiya Brāhmaṇa (2.69–70) narrates the victory of Prajāpati over 
Death through rival sacrifices: the result is that ‘now there is no ritual competition 
(saṃsava); what was the second sacrifice (of Death), that waned; the sacrifice is 
only one; Prajāpati alone is the sacrifice’. Prajāpati wins by discovering the sym-
bolical and numerical equivalences (saṃpad, saṃhkyāna). Heesterman describes 
the victory as follows:
He managed in the end to win not because he was a stronger, better equipped 
contender and sacrificer – the two are explicitly said to be equally strong – but 
exclusively through his ‘vision’ of saṃpad or saṃkhyāna and the intricate arithmetic 
involved in establishing the symbolic equivalences.4
The result is that ‘everything now depends on the correct execution of the 
automatically working ritual’.5 The ‘logical conclusion’ of the process of individ-
ualisation is, Heesterman claims, ‘the interiorisation of the ritual, which makes 
the officiants’ services superfluous’. The knower of equivalences ‘resumes in 
 1 Cavallin 2003a: 7–8.
 2 Heesterman 1985: 26–44, 1993.
 3 Heesterman 1985: 33.
 4 Heesterman 1993: 54.
 5 Heesterman 1985: 33–4, 1993: 3, 54–8.
206 Richard Seaford
himself the universe and performs in himself and by himself the sacrifice without 
any outside intervention’.6
Remarkable about this process of individualisation is that it might not – and 
sometimes did not – stop before everything was absorbed into the individual. 
What is required for an ‘automatically working ritual’ performed by an individ-
ual is neither reciprocity with other participants nor the intervention of deity but 
rather knowledge of its correct performance and of the equivalents. Knowledge 
of the equivalents is knowledge that controls, knowledge not only of the sacrifice 
but of the correspondence (or identification) of elements of the sacrifice with 
elements of the person and of the cosmos, extending to knowledge of the cosmos 
as a whole.
Individualisation advances to the point at which such knowledge amounts 
to absorption of the cosmos into the individual, identification of cosmos with 
individual self. ‘The classical doctrine implies’, notes Heesterman, ‘that the 
yajamāna, through knowledge of the equivalences, becomes the integral cosmos, 
realizing in himself, and thereby mastering, the cosmic alternation of life and 
death.’7
My second scholar is Clemens Cavallin. Many of the correspondences 
expounded in the Brāhmaṇas are between elements of the ritual and the prāṇa 
(meaning basically breaths, then faculties or life forces generally). In his book-
length study of these correspondences Cavallin8 concludes that
the tendency is that the sacrificer also becomes the goal of the ritual activity. It is, 
however, not only the sacrificer considered as self, as ātman, that is intended, but 
the focus is upon the constituent principles of the self, the breaths. The efficacy is 
thereby both dependent on the self – as knowledge of the correspondences is a pre-
requisite for the attaining of the fruits of the ritual actions – and, at the same time, 
directed towards it.
Given that many of the sacrificial correspondences are between ritual and man, 
more specifically the breaths of man (prāṇa), ‘there is thus an anthropocentric 
tendency in Vedic ritualistic thought, something which could explain the final 
abandonment of the “outer” aspects of sacrifice in preference for its “inner” 
aspects’.9 And there is in the Brāhmaṇas a development in reflection on the cor-
 6 Heesterman 1985: 38–9.
 7 Heesterman 1985: 39.
 8 Cavallin 2003a: 230.
 9 Cavallin 2003b: 20, citing Mundaka Upanishad 1.2.7–10 and Prasna Upanishad 1.9. 
Cavallin also distinguishes (2003b: 25–6) between three kinds of interiorisation: one is the 
ritual being performed within the body (for instance a food offering into the fires of the 
body), another is the ritual being performed mentally (imagined), and the third is intention-
ality and knowledge being considered as essential for ritual efficacy.
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respondences: ‘The logical outcome of a process in which interrelated objects 
more and more come to be considered as identical is some form of monism, and 
this tendency together with the focus on “breaths” prefigures the views expressed 
later in the Upaniṣads.’10 Similarly, Brian Smith observes that:
in the Upaniṣads, universal resemblance is brought to its logical terminus: univer-
sal identity. The complex system of connections between resembling phenomena, 
the web of bhandus integral to vedic ritualism, and hierarchical distinctions are 
collapsed in monistic thought into the ultimate connection: the equation of self and 
cosmos (without the ritual intermediary) formulated as the identity and full equality 
of ātman and the brahman.11
The collapse of connections between resembling phenomena into universal iden-
tity promotes and is promoted by the interiorisation of the sacrificial ritual, in 
which the complex system of connections is no longer sustained by the demands 
of actual practice. Interiorisation goes together with the development of monism 
and of the unitary inner self.
The process of individualisation of the sacrifice leading to its interiorisation 
is described also – with different material – by Herman Tull. He notes that there 
are a number of passages in the Brāhmaṇas that ‘indicate that the Brahmanic 
thinkers recognized two types of sacrifice: the traditional sacrificial format and 
a form of sacrifice that emphasises the individual to the point of excluding the 
priests and perhaps even the gods’.12 One such passage is Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 
11.2.6.13–14, which distinguishes between the one who sacrifices for the gods 
(devayājin, ‘god-offerer’) and the one who sacrifices for the self (ātmayājin, 
‘self-offerer’).13 Better is the ātmayājin:
As to this they ask, ‘Who is the better one, the self-offerer, or the god-offerer?’ Let 
him say, ‘The self-offerer;’ for a self-offerer, doubtless, is he who knows, ‘This my 
(new) body is formed by that (body of Yagña, the sacrifice), this my (new) body is 
procured thereby.’14
The devayājin on the other hand ‘is as the inferior who brings tribute to the supe-
rior, or like a man of the people who brings tribute to the king: indeed, he does 
not win such a place (in heaven) as the other’. Whereas the devayājin attains the 
benefit of the sacrifice through the intercession of the gods, the ātmayājin attains 
it directly.
The distinction drawn between devayājin and ātmayājin is another symptom 
10 Cavallin 2003a: 227.
11 Smith 1989: 194.
12 Tull 1990: 39, Heesterman 1993: 82, 216.
13 On this passage see Bodewitz 1973: 304.
14 Translation by Eggeling.
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of individualisation, and it introduces an economic dimension. If the devayājin 
is like the inferior who brings tribute to the superior, the implication is that 
the ātmayājin, whose body is created by the sacrifice, is like the economically 
autonomous individual. A similar idea15 occurs in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 
(1.4.10), where he who knows ‘I am brahman’, and thereby becomes this all 
and the ātman of the gods, is contrasted with one who worships another deity, 
thinking ‘he is one and I am another’, does not know, and relates to the gods as 
livestock do to men; and so ‘it is not pleasing to the gods when men know this’. 
Like those who pay tribute to their superiors, animals serve the economic inter-
ests of men, and some sacrificers benefit gods.
Another such passage (ŚB 9.5.2.12–13) fills out this picture by stating that 
the traditional sacrificer becomes poorer daily whereas the sacrificer for the self 
becomes richer daily. This suggests a world in which reciprocity (voluntary 
requital) has broken down: gifts do not necessarily elicit corresponding benefits 
in return, and so may impoverish the giver.16
The disadvantages of the economically less productive path arise from the 
facts that (a) the sacrificer’s gifts to the priests ransom the sacrificial merit, which 
also however accrues to the priests,17 and (b) the deceased must in the afterlife 
share both himself (with the gods, as food) and his accumulated store of sacrifi-
cial merit (with his ancestors): this is why
he does not attain a full and lasting afterlife existence, but remains there ‘only as 
long as there is a residue of sacrificial merit’ and re-enters the cycle of generation. 
On the other hand, those who follow the interiorised path of sacrifice attain a lasting 
afterlife in the world of Brahmā.18
Tull, rightly concerned to emphasise the continuity between Brāhmaṇas and 
Upaniṣads, notes that at ŚB 10.5.4.16 the world attained by knowledge is the 
place where sacrificial gifts (for the priests) do not go.
This constitutes an ‘experience independent of the ritual specialist’, which 
in the Upaniṣads ‘continues in the development of the interiorised sacrifice; its 
unfragmented nature, centering entirely on the individual, is thus mirrored in the 
conditions of the afterlife’.19 Accordingly, the distinction between pitṛyāna and 
devayana is
between a traditional path of worship, one that maintains the relationship between 
gods, priests, and sacrificers and a path that concentrates on the individual to the 
15 Tull 1990: 20.
16 Cf. Heesterman 1993: 210.
17 Cf. ŚB 4.3.4.6; 1.9.3.1.
18 Tull 1990: 35.
19 Tull 1990: 36.
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point of actually ‘interiorising’ the sacrifice . . . those who follow the interiorised 
path of sacrifice attain a lasting afterlife in the world of Brahmā.20
The distinction is consonant with the distinction we saw between devayājin and 
ātmayājin. And in both cases the new, superior form of sacrifice is associated 
with knowledge, focuses on the individual self, and implies escape from the 
automatic cycle.
The knowledge is mainly of the correspondences (as described earlier). 
Given also the focus on the individual self, the extreme outcome of such corre-
spondences is the identity of self, sacrifice and cosmos. And indeed that is what 
we find in the figure of Prajāpati, who is sacrificer, sacrifice, creator of every-
thing, and himself everything.21 The individual in performing the sacrifice may 
be identified with Prajāpati, and may become everything.22 The result is what I 
call personal monism: all things are one person.
The interiorisation of Greek mystic initiation
In Greece too, as in India at about the same time, we find the interiorisation of 
the ritual performed by the living to create well-being for themselves after death.
In India this ritual23 was the Vedic sacrifice; in Greece however it was mystic 
initiation.24 Indeed the Greek mystic initiand might, like the Indian sacrificer, be 
imagined as transported through the cosmos.25 Both rituals may be described as 
cosmic rites of passage. It is also true however that in Greece animal sacrifice 
might (along with other rituals) be an important part of mystic initiation, and that 
the initiand might be imagined as a sacrificial victim.26
Heraclitus
Heraclitus belonged to the Ephesian royal family that – being descended from the 
Athenian royal family – held the priesthood of Demeter Eleusinia, the  goddess of 
the Eleusinian mysteries.27
According to Heraclitus ‘the mysteries practised among humankind are per-
formed in an unholy way’ (22 DK B14). Note that he does not say that the 
20 Tull 1990: 34–5.
21 See the Brahmanic texts collected and discussed by Lévi 1898: 13–30.
22 E.g. ŚB 4.5.7.1; 3.3.4.5–11; 13.6.1.1; 13.7.1.1. 
23 Or one such ritual: others may have vanished without trace.
24 The only instance that I have been able to find of an (implied) interiorised sacrifice in Greek 
texts is at Iamblichus, The Mysteries of Egypt 5.15.
25 Seaford 1986.
26 Seaford 1994: 282–4, Parker 2005: 342–3.
27 22 DK A1(6), A2; cf. B125.
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mysteries are themselves unholy. And the specification ‘among humankind’ 
implies the existence of mysteries uncorrupted by human performance. Such 
imagined mysteries are, I suggest, in effect interiorised.
Wisdom comes through ‘listening to the logos’ (B50). A ‘sacred logos’ 
containing secret doctrine might be pronounced in the mysteries.28 The manner 
in which Heraclitus presents his logos, and the content of his doctrine, each 
independently suggest that he envisages himself as pronouncing a logos that – 
though it does not depend on the performance of mysteries – is in some sense a 
logos of the mysteries. Mystic initiation gives to initiates access to the afterlife 
by rehearsing their death, and accordingly might involve transformation of their 
understanding (of life and death, of the cosmos). Heraclitus, in insisting on 
the importance of understanding the logos, envisages himself as transforming 
understanding (of life and death, of the cosmos) independently of the enactment 
of ritual. The kind of wisdom revealed in mystic ritual has – with Heraclitus 
– become detached from its enactment. This is both interiorisation and individ-
ualisation, inasmuch as elements of the ritual (performed by a group) exist only 
within each individual mind.
It remains to indicate the surviving evidence for my claim that Heraclitus’ 
discourse resembled mystic doctrine both in the manner of its presentation and 
in its content.29
As for its presentation, Heraclitus’ discourse is – like the language used 
in mystic initiation – riddling.30 Accordingly – and this too resembles mystic 
discourse – the logos that he propounds is, he states, not understood at first hear-
ing.31 In a later text32 the difficulty of Heraclitus’ book is imagined as the initial 
darkness that is in the course of mystic initiation transformed into light.
A series of bone plates found at Olbia on the Black Sea seem to have been 
tokens of participation in sacrifices. Three of them, dating from the fifth century 
bce, have inscriptions. One has the words ‘life death life’, ‘truth’, ‘Dio(nysos)’ 
and ‘Orphic’. Another has ‘peace war’, ‘truth falsehood’ and ‘Dio(nysos)’, and a 
third has ‘Dio(nysos)’, ‘truth’ and ‘soul’ (psuchē) – possibly along with ‘body’ 
(sōma).33 The bone plates were almost certainly membership tokens of a group 
constituted by Orphic-Dionysiac mystic initiation (including animal sacrifice).34 
These inscriptions are strikingly similar, in both form and content, to Heraclitean 
28 E.g. Herodotus. 2.51.4; many further refs. in Seaford 2004: 233 n18; see also Riedweg 
1987: 5–14.
29 For more detail see Seaford 1986: 14–20, Seaford 2004: 234–8, Schefer 2000. 
30 Seaford 2004: 184, 226 n36, 233 n19.
31 B1, B34, Thomson 1961: 273–5, Schefer 2000: 56–62.
32 Anthologia Palatina 9.540.
33 Vinogradov (1991) believed he could detect it.
34 West 1983: 17–19.
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fragments such as B62 ‘immortals mortals, mortals immortals, . . .’ or B67 ‘god 
is day night, winter summer, war peace, . . .’. The similarity is surely due to 
Heraclitus’ use of the riddling style of mystery-cult, a hypothesis proposed well 
before the discovery of the Olbian incriptions (first published in 1978) and con-
firmed by them.
This brings us to what Heraclitean cosmology shares with the content 
of mystic doctrine, namely four things in particular: the idea that mortals are 
immortals (and vice versa), the general importance of the unity of opposites,35 
the idea that there are better and worse fates after death, and the importance of 
cosmological elements in the cyclical passage of the soul. The Olbian ‘life death 
life’ resembles Heraclitus in substance as well as in style, signifying as it does 
our transition (as immortal mortals or mortal immortals) through ‘death’ back to 
life, thereby also implying the unity of the opposites of life and death.36 The con-
tent of the mystic logos was sometimes a myth, which might explain the unity of 
immortality and mortal suffering in humankind (we are Titans), but also might 
be interpreted as a riddling account of physical cosmology.37
Finally, besides providing the earliest extant Greek interiorisation of ritual, 
Heraclitus was an early exponent of Greek monism, and provides the earli-
est extant Greek account of the inner self or soul (psuchē) as an entity of 
comprehensive consciousness. As in India, this threefold combination is not 
coincidental. Moreover, he was also the first to object to the actual practice of 
ritual (mystic initiation, and purification by blood).38 Plato, who – as we shall 
soon see – also interiorised mystic initiation, not only provided a supremely 
influential account of the central importance of the psuchē but was also the first 
extant writer to be critical of some kinds of sacrifice (without rejecting sacrifice 
per se).39 Objections to the practice of sacrifice occur – along with the interiori-
sation of ritual and the emergence both of monism and of the central importance 
of the inner self (ātman) – in roughly the same period also in India.
Parmenides
The fragments of Parmenides contain a narrative in which he journeys through 
the gates of the paths of day and night, where a goddess reveals to him the con-
tent of his philosophy. The narrative has been shown to correspond in various 
35 The mystic rite of passage involves the unity not only of the opposites of mortal and 
immortal, and of life and death, but also of male and female and of animal and human. See 
Seaford 1996: 43–4. 
36 More detail in Seaford 1986: 17–20.
37 As in the Derveni papyrus. See Seaford 2004: 233–5.
38 In B14 and B5.
39 Euthyphro 14e, Republic 364b, Laws 716e, 885b, 905d–6d. 
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details to mystic initiation.40 And there are reasons for believing that – as with 
Heraclitus – Parmenides’ doctrine is influenced by mystery-cult not only in its 
presentation but also in its content.41
Mystic ritual is a performance by a group, whereas the mystic journey of 
Parmenides seems to be the mere vision of a mere individual, and as such it 
seems – as with Heraclitus – to individualise as well as to interiorise mystic 
ritual. With Parmenides the individualisation is unusually marked. He represents 
the wisdom of the goddess as revealed to himself alone, setting him apart from 
the ignorance of mortals.42 As in mystic initiation, there is a right road and one 
or more wrong roads. Parmenides is carried, as ‘the man who knows’ (i.e. the 
mystic initiate),43 along one road, ‘far from the treading of humankind’ (28 DK 
B1.2–3, 27), to the goddess, who warns him off other roads, one of which is 
 followed by ‘mortals knowing nothing’ (B6.3–7).
Inasmuch as the journey imagined by Parmenides is a vision inspired by 
ritual, it represents the interiorisation of the ritual. There is interiorisation also in 
an aspect of his supposedly logical argumentation.
The goddess produces a chain of deductive argument to show that what exists 
is One, spherical, invariant in space and time (eternal, unchanging, unmoving, 
homogeneous), self-sufficient and limited. This bizarre conclusion is reached by 
privileging the subjective. Thinking, or its object, is identified by Parmenides 
with being. He imports into his argument an appeal to introspection: absent 
things present to the mind (i.e. objects of thought, imagined not perceived) are 
continuous (B4), and this assumption forms a premise from which the continuity 
and fullness of what exists can be deduced. But the assumption is in fact true 
only if the mind preconceives its contents as continuous.
Whence this preconception? And why does Parmenides privilege the sup-
posed continuity and reality of what is imagined or thought (the subjective)? A 
complete answer cannot be given here. For now we emphasise that we have here 
a further interiorisation of mystic ritual: it is not just that mystic initiation is inte-
riorised as a merely imagined revelation, but that moreover within the imagined 
mystic revelation there is a crucial appeal to introspection.
Moreover, the deduction of the continuity of what exists from the continuity 
of what is introspected, together with the use of the same terminology to express 
the continuity of each,44 implies a degree of assimilation between the subjective 
(absent things present to the mind of Parmenides) and the objective (what exists).
40 References in Seaford 2004: 185, 228–9. 
41 Seaford 2004: 228–9, 262–3.
42 B1.2–3, 27, 30–2, 6.4–9, 7.2–6, 8.51–2.
43 Thomson 1961: 289–90, Burkert 1969: 5.
44 Cf. B4.2 with B8.23–5.
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This is not the only instance of such assimilation in Parmenides.45 He 
describes the One as ‘whole and of a single kind and untrembling (ἀτρεμής) and 
complete’ (B8.4). The rare word ἀτρεμής, though it describes here the objective 
One, also implies subjectivity, as it does also more clearly when describing the 
‘heart’ of Truth at B1.29. The same word appears also in the passage of Plato’s 
Phaedrus in which he describes pre-natal
mysteries which it is right to call most blessed, which we celebrated ourselves whole 
(ὁλόκληροι) . . . with the gaze of our final initiation on whole (ὁλόκληρα) and simple 
and untrembling (ἀτρεμής) and blessed apparitions in a pure light, ourselves being 
pure. (250b8–c6)
The combination of ‘whole’ and ‘untrembling’ in both Parmenides and the 
explicitly mystic Platonic passage confirms that Parmenides is thinking of the 
goddess’ revelation of the One in terms of mystic revelation. Further, ‘blessed’ 
(εὐδαίμων) in the Plato passage is a word used of the permanent happiness 
bestowed by mystic initiation on the initiates.46 Its application here along with 
‘untrembling’ to the apparitions, together with ‘whole’ and ‘pure’ describing 
both the initiates and what they see, corresponds with various passages of Plato 
and others47 based on the idea that the initiates are partially assimilated to what 
they see or contemplate in mystic initiation. As for ‘untrembling’, trembling was 
a typical feature of the suffering of the mystic initiands before their transition to 
calm,48 and Proclus describes mystic apparitions as ‘full of calm’.49
And so mystic ritual, interiorised by Parmenides, might itself already con-
tain some interiorisation of object by subject. The division between subject and 
object of the mystic vision was transcended by partial assimilation between the 
two, in both directions. In Parmenides, we have seen, the distinction between 
subject and object (Being) is transcended, both in his deductive argument and in 
his vision of the One. The vision results from the ‘philosophical’ interiorisation 
of the ritual interiorisation of what is seen by the mystic initiate. The positive 
psychological effect of the merging of subject with object, which I locate in 
mystic initiation (a rehearsal and overcoming of death), is described from a 
 different perspective by Robbiano in this volume.
45 Seaford 2004: 227–9, 252.
46 E.g. Euripides Bacchae 902 with Seaford (1996) ad loc.
47 Phdr. 249c7, Phaedo 66e, 67ab, 69c, 79d, 81a, Symp. 212a, Plutarch fragment 178, Plotinus 
Enneads 6.9.11, Proclus Commentary on Plato’s Republic 2.108.17–20 Kroll.
48 Seaford 2004: 229.
49 Proclus Commentary 2.185.3 Kroll.
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Plato
In the many mentions and evocations of mystery-cult in Plato the psuchē has a 
central place. The allegory of the psuchē in his Phaedrus is full of evocations 
of mystery-cult.50 A metaphor in the Republic (560e) speaks of purifying the 
psuchē of the person being initiated preparatory to the transformative arrival of 
a crowned chorus. In Cratylus (400c) the followers of Orpheus are said to have 
taught that the psuchē is punished by being imprisoned in the body. The doctrine 
of the persistence of the immortal psuchē through death and rebirth is attributed 
by Plato (Meno 81ab) to a logos told by priests and priestesses (probably in 
mystery-cult). Plato’s Symposium is explicit in describing philosophical devel-
opment in terms of mystic initiation (210a1, etc.).
The Phaedo refers four times explicitly to doctrine propounded in mystic 
ritual concerning the passage of the psuchē to the next world (62b, 69c, 81a, 
108a). The psuchē should withdraw from the senses and ‘trust nothing except 
itself in its thought by itself of what exists by itself’, in a manner reminiscent 
of Parmenides. In doing so the psuchē ‘sees the intelligible and invisible’ (83b). 
The psuchē contains its own abstract object of thought, which it sees only when 
it achieves the purity of withdrawal from the senses, rather as mystic initiation 
requires exclusive focus on the object to which the inner self of the purified ini-
tiate is assimilated.
In the Phaedrus (249b8) we remember our pre-natal vision by understanding 
‘a general conception going from many sense-perceptions into a unity (εἰς ἓν) 
collected by reasoning. This is a memory of those things which our psuchē once 
saw when it journeyed with god . . . (i.e. in its mystic vision).’51 This helps to 
explain why shortly afterwards Plato insists – we saw – on the wholeness of the 
mystic initiate. His account in Phaedo of the soul gathering itself from all parts 
of the body52 may be one of the ideas that this passage of Plato has taken from 
mystery-cult.53 It seems to have inspired Plotinus’ account (Enneads 1.6.5) of the 
longing to ‘gather yourselves away from your body’ with an excitement that he 
calls a ‘bacchic revel’. In Neoplatonic philosophy the dismemberment and recon-
stitution of Dionysos is taken as an allegory for the fragmentation of the soul or 
mind (resulting from its fall into the sensible world) and its subsequent gathering 
of itself so as to recover its original unity.54 In the Epinomis (attributed to Plato) 
50 Riedweg 1987: 30–69.
51 For the importance of mystic initiation throughout this passage of Phaedrus see Riedweg 
1987: 30–69.
52 67c; similarly 80e, 83a.
53 Riedweg 1987: 11, 19, 27, 53.
54 Olympiodorus In Phaedonem 111, 4–19. Norvin; further refs. and discussion in Seaford 
1998: 142.
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a blessed person is described as having been initiated truly and really, ‘partici-
pating, being one, in one thinking (μεταλαβὼν φρονήσεως εἷς ὢν μιᾶς)’ (986d).
The sacrificial dismemberment and reconstitution of Dionysos, and of 
Pentheus in Euripides’ Bacchae, in fact derives from mystic initiation.55 Of 
course the mystic initiand was not in fact physically dismembered: there are 
indications56 that the idea of physical fragmentation may rather have inspired 
or expressed a terrifying experience of mental fragmentation that was – in the 
mystic transition from anxious ignorance to knowledge and belonging – replaced 
by a joyful sense of internal unity. After all, mental fragmentation was per-
haps most easily expressed by the idea of bodily fragmentation, especially in 
the pre-Platonic era, in which the mind was imagined as – however tenuous 
–  corporeal.57 Similarly, the assimilation of the sacrificer to the dismembered 
Prajāpati implied mental fragmentation.
In Plato’s Symposium the mystic assimilation of subject to object combines 
with the philosopher’s ascent from the multiplicity of particular objects of sense 
to a vision of a single unitary abstraction of absolute, eternal beauty, through 
which he finally becomes ‘if any other of mankind, he too immortal’ (212a). The 
perception of abstract unity beyond the appearance of multiplicity is salvational 
also in India.58
Plato interiorised mystery-cult and drew on its doctrine in propounding a 
coherent and influential ethics that dispensed with ritual, emphasising instead 
a subtle combination of understanding with freedom from desire. (For Indian 
parallels see Bussanich in this volume.)
What caused the interiorisation?
None of the scholars who describe the individualisation and interiorisation of 
Indian sacrifice can explain why it occurred. Any explanation based on the inter-
nal logic of the sacrificial system is bound to be at best insufficient, because it 
can explain neither why a system that needed to change came into being nor why 
it needed to change when it did. What is also required is attention to external 
developments. I have in my Money and the Early Greek Mind (2004) described 
the influence of monetisation on the earliest Greek philosophy  (including 
Heraclitus and Parmenides), including an account of how money merges with 
55 West 1983: 140–75, Seaford 1996.
56 E. Ba. 968–9 with Seaford 1998: 135, Plato Laws 672b: cf. Plut Mor. 389a, Seaford 2004: 
309, Seaford 1998: 136–7.
57 Indeed one ancient citation of Parmenides B8.4 has οὐλομελές (rather than μουνογενές), 
denoting the wholeness of the body. Cf. Empedocles B62.4, Seaford 2004: 252.
58 E.g. BU 4.4.19.
216 Richard Seaford
mystic doctrine in influencing the imagining of the cosmos. Here I confine 
myself to indicating briefly ways in which monetisation may have promoted the 
individualisation and interiorisation of the cosmic rite of passage, in both cul-
tures, although for detail here I confine myself here to India.
Money was a new form of power quite different from – and potentially a 
threat to – the ritual power of the Brahmins. It must be emphasised that a general 
measure of value, especially if it is also a general means of exchange, requires 
for its highly convenient effectiveness that the everyday life of ever more people 
is pervaded with something new, the impersonal power of uniform value. Money 
tends to pervade everything.
In the Brāhmaṇas gold (or occasionally silver) given to the priests might 
be specified as of a certain weight,59 and it might be given in pieces of a certain 
weight.60 In an early Upaniṣad Janaka, king of Videha, plans a sacrifice, at which 
he intends to give lavish gifts to the priests, and to the assembled Brahmins he 
declares that the most learned man of them should drive away a thousand cows, 
to the horns of each of which are attached ten pieces61 of gold.62 This goes beyond 
anything in the Ṛgveda, but is not yet money in the full sense. These texts are 
produced by a highly traditional rural elite (Brahmins), and in a period of urbani-
sation are hostile to urban forms of life and ignore towns. But this did not prevent 
the wealth once given to priests from now being paid. My argument would be 
enhanced by discussion of the complex issue of the chronology of monetisation 
(and of the relevant texts) in India, which I must postpone to my monograph.
The monetisation of the sacrifice can be illustrated by a passage in which 
Heesterman describes the earlier phase of sacrifice as one in which ‘the issue 
and outcome – the redistribution of the “goods of life” – are clear and for all to 
see. The munificent sacrificial patron may, moreover, hope that reciprocity will 
reward him over time.’ This is succeeded by a ‘ritualism’ that by contrast
is not dependent on the participation of others . . . It stands apart in sovereign 
independence . . . it transcends the surrounding world . . . deals with the invisible 
(adṛṣṭa). The effect, the ‘fruit’ it promises to the faithful sacrificer, comes about 
in an invisible way, and the promised effect is said to be invisible, namely heaven. 
The expert officiants who receive the daksinā wealth are not held to any reciprocity. 
The Mīmāmsa rejects the view that the daksinā should be considered a gift that 
59 E.g. ŚB 12.7.2.13; 13.2.3.2; 13.4.1.6–7; 13.4.2.10; 13.4.2.13; TB 1.8.9.1; 1.7.8.2; TS 2.3.11.6; 
Maitr. Sam. 1.6.4; 2.2.2; etc.: Prasad 1966: 165.
60 ŚB 5.4.3.26; 5.5.5.16; Pancavimsa Brāhmaṇa 18.3.2.
61 Sanskrit pāda (meaning foot, both part of body and measurement, as in English; also means 
a quarter). ‘Gold’ is understood.
62 BU 3.1.1. The combination of pastoral with metallic wealth (expressing a transition from 
the former to the latter?) occurs also in Greek mythology, for instance in the famous golden 
fleece.
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would consequently oblige the recipient. Instead it is viewed as a salary for services 
rendered. When the service is rendered and the salary received there is no longer 
reciprocity or mutual obligation . . . The ritual is supposed to produce its result auto-
matically, be it cattle, health and long life, male progeny, or headmanship, but the 
way in which the effect should come about is hidden from our view . . . It [śraddhā] 
has come to mean the unquestioning faith in the efficacy of the ritual. As such it has 
no social content. But the connection it still shows with the daksinā points in the 
direction of an original social context of gift-giving and alliance.63
It would – unbeknownst to its author – be difficult to think of a better account 
than this of what monetisation brings to society. Money replaces the interper-
sonal links created by gift-exchange (reciprocity) with a new unitary power 
that is individually owned, universal, transcendent, invisible, automatic (imper-
sonal), and dependent on a generalised confidence that replaced the interpersonal 
confidence attached to the gift. Another aspect of monetary influence may be in 
the cosmic cycle implicit in the sacrifice; and central new features of money that 
are easily interiorised are its abstractness and its unlimitedness.64 But I cannot 
discuss all these characteristics here. Instead I will say something more about 
what Heesterman calls the ‘fruit’ of the sacrifice, and conclude by sketching the 
relation of monetisation to the individualisation and interiorisation of ritual.
In the doctrine of the two paths as described above by Tull the performer of 
economically less productive sacrifices has eventually to return to the cycle of 
generation when his sacrificial merit in the afterlife runs out ( just as running out 
of money may mean returning to the commercial cycle). The concepts of sukṛta 
and iṣṭāpūrta each refers to the merit that the sacrificer accumulates for himself 
in the next world. Instead of being gifts for the gods, sacrifices now produce 
stores of something like money for the sacrificer. Similarly, the meaning of the 
word karma passed from ritual action to an ethicised substance-power that is 
accumulated by action in general and determines the well-being of the actor 
(like a store of money). Iṣṭāpūrta is etymologically connected with sacrifice, and 
could refer to the totality of merit accumulated (not only by sacrifice65) in the 
addressee’s life,66 or to material wealth in this world.67
63 Heesterman 1993: 77–8.
64 Just as for Heraclitus – in the context of the interiorisation of mystery-cult and its denigra-
tion as practised – the soul has an unlimited logos (B45), so for instance at BU 3.1.3–10 the 
brahman priest wins an unlimited world (loka) with the unlimited mind, whereas the other 
priests by sacrificing win only one or another loka.
65 Halbfass 2000: 59, Krishan 1997: 4–5.
66 Biardeau and Malamoud 1976: 165, Keith 1925: 250, 409, 478. Krishan 1997: 5: ‘It 
appears to be a synonym for nidhi (treasure), deposit in heaven, consisting of religious 
merit, something on a man’s credit side in the invisible world or in the life hereafter.’
67 Source references in Krishan 1997: 33.
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I proceed to individualisation. The ease with which metal money is stored, 
preserved, concealed, transported and exchanged makes it highly suitable for 
possession and use by the autonomous individual. The isolating effect of money 
has been confirmed by empirical psychology.68 In practice of course the mone-
tised individual may need, even if wealthy, to call on the loyalty of friends and 
relatives. But the overall effect of monetisation is undoubtedly to increase the 
potential or actual autonomy of the individual. Whereas gifts tend to leave donor 
connected to recipient, a monetised transaction concerns only the equivalence of 
money with goods, and qua monetised transaction leaves the transactors unre-
lated to each other. Each transactor is completely separated from what the other 
transactor has received and from the other transactor himself. The monetised 
transactor is individualised. Older forms of social relationship – gift-exchange, 
kinship, communal possession of land and so on – unite individuals, whereas 
money tends to make them autonomous. To the extent that what was once given 
by the sacrificer becomes payment he tends to become an isolated individual.
What then of the process by which this individualisation leads to interiorisa-
tion? Whereas gifts acquired embody some relation (such as memory, gratitude 
or obligation) to the donor, money acquired belongs absolutely to its owner. The 
invisible power of money is impersonal and universal, but expresses the will of 
its individual owner. Indeed, it is through the seemingly invisible power of his 
money, without any intermediary such as ritual or gift, that the individual enacts 
his will. There is anthropological and historical evidence for the role of individ-
ual property in shaping the very idea of the (autonomous, unitary) individual.69 
In Greek texts there is evidence indicating that the inner self is to some extent 
modelled on the abstract power-substance of money.70 The universal, invisible 
power of money may seem to belong to the inner self of its owner. Money is 
interiorised in Plato.71 Karma is imagined internal as well as external. The power 
of money may be interiorised.
The interiorisation of the Vedic sacrifice requires, we remember, knowledge 
rather than officiants or gods – knowledge especially of the correspondences by 
which ritual controls the external world; the sacrifice is increasingly directed 
towards the self; and each correspondence tends to collapse into identity, and 
their plurality ultimately into the fundamental identity of ātman with brahman.
How might this development be related to monetisation? In the pre- monetary 
sacrifice the sacrificer gave gifts to the priests, and the equivalences (or corre-
spondences) embodied various forms of ritual control over various things in the 
68 E.g. Vohs et al. 2006.
69 E.g. LiPuma 1998: 74, Macpherson 1962: 3.
70 Seaford 2016.
71 Phaedo 69a; Republic 416e.
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world. But with the advent of money, the individual may in principle use it to 
obtain all goods and services, and do so more successfully than with ritual. By 
accumulating money he is more obviously (than when he gives gifts) himself 
the goal of his economic activity, and because he can acquire a wide variety of 
goods by means of a single thing (money), all the various goods may seem to be 
manifestations of the monetary value that embodies his will. This dual process 
promotes monistic collapse (of money and inner self with world).
We have observed that this very same dual process promoting monistic col-
lapse occurred in the sacrifice – promoted, I suggest, by the advent of money;72 
for even if the sacrificer continued to sponsor the sacrifice in the traditional way 
(with goods in kind), the goods were not immune to acquiring monetary value.
The series of sacrificial equivalences – the individual sacrificer using b to 
control c, d to control e, f to control g – corresponds to the required series of 
interpersonal relationships (with various men and deities) in the pre-monetary 
world. But money is a single thing (x) that can in principle control all things, 
which seem therefore to merge into x; and because the power of the individual 
seems identical to the power of x, he too merges with x. Such a process in the 
sacrificial sphere promotes and is promoted by its interiorisation.73 The invisible 
power of money – individualising but universal, interiorised but direct – comes 
to influence the way in which the traditional power of the individual sacrificer 
is imagined. The mythical embodiment of the individual sacrificer, Prajāpati, 
prevails – we remember – exclusively through his vision of the intricate arith-
metic involved in establishing the symbolic equivalences. The traditional power 
of the sacrificer to obtain lokas (often translated ‘worlds’), together with the 
interiorised universal power of money, promotes the idea of an inner self that is 
identified with the universe.
I do not claim that monetisation was the only factor in the interiorisation 
of the Vedic sacrifice.74 But it was an important factor, and has been entirely 
ignored. Finally, I suggest that monetisation was also a factor in the interiori-
sation of Greek mystic initiation, but here I must postpone detailed argument to 
my monograph.75
72 For the similarity between monetary payment and ritual action see Seaford 2012: 125–7.
73 As a small example of how this might work, several passages of ŚB ‘suggest a subtle shift 
in the meaning of bandha, from the physical binding of the animal to that of a metaphysical 
binding of the animal to the sacrificer’ (Tull 1990: 74).
74 Other factors may have included the need for a merely symbolic death for the sacrificer, 
and resentment of the Brahminic monopoly.
75 See also Seaford 2016.
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Rebirth and ‘ethicisation’ in Greek and South 
Asian thought
Mikel Burley
Underlying many speculations about the origins of beliefs in rebirth or rein-
carnation is an assumption about the relation between metaphysics and ethics. 
Roughly speaking, the assumption is that ethical outlooks are grounded in met-
aphysical beliefs or theories, and hence that, in any given case, a metaphysical 
conception of the world is prior, logically and chronologically, to the ethical 
outlook. I call this the assumption of metaphysical priority. Among the theories 
in which we see this assumption at work is that developed by the anthropolo-
gist Gananath Obeyesekere in several publications since the late 1960s, which 
concerns how conceptions of rebirth evolved from ‘non-ethicised’ to ‘ethicised’ 
forms.1 Equating ‘ethicised’ with ‘karmic’, Obeyesekere posits a transition from 
‘rebirth eschatologies’ to ‘karmic eschatologies’. According to this view, rebirth 
eschatologies are conceptions of what happens after death that involve rebirth 
but lack a distinctive ethical dimension, whereas karmic eschatologies incor-
porate into their conception of what happens after death the idea that rebirth is 
conditioned or determined by the ethical quality of one’s actions in the preceding 
life. Although his thesis applies primarily to traditions deriving from South Asia 
– most notably Hindu, Buddhist and Jain traditions – Obeyesekere acknowledges 
similarities with conceptions of transmigration among certain Greek thinkers, 
noting for example that Pythagorean theory ‘perhaps’ constitutes a karmic 
eschatology.2
The assumption of metaphysical priority is, however, questionable. It has 
been poignantly challenged by Catherine Osborne, who argues that certain met-
aphysical theories of transmigration might in fact have emerged from the ethical 
commitments that their proponents held prior to devising the metaphysical the-
 1 See esp. Obeyesekere 1968, 1980, 1994, 2002.
 2 Obeyesekere 1994: xx.
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ories.3 Although Osborne’s claim is made with specific reference to ancient 
Greek philosophers and is not advanced as a direct response to Obeyesekere, the 
challenge it represents has wider implications. It forces us to question whether 
metaphysical conceptions must precede and undergird ethical values and prac-
tices, and thereby obliges us, when clear historical evidence is lacking, to refrain 
from simply assuming that they do have this undergirding role.
My purpose in this chapter is, after outlining Obeyesekere’s ethicisation 
thesis, to follow Osborne in disrupting the aforementioned assumption of meta-
physical priority, and then to go further by re-evaluating the idea that there must 
be an order of priority between metaphysics and ethics at all. A viable alternative 
is that worldviews involving a belief in rebirth comprise both metaphysical and 
ethical dimensions, neither of which is logically or chronologically prior to the 
other. Indeed, in at least some instances, the supposed bifurcation between met-
aphysical theory and ethical outlook is thoroughly misleading, and we should 
think more in terms of what Clifford Geertz spoke of as syntheses between 
metaphysical worldview and ‘ethos’ or ‘style of life’.4 An implication of this 
latter contention is that the coherence of talk of a transition from non-ethicised to 
ethicised versions of rebirth belief ought not to be taken for granted, for what is 
apt to be at issue would be better characterised as a transition from one ethically 
imbued conception to another.
Although the debate with which this chapter is concerned – over the rela-
tion between ethics and metaphysics in worldviews involving rebirth – cannot 
directly shed light on the historical relationship between eschatological think-
ing in ancient Greece and ancient South Asia, it does bring into sharper focus 
important conceptual issues that, while strongly influencing reflections upon that 
historical relationship, tend to go largely unnoticed.
The ethicisation thesis
Obeyesekere is far from unique in assuming that conceptions of rebirth involving 
notions of retributive karma and ethical evolution are higher or more advanced 
than those which do not. G. R. S. Mead, for example, writing in the early twenti-
eth century and subscribing to a broadly Theosophical model of human spiritual 
progress, distinguishes what he sees as the more philosophically refined versions 
of rebirth belief from those of so-called ‘primitive tribes’.5 In view of the wide 
 3 See Osborne 2007: 43–62. Since publishing this work, its author has reverted to using her 
maiden name, Catherine Rowett. To avoid confusion, however, I refer to her as Osborne in 
this chapter.
 4 Geertz 1973: chs 4 and 5.
 5 Mead 1912: 170.
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distribution of rebirth beliefs among diverse human societies, Mead infers that 
the idea of rebirth ‘must . . . be due to elementary experience of some sort’.6 It 
is, he avers, ‘in the comparatively highly cultured nations of India and Greece’ 
that, from the seventh century bce onwards, more sophisticated and systematic 
conceptions developed; these were characterised in particular by the idea that the 
human soul progresses morally and spiritually over a long series of lives like ‘a 
warrior or divine adventurer’ towards the ultimate goal of realising one’s unity 
with all living beings.7
Indian philosophers, too, have remarked upon the supposed fact that, when 
‘advanced religions’ adopted the notion of rebirth – paradigm cases being 
Buddhism, Jainism and Brahmanical Hinduism – ‘they added a rider thereto 
that the soul carries with it the results of the good or bad acts done by it’.8 We 
thus see a common conceptual and historical picture in play, according to which 
purportedly pre-ethical and pre-soteriological notions of rebirth were refined by 
more ‘highly cultured’ or ‘advanced’ peoples, who devised conceptions evinc-
ing greater ethical and philosophical nuance. It is this picture that Obeyesekere 
inherits, and he designates the alleged transition from relatively uncultivated to 
full-blown karmic versions of rebirth a process of ethicisation.
Obeyesekere articulates his ethicisation thesis in bold terms, contending 
that the historical process he is adumbrating has the force of logical necessity. 
‘When ethicization is systematically introduced into any rebirth eschatology’, 
he writes, ‘that rebirth eschatology must logically transform itself into a karmic 
eschatology.’9 It should be noted that Obeyesekere uses the term ‘eschatology’ 
not in the strict sense of a conception of the final destination or goal of human-
kind and of the world but rather to denote any conception of what happens to a 
person after death. Had he been aware of it, he could have borrowed John Hick’s 
term ‘pareschatology’ (which Hick himself attributes to his colleague Michael 
Goulder). ‘Whereas eschatology is the doctrine of the eschata or last things, and 
thus of the ultimate state of man’, Hick writes, ‘pareschatology is, by analogy, 
the doctrine of the para-eschata, or next-to-last things, and thus of the human 
future between the present life and man’s ultimate state.’10 In Obeyesekere’s 
terms, a rebirth eschatology is any system of beliefs incorporating the view 
 6 Mead 1912: 170.
 7 Mead 1912: 162, 177–9.
 8 Tatacharya 1967: 48. See also Radhakrishnan’s contention that, ‘While the conceptions of 
karma and rebirth are unquestionably the work of the Aryan mind, it need not be denied 
that the suggestions may have come from the aborigines [i.e. pre-Aryan inhabitants of 
the Indian subcontinent], who believed that after death their souls lived in animal bodies’ 
(Radhakrishnan 2008: 104).
 9 Obeyesekere 2002: 78.
10 Hick 1976: 22.
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that at least some people, and perhaps some animals as well, will be reborn in 
a new form after their present life. This construal, taken on its own, says noth-
ing about the ethical content of the beliefs at issue. But when Obeyesekere is 
drawing a contrast between rebirth eschatologies and karmic eschatologies the 
difference that he means to highlight is the specifically ethical one, that while a 
karmic eschatology remains a form of rebirth eschatology, it is one that has been 
ethicised. This means that the conception of rebirth has become one in which 
each person’s future life is conditioned by the moral quality of the individual’s 
 present-life actions.11
Obeyesekere’s narrative of transformation from simple rebirth eschatologies 
to specifically ethicised karmic eschatologies comprises two main steps. The first 
step is to form the belief that entry into the after-death world is dependent not 
exclusively on correct performance of religious rites but upon ‘the ethical nature 
of one’s this-worldly actions’. An element of this first step is that the ‘other 
world’ is conceived as being conducive to the appropriate reward or punishment 
of the deceased individual: ‘Heavens and hells have to be invented in any ethi-
cized eschatology.’12 The second step is to speculate that, beyond sojourning in 
the ‘other world’, one’s future earthly lives will also be ‘ethically conditioned’, 
taking forms consistent with and at least partially determined by the quality of 
one’s moral behaviour in a previous life or lives.13 Once the two steps of this 
conceptual shift have occurred, Obeyesekere maintains, ‘a concomitant episte-
mological shift takes place’, which involves viewing rebirth not as ‘a thing in 
itself’ but as ‘a product of the ethical nature of one’s actions’. From this new 
perspective, ‘Rebirth cannot be divorced from ethics; it looks as if it is generated 
from ethics.’14
Obeyesekere frames his presentation of this two-step narrative as an ‘imag-
inary experiment’, an approach that he derives from Max Weber, who speaks 
of using imagination to extrapolate from experientially acquired knowledge 
to historical claims that are at least ‘objectively possible’.15 In contrast with 
Weber’s talk of objective possibility, however, Obeyesekere’s suggestion of 
logical necessity seems inapposite. On the face of it his imaginative model, with 
its two main steps and their respective ramifications, constitutes a speculative 
reconstruction of how karma-imbued conceptions of rebirth emerged in South 
Asia around the middle centuries of the first millennium bce. So it comes as a 
surprise when he implies that the emergence ‘must logically’ have happened 
11 Obeyesekere 2002: 79–80, 247.
12 Obeyesekere 2002: 79.
13 Obeyesekere 2002: 80.
14 Obeyesekere 2002: 82; original emphasis.
15 Weber 1949: 174–5; cf. Obeyesekere 2002: 18.
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this way. By using this vocabulary, Obeyesekere blurs the distinction between 
an account of the historical (diachronic) development of particular beliefs and 
practices and an account of the logical (synchronic) relations between different 
conceptual features of those beliefs and practices.
What Obeyesekere says about a karmic eschatology’s having become ethi-
cised in the way he describes makes most sense when understood as an analytic 
description of what a particular conception of rebirth is; as an analysis, that is, 
of the strands of interconnected thought and practice that constitute the reli-
gious and cultural phenomenon that Obeyesekere terms ‘karmic eschatology’. 
When understood in this way, it provides what some philosophers, influenced 
by Ludwig Wittgenstein and Gilbert Ryle, have called a conceptual ‘map’, or 
what others have termed ‘connective analysis’.16 As characterised by Peter 
Hacker, the latter kind of analysis ‘is concerned with describing and clarifying 
the concepts we employ in discourse about ourselves and about the world, and in 
elucidating their relationships – their forms of relative priority, dependency, and 
interdependency’.17 Admittedly, the concepts that Obeyesekere seeks to describe 
and clarify, being specifically those concerning rebirth, might not be ones that 
we employ, since many of his readers will not be believers in rebirth themselves. 
But if ‘we’ in the passage from Hacker is expanded to encompass any given 
human community, then Hacker’s sketch of connective analysis seems to fit what 
Obeyesekere is up to fairly well.
Even when considered under the aspect of conceptual connective analysis, 
Obeyesekere’s use of the logical ‘must’ may still sound too categorical to many 
philosophical readers. This is because he implies that if certain basic concep-
tual factors are in place then, regardless of the details of any particular cultural 
milieu, certain other factors will necessarily also be there. The approach displays 
what Wittgenstein would call a ‘craving for generality’ modelled on the explana-
tory methods of natural science, carrying with it the danger of overlooking what 
is important in particular cases.18 Fortunately, Obeyesekere avoids an exclusive 
preoccupation with schematic generalisations by also devoting attention to spe-
cific textual sources, such as the Upaniṣads, and to religious traditions such as 
Buddhism and the Ājīvika sect.19 When examining these sources and traditions 
there is no problem with presenting one’s account as historical, since relevant 
historical evidence is available. The problem with Obeyesekere’s treatment of 
16 For the term ‘connective analysis’, see, e.g., Strawson 1992: ch. 2. For discussion of con-
ceptual ‘maps’ or ‘the metaphor of logical or conceptual geography’, see Baker and Hacker 
2005: 284.
17 Hacker 2004: 352.
18 See Wittgenstein 1969: 17–18.
19 For discussion of the Ājīvikas, see Obeyesekere 2002: 102–8.
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rebirth on which I have focused is his insistence that a speculative historical 
account – an ‘imaginary experiment’ – has the force of logical necessity. This 
insistence, and the assumption of metaphysical priority that underlies it, will be 
challenged in the remainder of this chapter.
Challenging the assumption of metaphysical priority
In an essay on Pythagoras, Empedocles and Plato, Catherine Osborne examines 
these three philosophers’ ideas on the relation between transmigration and eth-
ical attitudes towards animals. The thesis for which she argues has a negative 
and a positive aspect. Its negative aspect is that, contrary to a common presup-
position, it is not the case that each of the philosophers first devised a theory of 
transmigration according to which human souls can be reborn as members of 
other species and then, on that basis, developed a moral outlook advocating veg-
etarianism and respectful treatment of animals. This presupposition is a version 
of what I have termed the assumption of metaphysical priority. Though Osborne 
does not herself name any particular exemplars, we see the assumption typified 
in numerous places. For instance, it is often claimed of the Orphic religion, 
which is commonly held to have been a forerunner of Pythagorean thought, that 
its prohibition of eating meat is based on a belief in transmigration. As William 
Guthrie puts it:
The reasoning was this. If the soul of a man may be reborn in a beast, and rise again 
from beast to man, it follows that soul is one, and all life akin. Hence the most 
important Orphic commandment, the commandment to abstain from meat, since all 
meat-eating is virtually cannibalism.20
Whether or not this was the line of reasoning, most modern commentators 
certainly assume it to have been, not only in the case of the Orphics but also in 
the thought of the philosophers with whom Osborne is concerned.21 There are 
exceptions, such as Radcliffe Edmonds, who writes in a recent book that ‘the ear-
liest references to vegetarianism associated with Orpheus stress purity with no 
hint of the idea of reincarnation’, adding that ‘we must not let the assumption of 
a doctrine of reincarnation distract us from other interesting possibilities’.22 But 
such openness to other possibilities deviates from the predominant interpretive 
trend. Obeyesekere accords with the trend when he takes it for granted that belief 
in animal rebirth ‘explains’ the Pythagorean ‘injunction against  consuming 
20 Guthrie 1993: 196.
21 See, e.g., Walters and Portmess 2001: 2, Simons 2010: 159.
22 Edmonds 2013: 290.
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flesh’.23 It is even occasionally asserted by some that belief in transmigration 
‘leads logically to vegetarianism’,24 an assertion that faces many historical 
 counter-examples, one especially poignant instance being the Jewish Kabbalists 
who maintain that the ritual slaughter of an animal for human consumption ‘is 
an act of compassion’ because it enables the animal’s soul to rise to the human 
sphere where it can attain a conception of God as ruler of the earth.25
The positive aspect of Osborne’s thesis requires some clarification, as I 
argue below; but its gist is articulated in the following passage:
The claim that these beasts have human souls, and that they are related to us as close 
family members, is an expression of a distinctive outlook on the world, in which one 
can come to hold such creatures dear and find oneself as one of them (but temporar-
ily in human form). The theory does not ground the moral advice; rather, the moral 
outlook generates the theoretical justification.26
Underlying Osborne’s thesis is a more general contention regarding the asym-
metrical relation between theories and evaluative judgements. According to 
Osborne, while any theory or collection of information about the respective 
biological or psychological characteristics of humans and animals cannot avoid 
being guided by value judgements, the theory or body of information itself lacks 
any power to guide our evaluative perceptions and activities. So, for example, 
a taxonomy of animal species based on similarities and differences between 
them will inevitably be guided by judgements concerning which features of the 
respective species are important for classificatory purposes; yet the taxonomy 
itself cannot usefully inform our estimations of how different species ought to 
be treated. ‘There is’, Osborne writes, ‘no reason to suppose that the lines of 
division drawn up for a taxonomy of species include any differences that are 
morally relevant.’27
In the light of this underlying conception of the relation between theories 
and evaluations, Osborne’s thesis regarding Pythagoras, Empedocles and Plato 
can be read as the claim that, irrespective of what these philosophers thought 
they were doing, it cannot be the case that their dedication to animal welfare 
derived from value-neutral reflection upon psychological resemblances between 
humans and animals, with these resemblances in turn being taken to indicate 
cross-species transmigration. This cannot be so because such reflection is invar-
iably guided by evaluative commitments while being impotent to generate any 
23 Obeyesekere 2002: 191.
24 Spencer 1996: 74.
25 Rabbi Nosson Sternhartz of Breslov (1780–1844), Likkutei Halachos, Eiver Min HaChai 
2:1, quoted in Sears 2003: 289.
26 Osborne 2007: 45.
27 Osborne 2007: 60.
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such commitments itself. Osborne is not denying that a link exists between the 
philosophers’ advocacy of vegetarianism and their belief in the transmigration of 
souls; rather, as the passage quoted above indicates, she is reversing the  routinely 
assumed order of logical and chronological priority. Instead of its being the 
metaphysical theory that grounds the moral outlook, it is the ‘moral outlook that 
generates the theoretical justification’.
Although I, too, want to question the assumption of metaphysical priority, 
there are two doubts that I have concerning Osborne’s way of doing this. First, 
her thesis relies on an equivocation over notions such as ‘values’ and ‘evalua-
tion’; and second, the thesis remains uncertain whether to merely reverse the 
standard order of priority between metaphysics and ethics or instead to abandon 
the assumption that there need be any order of priority at all. I shall elaborate 
each of these doubts in turn, and in discussing the second of them it will become 
clear that my own sympathies favour the downplaying of any supposedly sharp 
distinction between metaphysical theory and moral or ethical outlook.
Equivocating on ‘values’
It is plainly true that taxonomical theories regarding similarities and differences 
between various animal species, including humans, will be guided (albeit nor-
mally implicitly rather than explicitly) by evaluative judgements or attitudes 
about which features of the species concerned should be attended to. But it does 
not follow that these judgements or attitudes are themselves ethical in nature. By 
analogy, my decision to go shopping may depend on a logically prior evaluation 
that my food cupboard needs restocking, but this does not entail that the latter 
evaluation is an ethical one. While there remains room for debate over where 
the boundaries of the ethical lie, it would be tendentious to extend the boundary 
so far that every evaluative judgement became eo ipso an expression of ethics.28 
Thus it sounds suspicious when Osborne moves from the non-contentious claim 
that ‘How we classify the animals and plants that are the subject of biology will 
depend upon the needs that the system of classification is required to serve’ to 
the contentious proposal that, when Pythagoras, Empedocles and Plato empha-
sise the commonality of ‘capacities and origins’ between ourselves and other 
creatures, ‘Their claims were based on a revised moral understanding of how the 
world is divided.’29
Admittedly, there is an intermediate step in Osborne’s argument. This 
involves citing a particular example from the Timaeus of how, in offering ‘a 
28 In common with both Obeyesekere and Osborne, I am not drawing a distinction between 
‘ethics’ and ‘morality’.
29 Osborne 2007: 60, 61.
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taxonomy according to the habitat that a creature occupies’, Plato ‘builds a set of 
value judgements into that classification by suggesting that one gets closer to the 
earth the more disabled one’s intellectual powers’.30 Osborne submits that, rather 
than having first observed the intellectual powers of various creatures and then 
inferred the correlation between these powers and the creatures’ proximity to the 
earth, Plato’s deliberations were imbued from the outset with evaluative associ-
ations such as those of ‘higher’ and ‘lower’. Plato assigns, for example, weaker 
intellects to worms than to birds ‘because he despises the weaker intellects, and 
because he thinks that worms are low on the scala naturae’.31 In other words, he 
has already decided which animals are least (morally) valuable before he con-
trives a system that ranks them according to their alleged intellectual capacities 
and proximity to the earth.
While the example just cited pertinently illustrates Osborne’s thesis, the 
thesis’ generality relies on the underlying contention that systems of classifica-
tion are substantially influenced by value judgements and that these judgements 
are specifically moral. It is still not obvious that this is so; and even in the exem-
plary case of Plato the situation may be more complicated than Osborne allows. 
Might he not have had other reasons for assigning weaker intellects to worms 
than to birds, over and above his ranking them lower in the scale of nature? One 
might, for example, consider the behaviour of birds to be more complex than that 
of worms and hold complexity of behaviour to be correlated with intellectual 
capacity. If someone such as Plato had taken this view, it might remain true that 
he despised weaker intellects, but it would become less credible that his judging 
worms to have weaker intellects than birds was due to (or at least partially due to) 
his underlying evaluation of worms as less morally worthy than birds. Whether 
this latter suggestion applies to Plato himself is hard to determine, yet the fact 
that it might should forestall our assuming that his verdict on worm intellects 
must be a consequence of his moral attitude. Clearly, Plato’s conception of intel-
lectual capacity is bound up with his understanding of moral worth, but it is the 
idea that one of these must precede and undergird the other that is questionable.
While discussing Plato, we should also note the uncertainty about how 
seriously to take his remarks on animals and transmigration. Some commenta-
tors surmise that the whole passage from Timaeus 91d to 92a is intended to be 
humorous. According to Alfred Taylor, for example, Plato’s ‘lumping together’ 
of various sea creatures into one category ‘should show that we are dealing with 
humour, not with science’.32 Osborne, while not deeming Plato’s taxonomy to be 
merely humorous, would not deem it to be merely scientific either; and I concur 
30 Osborne 2007: 60.
31 Osborne 2007: 61.
32 Taylor 1928: 644.
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with her on that. Part of what she takes Plato to be doing is encouraging his 
readers to see the positions of relative height and proximity to the earth as val-
ue-laden, and these identifications – of height with goodness and lack of height 
with badness – are ‘not written into nature to be discovered by science’.33 We 
might add that Taylor’s dichotomy between humour and science leaves out the 
live possibility that the taxonomy’s significance is best characterised neither as 
humour nor as science, but as something that combines playfulness with other 
purposes, such as serious allegory or an ontology that fuses biological with 
spiritual and ethical qualities.
Whether Plato was himself a vegetarian and whether he actually believed 
in transmigration both remain disputed matters. With regard to the first issue, 
after considering the textual evidence Daniel Dombrowski goes no further than 
‘to reserve the possibility that Plato was a vegetarian, or, at the very least, was 
supportive of vegetarian thought’.34 With regard to the second, the principal 
bone of contention is whether Plato used the idea of transmigration only ‘as 
a myth to convey ethical admonition’ or whether his belief went deeper than 
that.35 Again on the basis of close textual analysis, Dorothy Tarrant concludes 
that, on the whole, the topic of transmigration is treated with sufficient serious-
ness in those of Plato’s dialogues in which it is discussed to substantiate ‘the 
view that he did believe in the doctrine itself’.36 Few scholars deny, however, 
that the body of Plato’s works hardly presents a consistent perspective on the 
issue.37 Though I cannot enter into these disputes here, they illustrate the knot 
of difficulties that confronts anyone trying to settle the question of whether 
ethics or metaphysics has logical priority in Plato’s worldview. Difficulties of 
comparable severity – compounded all the more by the relative unavailability of 
primary textual material – hamper the exegetical task in the cases of Pythagoras 
and Empedocles.38
Reversing the order of priority – or abandoning it?
Turning now to my second worry concerning Osborne’s thesis, this was that the 
thesis betrays uncertainty over whether to merely reverse the standard order of 
priority between moral outlook and rebirth theory or instead to dispense with the 
33 Catherine Rowett (formerly Osborne), personal communication, 24 January 2012.
34 Dombrowski 1984: 62.
35 Tarrant 1948: 32.
36 Tarrant 1948: 32.
37 For discussion of the primary sources, see Ehnmark 1957.
38 See Kahn 2001, esp. ch. 1, for a lucid account of why Pythagoras is ‘one of the most 
fascinating and mysterious figures of antiquity’ (1). The same author discusses salient 
 difficulties associated with the interpretation of Empedocles’ fragments in Kahn 1960.
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idea of an order of priority altogether. Osborne seems principally to be saying 
of the philosophers she discusses that, instead of regarding their conception of 
rebirth as grounding their moral outlook, we should see their moral outlook as 
grounding their conception of rebirth. She says, for example, that ‘To change 
whom we see as kin, we must first change our moral outlook’,39 thereby implying 
that the moral outlook can change independently of whom we see as kin but that 
changing whom we see as kin requires changing our moral outlook. Osborne 
proceeds to say of Pythagoras, Empedocles and Plato that they ‘give us a story 
to explain how souls can transmigrate and how we might all be kin, but the story 
is there to defend and promote a revisionary moral outlook’, again implying that 
the moral outlook precedes the story of transmigration.
Earlier, however, in a passage that I have quoted already, Osborne asserts 
of the claim that animals ‘have human souls, and . . . are related to us as close 
family members’, that this ‘is an expression of a distinctive outlook on the world, 
in which one can come to hold such creatures dear and find oneself as one of 
them (but temporarily in human form)’. Here, Osborne’s emphasis on ‘expres-
sion’ suggests not that the ‘distinctive outlook on the world’ preexists the theory 
of human-to-animal transmigration, but that the outlook takes the form of or is 
articulated in terms of this theory. Under this description, we are not forced to 
say that if the theory of animal–human relations is to be changed ‘we must first 
change our moral outlook’, for there is a sense in which the theory and moral 
outlook are one. There is no logical gap between them: we see what the theory of 
transmigration means in the forms of ethical judgement and action that constitute 
the moral outlook. For this reason it would make no less sense to describe the 
moral outlook as expressing the claim that animals have human souls than it does 
to say that the claim that animals have human souls expresses the moral outlook. 
We could also describe both of these as expressions of one integrated picture.
If Osborne would agree with the points I have just made, then her real thesis 
could be formulated by saying that the transmigration theories of Pythagoras, 
Empedocles and Plato are infused with moral value and commitments from the 
outset. It is not that the theory is logically and chronologically prior to the moral 
outlook, but neither need it be that ‘the moral outlook generates the theoretical 
justification’. Rather, what we have is a unified way of being with, and respond-
ing to, animals in the world – an outlook that views animals and humans as a 
community of commonly ‘ensouled’ creatures.40
Wittgenstein, in his ‘Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough’, makes a point 
39 Osborne 2007: 62.
40 Cf. Osborne’s remark that Empedocles, Plato and Pythagoreans conceive of animals not 
merely as ensouled (empsucha), but as possessing ‘exactly the same kind of souls as we 
have’ (2007: 59).
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that resembles the one I have just been making. What Wittgenstein is objecting 
to is James Frazer’s purported explanation of the ancient rite of succession at 
Nemi, in which the successor had to kill the incumbent priest-king. More pre-
cisely, Wittgenstein is not so much criticising the particular explanation that 
Frazer offers, as questioning Frazer’s assumption that an explanation must dis-
close a belief upon which the action is based. Wittgenstein writes of Frazer that,
When, for example, he explains to us that the king must be killed in his prime, 
because the savages believe that otherwise his soul would not be kept fresh, all one 
can say is: where that practice and these views occur together, the practice does not 
spring from the view, but they are both just there.41
This remark was written in 1931 shortly after Wittgenstein’s first acquaintance 
with Frazer’s text. In a later manuscript from 1945 Wittgenstein makes a similar 
point with reference to cultures in which people hold what, when rendered into 
a European language, is expressed as the belief that they are descended from an 
animal (such as a snake). In response to those who would then describe various 
practices of the culture as ‘based on this belief’, Wittgenstein asks rhetorically: 
‘But why should we not say: these customs and laws are not based on that belief, 
but they show to what extent, in what sense, such a belief exists.’42
Although Wittgenstein is writing in condensed form, he is evidently resist-
ing the assumption that we must postulate an order of priority between belief and 
practice – an order in which the belief, or view, provides the rationale for the 
practice. How far Wittgenstein is going in the direction of rejecting all attempts 
at explanation is a moot point.43 For present purposes all that needs to be noted 
is that he is identifying the absence of any necessity to suppose that the practice 
is based on a prior belief. Both the belief and the practice – or, better, the belief–
practice nexus – may, to use Osborne’s phrase, express ‘a distinctive outlook on 
the world’. It follows from this that neither are we forced simply to reverse the 
direction of influence and say that the belief is based on the practice (or on the 
moral outlook).
It is worth pausing to register the philosophical dangers associated with 
using the term ‘expression’ in these contexts. For when Osborne says that the 
transmigration claims of Pythagoras and others are ‘an expression of a dis-
tinctive outlook on the world’, some critics will hear this as a denial that these 
philosophers ‘really’ believed in transmigration at all, and will assume that in 
debates such as those to which I alluded in the previous section, concerning 
41 Wittgenstein 1993: 119.
42 Wittgenstein 2000: MS 116, p. 283; my translation.
43 For discussion of what Wittgenstein is up to in his remarks on Frazer, see Clack 1999, esp. 
chs 4 and 5, Needham 1985: ch. 7, and Burley 2012: ch. 1.
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whether Plato for instance treated transmigration merely ‘as a myth to convey 
ethical admonition’, Osborne is coming down firmly on the side of those who 
maintain that he did. In short, such critics will perceive Osborne as offering 
a reductive, non-realist, non-cognitivist analysis of the philosophers’ transmi-
gration-talk: non-realist in the sense that the talk does not entail belief in the 
reality of transmigration, and non-cognitivist in the sense that it does not aim to 
articulate knowledge about the world but merely to express value judgements. It 
is thus reductive inasmuch as, by eliminating any cognitive or truth-apt content 
from the transmigration-related pronouncements of the philosophers, it reduces 
those pronouncements to ‘mere’ expressions. Although I doubt whether Osborne 
would look favourably upon this construal of her thesis, her claim that ‘the moral 
outlook generates the theoretical justification’ may unwittingly invite it.
One way of reclaiming Osborne’s thesis from the reductive reading involves 
rejecting the dualistic conception of facts and values on which the reading 
depends. To construe in non-realist or non-cognitivist terms the assertion that 
transmigration-claims express moral values, one would have to assume that 
moral values are incapable of connecting with reality in ways that are true or 
knowledge-bearing. Relinquishing this assumption facilitates our conceiving of 
transmigration-claims as true, without necessarily affirming that the criteria for 
their being true must conform to those that apply to, say, statements of empir-
ical science. We may, for example, allow that they could be morally true or 
metaphysically true without our thereby implying that transmigration beliefs are 
empirically testable. A further, related, way of resisting the reductive reading of 
Osborne’s thesis would be to reject the Cartesian metaphysical assumption that 
states of mind (including beliefs and value-commitments) are logically inde-
pendent of and prior to the actions and responses that they are supposed to 
causally initiate. If, as argued by Wittgenstein and Gilbert Ryle for example, it 
is in our actions and responses that our beliefs and values are characteristically 
seen, then the picture of an expression of a belief or value being logically (con-
ceptually) detachable from the belief or value itself loses its appeal.44
These latter thoughts are taking us further than my purposes in this chapter 
require. My principal reason for discussing Osborne’s proposal has been to 
indicate how a certain presupposition might be brought into question, the pre-
supposition being that the relation between a theory of rebirth or transmigration 
and a moral outlook must be one of logical and historical priority, wherein it is 
the theory that holds the prior position. Osborne displaces this presupposition 
by, apparently, switching the order of priority. What I have argued is that even 
this switching presupposes a division of roles between ‘theory’ and ‘outlook’, 
or ‘belief’ and ‘practice’, that need not be present. At the very least, we should 
44 See, e.g., Ryle 2009: 116–18. For discussion of Wittgenstein, see Churchill 1984. 
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question the viability of this postulated division rather than simply accepting that 
it is there.
Conclusions
A way of misreading the present chapter would be to see it as proposing a thor-
oughgoing scepticism about explanation in matters of religious or metaphysical 
belief. I have not been arguing that there is anything necessarily misguided 
about seeking explanations for how particular forms of belief, such as beliefs in 
karma and rebirth, came about in specific historical circumstances. What I have 
been arguing is that, in cases where clear evidence is lacking, there are certain 
assumptions that we should be wary of making. Central among these is the 
assumption that belief in rebirth – that is, the belief that in some sense each of 
us undergoes not a single lifetime but a series of lifetimes either in human or in 
some other form – must preexist and give rise to the systems of ethics that come 
to be associated with it. This is an instance of the more general assumption that 
metaphysical beliefs are logically and chronologically prior to ethical values and 
practices; or, more concisely, that metaphysics necessarily precedes ethics. It 
is an assumption of this sort, I have argued, that underlies Obeyesekere’s spec-
ulative reconstruction of the process by which ‘rebirth eschatologies’ became 
‘karmic eschatologies’ in ancient South Asian religious traditions – a process 
that Obeyesekere terms ‘ethicisation’. While not claiming that this account is 
necessarily false, I have argued that it lacks the force of logical necessity that 
Obeyesekere attributes to it.
An implication of accepting Obeyesekere’s thesis would be that the extent 
to which non-karmic conceptions of rebirth are also bound up with ethical values 
and practices is liable to be missed. This is because, by characterising the tran-
sition from rebirth eschatology to karmic eschatology in terms of ethicisation, 
the impression is given that the non-karmic conceptions must be non- or pre- 
ethical. The truth is that these conceptions are very rarely, if ever, dissociable 
from ethical values and practices, and hence the term ‘ethicisation’ as used by 
Obeyesekere is a misnomer.45
By adducing Osborne’s contention concerning the relation between ethics 
and metaphysics in the thought of Pythagoras, Empedocles and Plato, I have 
45 I discuss this matter at greater length in Burley 2013 and in Burley 2016: ch. 4. The present 
chapter expands and refines early portions of the argument advanced in those two publi-
cations. See also Mills (1994: 17): ‘One problem with Obeyesekere’s distinction between 
the Buddhist/Hindu/Jain concepts of reincarnation as “ethicized” and tribal concepts . . . 
as “unethicized” is that it masks the fact that tribal eschatologies also contain ethical 
premises.’
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illustrated one way of challenging the assumption of metaphysical priority upon 
which the sort of thesis advanced by Obeyesekere depends. By highlighting an 
apparent equivocation in Osborne’s argument and discussing an ambiguity in the 
alternative picture of the metaphysics–ethics relation that she is putting forward, 
I have sought to develop a clearer version of that alternative picture. Drawing 
upon the thought of Wittgenstein, the picture is one in which the relation between 
metaphysical beliefs or theories on the one hand and ethical values, practices or 
outlook on the other is not one of logical or chronological priority; the former 
do not generate the latter and neither do the latter generate the former, ‘but they 
are both just there’. This picture is intended not to explain how any particular 
conception of rebirth in fact came about, but rather to loosen the grip of compet-
ing pictures by which we might otherwise be held captive, pictures according to 
which not only must a clear division obtain between metaphysics and ethics but 
there must also be an order of priority between them.46
As for the relation between the respective conceptions of rebirth in ancient 
Greece and India, my purpose has not been to say anything directly about it. 
What we can say, however, is that the tasks of comparing them and theorising 
about their possible historical connections depend upon clear-sighted hermeneu-
tical investigations of the conceptions in question. These investigations are prone 
to vitiation if we bring with us suspect assumptions concerning how ethics and 
metaphysics ‘must’ be related. Freeing ourselves from those assumptions can at 
least play a part in setting the conditions for the kind of inquiry that is demanded.
46 I borrow the well-known metaphor of being held captive by a picture from Wittgenstein 
1967: §115.
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On affirmation, rejection and accommodation 
of the world in Greek and Indian religion
Matylda Obryk
Since its coinage by Jaspers, scholars have been looking for an explanation 
for the changes that Indian and Greek cultures (and many others) seem to have 
gone through in the so-called Axial Age.1 This is the time in which the so-called 
Greek Enlightenment and the Upaniṣadic turn in Indian philosophy took place 
(roughly a period of several centuries from the eighth to the second century bce). 
I will apply to this development a typology coined by Roy Wallis, a sociologist 
working on new religious movements in the 1980s. Wallis analyses par excel-
lence new religious movements from a static perspective. However, his typology 
might be understood even more broadly and provide a frame within which even 
the dynamics of the development of cultures may find a plausible explanation. 
We will also see that light on the similarities between Axial Age developments 
may be shed by an Indian concept of human development2 concerning the atti-
tudes of humans towards their environment in a widest possible sense. We 
should also note from the beginning that in the most ancient cultures there is 
no way to draw a sharp distinction between the secular and religious spheres of 
life, and therefore issues of both religious and philosophical character will be 
discussed in parallel here.3
Wallis divides religious movements into three categories according to their 
attitudes towards the values and settings of the surrounding world. Wallis’s first 
category is the world-affirming type wherein the world is being embraced and 
accepted as it appears in order to achieve goals that are immanently connected 
 1 Jaspers 1949: passim. 
 2 That the Indian philosophy includes three paths to salvation (karma-marga, jñana-marga 
and bhakti-marga) is widely known (Sikora 2002: 15). Within the Vaishnava Bengali tra-
dition there is to be spotted a notion of the progress from one to the other (see below).
 3 Cf. McPherran 1996: 20.
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with the life within this world as such – happiness, prosperity and so on.4 The 
second type would then encompass the world-rejecting movements. They reject 
the values and mind-sets that derive from the world, and very often strongly 
renounce and negate all that comes from the world of senses.5 And finally the 
third type is the world-accommodating type wherein the world is understood and 
moulded in such a way that it has to be neither rejected nor fully embraced but 
just seen from a new perspective or engaged in a new attitude.6
Wallis’ concern is with the attitudes towards the values of the society 
wherein a particular movement develops. However, a case could be made for 
widening the perspective so as to examine the attitudes towards the world and 
its components. The question of the main relation (either affirming, rejecting or 
accommodating) of each philosophy or religious movement to the world will be 
therefore central.
The Indian paradigm
As already mentioned, those three attitudes towards the world correspond to a 
paradigm found in the Indian scriptures. The Vedas contain a vast amount of 
different instructions. The first portion of them (the Ṛg-, Sāma-, Atharva- and 
Yajur-veda which make up about 90 per cent of the Veda) pertain to the path 
of karma and are therefore technically speaking karma-kāṇḍa. The oldest text 
(the Ṛgveda) is traditionally dated back to bce 1450–1350 and the whole Vedic 
period spans a time frame of roughly 1,000 years.7 Karma-kāṇḍa is the science 
of ritualistic acts and sacrifices, and aims at controlling the gods, who then 
become bound by the very performance of the rituals to act as requested by the 
worshippers.
For instance in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa (the brāhmaṇas are the part of the 
Veda that describes rituals) it is said:
And when he offers in the morning before sunrise, then he produces that (sun-child) 
and, having become a light, it rises shining. But, assuredly, it would not rise, were he 
not to make that offering: this is why he performs that offering. (ŚB 2.3.1, 5)
The aim of the ritual is therefore to make the world – through the medium of 
diverse divinities – function according to one’s needs and desires. The performer 
of the ritual is considered to have power over the world. The ritual is used as 
a somewhat mechanical technology that ensures the world’s functioning: the 
 4 Wallis 1984: 20–35.
 5 Wallis 1984: 9–20.
 6 Wallis 1984: 35–9.
 7 Witzel 2003: 68.
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performance of a certain ritual forces the gods to comply with the sacrificer’s 
wish. The polytheistic structure of the divine sphere is on this path immanently 
embedded into the concept of rituals.8 The ultimate goal of performing these 
sacrifices appears therefore to be a ‘happy life’ that is basically understood as 
having better opportunities for enjoyment. On this path the heavenly planets, 
which in their depictions vividly resemble Western ideas of paradise, are the 
highest goal.9 Within this realm the environment and the world are used as a 
tool for achieving one’s own ends and are therefore accepted as they appear. The 
main characteristics of this path are therefore rituals aimed at satisfying different 
divinities in order to achieve one’s personal goals. The divinities are prevalently 
regarded as being immanent, embedded in this very sphere of the world where 
the humans dwell, and resemble humans in almost all personal features. They 
therefore enable human beings to establish a relationship with them similar to 
that with the powerful personalities of this world (cf. the personal relationship of 
Odysseus with Athena in Homer’s Odyssey). This path and its outlook resemble 
Wallis’ world-affirming type.
Another portion of the Veda deals with the liberation that is to be achieved 
on the path of cultivating knowledge about the suffering that derives from the 
very contact with the world.10 The Upaniṣads are the main source for this path, 
called jñāna. The Upaniṣads are a part of the Vedas, but in them the philo-
sophical attempt at understanding the world became prominent, and they are 
commonly regarded as being anti-ritualistic. Traditionally they are dated to the 
period of bce 800–200, which corresponds smoothly with the Jasperian Axial 
Age and the rationalistic revolution in Greece.11 As simply being in this world 
is considered to be the cause of suffering, adherents to this path claim it is nec-
essary to free oneself from the bondage of this world. This liberation is to be 
achieved through the cessation of all karma. Karma means action and therefore 
work. The law of karma dictates that every action enforces a reaction: as long as 
there is action, a reaction in the form of either enjoyment or suffering will follow. 
As long as a reaction is to be experienced, the living entity is bound to remain in 
the world and always pursue a new body after the previous one has worn out. As 
the path of karma is par excellence action and therefore produces reactions (even 
 8 Siegel 1978: 420.
 9 Cf. Keith 1925: 581.
10 For the Upaniṣads as the main literature for the person pursuing the jñana-path, cf. Aruni 
Upaniṣad 7; Olivelle 1992: 228 n10; Olivelle 2014: 10. For the conflict of the values 
between the ritualistic (Brahminic/karmic) and the renouncer path ( jñana-marga) of the 
Hindu tradition see Olivelle 2003: passim, esp. 275–7.
11 Cf. Witzel 2003: 83–6. Olivelle points to the fact that any dating of the Upaniṣads is 
as stable as a house of cards (2014: 12). But this roughly dated period of six centuries 
 corresponds with the opinion of most scholars. 
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if good or predominantly good, but nevertheless binding), it is rejected. On the 
path of jñāna the goal is considered to be lasting12 and transcendental (liberation 
from the world), and therefore it cannot be achieved by mundane means.13 On 
this path the search for the divine reaches into transcendence and is achieved 
through the means of rejection. The concept of divinity becomes increasingly 
impersonal. The yoga path sees the iśvara, god, as being totally distinct from 
nature and removed from everyday experience. The concept of brahman, as the 
supreme force is called in jñāna, is pantheistic in its outline. Finally the Sāṃkhya 
school and then the Buddhist school arrive at a somewhat atheistic conception 
of the divine. They arrive at the notion that the supreme is Nothing.14 This is a 
perfected rejection that corresponds clearly with Wallis’ second type.
Finally, there is the path of reconciliation. Reconciliation comes from the 
realisation of the fact that negation is ultimately bound to what is negated (to say 
non-A, one first has to think of A) and therefore it cannot lead to the Absolute. 
Furthermore, the realisation that the rejection demanded by jñāna is ultimately a 
false renunciation15 leads to the path of upāsanā (which means meditation, as this 
is the process of getting into contact with a new type of divine) as Ramanuja16 
called it – or in later literature – bhakti (devotion). The bhakti reconciliation 
entails an engagement with the world and its components – for instance the para-
12 The reactions enjoyed or suffered on the karma-path are regarded as temporal and com-
pared to a bank account that can simply be used up. 
13 Or even described by any mundane means. Therefore the definition by negation is preva-
lent on this path. Similar notions occur in the KaU 1.2.10: ‘By non-permanent works the 
Permanent is not obtained’, or MuU 1.2.7: ‘Frail indeed are those boats, the sacrifices’. 
Therefore the injunction is to seek jñana: MuU 1.2, 12.13: ‘Let a Brahmana, after he has 
examined all these worlds that are gained by works, acquire freedom from all desires. What 
is not made cannot be gained by what is made . . .’
14 Cf. Siegel 1978: 420.
15 Bhaktirasāmṛta Sindhu, by a seventeenth-century author of the Bengali Vishnuite tradition, 
Rupa Goswami, makes the distinction between right and wrong renunciation: anāsaktasya 
viṣayān yathārham upayuñjataḥ / nirbandhaḥ kṛṣṇa-sambandhe yuktaṁ vairāgyam ucyate 
(‘Things should be accepted for the Lord’s service and not for one’s personal sense grati-
fication. If one accepts something without attachment and accepts it because it is related to 
Krishna [Supreme God], one’s renunciation is called yukta-vairāgya.’) . . . prāpañcikatayā 
buddhyā hari-sambandhi-vastunaḥ / mumukṣubhiḥ parityāgo vairāgyam phalgu kathyate 
(‘When persons eager to achieve liberation renounce things related to the Supreme God, 
thinking them to be material, their renunciation is called incomplete’ (Bhaktivedanta Swami 
2004, CC. Madhya 19.170–1, quoting Bhaktirasamrta Sindhu 1.2.255–6).
16 Ramanuja, a theologian of the Sri Vishnuite tradition of the eleventh/twelfth century, 
makes in his commentary on the first verse of the Vedanta Sūtra the point that ultimately 
the goal is to achieve happiness that in turn is to be found only when desires cease. This 
cessation of desires is only possible when the senses are properly engaged in meditation 
that is combined with work for the sake of the Supreme (Thibaut 1904: 18).
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phernalia of worship – in the service of a transcendent yet immanent Supreme.17 
The goal is similar to that of the jñāna path: termination of mundane existence.18 
Bhakti is therefore supposed to transcend the sentimental affirmation of karma 
and the cynical rejection of jñāna. As bhakti encompasses a service towards the 
Supreme that is ultimately a symptom of a developing genuine loving relationship 
with the divine, it encourages a highly personal attitude towards the divinity.19 
Interestingly, Wallis also recognised that the personal feature is a special charac-
teristic of the accommodating type of religious movements. The personal aspect 
of the third type will also become central in our discussion of its Greek equivalent.
The Hindu Vaishnava tradition of Bengal (Caitanyaite) claims that all 
cultures move along a progression: from karma, the world-affirming, through 
jñāna, the world-rejection, to upāsanā, or bhakti, the world-accommodating 
worldview.20 An illustration of this progression can be found on a micro-scale in 
the Bhagavad Gītā, the central Hindu scripture. The Gītā is the key part of the 
Mahābhārata, an Indian epic that narrates the story of the conflict between two 
factions of one family: the Kurus and the Pandavas. The sons of two brothers – 
Dhṛtaraṣtra and Pandu – fight over the kingdom on the battlefield of Kurukṣetra. 
Just before the battle starts, Arjuna, one of the Pandavas and commander in chief 
of the Pandava army, asks his chariot driver, who happens to be Krishna (the 
Supreme God as becomes clear in due course) to drive him into the midst of the 
armies so he can have a look at his opponents. Seeing on the other side his cous-
ins, grandfather and teacher, Arjuna breaks down and lays aside his bow (BG 
1.46). He presents arguments for his desired withdrawal from the battlefield, but 
Krishna instructs him and explains in roughly 700 verses both the ultimate goal 
of life and the real and proper relationship of a human being to both the world 
and the Supreme.
17 About the transcendence and immanence of God on the path of bhakti (especially its late 
Bengali version of the Caitanyaites): ‘God had to be transcendent because He was too great 
to be limited, and he had to be immanent, distinct from the self and personal, because He 
demanded love, passionate love’ (Siegel 1978: 422).
18 On the highest stages of spiritual understanding on this path this liberation is solely a 
by-product of the love of God. And the attainment of that love is the real aim and goal of 
every bhakta (follower on the path of bhakti). On this path the revival of a dormant rela-
tionship with the Supreme Person is the goal and means by which all happiness is to be 
achieved (Siegel 1978: 422).
19 Raj Singh 2006: 19.
20 Correctly understood, bhagavat-dharma, as presented in the Bengali tradition by its 
prophet Caitanya and explicated by his followers Sanatana, Rupa and Jiva, is the all-inclu-
sive religion, the religion of religion, in that it gives us a fruitful framework for grasping the 
whole range of human spiritual endeavours, both in their successes and their failures (from 
an email conversation with William Deadwyler aka Ravindra Svarupa Dasa, a scholar and 
practitioner of the bhakti path, from 14 October 2014; cf. also Deadwyler 1987: passim). 
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Gītā illustrates here a specific development. Dhṛtaraṣtra, the chief enemy 
of the Pandavas, is violating justice and the social order and therefore stands 
for sinful action. Arjuna, responding to the situation and having just suffered 
from a breakdown, tries to find the right response to the given circumstances. 
However, he considers restoring righteousness to be an action of the same type 
as violating it: he claims that it would be equal to performing duties with the 
goal of enjoying the fruits of action (BG 1.31). He rejects therefore the path of 
karma, the world-affirming process, and turns out of frustration and despair, to 
the opposite, which is considered to be higher by the scriptures themselves (BG 
2.5).21 He wants to renounce (reject) everything and head for the forest to live 
by begging. However, ultimately Krishna assures him that the path of rejection 
is not going to bring him full peace and satisfaction. The whole Bhagavad Gītā 
consists of Krishna persuading Arjuna to take to the path of accommodating his 
duties in the world in order to engage everything in the service of the Supreme, 
Krishna himself.22 Therefore the tension between work as understood by Arjuna 
as being karma, and knowledge as a reflection of the cessation of action ( jñāna), 
makes up the whole of the Bhagavad Gītā.23
This is in fact the very same progression: Arjuna first considers (and rejects) 
the path of karma – performing one’s duties in order to enjoy the kingdom – and 
consequently feels attracted to the path of jñāna, the path of rejection, and tries 
renounce all his life and duties. It takes Krishna 700 verses to explain to him the 
value of reconciliation of both of them, bhakti, for an even higher purpose: ser-
vice to the Supreme. And that promises him the ultimate fulfilment.
This development can also be discerned in a historical perspective. The 
Vedic period emphasised karma-mīmāṃsā or karma-kāṇḍa,24 followed by the 
rise of uttara-mīmāṃsā (also called Vedānta) which makes up the Upaniṣadic 
21 The question of the value of each path can be found as well in the Bhagavad Gītā itself. In 
the beginning of chapter 5 Arjuna asks about the difference between jñāna and bhakti: ‘O 
Krishna, first of all you ask me to renounce work (karma), and then again you recommend 
work with devotion. Now will you kindly tell me definitely which of the two is more bene-
ficial?’ And Krishna answers: ‘The renunciation of work ( jñāna) and work in devotion are 
both good for liberation. But, of the two, work in devotional service is better than renunci-
ation of work’ (BG 5.1–2). Further (5.3) it is stated that only one who is free from dualities 
of accepting and renouncing is completely liberated. Only one who has transcended the 
path of affirmation and rejection is truly free.
22 This is most clearly stated in the last instruction Krishna gives to Arjuna (BG 18.66): 
sarva-dharmān parityaja, mām ekaṁ śaraṇaṁ vraja / ahaṁ tvāṁ sarva-pāpebhyo, 
mokṣayiṣyāmi mā śucaḥ (‘Abandon all varieties of dharma and just surrender unto Me. I 
shall deliver you from all sinful reactions. Do not fear.’).
23 This tension is repeatedly voiced in the Gītā: the beginnings of chapter 3, 5 and 12.
24 The Vedas in the traditional understanding encompass the Ṛg, Sāma and Yajur Veda and 
are called śruti; in Sanskrit: revealed scriptures (the root śru means to hear). 
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view on brahman and the world, and then by the rise of bhakti, initiated in South 
India in the seventh and eight centuries ce and swept northwards in a wave of 
devotion that engulfed India from about the twelfth to the fifteenth century.25
The Greek counterpart
The aim of this chapter is to test whether the progression I have described is to 
be discerned in Greek culture as well. Greek thought and culture seem to move 
along the path of ritualistic state religion with the immanent gods of the myths 
(corresponding to the karma-path); in the next step the rituals and gods meet with 
a scientific rejection ( jñāna); finally there is a specific reconciliation of both, 
which can be traced for instance in the personal religion of Socrates or the the-
urgy of the Neoplatonists, both of which have a strong personal attitude towards 
the (nevertheless) transcendental divinity (upāsanā or bhakti).26
Polis religion
The religion of the polis provides a frame for the social structure and simulta-
neously, through rituals and sacrifices, claims to win control over the gods, who 
are therefore bound to perform according to the requests of their worshippers.27
Sacrifices played a central role in the life of every Greek citizen. They pro-
vided a timeframe, leisure and opportunity to accentuate one’s social position, 
and – last but not least – the rare portion of sacrificial meat in the assembly of 
the feasters. Attendance at and the performance of such sacrifices were the cen-
tral practices of the religion. Not orthodoxy, therefore, but orthopraxy was the 
criterion for being a good citizen and person.28 The family altar and hearth was 
the centre of the micro-cosmos, as the city temples were the centres of civic life. 
Sacrifices were performed because they were a part of the inherited family tra-
dition, and violating this tradition was considered to be a major breach of one’s 
25 Krishna in the Bhagavad Gītā (2.45) considers the three Vedas to be the core of the kar-
ma-kāṇḍa path. However, Olivelle (2014: 3) claims that the Upaniṣads are the major ancient 
influence on Hinduism. The progression from one path to the other is marked clearly in the 
commentary of Bhaktivedanta Swami on BG 2.45: ‘When the activities for sense gratifica-
tion, namely the karma-kāṇḍa chapter, are finished, then the chance for spiritual realisation 
is offered in the form of the Upaniṣads, which are part of different Vedas.’ 
26 For a similar depiction of this kind of progression – at least chronological – note Bruit 
Zaidmann and Schmitt Pantel 1992: 233–4.
27 Sourvinou-Inwood 2000: 24.
28 Bruit Zaidman and Schmitt Pantel (1992: 27) stress that not the acceptance of a specific 
dogma or belief was what held the community together but rather the right performance of 
ritual. The Vedic period with its rituals is also called the phase of orthopraxy (cf. Witzel 
2003: 86). 
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duties. But besides their importance in perpetuating tradition, the rituals seem to 
have had a tangible outcome that was widely believed in and apparently experi-
enced: prosperity both on the micro and the macro scale.
Isocrates speaks about the outcomes of the performed sacrifices with firm 
confidence:
καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὰ περὶ τοὺϲ θεοὺϲ . . . οὐκ ἀνομάλωϲ οὐδ᾽ ἀτάκτωϲ οὔτ᾽ ἐθεράπευον 
οὔτ᾽ ὠργίαζον· . . . καὶ γὰρ τοι καὶ τὰ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν οὐκ ἐμπλήκτωϲ οὐδὲ ταραχωδῶϲ 
αὐτοῖϲ ϲυνέβαινεν, ἀλλ᾿ εὐκαίρωϲ καὶ πρὸϲ τὴν ἐργαϲίαν τῆϲ χώραϲ καὶ πρὸϲ τὴν 
ϲυγκομιδὴν τῶν καρπῶν. (Isocrates Areopagiticus 29–30)
First of all as to their conduct towards the gods they were not erratic or irregular in 
their worship of them or in the celebration of their rites; . . . And so also the gifts of 
the gods were visited upon them, not fitfully or capriciously, but seasonably both 
for the ploughing of the land and for the ingathering of its fruits. (trans. G. Norlin)
The performance of sacrifices, then, was necessarily one of the most important 
obligations of every citizen. And, if done properly, the results were supposed to 
be immediately tangible: the gods provided their gift in the forms of rain and dry 
weather according to the needs of their dependants.
Not only the weather depended on the performance of sacrifices. So did the 
well-being of whole states. We hear from Lysias that due to the strict following 
of laws the ancestors managed to bring forth a prosperous city. The state’s good 
fortune depends solely on the rituals (τὰ ἱερά):
οἱ τοίνυν πρόγονοι τὰ ἐκ τῶν κύρβεων θύοντεϲ μεγίϲτην καὶ εὐδαιμονεϲτάτην 
τῶν Ἑλληνίδων τὴν πόλιν παρέδοϲαν, ὥϲτε ἄξιον ἡμῖν τὰϲ αὐτὰϲ ἐκείνοιϲ θυϲίαϲ 
ποιεῖϲθαι, καὶ εἰ μηδὲν δι᾿ ἄλλο, τῆϲ τύχηϲ ἕνεκα τῆϲ ἐξ ἐκείνων τῶν ἱερῶν 
γεγενημένηϲ. (Lysias 30.18)
Now our ancestors, by sacrificing in accordance with the tablets, have handed down 
to us a city superior in greatness and prosperity to any other in Greece; so that it 
behoves us to perform the same sacrifices as they did, if for no other reason than that 
of the success, which has resulted from those rites. (trans. W. R. M. Lamb)
One must (as Lysias himself insists) sacrifice according to the tradition of 
the homeland in order to assure its prosperity:
ὅϲτιϲ ἀξιῶ πρῶτον μὲν κατὰ τὰ πάτρια θύειν, ἔπειτα ἂ μᾶλλον ϲυμφέρει τῇ πόλει 
(Lysias 30.19).
First that our sacrifices be performed according to our ancestral rules, and second 
that they be those which tend to promote the interests of the city. (trans. W. R. M. 
Lamb)29
29 These results are also the ultimate proof for the very existence of gods. By sacrificing 
according to the tradition one gets what one wanted. It follows that someone has to be there 
to be able to grant these benedictions (cf. Parker 2011: 3).
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This process seems to be rather mechanistic: one has to perform a certain 
action in order to achieve the desired result.30 There is no room for consideration 
of the inner attitude. The action itself is the key to the result. Therefore, it clearly 
resembles in this particular feature the path of karma of the Indian tradition.31 In 
both cultures the rituals are employed to reach one’s own ends and goals, which 
are understood as gaining prosperity for oneself and the city one was born in. The 
environment and the rituals have their role and function solely in the context of 
earthly existence and are directed towards divinities, who are considered to be 
immanent and personal. All these characteristics hint at the similarity between 
this form of Greek religion and the Indian phase of karma.
Philosophical rejection
Relatively early on in the development of Greek thought there seems to occur a 
departure from the mythological view of the world and the at times all-too-human 
gods and strictly ritualistic approach to divinity. This rejection is mainly connected 
with the philosophical search for the one primordial element. This one primordial 
element takes the place of the manifold Olympus of the polytheistic religion.
The earliest extant explicit critique of the traditional view starts with 
Xenophanes, who dismisses the anthropomorphic images of the gods and seeks 
after a transcendent (or monistic) god. A god who is unlike anything humans can 
experience on earth. Xenophanes dismisses in regard to gods everything that is 
based on everyday experience and pleads for an uncompromising monism that 
quite vividly resembles the Upaniṣadic tradition. In the following famous lines, 
he criticises the traditional views on gods as being relative and dependent on the 
given circumstances of the people creating them:
ἀλλ᾿ οἱ βροτοὶ δοκέουϲι γεννᾶϲθαι θεοὺϲ,
τὴν ϲφετέρην δ᾿ ἐϲθῆτα ἔχειν φωνήν τε δὲμαϲ τε. (21 DK B14)
But mortals suppose that gods are born,
wear their own clothes and have a voice and body.
ἀλλ᾿ εἰ χεῖραϲ ἔχον βόεϲ <ἵπποι τ᾿> ἠὲ λέοντεϲ
ἤ γράψαι χείρεϲϲι καὶ ἔργα τελεῖν ἅπερ ἄνδρεϲ,
ἵπποι μέν θ᾿ ἵπποιϲι βόεϲ δέ τε βουϲὶν ὁμοίαϲ
καί <κε> θεῶν ἰδέαϲ ἔγραφον καὶ ϲώματ᾿ ἐποίουν
τοιαῦθ᾿ οἵόν περ καὐτοι δέμαϲ εἴχον <ἕκαϲτοι> (B15)
30 Apparently it worked as well the other way around: Suetonius tells that after the death of 
Germanicus the temples of the gods were destroyed, for they (the gods) did not provide the 
requested protection for the beloved Germanicus (Suetonius Life of Caligula 5).
31 This way of practising religion is encoded in the famous Latin phrase commenting on the 
religious attitudes of Romans: do ut des (‘I give that you may give’: cf. Rüpke 2007: 149). 
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But if horses or oxen or lions had hands
or could draw with their hands and accomplish such works as men,
horses would draw the figures of the gods as similar to horses and the oxen as 
similar to oxen,
and they would make the bodies
of the sort which each of them had.
Αἰθίοπέϲ τε <θεούϲ ϲφετέρουϲ> ϲιμοὺϲ μέλανάϲ τε
Θρῇκέϲ τε γλαυκοὺϲ καὶ πυρρούϲ <φασι πέλεϲθαι> (B16)
Aithiopians say that their gods are snub-nosed and black,
Thracians that they are blue-eyed and red-haired. (trans. J. H. Lesher)
Having rejected the traditional gods, he presents a constructive theology of a 
strict monism that resembles the Upaniṣadic view. Xenophanes claims that god 
is transcendent, completely unlike men: εἷϲ θεόϲ, ἐν δὲ θεοῖϲι καὶ ἀνθρώποιϲι 
μέγιϲτοϲ / οὔτι δέμαϲ θνητοῖϲιν ὁμοίιοϲ οὔδε νόημα, ‘One god is greatest among 
gods and men, / not at all like mortals in body or in thought’ (B23); that he does 
not have the necessity to move, as he moves the universe by his thought (B25–6); 
and that he sees, thinks and hears in his wholeness (B24). This divinity appears to 
be so different from the traditional gods that no relationship is possible between 
him (it?) and the world as such.32
Besides Xenophanes there were other philosophers who tended towards 
monism. Heraclitus for instance talks about the One God through opposites in a 
way that marks vividly the monistic approach – a breach from earthly dualism:33
ὁ θεὸϲ ἡμέρη εὐφρόνη, χειμὼν θέροϲ, πόλεμοϲ εἰρήνη, κόροϲ λιμόϲ· ἀλλοιοῦται δὲ 
ὅκωϲπερ πῦρ ὁπόταν ϲυμμιγῆ̣ θυώμαϲιν ὀνομάζεται καθ᾿ ἡδονὴν ἑκάϲτου [πῦρ]. 
(22 DK B67)
God is day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, plenty and want. But he is 
changed, just as when incense is mingled with incense, but named according to the 
pleasure of each. (trans. G. T. W. Patrick)34
32 Cf. Feyerabend 1987: 16.
33 Interestingly, such a definition through opposites is also found in the Isopaniṣad Mantra 
5: tad ejati tan naijati / tad dūre tad v antike / tad antar asya sarvasya / tad u sarvasyāsya 
bāhyataḥ (‘The Supreme Lord walks and does not walk. He is far away, but He is very near 
as well. He is within everything, and yet He is outside of everything.’) And 8: sa paryagāc 
chukram akāyam avraṇam / asnāviram śuddham apāpa-viddham / kavir manīṣī paribhūḥ 
svayambhūr / yāthātathyato‚ rthān vyadadhāc chāśvatibhyaḥ samābhyaḥ (‘Such a person 
must factually know the greatest of all, the Personality of Godhead, who is unembodied, 
omniscient, beyond reproach, without veins, pure and uncontaminated, the self-sufficient 
philosopher who has been fulfilling everyone’s desire since time immemorial.’) (trans. 
A. C. Bhaktivedanta Swami). 
34 Here god is so much unlike men that any meaningful talk about him is impossible. The 
Platonic Parmenides (134e 2–4) makes the point very clear and marks the first step towards 
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Xenophanes and Heraclitus both claimed that there is one god. But this 
divinity took on different shapes in the hands of the various philosophers. 
Interestingly, out of similar considerations the Upaniṣads arrived at the (almost 
pantheistic) notion that everything is spirit (brahman). The Ionian philosophers 
and their followers deified the elements of nature: water, fire, air and so on. In 
that way the philosophers did not reject the idea of divinity but acknowledged 
that basically everything may be of divine nature. This notion was further devel-
oped by Anaxagoras, who saw the ἀρχή in the Mind and – having deified it 
– arrived at a strongly impersonal image of a deity.35
However, the gods were not rejected without taking into consideration the 
rituals that go along with them. Heraclitus criticises for instance the practice of 
prayer in front of images of the deity and compares it to having a conversation 
with or trying to talk to houses without understanding the true nature of gods 
(cf. B5). The idea of there being a true nature of the gods is a hint that they are 
considered by him not as immanent, belonging to the earthly realm, but rather as 
coming from a different dimension.
Plato goes a step further and calls sacrifices bribery.36 However, this Platonic 
view, and the resulting notion that the attitude of the worshipper is far more 
important than the sacrifice itself, points towards an attempt at a personal rela-
tionship with the divinity and therefore to the next step in the development: the 
level of reconciliation (see below).
This turn to a monistic but rather impersonal view of the now transcendent 
divinity, coupled with the notion of its ineffability in comparison to the myth-
ological gods suited to narrative, is a shared step in the development of Greek 
and Indian thought. Interestingly, they happened roughly in the same time-span 
(the earliest Upaniṣads are dated around 600–500 bce; the Greek explosion of 
[so-called] rationalism starts around the same time).
Among the sages of the East this particular development is connected with 
a kind of frustration deriving from the realisation that the happiness achieved 
through the means of traditional religion is impermanent and shallow. The 
immediate reason for the Greek development is difficult to discern, although we 
the development of apophatic theology: ἀλλὰ ὁμοίωϲ ἡμεῖϲ τ᾿ ἐκείνων οὐκ ἄρχομεν τῇ 
παρ᾿ ἡμῖν ἀρχῇ οὐδὲ γιγνώϲκομεν τοῦ θείου οὐδὲν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ἐπιϲτήμῃ (‘we do not rule 
the gods with our authority, nor do we know anything of the divine with our knowledge’ 
– trans. H. N. Fowler).
35 Cf. Price 1999: 129 and Muir 1985: 196.
36 Leg. 10.885b 7–9: ‘. . . or he believes that they (scil. the gods) are easily to be won over 
when bribed by offerings and prayers’ (trans. R. G. Bury). Apparently Saint Paul had 
exactly the same criticism of this kind of religious behaviour. Businesslike religion, he 
claimed, has nothing to do with spirituality or developing a loving attitude towards the 
divine (Romans 4: 4).
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can detect a similar frustration about the all-too-human relations with the gods 
and a longing for an all-encompassing explanation of the world and a monistic 
yet transcendent dimension.
Reconciliation: towards a personal religion
The third and last step in the development, which is represented in the Indian 
tradition by bhakti, is characterised through an attempt at establishing personal 
contact with the divinity by means of loving or devotional service towards god. 
This service consists of engaging the world in the worship of the Supreme. On 
this path it is not one’s own satisfaction and pleasure that are central, but the 
pleasure of the divine. Within the Greek tradition it will be possible to detect 
similar reflections.
Besides calling traditional sacrifices bribery, Plato stressed that through the 
means of ritual and incantation one can win power.37 Plato makes a strong case 
that those who perform these kinds of rituals in order to achieve their own goals 
are hypocritical criminals hiding their utmost impiety under the semblance of 
religious behaviour (εἰρωνικοί; Leg. 10.908e1): they do not pay attention to the 
divine but just want their desires fulfilled. In simply doing some business with 
the gods they do not seek a deeper relationship with them (Leg. 10.908e–909c). 
He also recognised that it was not the rituals per se that were reproachable but 
the attitudes of the performers of the sacrifice. He stressed in a passage of the 
Laws that men have to commune with the gods continually in order to achieve 
real happiness in life:
τῷ μὲν ἀγαθῷ θύειν καὶ προϲομιλεῖν ἀεὶ τοῖϲ θεοῖϲ εὐχαῖϲ καὶ ἀναθήμαϲιν καὶ 
ϲυμπάϲῃ θεραπείᾳ θεῶν κάλλιϲτον καὶ ἄριϲτον καὶ ἀνυϲιμώτατον πρὸϲ τὸν 
εὐδαίμονα βίον καὶ δὴ καὶ διαφερόντωϲ πρέπον. (Leg. 4.716d)
To engage in sacrifice and commune with the gods continually, by prayers and offer-
ings and devotions of every kind, is a thing most noble and good and helpful towards 
the happy life, and superlatively fitting also for the good person. (trans. R. G. Bury)
Against the tradition of polis religion Plato claims that in the course of the sacri-
fice performance what is crucial is not the ritual itself but rather the attitude of the 
sacrificer. He opts for rituals to be performed primarily for the sake of the gods 
themselves. The satisfaction and happiness of the people who perform those 
acts is seen as a by-product of the satisfaction of the gods. Being lovingly wor-
shipped, the gods ensure through their goodwill and gratitude that their subjects 
37 Republic 2.364b 6–8: ‘begging priests and soothsayers go to rich men’s doors and make 
them believe that they by means of sacrifices and incantations have accumulated a treasure 
of power from the gods’ (trans. P. Shorey).
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are provided with all that is needed (Leg. 11.931a). The ritual begins therefore 
to cease to be a business-like enterprise. It rather appears to be a symptom of a 
budding relationship with the divine.
A similar notion is found in Porphyry, who is in the first place concerned 
with the ways to please the gods and claims that they are not as much satisfied 
with abundant meat offerings (for the people probably have in mind mostly the 
feast afterwards) as with offerings of the first fruits done in a devotional attitude 
(Porphyry De Abstinentia 2.16).38 And even more so it is not the sacrifice itself 
that is the key process of worship but the contemplation of god, as Porphyry 
claims along with Pythagoreans.39 Meditation as central to religious practice is 
found also in Apuleius. Lucius, after having been transformed back into human 
form, promises Isis, his saviour, that he will enclose her image in his heart – the 
very meaning of a meditative relationship:
ergo quod solum potest religiosus quidem, sed pauper alioquin, efficere curabo: 
divinos tuos vultus numenque sanctissimum intra pectoris mei secreta conditum 
perpetuo custodiens imaginabor. (Apuleius Metamorphoses 11.25)
Howbeit as a good religious person, and according to my poor estate, I will do what I 
may: I will always keep Thy divine appearance in remembrance, and close the imag-
ination of Thy most holy godhead within my heart. (trans. W. Adlington).
However, this kind of personal religious commitment is rarely institutional-
ised or widespread in Greece.40 As we have already mentioned, orthopraxy was 
considered to be the crucial element of the polis religion. In the early days it was 
in particular Orphics (and Pythagoreans) who demanded personal involvement, 
and offered in exchange a religious identity.41 Renunciation (especially of meat), 
coupled with a personal commitment to the deity, provided a revolutionary 
aspect in religious life: externally and internally encompassing commitment.
The philosophical longing for a monistic and transcendent divinity – which 
we recognised as characteristic on the jñāna-path of Indian thought – is also 
38 Price (1999: 140) notes that Porphyry is an example of an extreme spiritualisation of 
 conventional piety.
39 Price 1999: 140.
40 In the Indian tradition there is also a notion of a pyramid when it comes to the distribution 
of each of the paths in the society. For all three paths, despite being put in an order of devel-
opment, coexist with each other. The first one, karma-path, is acknowledged as having the 
most followers and the bhakti-path the least, as it is as well connected with a somewhat 
higher demand on the individual development.  
41 Price 1999: 141. Dodds called the Orphics and Pythagoreans ‘Puritans’ and world- 
renunciants in the sense that they had strict rules of conduct and believed strongly in 
purification as the main goal of life: ‘Purity, rather than justice, has become the cardinal 
means of  salvation’ (1951: 154).
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present in this type, but with an interesting personal twist. This can be seen in 
the person of Socrates, who made traditional offerings42 but at the same time 
carefully listened to what he called to daimonion. Muir claims that Socrates 
recognised in it a being who has supreme wisdom and intelligence and is respon-
sible for the order of the world, and that this divinity has much in common with 
Anaxagoras’ idea of the Mind as the controlling power of the universe.43 Socrates 
admitted to having been in his youth a disciple of Anaxagoras, but rejected him 
as he was dissatisfied with looking solely into Nature herself without inquir-
ing about the duties and roles of human beings (Plato Phaedo 97d). Socrates 
acknowledged therefore the achievements of the Ionian philosophers of Nature 
but tended to go further – investigating not only the question of how we should 
live but also the supreme power behind the realities described by the philoso-
phers of nature (cf. Phaedo 98c–99d: Socrates’ second voyage). Therefore, it 
seems that in Socrates (as in Arjuna in the Gītā) there can be detected a kind of 
development from one level of religious experience to the next.
This interesting merging of the philosophical and religious approaches finds 
its most striking example in the Neoplatonic theurgy. Iamblichus states in de 
mysteriis that not reason but ritual, some unspeakable act beyond comprehen-
sion, is the means for attaining salvation, which is understood to be a union with 
the divinity:
. . . οὐδὲ γαρ ἡ ἔννοια ϲυνάπτει τοῖϲ θεοῖϲ τοὺϲ θεουργούϲ· ἐπεὶ τί ἐκώλυε τοὺϲ 
θεωρητικῶϲ φιλοϲοφοῦνταϲ ἔχειν τὴν θεουργικὴν ἕνωϲιν πρὸϲ τοὺϲ θεοὺϲ; νῦν 
δ᾿ οὐκ ἔχει τό γε ἀληθὲϲ οὕτωϲ· ἀλλ᾿ ἡ τῶν ἔργων τῶν ἀρρήτων καὶ ὑπὲρ πᾶϲαν 
νόηϲιν θεοπρεπῶϲ ἐνεργουμένων τελεϲιουργία ἥ τε τῶν νοουμένων τοῖϲ θεοῖϲ 
μόνον ϲυμβόλων ἀφθέγκτων δύναμιϲ ἐντίθηϲι τὴν θεουργικὴν ἕνωϲιν. (Iamblichus 
De Mysteriis 96, 13 Parthey)
It is not thought that links the theurgist with the gods: what would hinder those 
who are theoretical philosophers from enjoying theurgic union with gods? But the 
situation is not so: it is the accomplishment of acts not to be divulged and beyond 
all conception, and the power of the unutterable symbols, understood solely by the 
gods, which establishes theurgic union. (trans. E. C. Clarke / J. M. Dillon / J. P. 
Hershbell)
Apparently the ritual of the theurgist is of a different kind than that of traditional 
religion. The theurgist, as the name suggests (θεόϲ and ἔργον), does not talk 
about the gods but rather acts upon them. Dodds points out that whereas the 
deeds in the environment of the polis aimed at worldly and oftentimes profane 
ends, here the same ritual is not abandoned but engaged in a different way. It per-
42 Cf. the famous ‘we owe a cock to Asklepios’ (Plato Phaedo 118a) and the statement of 
Xenophon about his religious behaviour conforming with the ways of his fellow citizens 
(Memorabilia 1.1–3).
43 Muir 1985: 208–9.
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tains to the solely religious ends of satisfying the divine or achieving a mystical 
theurgic union with the gods – ἕνωϲιϲ.44
Theurgy also used highly sophisticated magical enchantments to animate 
the statues of gods, which was considered the highest level of deity worship. 
Theurgists developed these techniques to such a point that they claimed to be 
able to ask the deities for oracles and in that way free themselves from fate45 and 
ensure for themselves τῆϲ ψυχῆϲ ἀπαθανατιϲμόϲ (‘the immortalisation of the 
soul‘: Proclus Commentary on Plato’s Republic 1.152, 10). So the performance 
of the ritual and religious acts had a different aim than that of the common state 
religion: the goal was not prosperity and fulfilment of immediate desires but 
rather liberation in the experienced union with the beloved divinity.46 Theurgy 
thus ‘may be described more simply as magic applied to a religious purpose and 
resting on a supposed revelation of a religious character’, as Dodds puts it.47
This form of worship of the gods and engagement in a ritual with a strictly 
religious purpose of pleasing the gods is comparable with what we have seen 
described as bhakti in the Indian tradition. Theurgy, combining philosophical 
reflection, the search for a transcendent divinity, and ritual directed at a personal 
god who is to be pleased, is the closest the Greek tradition gets to the Indian 
version of the third step of the development.
Conclusion
The notion of the Axial Age puts a spell on thinkers and scholars of various creeds 
and denominations. Diverse reasons for the parallel developments in the greatest 
cultures of the world between the eighth and the third centuries bce have been put 
forward.48 The Indian paradigm of a progression from karma through jñāna to 
upāsanā (or bhakti) seems to have its counterpart in Greek culture.
44 Dodds 1951: 291.
45 οὐ γὰρ ὑφ᾿ εἱμαρτὴν ἀγέλην πίπτουϲι θεουργοί (Chaldean Oracles, p. 59 Kr.): ‘the theur-
gists do not fall under the fate-fixed mass of people’.
46 Of course we hear as well famous stories about producing thunderstorms in order to 
save the Roman army (cf. Suidas s.v. Ἰουλιανόϲ) or even ending pestilence (cf. reference 
in Dodds 1951: 301), which might remind us of the traditional (in our scheme) karma 
approach to ritual. Using the ritual and worship for profane ends and not as a means to 
please the divine has in fact nothing to do with the path of real theurgy (in our scheme 
bhakti) as presented in Iamblichus. This development or abuse of theurgical acts might be 
considered a deterioration of their pure purpose as they were developed in the first place for 
the sake of establishing a meaningful relationship with the divine. 
47 Dodds 1951: 291.
48 For instance the theory that universal philosophies came into being in universal and 
 multi-cultured empires (Christian 2004: 319) or the view that coinage had a decisive influ-
ence on the development of new ways of thinking (Graeber 2011, drawing on Seaford 2004). 
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Greek culture moves along the path from a mythological understanding 
of the world, through a rationalistic one, towards an attempt at an apparent 
reconciliation between the two. The elements of each step are consistent with 
the characteristics of the Indian counterpart. Immanent polytheistic gods and 
the rituals designed to control them correspond with the first step (karma) of the 
Indian development. The search for a primordial monistic force underlying the 
universe and the ways of expressing it (apophatic theology) is analogous with 
the Upaniṣadic attempts at achieving jñāna. Finally the third step of the Indian 
paradigm, the bhakti stage, seems to have some elements that are analogous with 
the Neoplatonistic theurgy (and to some extent with the personal development 
of Socrates).
The Indian paradigm offers yet another approach to the question of the 
development of cultures. In its Vaishnava Bengali version it even claims a uni-
versality as it points out that not only individuals (cf. Arjuna in the Bhagavad 
Gītā) but whole cultures go through an affirming, rejecting and then finally 
accommodating phase in their development. From that perspective the changes 
that different cultures underwent at the point of the so-called Axial Age would 
be just a natural development from the first to the next step. The third step would 
then still await its Jaspers to name it.
16
The justice of the Indians
Richard Stoneman
Περὶ τῶν Ἰνδῶν, ὅτι δικαιότατοι, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐθῶν καὶ νομίμων αὐτῶν.
Ctesias claims that the Indians are very just people; he also describes their customs 
and manners. (Ctesias fragment [= F] 45.16)
Πολλὰ δὲ λέγει (sc. Ctesias) περὶ τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς περὶ τὸν σφῶν 
βασιλέα εὐνοίας καὶ τῆς τοῦ θανάτου καταφρονήσεως.
Ctesias says a great deal about their justice, their goodwill towards their king, and 
their contempt for death. (Ctesias F45.30)
(Οἱ Κυνοκέφαλοι) . . . δίκαιοι δέ εἰσι καὶ μακροβιώτατοι πάντων ἀνθρώπων.
The Dogheads . . . are just men who enjoy the greatest longevity of any people. 
(Ctesias F45.43)
Greek accounts
These three passages are almost the only references to the customs of any Indian 
peoples in what survives of Ctesias’ account of India.1 Ctesias of Cnidus was a 
physician who held a post at the court of the Persian King Artaxerxes I, proba-
bly from 415 to 398/7 bce. He wrote an extensive account of Persian history in 
 twenty-three books and a much shorter description of India in one book. His his-
tory of Persia is regarded as extremely unreliable, not least where it contradicts his 
predecessor Herodotus, but it probably contains much that was in oral circulation 
in Persian court circles. Ctesias’ Indica is the first monograph devoted in Greek 
(or any other language) to India: he did not visit India but recorded what he had 
learned from merchants, some of them Bactrian, visiting Persia from the Indus 
 1 F45.23 has a similar report of the Pygmies of India; the Dog-heads are described at length 
in F45.37–43.
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Valley and the ‘Silk Road’.2 His works are lost, but we possess long excerpts from 
both of them in the reading diary of the tenth-century Byzantine bishop Photius, 
as well as scattered quotations in other writers, notably Aelian. Most of the Indian 
extract is devoted to hydrography, to zoological and botanical marvels – griffins, 
poisonous birds, manticores – and to bizarre races like the Dog-headed people. 
By contrast, Megasthenes, who spent time at the court of Chandragupta Maurya 
in the early third century bce, wrote a book which included extensive information 
on manners and customs, including (F27 Schwanbeck = FGrH 715F32) their sim-
plicity and the infrequency of lawsuits among them.3
Is this what Ctesias meant by calling the Indians ‘very just’?4 The question 
requires some investigation of the meaning of ‘justice’ for Greek writers, in par-
ticular in its ethnographic application. Distant (or ‘primitive’) peoples are often 
described as ‘just’ or something similar by Greek writers, beginning with the 
‘blameless Ethiopians’ of Homer. The Augustan writer Nicolaus of Damascus 
(FGrH 90F103m)5 also wrote of the Ethiopians that they ἀσκοῦσι δὲ εὐσέβειαν 
καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ἄθυροι δὲ αὐτῶν αἱ οἰκίαι. Και ἐν τοῖς ὅδοις κειμένων πολλῶν 
οὐδὲ εἷς κλέπτει, ‘They practice piety and justice, and their houses have no 
doors. No one steals any of the many things lying around in the streets.’ They are 
also said by Stephanus to have been the first people to create laws (s.v. Αἰθίοψ).
Aeschylus, if he is the author of Prometheus Unbound, mentioned the Gabii,
   Δῆμον ἐνδικώτατον
<βροτῶν> ἁπάντων καὶ φιλοξενώτατον (F196 Lloyd-Jones),
‘a people of all mortals most just and hospitable’, who need never plough the 
earth for it brings forth all they need of its own accord. These are no doubt the 
same as the Abii of Homer (Iliad 13.6). Their justice and hospitality are part of 
a Golden Age scenario in which nature provides men’s needs without work, like 
the Garden of Eden, expulsion from which entailed that ‘in the sweat of thy brow 
shalt thou eat bread’.
 2 F45.51; on Bactria F45.6 and 26; Karttunen 1989: 85, Nichols 2011: 21–7.
 3 Karttunen (1989: 97) is of the opinion that Ctesias imposes less interpretation than 
Megasthenes, who makes India into a Utopia. But is he right? Strabo 2.1.9 rates 
Megasthenes’ reliability lower than that of Patrocles, but only on geographical matters. 
Cf. Democritus 68 DK A18 (Taylor 1999: 61 = Strabo 15.1.38): Strabo, discussing the 
River Sila(s), on which it is said nothing floats, notes that Megasthenes asserts this and that 
Democritus denies it, and he also refers to Aristotle for the denial.
 4 There is probably an implied contrast, in their loyalty to their kings, with the relationship 
of the Persian Great King to his peoples. See Lenfant 2004: clviii.
 5 Stobaeus 44.25 (IV.142). Photius calls Nicolaus’ work παραδόξων ἐθῶν συναγωγή, which 
implies a work of paradoxography rather than ethnography; he adds to a number of weird 
tales collected by Conon (no. 186 in Wilson). See Wilson 1994: 129. Edith Parmentier in 
her edition of Nicolas de Damascus (2011), xxviii–xxxii follows the geographical order of 
these ethnographic snippets rather than the Byzantine ‘moral’ order.
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Other peoples are described in similar terms. Agatharchides (Periplus of the 
Red Sea 49) says that the Fish-Eaters of the Red Sea are notable for the absence 
of greed among them, and for this reason they neither inflict evil on others nor 
incur it. Strabo (11.4.4) says of the Albanians of the Caucasus that they are 
ἁπλοῖ, not so much simple as straightforward: they use barter not money and 
because they are ‘uncivilised’ they do not engage in business. Similar qualities 
are sometimes attributed also to the Scythians6 and to the Seres.7
Such qualities verge on the Utopian.8 Onesicritus, who travelled with 
Alexander, described the kingdom of Musicanus on the Lower Indus (FGrH 
134F24 = Strabo 15.1.34), ‘lauding it rather at length for things of which some 
are reported as common also to other Indians, as, for example their length of life 
. . . their healthfulness, their simple diet . . .’; they do not use gold or silver; there 
is no slavery (since the young men perform the duties of public servants, like the 
helots of Sparta [see also F25]); they regard science as wickedness (except for 
medicine); ‘they have no process at laws except for murder and outrage, for it is 
not in one’s power to avoid suffering these, whereas the content of contracts is 
in the power of each man himself’. Much the same is reported of the definitely 
fabulous people described in the novel of Iambulus: they also live in India 
(somewhere), are notably long-lived and have no private property.9
All this raises the suspicion that Greek writers about India simply foisted on 
its inhabitants a set of qualities that they associated with what later came to be 
called the ‘noble savage’. Even Megasthenes, who wrote some fifty years after 
Alexander’s expedition, has been accused of interpretatio Graeca, with perhaps 
less justification than most authors.10 Karttunen in fact states that Ctesias is less 
prone to this vice than other Greeks.11 Indians were conveniently ‘other’ and 
could be used as a stick to beat Greeks, as for example in Eratosthenes (Strabo 
 6 Strabo 7.3.7, Dio Chrysostom Orations 69.6. Σκύθαι γοῦν οὐδὲν κωλύονται οἱ νομάδες μήτε 
οἰκίας ἔχοντες μήτε γὴν σπείροντες ἦ φυτεύοντες δικαίας καὶ κατὰ νόμους πολιτεύεσθαι. 
ἀνεὺ δὲ νόμου καὶ δικαίου μὴ κακῶς ζῆν ἀνθρώπους καὶ πολὺ τῶν θηρίων ὠμότερον οὐ 
δυνατόν, ‘The Scythians, at any rate, nomads who have no houses and do not sow or plant 
land, are not precluded from living justly and according to laws. It is not possible for 
men without law and justice not to live a bad life, and one much more savage than that of 
animals.’
 7 Epistula Alexandri ad Aristotelem 22. 
 8 See Ferguson 1975: 18–19 on all this. In general, Lovejoy and Boas 1935: 287–367 on ‘the 
Noble Savage’. The standard work is now Winiarczyk 2011. At pp. 247–50 he collects all 
the instances of justice as a utopian topos, but omits Epistula Alexandri ad Aristotelem 22.
 9 See Winiarczyk 2011: 190 (Taprobane), 238 (long-livedness), 250 (commonality of prop-
erty) for these markers of Utopia.
10 Karttunen 1989: 97, who asserts that Herodotus also makes use of interpretation Graeca, 
while Ctesias listens to everything ‘with attention and credulity’ (80).
11 Karttunen 1989: 80.
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1.4.9) who wrote that ‘not only are many of the Greeks bad, but many of the 
barbarians refined (ἀστεῖοι)12 – Indians and Arians [from the region of Herat], for 
example’. Aelian (Varia Historia 10.14) says that the Indians and Persians are 
‘brave and free’. However, there is also material in the Greek sources that indi-
cates a serious attempt to report on Indian conditions, even before Megasthenes, 
and I propose to explore some of the connotations of the idea of Indian ‘justice’ 
through Indian material also.
It is worth noting that in the sixth century ce the Chinese traveller Xuan 
Zang reported in similar terms on the Indian peoples:
With respect to the ordinary people, although they are naturally light-minded, yet 
they are upright and honourable. In money matters they are without craft, and in 
administering justice they are considerate. . . . They are not deceitful or treacherous 
in their conduct, and are faithful to their oaths and promises . . . with respect to 
criminals or rebels, these are few in number, and only occasionally troublesome.13
Xuan Zang goes on to enumerate the rules of trial and forms of punishment. This 
may be regarded as independent testimony, from nearly a millennium later, of a 
general view of the Indians as a law-abiding people.
Justice in Greek philosophy
If we look beyond the ethnographic perspective, it is clear that Justice is a key 
concept in Greek philosophy, and if I were to summarise Plato’s philosophy 
in a couple of sentences I could do worse than describe it as an exploration of 
the nature and conditions of justice. The Republic begins from the insight that 
‘no man is an island’ and that to live in society entails getting along with one’s 
fellow-man; the Laws is an exploration of the way that a just society might 
be created in the teeth of man’s natural propensity to injustice and personal 
advantage. Justice is social justice: but that can be interpreted in different ways. 
Heraclides Ponticus in his lost work περὶ δικαιοσύνης (F50 Wehrli), describing 
the collapse of the Milesian polis, described it in terms of political strife of rich 
and poor, perhaps implying that his definition of justice includes a measure of 
political equality. Much later, Philostratus in his Life of Apollonius of Tyana 
(3.25), has an Indian reprove the philosopher: ‘You seem to think avoidance of 
12 The meaning of asteioi here is not perspicuous. Probably ‘refined’, ‘gracious’ is the correct 
translation, rather than a specific reference to being city-dwellers.
13 Beal 1884: I. 83. Cf. also I. 177 on the bravery and justice of the Kullu people. The first 
passage is also included in Devahuti 2001: 132. Xuan Zang is also spelled Hsüan Ts’ang, 
and other variants, in older scholarship. See also Waley 1952, for a lively account of Xuan 
Zang’s journey.
The justice of the Indians 255
wrong is the same as Justice’, which implies that social equality, not just the rule 
of law, is required.
Plato’s society, however, is to be ruled by philosopher kings, embodiments 
of wisdom, who control both the spirited part of the soul and of society and 
that dominated by desire. No conception of social equality here. John Ferguson 
declared without argument14 that Plato based this idea on the threefold divi-
sion of Indian society into Brahmins (wisdom), Kshatriyas (temper) and traders 
(desire), while the Sudras were the equivalent of slaves in Plato’s construction. 
This idea, Ferguson averred, Plato had got from Pythagoras following the latter’s 
travels in India where he also picked up the idea of metempsychosis and so on. 
We need not take this idea very seriously in this form,15 even while we admit that 
earlier Greeks had acquired some knowledge of India. Plato’s older contempo-
rary, Democritus, in particular was said to have travelled to India (and practically 
everywhere else in the known world as well).16 Both Aelian17 in the second 
century ce and Bishop Hippolytus18 in the fourth have him visiting India and 
the ‘naked sages’.19 He seems to have had views on the origins of civilisation, 
perhaps based on observation of polities less ‘advanced’ in organisation than 
that of contemporary Greeks. Most of the anthropogony in Diodorus’ History I. 
35–42, which is the reverse of any Golden Age concept, probably derives from 
Democritus.20
Law
Plato believed it was necessary to create a Utopia to ensure a just society, and 
that justice could only be ensured by extensive and detailed laws. Indian society 
in the period before and around Alexander is characterised by both Nearchus and 
Megasthenes as having no written laws,21 which would qualify it as a natural 
Utopia. However, if we examine this phrase further, it is clear that these authors 
are not saying that there are no laws in India. In fact, if there was, as it seems, 
14 Ferguson 1975: 63–4.
15 Plato’s suggestion may, however, be taken to imply some awareness of the kind of tripartite 
division of Indo-European society argued for by Georges Dumézil
16 68 DK A7 = T7 in Taylor 1999: 59.
17 Varia Historia 4.20 = T22 Taylor.
18 Refutatio 1.12–13 = T78.
19 T6 Taylor = DL 9.35.
20 Cole 1967: 186, Cartledge 1998: 20–1.
21 Nearchus FGrH 133F23 = Strabo 15.1.66; Megasthenes F27 Schwanbeck = FGrH 715F32 
= Strabo 15.1.53. See also Onesicritus FGrH 134F24 who says that in the kingdom of 
Musicanus there was no process of law.
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no writing, there could be no written laws.22 This does not preclude there having 
been extensive laws. The detailing in these authors of various severe punish-
ments for certain crimes (mutilation for false witness, the loss of a hand for 
maiming another person, death for causing another to lose a hand or eye)23 makes 
clear that there were laws to be applied. In writing about the absence of slavery 
Megasthenes (as paraphrased by Diodorus)24 states that ‘it is silly to make laws 
on the basis of equality for all persons, and yet to establish inequalities in social 
intercourse’.25 Though our surviving Indian texts all belong to a later period, 
the tradition of Indian law-making goes back at least to the sixth century bce. 
Romila Thapar writes of the emergence of kingdoms in this period that one of 
the responsibilities of kings was to maintain the laws (and to collect taxes).26 
Authority was required to combat the ‘law of the fish’, which is that big fish eat 
little fish. This took place when the religious forms of Vedic society began to be 
modified by the rise of kingships, clan-states and republics.27 Ctesias, notably, 
never mentions kings, perhaps reflecting a backward-looking view of Indian 
society.
Indians, like Plato, recognised that society was impossible without a sense of 
justice. So the dharma was established at the moment of creation, when the gods 
dismembered the cosmic giant.28
From that sacrifice in which everything was offered, the verses and chants were 
born, the metres were born from it, and from it the formulas were born. Horses 
were born from it, and those other animals that have two rows of teeth; cows were 
born from it, and from it goats and sheep were born. . . . With the sacrifice the gods 
sacrificed to the sacrifice. These were the first ritual laws (the dharmas, archetypal 
22 The evidence is somewhat contradictory. Megasthenes says that the Indians ‘have no 
written laws, but are ignorant of writing’ (Strabo 15.1.53 = Megasthenes F27 Schwanbeck 
= FGrH 715F32), while Nearchus says that ‘they write missives on linen cloth’ (Strabo 
15.1.67 = FGrH 133F23). Modern scholars are equally divided, with Romila Thapar (2002: 
163) conceding the existence of writing in the fifth century and Richard Gombrich (2013: 
17) adamant that there is no writing before Aśoka. For a fuller discussion see Stoneman 
(forthcoming).
23 Megasthenes FGrH 715F32 = Strabo 15.1.54. The delightful tenth-century ce book of 
travellers’ tales by Buzurg ibn Shahriyar (1928: no. 99, 137f) notes that ‘theft among the 
Indians is a very serious offence’, and is punishable by death.
24 Diod. 2.39 = Megasthenes FGrH 715F4.39.
25 ‘Social intercourse’ translates the conjecture συνουσίας (Capps); the mss. have οὐσίας 
(‘properties’). The existence of judges is also mentioned at FGrH 715F4.42. 
26 Thapar 2002: 153.
27 Cf. Avari 2007: 86ff. Gore Vidal also shows awareness of this social development in his 
novel about Xerxes, Creation (1981: 214, 219–20), in which Jains and Buddhists pose a 
threat to society by their rejection of caste rigidities.
28 Doniger 1981: 31.
The justice of the Indians 257
patterns of behaviour). These very powers reached the sky where dwell the Sadhyas, 
the ancient gods. (RV 10.90.9–16)
Righteousness is the first need of all: ‘What is needful? Righteousness, and sacred 
learning and teaching’ (TU 1.9). This is then followed by Truth, Meditation, 
Self-control, Peace, Ritual and Humanity. Another statement about justice in 
the Upaniṣads comes in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad: ‘in my kingdom there are no 
thieves, no misers, no one who drinks; no one without learning or a sacred fire, 
no lecher, much less a whore!’ (ChU 5.11.5).29 Again, theft ranks high among 
the blemishes on a just or righteous society. However, dharma varies according 
to caste and status,30 and the duty of Krishna expressed in the Bhagavad Gītā is 
not necessarily the same as that of non-heroic mortals. It also progresses through 
a historical development.
Can dharma be the concept that the Greeks had in mind when they extolled 
Indian dikaiosyne? When the British ruled India they took dharma to be the 
equivalent of Law and attempted to introduce the Laws of Manu as a law-code 
for India.31 However dubious this enterprise, the Laws of Manu and its prede-
cessor texts, the Dharmasūtras, are a repository of information about laws that 
may go back at least to the sixth century bce. They are both descriptive and 
prescriptive.32 The earliest of the Dharmasūtras have sometimes been attributed 
to the sixth century.33 That of Gautama has sometimes been regarded as the ear-
liest, but its references to Yaunas (Greeks) may preclude its being earlier than 
the middle of the third century.34 Patrick Olivelle35 regards that of Apastamba as 
being somewhat earlier than this, while Doniger36 is of the opinion that the earli-
est of the Dharmasūtras belong to the fourth century bce. Most of the provisions 
in Apastamba’s work relate to ritual rather than social interaction, though from 
2.10 onwards there are discussions of class, marriage and inheritance. From 2.25 
the duties of the king include taxes, crime and punishment and judicial process. 
It is the king’s rod (danda) that symbolises authority and the power of coercion.
These basics are much more developed in the Laws of Manu, which certainly 
belongs to a later period, but the range of topics is similar. Book 7 (12–18) begins 
from a consideration of justice, emblematised in the rod, as a duty of kings in 
29 The passage is discussed by Agrawala 1953: 485–7. 
30 Thapar 2013: 339.
31 Doniger and Smith 1991: lx.
32 Doniger and Smith 1991: x and lvi.
33 Olivelle 1999: xxxi.
34 Indians may have known of Greeks as subjects of the Achaemenid empire before they 
encountered the army of Alexander.
35 Olivelle 1999: xxi.
36 Doniger 1981: xxxv.
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order to avoid social collapse. Book 8 includes discussion of such matters as 
interest (140–3), contracts (163), the necessity of impartial judgement (174), 
deception (224), livestock, boundaries, irreligion (310), theft (314), assault 
(345), adultery (352).
It is interesting to examine how far such topics, which are not specified in the 
earliest Dharmasūtras, are nevertheless reflected in the reports of Greek writers. 
The Greeks might thus prove to be witnesses for adherence to law and social 
customs from the sixth century, prior to their encoding in the written law codes. 
Let us take some examples.
Piety
As was made clear above, the moment of creation was marked by the establish-
ment of the rule of sacrifice and reverence towards the gods. Aelian writes:
Who could fail to admire the wisdom of the barbarians? None of them has lapsed 
into atheism, and none argue about the gods – whether they exist or do not exist, 
and whether they have any concern for us or not . . . neither the Indian, nor the Celt, 
nor the Egyptian. The barbarians I have just mentioned say that gods exist, that they 
provide for us, that they indicate the future by omens and signs, by entrails and by 
other forms of instruction and teachings. (Varia Historia 2.31)
Aelian contrasts the barbarians in this matter with the sophisticated Greek intel-
lectuals such as Euhemerus and Epicurus who deny the gods. While Aelian does 
not refer exclusively to Indians, and not all his characteristics belong to Indian 
religion (e.g. divination by entrails), he certainly makes them a prominent exam-
ple. It is probable that this passage, like many of Aelian’s unattributed snippets 
of information about India, derives ultimately from Ctesias. In fact, religious 
dissent and scepticism are found as early as the sixth century, when shramanas 
begin to reject animal sacrifice and other Vedic practices; their attitudes may 
have influenced Pyrrhonian scepticism in the generation after Alexander.37
Honesty
If we turn now to matters of human interaction, there are a number of traits 
reported by Greeks that exemplify justice. A long excerpt from Megasthenes pre-
served by Strabo begins by observing the frugality of the Indians, and goes on:
37 Frenkian 1957: 75ff.: see the German summary review in Bibliotheca Classica Orientalis 
4 (1958), 212–49; Flintoff 1980: 88–108, Kuzminski 2010, Beckwith 2015. See note 27 
above on ascetics as the enemy of traditional religion.
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Theft is of very rare occurrence. Megasthenes says that those who were in the camp 
of Sandrokottos, wherein lay 400,000 men, found that the thefts reported on any one 
day did not exceed the value of two hundred drachmae, and this among a people 
who have no written laws, but are ignorant of writing, and must therefore in all the 
business of life trust to memory.38
Below, he writes ‘Their houses and property they generally leave unguarded.’ 
This description of Indian manners recalls the behaviour of the idealised 
Ethiopians mentioned by Nicolaus (above, note 5), who are able to leave property 
lying about in public places. However, an identification of Nicolaus’ Ethiopians 
with Indians seems precluded by the fact that he has another passage specifically 
about Indians (F103y), in which he writes:
Among the Indians, if anyone is deprived of money he has lent or deposited, there 
is no trial, but the creditor accuses him personally. He who deprives an artisan of 
the use of his hand or his eye is punished by death. By order of the king, the greatest 
offenders have their heads shaved, since this is the extremity of shame among them.
This may be set alongside a passage just following in Strabo’s report of 
Megasthenes: ‘The simplicity of their laws and their contracts is proved by the 
fact that they seldom go to law. They have no suits about pledges or deposits, nor 
do they require either seals or witnesses, but make their deposits and confide in 
each other.’ All these passages bear witness to the honesty of Indians, the unusu-
alness of theft and their reluctance to go to law.
Elsewhere Aelian (Varia Historia 10.14) quotes Socrates (!) as saying that 
Indians are ‘brave and free but idle in commerce’, a description which recalls 
that of Heraclides Ponticus (F55 Wehrli) who says that Indians don’t work, 
because they are given over to tryphe. Both passages may perhaps be taken to 
imply a kind of negative honesty, in the sense that these alleged Indians are too 
lazy to rob or cheat you.
The mention of pledges and deposits prompts consideration of usury and 
rates of interest. Aelian (Varia Historia 45.1) writes: ‘The Indians do not lend 
money, nor do they have any notion of accepting a loan. For an Indian it is not 
right (themis) to commit an injustice or to be the victim of one. Hence they make 
no written contracts or deposits’ (οὐδὲ ποιοῦνται συγγραφὴν ἢ καταθήκην, a 
difficult clause to translate). The second sentence seems vapid, though perhaps 
suggesting a religious underpinning of their honest behaviour, but the key point, 
that Indians do not or should not lend at interest, is a topos of the Vedic texts.39 
Usury is also condemned in the Jatakas, though money-lending is accepted as 
an honest trade, though not one to be engaged in by Brahmins and Kshatriyas. 
38 F27 = FGrH 715F32 = Strabo 15.1.53–6.
39 Jain 1929: 3.
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A rate of 15 per cent is commonly mentioned. The Arthashastra (3.11.1–9)40 
devotes a substantial section to loans, termed ‘debt’, rina, specifying a rate of 15 
per cent on ‘normal’ transactions, but much more for commercial transactions 
(5% per month, i.e. 60% p.a.), and even more for risky travel by sea or through 
forests. The Laws of Manu also devoted a substantial section (8.140–62) to debt, 
interest and contract.
Plato regarded usury and lending at interest as undesirable and forbade them 
in his ideal society in Laws (742c). While the idea in Plato is a Utopian one, it 
may nonetheless recall what was believed to be the case in an actually existing 
society which Greeks regarded as in some ways ideal, namely India. But the 
writers either confused ideal with reality, taking a prohibition on such practice 
for members of higher castes as a general rule, or were misled by their idealisa-
tion of the barbarian. A third possibility is that they are describing old-fashioned 
Vedic-age ideas rather than the situation in the more complex societies they 
(presumably) actually encountered. Ctesias, reporting what he heard from visi-
tors to Persia,41 may be telling what those people thought ought to be the case, as 
it had been in the good old days. If Aelian is using Ctesias, then he too reflects 
practices from those good old days before Ctesias’ activity at the very end of the 
fifth century bce and in the early fourth.
Violence and non-violence
Non-violence, that most iconic of Indian practices42 (though non-Vedic, and 
associated with asceticism), is enshrined in numerous places in the Laws of Manu 
(e.g. 6.75) but is largely absent from the ethnographer Megasthenes. However, 
Onesicritus, in his account of his interview with the Naked Philosophers (F17a, 
Strabo 15.1.64), writes that Dandamis/Mandanis described Alexander as ‘the 
only philosopher in arms that he ever saw, and that it was the most useful thing in 
the world if those men were wise who have the power of persuading the willing, 
and forcing the unwilling, to learn self-control’. The two men go on to discuss 
vegetarianism, Onesicritus explaining to Mandanis that this is also a Pythagorean 
custom (because of the transmigration of souls). These hints are expanded in the 
Alexander Romance, which may be the earliest surviving Alexander text, when 
(3.6) the philosophers reply to Alexander’s question ‘What is the wickedest of 
creatures?’, that the answer is ‘Man . . . Learn from yourself the answer to that. 
You are a wild beast, and see how many other wild beasts you have with you, 
40 Rangarajan 1992: 425.
41 F45.6 and 45h; see above, note 2.
42 Chapple 1993. 
The justice of the Indians 261
to help you tear away the lives of other beasts.’ Later they ask Alexander ‘Since 
you are a mortal, why do you make so many wars?’
This passage is developed in the somewhat later Cynic diatribe, the Geneva 
papyrus,43 into an attack on meat-eating, and this in turn in the much later Life 
of the Brahmans44 by the fifth century ce author Palladius45 into an attack on 
the wild beast shows of the Roman Empire. These authors were well aware of 
Indian non-violence, and its specific manifestation as vegetarianism, as well as 
making it part of their own philosophical approach to life. It seems that this motif 
would not have developed if they had not found it expressed in the earliest Greek 
writers about India, even though the fragments we have are silent on the matter. 
The Alexander Romance appears to reflect more up-to-date information than 
Megasthenes, who describes Vedic conditions.
Drunkenness also forms part of the diatribe in Palladius, and is a major 
crime for Manu (9.235).
Marriage
Aristobulus (who travelled with Alexander) described how in Taxila the unmar-
ried daughters of poor families were shown in the market place to find husbands 
for them.46 A related tale is that of Nearchus who describes how brides may 
be won in fist-fights.47 Some historians have supposed that this is a reference 
to sale of brides, a practice explicitly forbidden by Manu (3.31), in which case 
Aristobulus would be either wrong, or evidence for a custom at odds with later 
Indian law-making. However, as Karttunen points out, ‘it seems to have been 
customary somewhere as there was the need to grant a wife’s status to women 
married in this way’, as the passage of Manu makes clear. He goes on to state that 
the custom is still alive, and quotes Sir John Marshall for the practice in parts of 
the Himalayas. However, Aristobulus does not actually say that the brides were 
purchased, unlike Herodotus in his comparable account of bride-sale in Babylon 
(1.196).
Under the heading of marriage, adultery is naturally an important issue for 
Manu (8.352), though it is unmentioned in the Greek writers except for a line in 
43 Martin 1959.
44 The naked philosophers are not actually Brahmins. Megasthenes understood this. See 
Stoneman 1995; the reference is to p. 102.
45 Ed. Berghoff 1967, Derrett 1960: 77–135. A new edition of this text will appear in 
volume III of Il Romanzo di Alessandro, ed. Richard Stoneman and Tristano Gargiulo 
(forthcoming). 
46 Aristobulus FGrH 139F42. See Karttunen 1989: 223.
47 Nearchus FGrH 133F23 = Strabo 15.1.66.
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Megasthenes48 stating that ‘the wives prostitute themselves unless they are com-
pelled to be chaste’. Widow-burning is however mentioned by Onesicritus (F21), 
who attributes it to a people called the Cathaeans, located between the rivers 
Hydaspes (Jhelum) and Acesines (Chenab). The same practice is attributed more 
generally to ‘the Indians’ by Aelian (Varia Historia 7.18).
Suicide
Suicide by fire may be mentioned here since Onesicritus (F17, end) states that 
this is normal among Brahmins who feel their end approaching, as in the case of 
the renegade Calanus who accompanied Alexander to Babylon. Philo49 regards 
this as the normal view of philosophers. Megasthenes however denies this. He 
seems right to do so, but, as I wrote in 1994, it looks as if this conflict in the 
sources reflects a genuine controversy in ancient India about suicide by fire:
Such suicide was practised by some Indian ascetics, but orthodox Hinduism [I would 
now write mainstream Brahmin opinion] would be opposed to it, and this is the view 
that Megasthenes reflects. That there were accounts of Calanus with a different ten-
dency is clear from the account in Philo which has Calanus praise suicide without 
any hint of controversiality.50
Megasthenes reflects an older state of affairs, perhaps because he talked to 
Brahmins and had his attention drawn to the Ṛgveda.
Basham (1951) makes it possible to be more precise about the nature of 
this controversy. Though Jains, for example, disapproved of suicide, a break-
away group known as the Ajivikas practised voluntary death and went so far 
as to detail forty-eight different ways of seeking death. Ajivikas were known 
for their skill in fortune-telling. Though both Jains and Ajivikas were known 
as ekadandin (‘carrying a single staff’), a word which recalls the name of 
the leader of the Naked Philosophers in the Alexander Romance, Dandamis, 
Ajivikas were regarded as ‘bad’ ascetics, because hypocritical in both diet 
and sexual matters. Much of our information about the Ajivikas comes from 
the Buddhist text, the Samannapala Sutta, which is hostile to both ascetics 
and Brahmins (not as good as Buddhists), and details the numerous forms of 
Ajivika hypocrisy.51 The conclusion to be drawn is that the Naked Philosophers 
may be Jains, or something very like them, expressing their hostility to the 
48 F27 Schwanbeck = FGrH 715F32 = Strabo 15.1.54.
49 Quod omnis probus liber 96.
50 Stoneman 1994: 505.
51 See e.g. Ling 1981: 18–22 (paras 46–61 of the Samannapala Sutta). The classic study of 
the Ajivikas (Basham 1951: 124) details their misdemeanours (as a Buddhist/Jain saw 
them).
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Ajivika Calanus, who breaks away from them to accompany Alexander (telling 
his fortune and enjoying his food) and ultimately to commit suicide in spec-
tacular fashion.
Slavery
Megasthenes says that slavery is unknown among the Indians,52 while Onesicritus 
states that it is peculiar to the Indians in the kingdom of Musicanus,53 and is just 
one aspect of the excellent government of this country. Manu however regards 
the existence of slavery as a datum, and at 8.415 specifies the seven ways in 
which slaves can be made: through warfare, out of poverty, through being born 
in a household, by purchase, by gift, by inheritance, or as a punishment.54 It looks 
as if Megasthenes’ information here is simply wrong. Romila Thapar writes:
Slavery was a recognized institution . . . Megasthenes may have been confused 
by the caste status cutting across the economic stratification. Technically, there 
was no large-scale slavery for production. Greek society made a sharp distinction 
between the freeman and the slave, which distinction was not apparent in Indian 
society. A slave in India could buy back his freedom or be voluntarily released by 
his master . . . What was immutable in Indian society was not freedom or slavery, 
but caste.55
In this case, therefore, the Greek writer seems to be imposing an idealising view 
of India on the facts, partly through misunderstanding.
Conclusion
The picture that has emerged is a complex one. Greeks regarded India as a par-
ticularly just society. In part this was due to an idealising tendency that made the 
distant people an example of Utopia, and reinforced this by finding examples of 
social equality in Indian conditions. However, the Greek writers do also provide 
evidence of legal practices and social customs resembling those described by 
the later Indian law codes, and thus have the right to be regarded as genuine 
witnesses for Indian society in the period before Alexander. Paradoxically, infor-
mation in the Alexander Romance and Onesicritus seems to be more up-to-date 
than that in either Ctesias (who preceded them but relied on non-Indian inform-
ants) or Megasthenes (who was a generation later but seems to have derived his 
52 A Utopian motif: Winiarczyk 2011: 255
53 F22, 24 and 25, Strabo 15.1.54.
54 A similar account is in Rangarajan 1992: 453. See also Ray 2000: 265–6 (non vidi).
55 Thapar 2002: 77.
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information mainly from conservative Brahmin intellectuals). The evidence of 
all these authors must be treated critically and with caution, but is not to be dis-
missed as mere idealisation. The Justice of the Indians was a reality in the fifth 
and fourth centuries bce.
17
Nietzsche on Greek and Indian philosophy
Emma Syea
This chapter aims to use Nietzsche as a prism for examining the parallels 
between ancient India and ancient Greece. As Mervyn Sprung maintains, ideas 
of Greece and India are viewed by Nietzsche very much through a ‘powerful 
Nietzschean lens’1 in that he mines these cultures for concepts, attitudes and 
Weltanschauungen which will provide him with alternatives to the life-deny-
ing Christian morality he so deplored. I would like to suggest, however, that 
the interpretations Nietzsche offers are by no means redundant. The parallels 
between ancient Indian and ancient Greek philosophy have frequently been 
noted by commentators, and various theories have been put forward to account 
for them. One prevalent theory is the idea of parallel autonomous intellectual 
development in these countries. I would like to suggest here that the genealogical 
approach Nietzsche advances in On the Genealogy of Morality (1887) comple-
ments this notion of parallel autonomous intellectual development in Greece and 
India. The genealogical method asserts that the value systems which emerge in 
societies are driven by and supported by certain physiological, psychological and 
sociological trends. There is no sole origin for values; instead we see a conjunc-
tion of diverse lines of development and a multiplicity of origins. In this way 
it seems very possible that we would see parallels between Greek and Indian 
thought if certain conditions obtained in both cultures.
In particular this chapter will examine the idea of value systems arising in 
India and Greece in part due to the emergence of city-states, and the ever present 
threat of war. Such conditions cultivated a spirit of agon (ἀγών, often translated 
as conflict, strife, competition),2 at both a personal and societal level, leading 
 1 Nietzsche’s ‘trans-European eye saw India through a powerful Nietzschean lens’ (Sprung 
1996: 83).
 2 The concept of the agon was especially prevalent amongst the Pre-Socratics, most notably 
Empedocles, Hesiod and Heraclitus. 
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to a certain set of values. The idea of conflict and agon preoccupied Nietzsche 
across his oeuvre. I would like to suggest that such themes are manifest not only 
in Greek thought – we need only think of Homer’s Iliad, Hesiod’s two Erises 
and Heraclitean strife – but also in Indian texts such as the Mahābhārata and the 
Ramayana, both of which Nietzsche was acquainted with from as early on as his 
school days.3 This chapter will: 1) examine how Nietzsche found cultures which 
he believed offered viable models of self and state; 2) suggest that these models 
were born out of an agonal context; and 3) propose that Nietzsche came to see 
‘Greek’ and ‘Indian’ as modes of being, which informed his own ideas on nor-
mativity, providing an alternative to the Christian slave morality he so despised.
Nietzsche’s project
In Human, all too Human (1878) Nietzsche declares that the defining feature of 
truly original thinkers is their ability to see the old and the familiar as though 
it were new, to look past the obvious, and to re-examine the overlooked. In the 
aphorism titled ‘Estranged from the Present’, he uses ocean metaphors to convey 
the distance he deems necessary for cultivating this ability:
There is a great advantage to be gained in distantly estranging ourselves from our 
age and for once being driven as it were away from its shores back to the ocean 
of the world-outlooks of the past. Looking back at the coast from this distance we 
command a view, no doubt for the first time, of its total configuration, and when we 
approach it again we have the advantage of understanding it better as a whole than 
those who have never left it. (HH I 616)4
Turning to other cultures – ‘das Fremde’ – provides Nietzsche with this requisite 
‘distance’.
We should note that this distance is not merely the idea of space but rather 
involves a notion of superiority. For Nietzsche nineteenth-century Germany was 
in a crisis. Around him he witnessed a stagnant, decadent society, corrupted by a 
Christian slave morality,5 which could benefit from emulating concepts belong-
 3 See Figl 1996. These epics were mentioned in a draft for a school essay on ‘the char-
acterisation of Kriemhild in the Nibelungen Song’ on 8 December 1862 (BAW 2.445 
Nachbericht). 
 4 A list of abbreviations and works by Nietzsche referred to can be found at the end of this 
chapter.
 5 Nietzsche first discusses the notion of slave morality (which is contrasted with master 
morality) in On the Genealogy of Morality. Slave morality promotes values of humility, 
patience, compassion, pity, altruism. Such a morality, according to Nietzsche, is born from 
a sense of ressentiment against those who are stronger (the masters), forcing the masters’ 
natural set of values such as ‘pride, strength, power, nobility’ to become regarded as degen-
erate and harmful. In this way slave morality is a reactive, negative morality designed to 
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ing to the vastly superior Hellas. He took ancient Greece, as did many others in 
German Philhellenist circles,6 to be the pinnacle of culture, and indeed mankind 
(although the reasons why Nietzsche praises Greece differ greatly from those 
of his Philhellenist predecessors, as I shall discuss later). Nietzsche consistently 
emphasises the alterity of Hellas from modern Germany, and sees within Greek 
culture the seeds for the regeneration of his own. In the Greeks Nietzsche found 
a ‘surplus of a wise and harmonious conduct of life’ (HH II 173).
Ancient India too held many admirable traits for Nietzsche. Upon reading 
the Laws of Manu the Brahmins emerged in his eyes as ‘a species of human 
being a hundred times more gentle and rational’ than the oppressive Christian 
slave morality with its ‘sick house and dungeon atmosphere’ (TI, ‘The Improvers 
of Mankind’, 3). As Scheiffele suggests, unlike the eighteenth century with its 
concept of the ‘Noble Savage’, Nietzsche does not value ‘alien cultures because 
of their close ties with nature, their “primordality”, or because they were morally 
unspoiled’. Instead, he admired them for what he perceived as an ‘intellectual, 
artistic, and practical superiority’.7
Viewing Germany from the Greek or Indian standpoint provides Nietzsche 
with what he calls a ‘pathos of distance’.8 These cultures offered vitalising models 
of the self and the state which he believed would pave the way for cultural dom-
inance and lay the foundations for a strong German identity. Contrasting them 
level out natural differences in society. Nietzsche views slave forms of morality as inimical 
to the flourishing of Kultur and art. 
 6 German Philhellenism reached its peak in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and 
went hand in hand with a resurgence in Neo-Classicism. Art historians such as Johann 
Winckelmann and Gotthold Lessing idealised fifth-century classical Greek art and architec-
ture, with Winckelmann coining the phrase ‘edle Einfalt, stille Größe’, ‘noble simplicity, 
quiet grandeur’, to capture the spirit of Hellenic art. Jacob Burckhardt later offered a very 
different interpretation of classical Greece and evoked a more violent, cruel image of Greek 
society. 
 7 Scheiffele 1996: 42.
 8 BGE 25: ‘Every enhancement so far in the type “man” has been the work of an aristocratic 
society – and that is how it will be, again and again, since this sort of society believes in 
a long ladder of rank order and value distinctions between men, and in some sense needs 
slavery. Without the pathos of distance as it grows out of the ingrained differences between 
stations, out of the way the ruling caste maintains an overview and keeps looking down on 
subservient types and tools, and out of this caste’s equally continuous exercise in obeying 
and commanding, in keeping away and below – without this pathos, that other, more mys-
terious pathos could not have grown at all, that demand for new expansions of distance 
within the soul itself, the development of states that are increasingly high, rare, distant, 
tautly drawn and comprehensive, and in short, the enhancement of the type “man”, the 
constant “self-overcoming of man” (to use a moral formula in a supra-moral sense).’ 
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with the life-denying, nay-saying Christian culture9 he perceived in Germany 
allows him to reinforce his attack against Christianity and to acquire a greater 
self-knowledge – he is ‘looking back at his own from the respective counterpo-
sitions’.10 Greece and India are therefore enlisted by Nietzsche in his polemical 
project. Consequently his primary concern is not to offer the most accurate or 
faithful readings of the texts. Having begun his career as a philologist, Nietzsche 
was very well acquainted with the Greek texts. In the case of the Indian texts, 
however, his knowledge is far from extensive. Much of it is second-hand from 
figures such as Schopenhauer and Paul Deussen,11 and more often than not, he 
makes use of poor translations, for example Louis Jacolloit’s Les législateurs 
religieux. Manou, Moïse, Mahomet (1876).12 He is therefore prone to making 
broad generalisations on the basis of insufficient knowledge, and is at times 
somewhat cavalier with his use of the texts, compiling quotations from the orig-
inals and composing them into one single quotation to intensify his argument. 
Essentially Nietzsche plays fast and loose with the sources.
This is not say, however, that the interpretations he offers should be dis-
missed. Nietzsche may make use of Greece and India primarily for advancing his 
critique of the ideas of his own time, but he often hits upon crucial similarities, 
and there is a certain intuitiveness in some of his insights into these cultures. At 
times, he identifies, as it were, the spirit rather than the letter of the concepts that 
arise in these cultures.
The state
Perhaps the most obvious (and impressive) parallel Nietzsche saw in Greece and 
India was the idea of the aristocratic state. According to Nietzsche, the effica-
cious society is the artistic society; it is through art that we measure and assess a 
culture. It is paramount that the artistic individuals – the so-called ‘higher types’ 
– should be permitted to flourish. In his unpublished essay ‘The Greek State’ 
(1871/2) Nietzsche declares that: ‘in order for there to be a broad, deep, fertile 
soil for the development of art, the overwhelming majority has to be slavishly 
subjected to life’s necessity in the service of the minority’ (GSt 166). The pyram-
idal structure of the aristocratic society, whereby, through rigid stratification, 
the bottom stratum enables the elite to prosper, is therefore highly desirable. For 
 9 Nietzsche consistently emphasises the idea that Christian morality ‘encouraged man to 
consider himself even blacker and more evil than is actually the case’ (HH I: 124).
10 Scheiffele 1996: 42.
11 For example Deussen 1883. 
12 For discussion relating to this problematic translation see Etter 1987: 340–52 and Smith 
2004: 37–56. 
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Nietzsche, the model of the Greek polis, as envisaged by Plato in the Republic, 
was the sine qua non of the Greeks’ creative achievements:
Plato’s perfect state . . . the actual aim of the state, the Olympian existence and 
constantly renewed creation and preparation of the genius, compared with whom 
everyone else is just a tool, aid, and facilitator, is discovered here through poetic 
intuition and described vividly. (GSt 173)
Similarly the caste system outlined in the Laws of Manu greatly appealed to 
Nietzsche. In The Anti-Christ (1895) he states that ‘to draw up a law book such 
as Manu means to permit oneself to get the upper hand, to become perfection, 
to be ambitious of the highest art of living’ (A 57). This is because the divisions 
of the four varnas in Manu (from lowest rank to highest: the Sudras [labourers 
and service providers], the Vaishyas [merchants, agriculturists, artisans], the 
Kshatriyas [warriors and kings], and the Brahmins [priests and scholars]) safe-
guard ‘the higher types’.
In both the Republic and the Laws of Manu every individual has to perform 
the function best suited to their nature, with each stratum having its own particu-
lar obligations and rights. This principle of specialisation facilitates a division 
of labour to ensure the smooth running of the state, and ensures that the various 
classes within society remain in fixed relations of power and influence. The 
divisions are sustained and sanctioned by Noble Lies.13 In the Republic Socrates 
adduces the ‘myth of the metals’, whilst in the Laws of Manu a reference to the 
Puruṣa myth in the Vedic ‘Hymn to Creation’ is made.14 Both these Noble Lies 
propagate the view that despite the partitions in society, there is ultimate unity. 
Socrates is careful to make mention of the fact that the citizens of the polis are 
‘all akin’ and ‘brothers’, whilst the Puruṣa myth sees all the varnas spring from 
the same fundamental material via the dismemberment of the divine primor-
dial being. Through reference to the divine, these divisions are grounded in an 
unquestionable authority and individuals are seen to serve a higher purpose, 
thereby strengthening the model, and sugaring the pill which the lower divisions 
must swallow.
The Laws of Manu go a step further than Plato by implying that these 
13 In The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche highlights art’s restorative properties and terms it ‘the 
great enabler of the possibility of life’, ‘the great seducer to life’ – without it life would be 
rendered unbearable. The myths and legislation which constitute the Republic and Manu’s 
Noble Lies ennoble and justify any suffering encountered in the state, providing us with 
a clear illustration of why, for Nietzsche, art is worth more than truth: cf. KSA 11.587, 
13.194.
14 Radhakrishnan and Moore 1957: 1.31: ‘But for the sake of the prosperity of the worlds he 
caused the Brahmana, the Kshatriya, the Vaisya, and the Sudra to proceed from his mouth, 
his arms, his thighs, and his feet.’
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 societal divisions have an ontological status – the varnas are quasi-biological: 
‘he was created by the Self-existent to be the slave of a brahmin’ (414); ‘a 
sudra, though emancipated by his master, is not released from servitude; since 
that is innate in him, who can set him free from it?’ (415). As Nietzsche puts it 
in The Anti-Christ: ‘Caste-order . . . is just the sanction of a natural order’ (A 
57). In this way Manu appears to be closer to Aristotle in the Politics when he 
suggests that an individual’s societal role is determined by his inherent nature: 
‘from the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for 
rule’ (1254a22–3). For Aristotle social status has a biological basis and neces-
sarily cannot be altered. Unlike the Republic, which does allow for some social 
mobility – Socrates observes that on occasions a golden child may be born from 
a silver parent, and in that event rulers should give such a child ‘the position in 
society his nature deserves’ (415b) – Aristotle does not allow for any promotion 
within the classes. Similarly Manu explicitly bans any miscegenation between 
varnas, effectively breeding individuals for their assigned societal roles, thereby 
preserving the purity of the higher castes.
What Nietzsche admires in these models of the state is the acknowledge-
ment of the fundamental heterogeneity of individuals comprising the state; 
difference is not denied and there are no attempts to level mankind. This is 
in line with his theory of ‘types’ whereby individuals are classified accord-
ing to their  psycho-physical constitution. Additionally an individual’s type will 
determine the values he adopts. In this way Nietzsche denies any fundamental 
parity amongst men. Furthermore we see an active promotion of these intrinsic 
differences via the ordering of society, or Rangordnung as Nietzsche terms it. 
In On the Genealogy of Morality Nietzsche maintains that in societies with a 
clear Rangordnung, the values which will be generated will be so-called ‘noble’ 
values – values of strength, power, pride – all of which he contrasts with the 
weaker ‘slave’ values such as humility and sympathy, espoused by Christianity. 
This is because those belonging to the highest ranked class – the so-called 
‘noble’ types – are permitted to cultivate a positive sense of self, feel themselves 
to be superior to the other classes, and subsequently propagate their own values. 
The Rangordnung facilitated by aristocratic societies is, according to Nietzsche, 
the sole reason for the cultural achievements of these societies, and is that which 
allows the higher types to flourish: ‘every enhancement so far in the type “man” 
has been the work of an aristocratic society’ (BGE 257).
The agonal context
Something which particularly preoccupied Nietzsche was the fact that Greek 
city-states often existed against a background of bellum omnium contra omnes 
(‘the war of all against all’). War was a structural component in these societies, 
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and something which was reflected at a personal, societal and cosmic level. 
Regarding Greece, the prevailing Philhellenist view at the time held by figures 
such as Johann Winckelmann painted a picture of a beautified Hellas, which 
encompassed spiritual nobility, clarity, composure, self-restraint and harmony. 
This Neo-Classical idea was encapsulated by the leitmotiv ‘edle Einfalt, stille 
Größe’ (noble simplicity, calm grandeur). Following Jacob Burckhardt, who 
characterised the polis as a città dolente (a city of pain), Nietzsche proposed 
a revaluation of Greece and emphasised its agonal spirit, championing Sparta 
over Athens. He glorified ‘the bloody jealousy of one town for another . . . this 
murderous greed of those petty wars, the tiger-like triumph over the corpse of the 
slain enemy’ (GSt 169), and accentuated conflict and disunity rather than central-
isation and stability. The Hellas depicted by Winckelmann and his  followers – a 
serene, moderate and harmonious Hellas – was, according to Nietzsche, a gross 
misrepresentation. The fact that the poleis were in constant competition with each 
other and that war often seemed more prevalent than peace was an inescapable 
factor for Nietzsche in assessing ancient Greece. As Porter notes: ‘the back-
ground that ultimately matters to him is not metaphysical but anthropological 
and cultural; and the violence of the politics is only one of the arenas in which the 
ramifications of cultural violence make themselves felt’.15 Heidegger’s assertion 
that Nietzsche was ‘the discoverer of the Greeks’ demonstrates how he moved 
away from seeing the Greeks as a product of ‘cheerfulness’,16 à la Winckelmann 
et al., and instead proposed that their philosophy came into being through an 
excess of the agonistic cultural sphere.
In Greece war was considered not only as a way of life, but as a means 
of bringing out the best in men; victory was seen as an expression of manly 
excellence.17 In the Rhetoric Aristotle declares: ‘victory is pleasant too, not only 
for those who are competitive, but for everyone; for there arises a sense (phan-
tasia) of superiority, for which everyone has a passion, whether less or more’ 
(1371b14–15). War was thus seen to elevate the entire polis, allowing both the 
individual and the state to forge a strong identity born out of this feeling of supe-
riority. It was precisely this sense of superiority which Nietzsche pinpointed as 
the driving force behind Greece’s cultural achievements. And he saw war as the 
necessary catalyst. In ‘The Greek State’ he explicitly refers to the relationship 
between war and culture:
this mysterious connection . . . between the state and art, political greed and artistic 
creation, battlefield and work of art . . . the concentrated effect of that bellum, turned 
15 Porter 2000: 142.
16 Luchte 2011: 16.
17 Tritle 2007.
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inwards, gives society time to germinate and turn green everywhere, so that it can let 
the radiant blossoms of genius sprout forth as soon as warmer days come. (GSt 170)
And in a notebook of 1887 he proposes that ‘a dominating race can only grow 
up out of terrible and violent beginnings’.18 In this way we can see how he draws 
on Heraclitus’ claim that ‘war is father of all and king of all’ (22 DK B53), 
viewing it as a fundamentally productive phenomenon. Moreover in Human, 
all too Human, he calls for Germany to exercise its own destructive urges: ‘the 
present-day Europeans require not merely war but the greatest and most terrible 
wars – thus temporary relapses into barbarism – if the means to culture are not 
to deprive them of their culture and of their existence itself’ (HH I 477). The 
war he speaks of is not a physical war, but a cultural war against the decadence 
and Christian slave morality he saw prevailing in Germany; instead he hopes to 
reinstate the agonal, virile, noble values of the ancients.
If we turn to ancient India, a similar social context and cultural attitude 
to war can be seen. Reception of Indian philosophy in the West has, for the 
most part, tended to focus on the rejection of violence, with texts such as the 
Buddhist darśana – in this way we have come to associate Indian philosophy 
with quietism and pacifism. But of course this says nothing about the reality of 
peace and war. Just like the Greek poleis, city-states in India fought for power 
and control. According to Unto Tähtinen, in ancient India ‘peace is merely the 
interval between two wars . . . war is a permanent institution’.19 This is reflected 
in the Sanskrit term for peace, shanti, which has several nuances. As Salomon 
suggests,20 the sense in which it would approximate to the English ‘peace’ – i.e. 
with connotations of ‘welfare, prosperity, good fortune, ease, happiness, com-
fort, bliss, concord, cordiality’ – is not its most customary meaning. Instead, 
rather than referring to external circumstances, shanti relates to inner states of 
mind or spirit such as the calmness of mind, absence of passion, averting of pain, 
indifference to objects of pleasure or pain, alleviation, cessation, abatement, 
extinction. Shanti then, is far more concerned with inner peace than outer peace, 
perhaps suggesting that the latter is not the norm. Moreover such an inner peace 
created ideal Kshatriyas (warriors/kings), with a strong sense of self-control and 
clarity of mind – both important qualities for military strategy and combat.
Moral codes
Given the caste divisions in the Indian city-states, and the perception of such 
divisions as being natural, and divinely ordained, it follows that there would be 
18 WP 868: November 1887–March 1888.
19 Tähtinen 1976: 91–2.
20 Salomon 2007: 58.
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no universal code of conduct pervading the state. Instead moral codes emerge 
which are specific to these castes.
This can be seen with the caste specific notion of dharma (a notoriously 
difficult term to translate – connotations include virtues, principles, duties, all 
of which determine a person’s relationship to (a) himself/herself, (b) the gods, 
and (c) the cosmos).21 The struggle we see in the Bhagavad Gītā between uni-
versal dharma which dictates that one should not kill, and svadharma which is 
caste-specific and holds that Arjuna, as a Kshatriya, ought to fight and kill in 
order to fulfil his dharma, illustrates the more nuanced understanding of moral 
codes present in Indian thought. Dharma and adharma, ‘that which is not in 
accordance with the dharma’, are relative terms – one person’s dharma may be 
another person’s sin. There is no Manichaeism here. In this way we can see how 
this would tie in with Nietzsche’s theory of types. Given that he believed there 
was no universality amongst men due to the presence of types, a universal code 
of morality is unrealistic and inappropriate. As Leiter (2002) suggests, Nietzsche 
claims that, like nutrients, values can also be good or bad (nutritional or non-nu-
tritional, even harmful) for different types of people, depending on their nature. 
The relativity of dharma according to castes in Indian thought would therefore 
have greatly appealed to him.
Similarly in Greece there evolved a code of conduct and a set of virtues 
achievable only by certain types. If these normative standards are not met, 
just as the Kshatriya risks accumulating adharma, so the Homeric hero risks 
incurring shame, aidos. Crucially, Homeric ethics revolves around – as the 
Spartan Tyrtaeus puts it – ‘the man good in war’.22 Courage is highly prized and 
deemed necessary for the common good along with a respect for one’s enemy. 
As Konstan (2007) highlights, there is a clear distinction between a polemios (a 
‘military enemy’) and an ekhthros (a ‘personal enemy’), which comes from the 
noun ‘ekhthra’ meaning ‘enmity’. It is only with the former, a polemios, that 
warfare should be conducted. In the Iliad, after a duel, it is not hatred which 
Hector displays towards Ajax but rather noble courtesy and respect:
21 This notion of dharma as being specific to caste and as something to which individuals 
must strictly adhere is best exemplified in the Bhagavad Gītā where Arjuna and Krishna 
discuss the duties of the Kshatriya caste, and how contravening these duties would amount 
to gathering karmic demerit. 
22 ‘This is courage, this is the finest possession of men, the noblest prize that a young man can 
win. This is the common good for the city and for all the people, when a man stands firm 
and remains unmoved in the front of the rank and forgets all thought of disgraceful flight, 
steeling his spirit and heart to endure, and with words encourages the man standing beside 
him. This is the man good in war’ (Tyrtaeus fr. 12.13–20 West).
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Come then, let us give each other glorious presents, so that any of the Achaians or 
Trojans may say of us: ‘These two fought each other in heart-consuming strife, then 
joined with each other in close friendship, before they were parted.’ (Il. 7.299–302; 
trans. Lattimore)
We may see this reflected in Nietzsche’s claim in Ecce Homo (1908) that: ‘equal-
ity before the enemy: the first presupposition of an honest duel. Where one sees 
something beneath oneself, one has no business waging war’ (EH ‘Why I am so 
wise’ 7), so emotions such as contempt or pity should not feature.23 That one may 
only engage in warfare with one’s equals where mutual respect exists is indica-
tive of the presence of different types of men within the state.
The focus on the moral codes of the warrior classes present in both Greek and 
Indian texts suggests that not only was conflict seen as a normal feature of life; it 
was also exalted as ‘an instrument of policy and a means of releasing heroic and 
praiseworthy human qualities’.24 The warrior classes are venerated. In Plato’s 
Republic only the philosopher-kings are placed a class above the Guardians; 
similarly in the Laws of Manu, the Kshatriyas are only superseded in importance 
by the intellectual and priestly Brahmins. Society looks to the Guardians and the 
Kshatriyas as defenders of the state. With their high-ranking position in society 
comes a strict code of conduct or dharma. In the Mahābhārata (2.59.11) it is 
made clear that ‘honest men carry on war without crookedness or cunning’ – we 
can see here that there is a strong element of honour that goes along with con-
ducting warfare. In Salya Parva it is stated that if a Kshatriya is killed in battle, 
‘there is great merit in it’. Similarly there is great sin if he flies from the field. Just 
like the champions in Greek epics like the Iliad, the main ‘heroes’ in the Indian 
epics are warriors engaging in warfare, providing us with laudable exemplars. 
The values of these exemplars are explicitly cultivated in the context of warfare.
In both Greece and India moral codes were forged (a) out of perceived nat-
ural differences amongst individuals, and (b) against a background of war and 
conflict. For Nietzsche, both the content and the context that generated these 
moralities were infinitely superior to those of a Christian slave-based morality. 
These ancient moralities acknowledged and promoted natural differences, har-
23 Cf. Acampora 2013: 19: ‘One can defeat an opponent in at least two ways: either by 
summoning a superlative performance from oneself, thereby winning by surpassing one’s 
opposition, or by diminishing the capacities of one’s opponent, thereby undercutting his 
excellence and overcoming by diminishing one’s opposition. An effect of the latter is 
to lower the bar for what stands as the best.’ Emotions such as contempt or pity would 
amount to the latter method, by diminishing both the enemy and oneself. In The Anti-Christ 
Nietzsche appears scathing about pity: ‘pity stands in antithesis to the tonic emotions which 
enhance the energy of the feeling or life: it has a depressive effect. One loses force when 
one pities . . . it preserves what is ripe for destruction’ (A 7). 
24 Derrett 1961: 143–4.
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nessed these differences to create efficient and cohesive states, and promulgated 
‘noble’ values based on strength and superiority. That these moralities were born 
out of conflict and agon is for Nietzsche central to their appeal.
The self
The idea of conflict also infiltrates the model of the self in Greece and India. It 
is noticeable that in both cultures the image of the chariot is used to depict the 
self – we need only think of Plato’s Phaedrus or the Kaṭha Upaniṣad (see 
the contributions by Forte and Smith, Magnone and Schlieter in this volume). 
Such an image provides us with a useful metaphor to illustrate the composite 
nature of the psyche and the ātman; in both the Greek and Indian traditions we 
see the soul being divided up into parts relating to reason, appetite and spirit. 
In all individuals these various parts vie for control but in the ideal individual 
the more contemplative, cognitive aspect will prevail and maintain order in the 
psychological economy: i.e. the driver must control and steer the chariot. The 
chariot also appears in the Iliad and the Ṛgveda as an emblem of power and a 
vehicle of battle; the choice of an instrument of war to represent the self is surely 
noteworthy.
Such depictions of the self may be aligned with some of Nietzsche’s views 
on the self; he envisages the self as a plurality of ‘drives’ and ‘affects’ which 
must be continuously ordered into a hierarchy. In Beyond Good and Evil he pro-
poses that the soul is a ‘social structure of the drives and affects’ (BGE 12), and 
in Human, all too Human he declares ‘the self has become, not an individuum, 
but a dividuum, an “oligarchy”, “a multiplicity” where the drives or affects are 
continually competing with and against each other leading to a dynamic state of 
continual change’ (HH I 57). Here we can see how the composite nature of the 
self present in Greek and Indian thought would appeal to him. Crucially we also 
witness how the agon is turned inwards with this idea of aspects of the self com-
peting against one another: ‘the highest man would have the greatest multiplicity 
of drives, in the relatively greatest strength that can be endured. Indeed, where 
the plant “man” shows himself strongest one finds instincts that conflict power-
fully (e.g. in Shakespeare), but are controlled’ (WP 966; cf. BGE 212, TI 9).25 
The notion of gaining mastery over this plurality of drives is therefore paramount 
for Nietzsche; the individual must be able to exercise control over the drives in 
25 The idea that the drives occur in their strongest form is also crucial – we can relate this to 
the model of agon and recall that the noble man must always seek his strongest opponent. 
Here Zarathustra’s recommendation, ‘for the worthier enemy, O my friends, you shall save 
yourselves; therefore you must pass much by’ (Z II 12.21), suggests that the greater the 
challenge, the more worthy the contest.
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the sense of ‘giving style to one’s character’, as is suggested in The Gay Science 
(1882).26 The competing drives must be moulded into a hierarchy, and arranged 
into configurations such that the individual will be able to flourish. The chariot 
metaphor is therefore apt to capture Nietzsche’s understanding of the conflictual 
nature of the individual: for Nietzsche, man is nothing more than ‘dissonance’.27 
Thus, aligning the individual with something which experiences warfare and 
which requires a skilful mastery goes hand in hand with his interpretation of the 
self.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it seems that the agonal spirit Nietzsche hits upon in his interpre-
tations of ancient Greece, and the importance he attaches to the role of conflict 
within the culture, could also be extended to ancient India. In this way factoring 
in conditions such as warfare amongst the city-states, through a genealogical 
method, can be a useful way of explaining an autonomous parallel intellectual 
development in Greece and India. Understanding the models of the self and 
ideas on normativity which emerge in Greece and India against this background 
of conflict provide us with an insight into the Weltanschauung of these two cul-
tures. For Nietzsche such a Weltanschauung appears far superior to the attitudes 
prevailing in nineteenth-century Germany, and makes the failings of Christian-
based morality with its misconceptions regarding the nature of man all the 
more acute. In this way he considers ‘Greek’ and ‘Indian’ as modes of being28 
– identifiable with certain outlooks, codes of values and ways of assessing and 
implementing these codes. Such modes of being are, according to Nietzsche, 
conducive to higher types and a vibrant, virile Kultur.
26 Unlike the Greek and Indian models, Nietzsche does not wish to privilege reason or con-
scious thought in the mental economy. 
27 ‘If we could imagine dissonance become man – and what else is man?’ (BT 25). In this way 
the self appears as a scaled-down Heraclitean cosmos – cf. Heraclitus 22 DK B10: ‘Couples 
are things whole and not whole, what is drawn together and what is drawn asunder, the 
harmonious and discordant. The one is made up of all things, and all things issue from the 
one.’
28 Nietzsche seems to use terms like ‘orientally’, ‘Indian’ or ‘Greek’ in such a manner that a 
mode of being or thinking is suggested: ‘I must learn to think more orientally about philos-
ophy and knowledge. Oriental [Morgenländischer] overview of Europe’, (notebook from 
1884: KSA 11, 26 [317]); ‘I fear that we do not understand these people in a sufficiently 
“Greek” way, indeed, that we would shudder were we to understand them for once in a 
genuinely Greek way’ (HC 175; in KSA 1 783–92); ‘so patient do I become, so happy, so 
Indian, so settled’ (CW I: i). 
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Kaṭha Upaniṣad (KaU), 198–200
Parmenides, 188, 189–90, 190–1, 192, 195
Phaedrus, 178–80
chariot metaphors, 8, 168–9, 171–2, 176–83, 
202–3, 275–6
anthropo-therio-technological metaphor, 176–83
chariot of the soul, 80–1
chariots of the sun, 174–6
historical dependency or coevolution, 183–5, 
188 









code of conduct, 273, 274







concentration, 89, 101, 102
conceptual metaphor theory, 29, 169–72
conflict, 266, 274; see also war





Cornford, F. M., 71–2n, 74n
cosmic order, 5, 83–4
cosmic rite of passage, 9
cosmogony, 5, 23–4, 60–5, 74–9
cosmology, 5, 44, 45, 46–50, 60–5, 85–6, 86n





cows, 30–2, 33–4, 35–6
body parts, 37–9
Coxon, A. H., 144–5
Cratylus, 214
creation myths, 46–7
cross-cultural contacts, 2, 150–3
Index 305





dawn, 30, 31, 32
death, 69–70
deity see divinity; gods
deluge myth, 152–3
dēmiourgos, 79, 83
Descartes, R., 7, 29, 136, 137, 141













divinity, 53, 80, 82, 83, 126, 155





Dumézil, G., 3, 12–13, 20
dynamic principle of order, 47
early Buddhism, 6
earth, 23, 24
Ecce Homo (Nietzsche), 274





elements, 23–4, 26, 45, 73, 245
Empedocles
chariot imagery, 192, 193
cosmology, 44, 45












ethicisation theory, 9, 221–5, 233











fire, 23, 24, 30, 32–3, 37, 200–1





















God, 239n, 244; see also divinity; monism
god of the sun, 175
gods, 120, 243
and the brahman, 129
in chariot allegory, 155
in chariot imagery, 178, 179
in chariot metaphors, 175
and cosmogony, 75
and immortality, 107–8, 122
River God, 15




goodness, 72–3, 78, 82–3







violence and non-violence, 260–1
Greek language, 12
‘Greek State, The’ (Nietzsche), 268–9, 271–2
Gren-Eklund, G., 67n
guṇas, 22
harmonia, 4, 40, 48–9, 51–2, 73




similarities between ṛtá and, 43
306 Index
harmony, 41, 53, 73, 79, 82, 83
Havelock, E. A., 28
Heesterman, J. C., 205, 216
Helios, 175









hidden harmonia, 47, 52
higher mind, 90
highest knowledge, 120–1, 127
historical documentation, 151







Hsüan Ts’ang see Xuan Zang
Human, all too Human (Nietzsche), 266–7, 272, 
275
human souls, 108–9, 154, 155, 178–9, 222





chariot imagery, 9, 188–9, 190, 191–2, 193, 195
Gabii, 252
harmonia, 41
Ilievski, P. H., 41n
Ilya, 16, 18–19
imaginary experiment, 223, 225
immortal self see ātman
immortal souls, 125n, 180
immortality, 6, 107n
Chāndogya Upaniṣad (ChU), 84
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